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ABSTRACT 
The importance of privacy lies in the fact that it represents the very idea of human dignity or 
the preservation of the ‘inner sanctum’. Not surprisingly, however, operational concerns of 
employers and technological developments combine continuously to challenge the 
preservation of privacy in the workplace. Employees the world over are exposed to numerous 
privacy invasive measures, including drug testing, psychological testing, polygraph testing, 
genetic testing, psychological testing, electronic monitoring and background checks. Hence, 
the issue at the heart of this dissertation is to determine to what extent privacy is protected in 
the South African workplace given advancements in technology and the implications (if any) 
for the right to privacy as such.  
A secondary aim of the dissertation is to attempt to provide a realistic balance between the 
privacy concerns of employees and the operational needs of employers in this technological 
age. As such the main focus of dissertation falls within the sphere of employment law. In 
order to provide an answer to the research issue discussed above, the dissertation addresses 
five ancillary or interrelated issues. First, the broad historical development of the legal 
protection of privacy is traced and examined. Second, a workable definition of privacy is 
identified with reference to academic debate and comparative legislative and judicial 
developments. Third, those policies and practices, which would typically threaten privacy in 
the employment sphere are identified and briefly discussed. Fourth, a detailed evaluation of 
the tension between privacy and a number of selected policies and practices in selected 
countries is provided. More specifically, the dissertation considers how these policies and 
practices challenge privacy, the rationale for their existence and, if applicable, how these 
policies and practices – if necessary through appropriate regulation – may be accommodated 
while simultaneously accommodating both privacy and the legitimate concerns of employers. 
The selection of these practices and policies is guided by two considerations. At the first level 
the emphasis is on those challenges to privacy, which can be traced back to technological 
developments and which, as such, foster new and unique demands to the accommodation of 
privacy in the workplace. The secondary emphasis is on those policies, which are 
representative of the fundamental challenges created by new technologies to privacy.  
To effectively address the above issues the dissertation uses the traditional legal methodology 
associated with comparative legal research, which includes a literature review of applicable 
law and legal frame work and a review of relevant case law and a comparative study of 
selected foreign jurisdictions.
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CHAPTER 1:  
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 RESEARCH PROBLEM 
The issue that constitutes the heart of this research is the extent to which 
advancements in technology impact on the protection of privacy in the workplace and 
the implications (if any) thereof for the right to privacy.   
In order to determine this core issue, four ancillary and interrelated issues are 
addressed in this dissertation. The first ancillary issue relates to the broad historical 
development of the legal protection of privacy. The issue is addressed by focusing on 
the social conditions that have influenced the development of the legal protection of 
privacy and examining how early societies dealt with the notion and concept of 
privacy as it is known today. In addition, the gradual and somewhat laboured 
development of privacy protection from early times to present times is traced. 
The identification of a workable definition of privacy comprises the second ancillary 
issue that is addressed in this dissertation. In doing so, reference is made to the 
extensive academic literature on the concept and value of privacy. In addition, the 
views of both proponents and critics of the notion of privacy are subjected to critical 
analysis.  
The third ancillary issue to be addressed in the dissertation is the identification of 
workplace policies and practices of employers that typically threaten or place pressure 
on the notion of privacy in the employment sphere and the extent to which these 
policies and practices impact on the right to privacy in the workplace.  
The fourth and final ancillary issue entails a detailed evaluation of the tension 
between privacy and a number of selected policies and practices. The selection of 
these practices and policies is guided by two primary considerations: 
a) the primary emphasis is on those challenges to privacy that arise from 
technological developments and that, as such, place new and unique demands 
on the accommodation of privacy in the workplace; 
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b) a secondary focus is on those policies and practices that are representative of 
the fundamental challenges created by new technologies to privacy, such as 
genetic testing and e-mail/Internet monitoring. 
Today, the rationale for the protection of privacy is not only widely accepted, but also 
extensively protected through a combination of international instruments, domestic 
constitutions, legislation, and, where applicable, the common law. This state of affairs 
belies the preceding, long and incremental struggle towards the legal protection of 
privacy that can be traced back to 1361, when the Justices of the Peace Act in England 
provided for the detention and arrest of peeping toms and eavesdroppers.1 Up until the 
Second World War, privacy protection existed on an ad hoc basis through the 
application of existing legal principles such as the principles of the inviolability or the 
sanctity of the home and the secrecy of communications. In 1766, for example, the 
Swedish Parliament enacted the “Access to Public Records Act”, requiring that all 
state held information be used solely for legitimate purposes. This Swedish law 
granted public access to government documents and upheld a principle known as 
offentlighetsprincipen (the principle of publicity) which was incorporated into the 
Swedish Constitution.2 Consequently the eighteenth century was marked by a handful 
of countries enacting laws providing remedies for specific violations of privacy. The 
laws protected private property, personal and domestic affairs and state held 
information. However, none of these laws provided for a general right to privacy and 
privacy protection at this stage was largely protected on an ad hoc basis using existing 
law. That having been said there was growing awareness in legal circles that privacy 
had to be more than just a rule, but a protected right however a pronounced protection 
of privacy was only experienced at the end of the Second World War. The end of the 
Second World War and knowledge of the atrocities committed during this war 
resulted in increased awareness of the need to protect human rights, including the 
right to privacy, leading to concerted efforts to protect these international rights at an 
international and regional level through the adoption of various covenants3 such as 
                                               
1
 Michael Privacy and Human Rights: An International and Comparative Study, with Special Reference 
to Developments in Information Technology (1994) 15. 
2Supra. 
3Craig Privacy and Employment Law (1999) 5. 
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International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights4 (“ICCPR”). As far as privacy 
protection is concerned, the early 1970s saw the incorporation or induction of the 
norms and principles established by the various covenants into national legal systems 
through the enactment of domestic privacy legislation.5 Today a large number of 
countries recognise the right to privacy explicitly or implicitly in their constitutions. 
Although the constitutional provisions differ from country to country, at the 
minimum, these provisions include rights of the inviolability of the home and 
inviolability of communications.6 Moreover, some countries such as South Africa 
include in their protection of privacy specific rights to access and control of one’s 
personal information.7 Even in those countries such as Ireland, the United States and 
India, where the Constitution is silent on the issue of the protection of privacy, the 
courts have imputed the protection of privacy from other constitutional rights.  
1.2 HYPOTHESES 
The research into the development of privacy protection revealed three significant 
realities with regard to right to privacy. First, the right to privacy remains an elusive 
concept, resulting in much debate and confusion. Not only is privacy difficult to 
define8 but according to some commentators the difficulty with accurately defining 
privacy has also played a role in undermining its value and usefulness and has further 
impeded its effective legal protection.9 Second, the fact that  privacy has multiple 
meanings and therefore takes diverse forms means that a sense of what is private and 
what should be kept private differs from society to society. This means that privacy 
will have different consequences in different situations.10 For this reason privacy as a 
concept is neither eternal nor universal, but rather a relative and contextual concept.11 
Third, the biggest continuous threat to privacy in the workplace remains 
developments in science and technology notwithstanding the fact that it has been 
                                               
4Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by the General Assembly of the United 
Nations resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966, entry into force March 23 1976.  
5
 Michael Privacy and Human Rights: An International and Comparative Study, with Special Reference 
to Developments in Information Technology (1994) 4. 
6Supra. 
7Section 14 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996. 
8Posner “Privacy, Secrecy and Reputation” (1979) 28 Buffalo Law Review 1 3. 
9
 Wacks Privacy: Volume I The Concept of Privacy (1993) xii. 
10
 Solove “Conceptualizing Privacy” (2002) 90 California Law Review1099 1132. 
11
 See Gutwirth Privacy and the Information Age (2002) 29 and Whitman “The Two Western Cultures 
of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty” (2004) 113 Yale Law Journal  1151 1153.  
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more than 100 years since two American lawyers, Warren and Brandeis observed that 
“the intensity and complexity of life and modern enterprise and invention ripened the 
time for the courts and judges to redefine the nature of personal rights to protect 
appearance, sayings acts and …personal relations, domestic or otherwise.”12In this 
regard Warren and Brandeis further suggested that the law should recognise a right to 
“an inviolate personality” that would protect “thoughts, emotions and 
sensations…whether expressed in writing or in conduct, in conversation, in attitudes, 
or in facial expression.”13 
Present day advancements in technology and science make the recognition and 
protection of the right to privacy even more urgent. It is arguable that the rationale for 
the protection of privacy finds its most direct application in the employment sphere – 
a sphere where many employees spend most of their lives. The rationale for the 
protection of privacy in the workplace denotes the retention by the employee of a 
sense of autonomy, dignity and well being in the workplace. It may further be linked 
to the existence of the elements of good faith, trust, respect and loyalty within the 
employment relationship, recognised as such by the contractual basis of any 
employment relationship. Privacy in employment further ensures that the individual is 
free from conformist pressure and able to develop of fresh ideas, beliefs and attitudes 
which are pivotal to industrial pluralism.14 
In contrast, those who oppose the need to protect privacy in the workplace, endeavour 
to justify curtailing employee privacy for the following reasons: 
a) the improvement of economic conditions; 
b) the need to protect the health and safety of workers, consumers and the public;  
c) the need to deter and control employee abuse of the employment relationship;  
d) the obligation to comply with legislation; and 
e) the promotion of public interest.15 
                                               
12Warren and Brandeis “The Right to Privacy” 1890 Harvard Law Review 193 196. According to the 
authors, “(t)he intensity and complexity of life attendant upon advancing civilization, have rendered 
necessary some retreat from the world and man under refining influence of culture has become more 
sensitive to publicity so that solitude and privacy have become essential to the individual…”. 
13
 Bible and McWhirter Privacy in the Workplace: A Guide for Human Resource Managers (1990) 34. 
14
 Craig Privacy and Employment Law (1999) 20-26.  
15Supra. 
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Thus, it may be said that the arguments advanced in opposition to the protection of 
privacy in the workplace do not really focus on the employee and the individual 
relationship of that employee with the employer instead they focus on the freedom of 
the employer to run its business and to exclude its possible liability, the more so 
where every employer operates in an environment concerned with the safety of 
employees and the public.   
The concept of privacy in the workplace has grown in importance as technology has 
enabled new forms of testing and monitoring of employees. Employee monitoring is 
not necessarily a new trend,16 but modern technology has enabled sophisticated forms 
of testing or monitoring of employees. These forms of testing or monitoring include 
drug tests, obtaining employees’ credit history, HIV testing, genetic testing, 
background checks, psychological testing, polygraph tests, keystroke monitoring, 
listening to telephone calls and voice-mail, reading e-mail, monitoring computer, 
telephone and fax usage, use of electronic devices to track the location of employees, 
searching offices and workplaces as well as the use of video surveillance devices to 
monitor employees.17 Use of these technological advancements has emphasized the 
tension between two conflicting sets of principles. On the one hand there is the 
principle of inviolability of the employee’s right to privacy - employees do not cede 
their rights to privacy and dignity when they sign an employment contract. On the 
other hand, there is the right of the employer to enjoy its property and exercise its 
managerial powers of command to protect its property against abuse that might cause 
direct or indirect damage to the employer’s business.18 
Against this background, this dissertation identifies and examines some of the most 
prevalent technology-enabled employment practices and policies, namely background 
checks, polygraph testing, psychological testing, drug testing and HIV/AIDS testing 
and provides an illustration of how these practices and policies may invade the 
privacy of employees. It should be noted that the selection of the practices and 
                                               
16
 Kesan First Principle Examination of Electronic Privacy in the Workplace in Blanpain (ed.) On-line 
Rights for Employees in the Information Society: Use and Monitoring of E-mail and Internet at Work 
(2002) 258.  
17
 Solove and Rotenburg Information Privacy Law (2003) 618. 
18
 Reinhard “Information Technology and Workers’ Privacy: A Comparative Study: Part III: Recurring 
Questions of Comparative Law; Information Technology and Worker’s Privacy: Information 
Technology and Worker’s Privacy: Enforcement” (2002) 23 Comparative Labour Law & Policy 
Journal 527 527. 
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policies in this dissertation was guided by the emphasis on those challenges to privacy 
which arise from technological developments and foster new and unique demands for 
the accommodation of privacy in the workplace. 
Background checks entail that employers acquire (and often store) information about 
an employee’s credit history, employment history, school records, criminal 
convictions and medical history from the employee and third parties (such as previous 
employers, insurance companies and credit bureaus). Employers usually acquire such 
information during the recruitment and selection stages of employment. However, 
employers have also been known to undertake such checks during employment19 and 
it is also important to note that in positions requiring a high degree of trustworthiness 
on the part of the employee, employers have a right (and perhaps a duty) to 
investigate the background of applicants. Background checks may infringe on an 
employee’s privacy rights, particularly where the checks result in the disclosure of 
personal information that bears no relevance to the employment position or the 
suitability of an applicant for a position.20 
The polygraph relies mainly on the subject’s physiological reactions to a set of 
questions to draw an inference on the subject’s truthfulness. There has been much 
debate as to whether the polygraph can produce empirically and scientifically reliable 
results.21 Employers turn to polygraphs in the belief that the tests “detect and deter 
employee theft and other employee misconduct, including drug abuse, industrial 
espionage, and crime”.22 The widespread use of polygraph testing is especially evident 
in industries requiring high levels of trust and honesty, such as information 
                                               
19See in this regard the decisions of Smith and Grady v United Kingdom [1999] ECHR 72 and Lustig-
Prean v United Kingdom (1997) 7BHRC 65. 
20
 The applicants in Smith and Grady v United Kingdom and Lustig-Prean v United Kingdom,  
members of the Royal Air Force and the Royal Navy (respectively), contented that investigations into 
their homosexuality and subsequent discharge on the sole ground of their homosexuality constituted a 
violation of their privacy right protected by Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(which was drafted in 1950 by the Council of Europe and came into force on 3 September 1953). The 
government argued that admitting homosexuals to the armed forces would have a significant and 
negative impact on the fighting power, morale of armed forces personnel and the operational 
effectiveness of the armed forces. The European Court of Human Rights was of the view that the 
investigations into the applicant’s homosexuality, which included detailed interviews with each of 
them and with third parties on matters relating to their sexual orientation and practices constituted a 
direct interference with the applicant’s rights to have their private lives respected by others. 
21Finkin Privacy in Employment Law (2003) 117.  
22
 Hebert Employee Privacy Law (2009) § 6:5. See also Christianson “Truth, Lies and Polygraphs: 
Detecting Dishonesty in the Workplace” (1998) 18 Contemporary Labour Law 1. 
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technology, retail, security, criminal investigation and banking.23 The right to privacy 
of individuals may be violated by the use of polygraphs particularly where the 
questions asked relate to personal information. 
Psychological tests are used in the employment context to assess the suitability of an 
applicant’s personality for a particular position. Employers use various psychological 
tests in the workplace, including personality tests, honesty tests and projective testing. 
Personality tests are aimed at identifying a person’s “personal characteristics, 
thoughts, feelings and behaviour” through related questions.24 The widespread use of 
personality tests as a way of identifying suitable employees has raised concerns 
relating to their validity and reliability.25 Furthermore, and particularly relevant to this 
dissertation, personality tests infringe the privacy interests of test subjects because 
they consist of questions which are highly personal and sensitive in nature.26 
Employers engage in drug and alcohol testing to identify users of illicit drugs and 
alcohol in the workplace to deter individuals in the workplace from using drugs and 
alcohol and to reduce the incidence of drug and alcohol related problems such as 
accidents and illnesses.27 Urinalysis is the most common and preferred method of drug 
testing, because urine samples can be easily obtained and urine retains the presence of 
drugs for longer periods of time than, for example, blood.28 Urinalysis as a method of 
drug testing has privacy implications primarily because the act of urination in itself is 
regarded as and has been described as highly personal and private.29 
                                               
23
 Christianson “Polygraph Testing in South Africa Workplaces: Shield and Sword in the Dishonesty 
Detection versus Compromising Privacy Debate” (2000) 21 Industrial Law Journal 17. 
24
 Hebert Employee Privacy Law (2009) § 7: 1. 
25Critics of psychological and personality tests have argued that the tests are actually not an accurate 
predictor of employee performance. They further contend that the tests were developed for 
diagnosing psychological disorders and not best candidates for a job. Moreover in certain countries 
there are no rules regarding the analysis and validation of test procedures. To make matters worse no 
credentials are generally required for individuals and companies that develop and market the tests. 
Menjoge “Testing the Limits of Anti – discrimination Law: How Employers Use of Pre-employment 
Psychological and Personality Tests Can Circumvent Title VII and the ADA” (2003) 82 North 
Carolina Law Review 326 332. See also Ecker “To Catch A Thief: The Private Employer’s Guide to 
Getting and Keeping an Honest Employee” (1994) 63 University of Missouri at Kansas City Law 
Review 251259 and Hebert Employee Privacy Law (2009) § 7: 3.  
26
 Hebert Employee Privacy Law (2009) § 7: 4. 
27
 Hebert Employee Privacy Law (2009) § 2:5. 
28Hebert Employee Privacy Law (2009) § 3:15. 
29Skinner v Railway Labour Executives Ass'n 109 S.ct 1402 (1989) and National Treasury Employees 
Union v Von Raab 109 S.ct 1384 (1989). 
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HIV/AIDS tests are designed to determine if an individual has been infected with the 
HIV virus and do not detect the virus in individuals, but rather establish the presence 
of HIV virus antibodies in an individual’s blood. As such, when a person tests 
positive for the virus, it is an indication of the fact that the person has HIV antibodies 
in their blood. HIV/AIDS testing in the workplace takes place not only in workplaces 
where the exchange of bodily fluids (or risk thereof) takes place, but also, in general, 
where an employer needs statistics for strategic workplace planning. However, even 
in those areas where there is a risk of an exchange of bodily fluids there is a 
reasonable expectation on employers to accommodate workers with the virus.30 In this 
regard various countries have implemented legislation that substantially limits the 
extent to which employers carry out HIV/AIDS testing.31 Such legislation is based on 
the premise that people living with HIV/AIDS should be entitled to work for as long 
as they can and further takes cognisance of the fact that with access to antiretroviral 
medication persons living with HIV/AIDS are able to lead healthy and productive 
lives.32 One of the arguments made in opposition to HIV/AIDS testing in the 
employment sphere an employee is that such testing may infringe an individual’s 
constitutional rights, such as the right to physical integrity and privacy and these 
inherent and constitutionally protected rights should trump the employer’s right to 
contractual freedom in those instances where an employee’s HIV positive status has 
no bearing on the job. 
As previously stated the monitoring of employees by employers certainly occurred 
before the introduction of electronic communications. In the past employers 
monitored use of company resources by using onsite managers and supervisors whose 
job was to physically observe and monitor employees at work, to ensure that 
employees were being productive and efficient. Nonetheless, in the information age 
employers prefer other, perhaps more efficient, methods to monitor their business 
                                               
30
 Bible and McWhirter Privacy in the Workplace: A Guide for Human Resource Managers (1990) 
135.  
31
 South Africa for example protects employees from HIV/AIDS testing through the Employment 
Equity Act 55 of 1998 and the Code of Good Practice on Key Aspects of HIV/AIDS and 
Employment of 2000. 
32
 Bible and McWhirter Privacy in the Workplace: A Guide for Human Resource Managers (1990) 
135.  
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operations in the interest of productivity such as e-mail/Internet monitoring.33 
Employers feel the need to closely regulate or monitor the use by employees of their 
e-mail/Internet resources to avoid the threats or risks associated with their use.34 The 
monitoring of employee Internet and e-mail use involves two competing interests in 
the employment context: namely, the employer’s right to conduct his or her business 
as he or she deems fit and the employee’s right to privacy. On the one hand, 
employers are concerned about the abuse and unrestricted use of these tools by 
employees and the harm that could result from this unrestricted use. On the other 
hand, employees are concerned about their right to privacy and the use of Internet and 
e-mail in the workplace. The monitoring of employee Internet and e-mail use can, for 
example, result in the employer having knowledge of an employee’s personal and 
private information.35 
Genetic testing can reveal an array of existing and probable medical information 
concerning an individual including “presymptomatic medical information about an 
individual, including information about an individual’s increased risk of future 
disease, disability, or early death…carrier status, that is, the likelihood of parents 
passing on to their children a genetic condition and about the health of the 
individual’s family members”.36 That is to say, genetic testing can reveal an array of 
existing and probable medical information concerning an individuals’ future health 
and an individuals’ family’s future health and also information relating to private 
decision making (such as whether or not to have a child)37 and this is the primary 
reason why this type of information is considered more private than other forms of 
information. In the context of the workplace, employers administer genetic testing for 
pre-symptomatic, susceptibility and carrier testing purposes.38  Two types of genetic 
                                               
33
 Kesan “First Principle Examination of Electronic Privacy in the Workplace” in Blanpain (ed.) On-
line Rights for Employees in the Information Society: Use and Monitoring of E-mail and Internet at 
Work (2002) 258. 
34
 Kesan “First Principle Examination of Electronic Privacy in the Workplace” in Blanpain (ed.) On-
line Rights for Employees in the Information Society: Use and Monitoring of E-mail and Internet at 
Work (2002) 253. 
35
 Hebert Employment Privacy Law (2009) § 8A: 2. 
36
 Pagnattaro “Genetic Discrimination and the Workplace: Employee’s Right to Privacy v Employer’s 
Need to Know” (2001) 39 American Business Law Journal 139 143. 
37Annas “Genetic Privacy: There Ought To Be Law” (1999) 4 Texas Review of Law & Politics 9 10. 
38
 United Kingdom Human Genetics Advisory Commission: Report on The Implications of Genetic 
Testing for Employment 1999. 
http://www.advisorybodies.doh.gov.uk/hgac/papers/papers_g/g_03.htm (2006-03-27). 
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testing occur in the workplace, namely genetic screening and genetic monitoring. 
Genetic screening determines whether an individual has inherited genes that render 
him or her susceptible to both occupation – related or non – occupation related 
disease,39whilst genetic monitoring determines whether “occupational exposure to 
hazardous agents has resulted in any chromosomal or genetic damage”.40 
Insofar as this dissertation is concerned, a detailed emphasis or focus is placed on only 
two of the aforementioned employer practices and policies, namely genetic testing 
and e-mail and Internet monitoring of employees. What perhaps makes these practices 
and policies - e-mail/Internet monitoring and genetic testing – different from policies 
such as drug testing and HIV/AIDS testing is the fact that they arguably represent 
policies and practices that are based on the most recent and advanced technology 
available. As such, they represent both the essence of, and the latest in, the ongoing 
technological challenge to privacy in the workplace. Genetic testing and electronic 
surveillance therefore enhance the value of the research and thus serve as guiding 
principles for the further development of privacy in the workplace. At the same time, 
scientific and technological developments have a very real impact on the well being of 
employees worldwide. As such, this research focuses on the development of new 
technologies, their impact on the workplace and their inevitable adoption in the South 
African workplace. Finally, it is hoped that the research can be of practical value and 
enable employers to establish principles and guidelines for properly dealing with the 
issue of privacy in the workplace. 
1.3 METHODOLOGY 
In order to address the above issues, the traditional methodology associated with 
comparative legal research is used. This includes a literature review of the legal 
framework and relevant case law of a number of selected foreign jurisdictions - 
namely South Africa, the United Kingdom and the United States. The selection of 
these countries is motivated by the fact that each country presents a distinctly different 
approach to privacy protection: South Africa provides for and protects privacy 
explicitly through its Constitution; the United States has found a way to protect 
                                               
39
 Hebert Employee Privacy Law (2009) § 12: 1. 
40Deyerle “Genetic Testing in the Workplace: Employer Dream, Employee Nightmare Legislative 
Regulation in the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany” (1997) 18 Comparative 
Labour Law Journal 547 555. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
11 
 
privacy through other rights in its constitution despite the absence of an enumerated 
privacy right; and the United Kingdom (more specifically England) has no 
constitution, yet it protects privacy through common law principles and absorption of 
international human rights instruments.  
1.4 SEQUENCE OF CHAPTERS 
This dissertation will be structured in the following manner: Chapter 2 of the 
dissertation traces the historical development of the legal protection of privacy. In 
order to effectively do so, the chapter divides the history of the legal protection of 
privacy into four parts. The first part examines early conceptions of privacy and 
entails a brief exposition of social conditions in Greek, Roman, Ancient Hebrew, 
Medieval and Renaissance societies that highlight the origins of privacy concerns in 
these societies. The first part also discusses a number of early English cases often 
credited with sowing the seeds of what today is called privacy. The second part of the 
chapter deals with the gradual and specific protection of the right to privacy and, 
considers a number of legal principles and remedies that developed during the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and which were primarily aimed at protecting 
various aspects of privacy. The third part, dealing with the legal protection of privacy, 
focuses on the international recognition of the right to privacy and examines various 
international instruments adopted during the twentieth century (especially after the 
Second World War) aimed at protecting fundamental rights, including the right to 
privacy. The fourth and last part of chapter 2 examines the explicit protection of 
privacy at domestic level and highlights the state of privacy protection today, 
particularly as far as its inclusion and protection in various national constitutions is 
concerned. The purpose of chapter 2 is therefore twofold: first, to chronologically 
address the development of the legal protection of privacy, and, second, to draw 
attention to the specific social conditions that influenced the protection of privacy. 
Chapter 3 narrows down the general background picture provided by chapter 2. It 
focuses on the legal development of privacy protection in selected countries, namely 
South Africa, the United States and United Kingdom. This is done through the 
consideration of relevant case law and legislation that have contributed to the 
development of privacy protection in each jurisdiction under review. The selection of 
the aforementioned countries is motivated by the fact that each country has adopted a 
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differing approach to privacy protection. In this regard, South Africa provides for and 
protects privacy explicitly through its Constitution and the United States has found a 
way to protect privacy through other rights in its constitution, despite there being no 
explicit mention of this right in its Constitution. The United Kingdom has no 
constitution, yet it protects privacy through common law principles and absorption of 
international human rights instruments. 
Chapter 4 of the dissertation critically assesses the possibility of a universal workable 
definition of privacy for purposes of the subsequent discussion. Of particular 
importance in this regard is the consideration of the concept and value of privacy. In 
doing so, various conceptions of privacy are examined, criticisms against the notion 
are canvassed, and, lastly (and perhaps more importantly), a workable definition of 
privacy is proposed. 
The goal of the subsequent chapters, namely chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8, is to consider the  
issue that constitutes the heart of this research, namely, the extent to which privacy is 
protected in the workplace given advancements in technology and the implications (if 
any) for the right to privacy as such. In this regard, it may be said that privacy in the 
workplace has grown in importance as technology has enabled new forms of testing 
and monitoring of employees.  
Chapter 5 advances the notion that employee monitoring is not necessarily a new 
trend,41 but that modern technology has enabled sophisticated forms of testing or 
monitoring of employees. Chapter 5 proceeds to identity these various  forms of 
testing or monitoring namely drug tests, obtaining the  credit history of employees, 
HIV testing, genetic testing, background checks, psychological testing, polygraph 
tests, reading e-mail, and monitoring Internet and e-mail usage.42 Subsequent to 
identifying and broadly discussing these forms of testing or monitoring, the chapter 
goes on to examine the two conflicting sets of principles implicated in the use of such 
testing or monitoring, namely  the principle of inviolability of the employee’s right to 
                                               
41For instance, prior to the introduction of current technology enabling monitoring of employees, 
employers monitored their employee use of company resources by using onsite managers and 
supervisors whose job was to physically observe and monitor employees at work to ensure that they 
were being productive and efficient. Kesan “First Principle Examination of Electronic Privacy in the 
Workplace” in Blanpain (ed.) On-line Rights for Employees in the Information Society: Use and 
Monitoring of E-mail and Internet at Work (2002) 258.  
42
 Solove and Rotenberg Information Privacy Law (2003) 618. 
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privacy on the one hand, and the right of the employer to enjoy its property and 
exercise its managerial powers of command to protect its property against abuse that 
might cause direct or indirect damage to the its business, on the other hand.43 Chapter 
5 also briefly considers the meaning of the phrase “privacy in the workplace” and 
provides an overview of the arguments for and against the need for privacy protection 
in the workplace.  
Chapter 6 provides a more detailed and comparative discussion of the policies and 
practices identified in the preceding chapter in an effort to further explore the 
relationship between technological developments and privacy in the context of the 
workplace. To this end Chapter 6  sets out to do the following: first,  it  provides a 
brief introduction or overview of the extent to which a particular policy or practice is 
used in three selected jurisdictions, namely South Africa, the United Kingdom (as part 
of the European Community) and the United States; second, the chapter briefly 
examines the legislation, if any, regulating or impacting on the use of the particular 
policy or practice in these jurisdictions; third, reviews a selection of cases (where 
available) in respect of each jurisdiction  which create a  picture of how courts and 
tribunals in that jurisdiction have approached the application and impact of the policy 
or practice in question; and last, analyses the extent to which privacy is protected in 
light of the use of that particular policy or practice across the different jurisdictions. 
Chapter 7 is the first of two chapters which give in -depth consideration of two sets of 
policies, namely, e-mail/Internet monitoring that are of recent origin and that illustrate 
the difficulty involved in resolving the tension between the rights of employers to 
have their property used in a beneficial and productive manner and the right of 
employees to the protection of their privacy. What perhaps makes these practices and 
policies - e – mail/internet monitoring and genetic testing – different to those 
considered in chapters 5 and 6 – is that  e – mail/internet monitoring and genetic 
testing arguably represent policies and practices based on the most recent and 
advanced technology available. As such, they represent both the essence of, and the 
latest in, the ongoing technological challenge to privacy in the workplace. In this 
                                               
43
 Reinhard “Information Technology and Workers’ Privacy: A Comparative Study: Part III: Recurring 
Questions of Comparative Law; Information Technology and Worker’s Privacy: Information 
Technology and Worker’s Privacy: Enforcement” (2002) 23 Comparative Labour Law & Policy 
Journal 527. 
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chapter, e–mail/internet monitoring will be considered in some detail, while chapter 8 
will focus on genetic testing. 
As mentioned above Chapter 8 focuses on genetic testing, which perhaps is the most 
recent example of the way in which scientific advancement may challenge privacy. 
The chapter first considers what genetic testing means, an enquiry which requires, in 
turn, a consideration of genes, genetic testing and genetic information. Thereafter, the 
chapter considers the legal challenges created by genetic testing. 
Chapter 9 of the dissertation draws the conclusion that even though the journey 
towards the legal protection of privacy has been a laboured one it was only a matter of 
time before the legal protection of privacy reached the level of protection that it now 
enjoys the world over because privacy is an essential and necessary value, right or 
claim without which man would cease to flourish, create and function. Chapter 9 
further concludes advancements in technology remain the biggest threat to privacy in 
this day and age of significant scientific research and progress and as such they would 
invariably determine the extent to which privacy is protected. More importantly, the 
dissertation concludes the effective legal protection of privacy in is still in its infancy 
as far as South Africa is concerned and the concept of privacy as described in the 
Constitution is still being developed and nurtured by legal commentators and courts. 
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CHAPTER 2:  
A BROAD HISTORY OF THE LEGAL PROTECTION OF 
PRIVACY 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
A person’s need for privacy is not a distinctly human notion, nor is it the result of the 
unique creative, ethical or intellectual abilities of humans. Ecological, biological and 
anthropological studies bring to light the fact that all animals (including humans) seek 
periods of seclusion or to be alone in small intimate or anonymous groups44 without 
which they would cease to flourish and probably deteriorate or perish.45 On the basis 
of this innate desire for privacy, Westin describes privacy as “the voluntary and 
temporary withdrawal of a person from the general society through physical or 
psychological means, either in state of solitude or small group intimacy, or, when 
among larger groups, in a condition of anonymity or reserve”.46 This state of 
anonymity or reserve was not always achievable or possible in early societies, which 
shaped and founded modern day notions of privacy (particularly the early Greek, 
Roman, Hebrew, as well as in medieval societies).47 These societies were largely 
                                               
44
 This seclusion is usually described as the tendency toward territoriality “in which an organism lays 
claim to an area of land, water, or air and defends its territory against intrusion by members of its 
own species. For example, the spined stickleback fish erects an invisible water wall around it and 
attacks any other stickleback that swim over the wall. The territorial tendency of animals, according 
to scientists serves the following purposes: it ensures propagation of the species by regulating density 
in relation to available resources; it enhances selection of “worthy” males; it provides breeding 
stations for animals that require male assistance in rearing their offspring; it provides a contact for 
group members against the entry of intruders and provides a physical frame of reference for group 
activity such as hiding. Animals and humans share distance setting mechanisms. An example of such 
distancing in the animal kingdom would be intimate distance among the bird and ape species where 
rules regulate the space between mates or between parents and their young. Westin Privacy and 
Freedom (1967) 7 – 8. 
45
 Ecological studies show that overpopulation amongst animals can hamper the animal’s ability to 
court, smell, feed properly or be free from constant defensive actions. In fact, overpopulation in 
animals can result in animals killing each other to reduce crowding or engage in mass suicides. 
Westin Privacy and Freedom (1967) 8. 
46
 Contrary to Westin’s assertion that privacy is an innate desire experienced by humans and animals 
alike, Posner argues privacy is a “cultural artefact” seeing as “[m]ost cultures have functioned 
tolerably well without the concept or reality of privacy in either its [sense] of seclusion or secrecy.” 
Posner “Privacy, Secrecy and Reputation” (1979) 28 Buffalo Law Review 1 2. 
47
 These societies were chosen because they laid the foundation and shaped modern day notions of 
privacy. Moreover, there exist a considerable number of secondary sources detailing life in these 
societies. 
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communalistic, paternalistic and patrilineal in nature. In early societies, the need for 
privacy, solitude, seclusion or intimacy was not the dominant concern that it is in 
most contemporary societies. Nevertheless, individuals in early societies certainly felt 
the need for privacy. However, such a need was subjected to the existence of a range 
of social characteristics, such as the structure and nature of the society, the absence of 
words equivalent to the contemporary meaning of “private” and “public”, the 
dominance of religion and religious practices, as well as the prevalent ideals, values or 
principles that excluded privacy and the public nature of “private affairs”, such as 
marriage, relationships between men and women and child rearing.  
This chapter broadly traces the development of the legal protection of privacy. To this 
end, the chapter divides the history of the legal protection of privacy into four parts. 
The first part examines early conceptions of privacy and entails a brief exposition of 
social conditions in Greek, Roman, Ancient Hebrew, Medieval and Renaissance 
societies that illustrate the privacy concerns in these societies. The first part also 
discusses a number of early English cases often credited with sowing the seeds of 
what today is called privacy. The second part dealing with the gradual and specific 
protection of the right to privacy, considers a number of legal principles and remedies 
during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries which were primarily aimed at 
protecting various aspects of privacy. The third part, which deals with the legal 
protection of privacy, focuses on the international recognition of the right to privacy 
and examines various international instruments adopted during the twentieth century 
(especially after the Second World War) aimed at protecting fundamental rights, 
including the right to privacy. The last part of this chapter looks at the explicit 
protection of privacy at domestic level and highlights the state of privacy protection 
today, particularly as far as its inclusion and protection in various national 
constitutions is concerned. 
As such, the primary purpose of this chapter is two-fold: first, to draw attention to 
social conditions in history that influenced the protection of privacy and, secondly, to 
chronologically address the development of the legal protection of privacy. Important 
moments in the development of such protection, at both an international and a 
domestic level, last-mentioned inclusive of legislation and case law, will be 
emphasised.  
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2.2 EARLY CONCEPTIONS OF PRIVACY 
2.2.1 Ancient Greek Conceptions of Privacy 
Early Greek conceptions of privacy dealt mainly with the refusal to seek or accept 
public office.48 The individual seeking privacy and withdrawing into the private realm 
was no better than the Greek slave, female and child who had no role in public life. 
Public participation and responsibility and even competing for public office gave an 
individual dignity, self respect and personal honour.49 
The oikos or oikio constituted the basic social unit in ancient Greek society. Oikos 
denoted all those living under the same roof. The oldest male headed the oikos, 
conducted all religious practices and performed all religious rites as well.50 The social 
and political realm was known as the polis51 and membership in this realm was 
guaranteed to all adult free males.52 Women, children and slaves were excluded from 
participation in the polis. Citizenship in the polis meant access to sacramental or 
initiation ceremonies, markets, participating in public debate, policy and legislation 
formulation, religious festivals, the military (a primary obligation of the free male) 
and contributing to public opinion. Ancient Greeks, at least the Athenians, desired and 
lived a social life in the polis.53 The ideal and accepted character was that of a man 
who was entirely social or of polites and any man displaying behaviour contrary to 
that of polites was regarded with suspicion:54 
“The polis demanded that the individual not only take part in [public 
activities], but he is ready to sacrifice his individual existence for it is to 
                                               
48
 Moore Privacy: Studies in Social and Cultural History (1984) 118.  
49
 Moore Privacy: Studies in Social and Cultural History (1984) 118.  
50
 Salisbury (ed.) and Aldrette (vol. ed.) The Greenwood Encyclopaedia of Daily Life: A Tour through 
History from Ancient Times to the Present Volume 1 The Ancient World (2004) 25. 
51
 Moore Privacy: Studies in Social and Cultural History (1984) 85. 
52
 Citizenship in the Athenian polis was based strictly on descent. That is to say one had to be born of 
Greek parents to be considered a full citizen of the polis. Foreigners, women and slaves were 
generally excluded from citizenship in the Athenian polis. Nonetheless, in exceptional circumstances, 
the assembly of adult male citizens (the ekklesia) granted citizenship to a foreigner for exceptional 
service to the polis. Slaves in Athenian society also enjoyed varied degrees of social status.  Moore 
Privacy: Studies in Social and Cultural History (1984) 85. See also Dickinson The Greek View of 
Life 19th ed. (1945) 77. 
53
 Burns Greek Ideals: A Study of Social Life 2nd ed. (1919) 2. 
54
 Burns Greek Ideals: A Study of Social Life 2nd ed. (1919) 2. 
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the [polis] that he owes everything including the security of his very 
existence….”.55 
One writer described early Greek life as: 
“…one not only of public action. In this sense the social ideal may be 
called political… anyone who did not take part in the administration of 
the polis was looked at with suspicion…But although public activity 
was admired and cultivated, a quiet life was also allowed to be ideal, if 
it did not involve isolation. For a man should not be too busy about 
everything public”.56 
The Greek language drew a distinction between “private” and “public” realms. The 
distinction however was not clearly maintained in practice. The Greek word for 
private was oikos meaning “one’s own” or “pertaining to one’s self” and the word for 
public was demios meaning “having to do with other people” or koinos meaning 
“what is shared among friends” or “public affairs”.57 It is unclear what forms of social 
behaviour or activities fell into each realm, but there was a bias in Greek language 
against what is private.58 Moreover, there was a greater emphasis on sharing what is in 
the public. There was debate amongst Greek philosophers centred on what private life 
is and whether it was preferable to public life.59 The alternative of a life outside of 
public participation and responsibility, according to Greek writers such as Plato and 
Aristotle, was a life devoted to intellectual pursuits.60 Plato expressed hostility 
towards privacy in his writing and argued that privacy posed a threat to the Greek 
communitarian tradition and togetherness. Plato further contended that privacy served 
no constructive or psychological purpose; hence any inclinations towards privacy in 
society should be rooted out.61 
The distinction between the “private” and “public” realm overlapped with the 
distinction between the male dominated political realm and the female managed 
                                               
55Burckhardt History of Greek Culture (1963) 13. 
56Burns Greek Ideals: A Study of Social Life 2nded (1919) 120.  
57
 Moore Privacy: Studies in Social and Cultural History (1984) 82. 
58
 Moore Privacy: Studies in Social and Cultural History (1984) 82. 
59
 Moore Privacy: Studies in Social and Cultural History (1984) 120 – 124. 
60
 Moore Privacy: Studies in Social and Cultural History (1984) 120 – 124. 
61
 Moore Privacy: Studies in Social and Cultural History (1984) 120 – 124. 
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household realm. As such, the home became tantamount to a sacred space reserved 
exclusively for the male and his family.62 This theme has filtered into modern legal 
notions of a man’s home, expressed in the adage a “man’s home is his castle”.63 
Despite this measure of privacy in one’s home, there existed very few activities in 
early Greek life that individuals could partake of in isolation,64 considering that the 
polis intervened in this household realm. The polis, for example, supported the 
punishment the husband meted out to an adulterous wife and appointed officials to 
keep aristocratic women and children within the confines of the home and away from 
the streets.65 
The blurring of the “public” and the “private” realms in ancient Greek society is 
reflected in the regulation of marriage, child bearing and rearing. Philosophers like 
Aristotle encouraged the regulation of marriages, particularly with regard to when 
men and women could marry.66 Hence, arranged marriages became the norm. 
Marriages were also used by privileged society to establish or cement alliances or 
social relations and for this reason wealth and status became criteria for choosing a 
suitable partner.67 
The role of the Greek wife sheds further light on the diminished privacy individuals 
enjoyed. The overriding duty of a Greek wife was to provide her husband with healthy 
offspring to ensure succession of the household. Procreation in specific societies was 
also state regulated.68 For example, in the Greek state of Sparta, the birth and rearing 
of children was controlled by the state. Spartan women were physically trained to 
enable them to successfully execute their maternal duties.69 Moreover, children born 
to a man and woman were inspected by the elders for deformities. If a child upon 
inspection by the elders was found to be healthy, the mother was allowed to rear it, 
                                               
62
 Moore Privacy: Studies in Social and Cultural History (1984) 120 – 124.  
63
 Flaherty agrees that the notion of the sanctity of the home has filtered into modern law from ancient 
times, biblical literature and Roman law. Flaherty Privacy in Colonial New England (1972) 85. 
64
 Dickinson The Greek View of Life 19th ed. (1945) 12. 
65
 Moore Privacy: Studies in Social and Cultural History (1984) 135. 
66
 Moore Privacy: Studies in Social and Cultural History (1984) 135. 
67
 Moore agrees that marriage was not the result of romantic relationships and romantic relationships 
were commonly sought outside the marriage. Moore Privacy: Studies in Social and Cultural History 
(1984) 135.  
68
 Dickinson The Greek View of Life 19th ed. (1945) 105. 
69
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but if a child upon inspection was found to be deformed, it was left to die.70 Also in 
Sparta, a man could lend out his wife to another man in order to impregnate her.71 The 
pressures of child bearing on the Greek woman did not only come from her 
household, but also from society at large and were also reinforced by prevailing 
medical theories.72 Society at large expected its married people to have children to 
keep the population at parity and medical theory taught that abstinence from sexual 
activity was detrimental to one’s health.73 Plato’s writings advocated the view that 
marriage should be conducted solely for the benefit of the polis – to elicit the 
“goodness” and “beauty” of the polis. Aristotle wrote that it was preferable to have 
sexual intercourse in winter time instead of spring or summer thereby equating sexual 
intercourse to a seasonal activity like the sowing or harvesting of crops.74 
Privacy norms about marital and extramarital sexual relations existed even though 
Greek appreciation of artistic expression indicated that society was brazen about 
images of male genitalia, male and female nudity and heterosexual and homosexual 
fornication.75 Sexual relations between the master and his slaves were also a common 
occurrence in the Greek household. Moreover, prostitution was a socially acceptable 
profession that was taxed and Greek prostitutes were intellectually accomplished and 
gifted women who charged for their companionship.76 
No other members of Greek society experienced an absence of personal privacy to the 
extent of Greek slaves. Greek slaves generally had no legal status, but those who could, 
paid commission to their owners to live independently and carry out respectable 
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positions in society as bankers, captains of trading vessels or shop managers.77 Whereas 
free slaves lived independently of their master and merely handed a portion of their 
income to their master, chattel slaves were considered the property of their master.  
2.2.2 Ancient Roman Conceptions of Privacy 
Ancient Roman conceptions of privacy were largely similar to those of ancient 
Greece. This is not surprising given that Greek culture, art, religion and literature 
permeated Roman society.78 Holding public office or engaging in public life (bios 
politikis) was expected of all males of the governing class and ensured a lifetime of 
honour. Persons holding no public office or deprived of public office were regarded as 
being persons of “no account” and not considered one of the “first men of the city”.79 
Ancient Rome80 comprised of a male dominated society in which the father of a 
family, the paterfamilias, wielded paternal power (or pater potestas) and respect. The 
paterfamilias possessed unlimited authority in controlling the household and 
individuals living in that household. The paterfamilias not only negotiated and 
arranged marriages and divorces for his children, but acted as the “natural judge of the 
household”.81 As the “natural judge” of his household, the paterfamilias could also put 
his children to death82 or sell members of his family into slavery.83 Marriages in 
ancient Roman society (as in Greek society) were social and political arrangements. 
Roman marriages were private acts between individual families and, as such, could be 
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conducted in the absence of official sanction, a marriage contract or a formal 
ceremony.84 Given that marriages were chiefly conducted to erect or cement alliances 
between families or political groupings, it was common for a politician to, for 
instance, marry, divorce and remarry to accommodate his altering political 
affiliations.85 
All unmarried children were under the authority of the paterfamilias. The female 
child, once married, fell under the authority of her husband. The husband took up her 
father’s role as her legal custodian or guardian.86 The manus marriage was a popular 
form of marriage in which the wife figuratively speaking handed herself as property 
from her father to her husband.87 Her husband consequently took ownership of her 
property and, like her father, was permitted by custom and law to kill his wife should 
she commit adultery or drink wine without his consent.88 Whereas the female child 
was under the authority of her husband upon marriage, the male child (married or 
unmarried) remained under the authority of the paterfamilias unless the paterfamilias 
died or emancipated the male child.89 Whilst the paterfamilias was alive or had not 
emancipated his male child, the male child could not without his father’s consent sign 
a contract, engage in a career, free a slave or draw up a will and the paterfamilias 
owned whatever the male child earned or inherited.90 
In addition to being conducted for political and economic gain, Roman marriages 
further sought to ensure procreation. As such a couple’s duty was to bear legitimate 
heirs and replenish the ranks of the Roman citizenry.91 Procreation was considered a 
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serious matter, so much so that the Emperor Augustus promulgated laws promoting 
marriage and procreation.92 
Broadly speaking, Roman women led sheltered lives and had no citizenship rights 
such as voting, debating and running for office, but were expected to spend their days 
within the confines of the household and further be virtuous and modest in their 
behaviour. Upon venturing outside the confines of the household Roman women were 
carried by slaves in sheltered litters or in the company of female companions. Under 
the Empire wealthy women were in addition subject to laws regulating their clothing 
and jewellery.93 
Slavery in Roman society also denied certain persons of individual privacy. Slaves 
had their fates determined by their owners and did not engage in public life. Roman 
slaves were obtained through military conquest or by birth and, once sold, these slaves 
became the property or possession of their buyer.94 Before the slaves were sold their 
feet were chalked in white to indicate that they were for sale and wore signage around 
their collars listing their virtues and imperfections.95 The more educated the slave was, 
the higher the price the slave fetched for its trader.96 A slave could also be leased for a 
price and for a specified or indefinite period of time. Rural slaves usually endured 
manual labour on farms and were considered “articulate” tools of the farmer. Urban 
slaves enjoyed more freedom and undertook less arduous tasks than rural slaves, 
seeing that they lived in their master’s household and were sometimes permitted to 
have families of their own.97 Urban slaves were also more likely to receive an 
education and receive money from their master.98 Slaves also had the misfortune of 
being branded by their masters in visible places or made to wear collars with their 
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master’s details.99 Slaves had no legal rights and, furthermore, their children were 
born into slavery and became the property of the master.100 A Roman slave’s 
inferiority in society was further emphasised by the fact that a slave’s evidence in 
court was only regarded as credible evidence under torture. Notwithstanding the 
inferiority of the slave, some slaves were employed by the Republic or religious 
temples as government officials. Roman law further provided that if a master was 
killed by one of his slaves, then all his slaves had to follow his fate and be put to 
death, usually by crucifixion.101 
As in Greek society, sexual relations between the master and his slaves were 
commonplace. Ancient Romans lacked categories of sexual orientation and were 
therefore documented to have had sexual relations with both men and women. 
Prostitution was both a lawful and popular profession.102 Prostitutes were taxpaying 
members of society who were required to register themselves with a local magistrate. 
Pornographic images adorned certain household items such as bowls and lamps. 
Marketplaces were sheltered by erotic murals and many homes housed paintings and 
mosaics depicting sexually explicit scenes.103 
2.2.3 Ancient Hebrew Conceptions of Privacy 
The social and political system of ancient Israel was also communal in nature. 
Ancient Hebrew society was built on kinship systems formed on the basis of blood 
relations and financial and social covenants.104 That is to say, members of a household 
were not necessarily related by blood and households could be comprised of persons 
related by a covenant entered into by that household to ensure their socioeconomic 
survival.105 The major difference between early Hebrew society and early Greco-
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Roman society was the formers’ secular and religious nature, in comparison to the 
largely political and social nature of the latter. 
The institution of marriage in early Hebrew society was far from a personal matter 
between a man and a woman. Rather, marriage was symbolic of the formation of 
political, economic and social agreements between households.106 Men and women 
rarely chose their marriage partners as this was left to the father as the head of the 
household who had to exercise the responsibility of negotiating marriage covenants on 
behalf of the unmarried men and women in his household.107 The father had the added 
responsibility of safeguarding the virginity of unwed women in his household before 
they were married off. A father’s role in this regard was considered very important 
and a matter of honour for a household.108 
The selection and consumption of food, especially during religious rites such as 
Passover, 109 defined and confirmed membership in Old Testament Hebrew society.110 
The Passover rite commemorates the time when God asked the Hebrews to mark the 
sides and tops of their doorframes with blood. The blood markings indicated the 
residence of Israelites in a particular house and such a household was spared 
destruction from various plagues.111 Furthermore, the rite was a private affair 
performed in the intimacy of the household. The book of Deuteronomy contains a list 
of clean and unclean food Hebrews may (not) consume as “the children of the 
Lord”.112 The non – consumption or consumption of specified foods invoked religious 
and spiritual issues of  “purity”, “impurity”, “holiness” and “profanity” and “sin” and 
“virtue”.113 In specific sections of the Old Testament, the Israelites are addressed, 
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throughout the Old Testament, as “the Lord’s children” or “the Lord’s treasured 
possession” or “the Lord’s chosen people”.114 The concept that Old Testament 
Hebrews were the Lord’s property is another feature of ancient Hebrew culture that 
points to the fact that there was no defined conception of privacy.115 
The Old Testament’s treatment of nudity and nakedness provides insight into the fact 
that society recognised that the individual had some personal privacy. The book of 
Genesis records Adam and Eve as originally naked and not ashamed of their nudity. 
According to Genesis, Adam and Eve became aware and ashamed of their nakedness 
after they consumed fruit from the “tree of the knowledge of good and evil”:  
“When the woman saw the fruit of the tree [of knowledge] was good 
for food and pleasing to the eye, and also desirable for gaining 
wisdom, she took some and ate it. She also gave some to her husband, 
who was with her, and he ate it. The eyes of both of them were opened 
and they realised they were naked; so they sewed fig trees together and 
made coverings for themselves.”116 
After consuming the fruit from the tree of knowledge, Adam and Eve experienced 
feelings of embarrassment, awkwardness, fear, shame and guilt and tried to hide 
themselves among the trees when God approached them.117 Adam tells God “I heard 
you in the garden and I was afraid because I was naked; so I hid”. Adam and Eve 
were said to “know instinctively without God’s insight, the feeling of privacy and the 
fact that they had lost this feeling of privacy”.118 God in this regard gave man the right 
                                                                                                                                      
to the entire community. That is not to say sexual behaviour was treated as a private matter subject to 
the free choice and will of the individual. Ancient Hebrew legislation and authorities used stringent 
sanctions to control sexual impulses within acceptable limitations.  The book of Leviticus in chapter 
18 and 20 respectively contain lists of unlawful sexual relations and sexual offences subject to the 
death penalty. Moore Privacy: Studies in Social and Cultural History (1984) 203. 
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three times in the Old Testament in the book of Deuteronomy chapter 7 verse 6; chapter 14 verse 2 
and chapter 28 verse 18. Dearman Religion and Culture in Ancient Israel (1992) 130. 
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God’s peculiar possession, according to Dearman, should not be construed as God asserting 
possession or ownership over the Israelites. Nor should it be construed as an assertion by God that the 
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to be “reticent before the eyes of each other” by making Adam and his wife garments 
of skin and clothing them with these garments.119  God is portrayed in this particular 
passage of the Old Testament as protecting the privacy of his children and 
inadvertently creating the right to personal privacy.120 
The story of Noah and his sons also reinforces man’s right to be reticent before the 
eyes of each other: 
“After the flood, Noah and his sons Shem, Ham and Japheth came out 
of the ark. Noah, a man of the soil proceeded to plant a vineyard. When 
he drank some of its wine, he became drunk and lay uncovered inside 
his tent. Ham, the father of Canaan, saw his father’s nakedness and told 
his two brothers outside.”121 
Ham’s bothers instinctively knew that Ham had violated their father’s privacy by 
seeing their father naked and telling them that he had seen their father naked.122  “But 
Shem and Japheth took a garment and laid it across their shoulders; then walked 
backward123 and covered their father’s nakedness. Their faces were turned the other 
way so that they would not see their father’s nakedness.”124 The act of being naked or 
nakedness in the story of Noah and his sons is reinforced as private.125 
Certain passages in the Old Testament further suggest there may have been no 
distinction between public and private realms of conduct and perhaps no words 
equivalent to “private” and “public”. For example, the book of Psalms describes God 
as knowing the secrets of the human heart.126 Moore writes: “There could be no 
secrets from God, and the most intimate affairs of what we would call private life 
were subject to religious norms and public intervention”.127 Some form of privacy was 
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observed with regards to “certain attributes of the deity and the purity of certain 
objects associated with religious aspects of their culture”. The book of Deuteronomy 
explains “[t]he secret things belong to the Lord our God, but the things that are 
revealed belong to us and our children forever that we may follow all the words of 
this law”.128 For instance, on Mount Sinai, Moses points out to God: “The people 
cannot come up Mount Sinai, because you yourself warned us [to] [p]ut limits around 
the mountain and set it apart as holy.”129 This passage suggests that only God had a 
claim to privacy or secrecy. Religious rules also allowed the ancient Hebrew limited 
access to religious objects considered sacred such as the ark130 and the Tabernacle. 
Limited rights to the private use and enjoyment of one’s property existed, given that 
individuals were permitted to help themselves to their neighbours grain and grapes.131 
This is unsurprising in light of the fact that early Hebrew society was communal and 
individuals owned and did things for the benefit of the community as a whole.132 
2.2.4 Medieval Conceptions of Privacy 
The institution of feudalism characterised part of the Middle Ages in Europe. 
Feudalism essentially removed public power from the monarch and placed it into the 
hands of individuals holding public office and aristocrats possessing vast amounts of 
land and wealth.133 Feudalism stripped the monarch of public power resulting “…in 
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each great household becoming a sovereign unto itself, where the power exercised by 
the master [dominus] …was public”, the landless and poor majority were relegated 
into serving as serfs for those wielding such public power.134 Feudal lawyers described 
the “serf” as the lord’s property as it was common to sell the serf as a slave and the 
serf was unable to leave the lord’s service without the lord’s permission. In addition 
the serf paid the lord taxes in money or in kind, sometimes at the Lord’s discretion, 
and could not marry without the lord’s authorization which was usually obtained after 
the serf paid the lord a marriage fee. The serf could further not appear against a 
freeman or his lord in a court of law.135 Landed and wealthy aristocrats, as “kings” 
possessing their own “kingdoms”, exercised a number of public duties ranging from 
conducting business transactions on behalf of their “kingdoms” and punishing 
offences committed by serfs and peasant workers inside and outside their 
“kingdom”.136 
In feudal Europe little privacy existed, even for the nobleman and the gentry in their 
“kingdoms”. One writer explains: 
“[i]n feudal times, there was little space for privacy because of the 
paradoxical reason that all power was private. There was no public 
debate or public space where the common good was considered or 
observed”.137 
Moreover “[p]rivate interests in the middle ages were seldom honoured, for 
monarchies and churchmen were constantly preoccupied with constant battles for 
                                                                                                                                      
of commendation, immunity and benefice. The practice of commendation took place where a landless 
and poor man would offer his service and honour to a landed man (such as a duke, count or court 
official) in exchange for food, clothing and protection.. The practice of benefice was similar to that of 
commendation but differed in that the latter involved a less powerful man offering his land to a 
powerful landed aristocrat. A small landowner who found himself burdened by ownership 
responsibilities would cede his land to a big landowner in exchange for his continued tenancy on the 
land. In other words the small landowner would have a usufruct over the land, but in practice the 
small landowner also found himself in the service of the big landowner. The granting of immunities 
usually took place were the King would grant royal land subject to immunity to the Church through 
bishops and abbots. The bishops and abbots would then require that this immunity on the land be 
transferred to the Church. The Church as the owner of this royal immunity would then have royal 
prerogatives such the collection of taxes and dues. Thompson and Nathan An Introduction to 
Medieval Europe 300 – 1500 (1965) 232. 
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power”.138  The poor and landless classes were also unable to afford privacy given 
their squalid and cramped living conditions.139 Prior to medieval feudal society, the 
existing power structures and relations were rarely mentioned or acknowledged in 
official documents.140 Feudalism subsequently introduced the exposure and discussion 
of the existing power structures and relations through official documents141 such as the 
English Magna Carta. The Magna Carta of 1215 accorded a range of rights and duties 
to freemen. The common man (known as “villien” - serfs, urban workers and those in 
the lower classes of society and their extended families) was excluded from exercising 
these rights and duties.142 
The villien were bound by contractual obligations they owed to the lord. Lords could, 
as a consequence of these contractual obligations, acquire and dispose of the villien 
and the personal property of the villien belonged to the lord. The villien were 
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forbidden from departing the lord’s manor without permission from the lord.143 The 
permission to leave the jurisdiction of the manor was usually granted if a villien paid 
his lord an annual fee. Secondary sources further indicate that the villien needed 
permission from the lord for his children to marry.144 The villien usually exercised the 
obligations they owed to their lords by paying rent, fees and fines. Even as the villien 
served their lords, the freemen worked together with others of similar social status to 
protect the res publica (community) and the country (patria) against external and 
internal aggression by participating in military expeditions and local “peacekeeping” 
activities. These activities were usually directed by the magistrates charged with 
keeping the peace and justice in society.145 
There seems to be no words for “public” and “private” in the Middle Ages. However, 
written Latin chronicles and charters made a distinction between public (publicus) and 
private (privatus) objects and acts. The word publicus denoted those things which 
belonged to the sovereign or were part of public office, or those acts falling under the 
jurisdiction of the magistrates who were charged with preserving the peace and 
dispensing justice146 (such as Justices of the Peace Act in England of 1361). The 
Justices of the Peace Act provided for the detention and arrest of peeping toms and 
eavesdroppers in order to keep the peace.147 There were also legal remedies against 
gossip and the scold.148 The word privatus described those acts that were not 
performed in public or in the open, but inside one’s home, in isolation and away from 
the prying eyes of others.149Privatus further denoted those acts, individuals and 
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objects which were by law not subject to public authority. Therefore, non festive and 
domestic activities were often associated with the word privatus.150 
Medieval society made little use of writing; written records were therefore not kept 
except for church, birth, death and marriage records.151 Medieval society instead made 
great use of symbols such as emblems on the main gates of property and, more 
importantly, enclosures surrounding property.152 Emblems decorating the gates and 
surrounding enclosures indicated the existence of private property and simultaneously 
served as a sign of ownership and privacy. Surrounding enclosures also served to 
“ward off violence, to drive it away from the place where people were most 
vulnerable…”.153 Public law encouraged the privacy provided by these enclosures, so 
much so that the crimes committed within these enclosures (or “private crimes”) were 
subject to twice the penalty that “public crimes” (or crimes committed outside these 
enclosures) were subject to.154 An offender committing a “private crime” within an 
enclosure he or she was found to be resident of could not be tried in terms of public 
law. The magistrate could not arrest the offender or even enter the enclosure unless 
the dominus authorised the magistrate to do so.155 The non- application of public law 
or authority to the private realm illustrates the dissolution of public power during 
feudalism. The enclosure in early medieval society also housed the res privatae that is 
private property belonging to a household that was not res publica.156 This property 
included reserves of food, livestock and slaves, women and minors. Persons residing 
in the household who were not part of populus, such as serfs, women and minors 
could only come under public authority if:  
a) they went unaccompanied by the dominus or a freeman on public property, 
such as a road: 
b) the dominus was absent and no freeman was able to protect them, and 
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c) a public grievance (known as a “hue and cry”) was brought by a complainant 
against a member of a household. 157 
Under feudalism, landowners therefore assumed the responsibility of privately 
regulating and protecting their “kingdoms” (against outside attacks in times of battle 
and controlled economic social and economic relationships). Landowners were not the 
only beneficiaries of a feudal state - monarchs also sought to benefit in transferring 
their public power and prestige to landowners.158 This was especially true in the case 
of weak monarchs or where a monarch was experiencing difficulties in establishing 
effective administrative control over a kingdom. Due to this “numbing” of public 
power in the feudal state, there ceased to be a single unit of government. Instead, there 
were numerous small units of government known as marches, counties or duchies.159 
Marriage in medieval Europe was characterised by a combination of economic and 
religious notions. For the serfs or villien the woman was a significant contributor to 
the household and a man therefore sought a wife who was skilled and industrious.160 
For the aristocrat, the woman played a less significant role in the household and so an 
aristocratic man sought a bride who came with a substantial dowry in the form of 
money or land. For the church, the overriding purpose of marriage was procreation 
and as such abortion and contraception were forbidden.161 The medieval wife had the 
status of a child or servant of her husband. However, women were allowed to earn 
money by plying their trade and selling crafts and goods they made.162 
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2.2.5 Renaissance and Enlightenment Conceptions of Privacy 
The Renaissance and Enlightenment are often credited with the conception of 
contemporary notions of privacy.163 Writers attribute the creation of contemporary 
notions of privacy to four cultural and political events: 
a) The change in the role of the state;  
b) The birth of the nuclear family;  
c) The emergence of new forms of religion; and 
d) The expansion of literature and the increase in the literacy rate.164 
If the Middle Ages can be described as the period in which “all public power became 
private”,165 then it would be apt to describe the Renaissance as the period in which 
“almost all private power became public”. In other words, the Renaissance epitomised 
the end of private power and the beginning of a powerful state.166 The Middle Ages 
marked a time in history when the state was weak and played a largely symbolic role, 
as all public power became concentrated in feudal constituencies.167 The Renaissance 
period redefined the role and status of the state to enable it to intervene in creating 
social order168 and in asserting control over individuals and their actions.169 As such, 
matters or individuals formerly restricted or confined to the private jurisdiction of the 
manor now fell under the public jurisdiction of the state. The state created at the end 
of the Middle Ages aimed, amongst other things, to establish peace and determined 
permissible and impermissible conduct.170 
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The role and status of the home also underwent transformation. The home, in the 
eighteenth century, became the focal point of private life and social life. The home 
also became a refuge or haven in which family members could seek solace and find 
defence against public scrutiny, outsiders or uninvited guests.171 The home further 
became associated with happiness, affection and served as a symbol of morality.172 
The nuclear family emerged from the transformation of the home and individuals 
continued to withdraw into the privacy and comfort of the home.173 
Along with this new role of the home came improved perceptions of the child. 
Whereas in the Middle Ages and earlier periods, the child had been viewed as a small 
adult constantly in need of correction and chastisement, the child was no longer 
chastised and expected to behave and dress like an adult.174 Society celebrated the 
naturalness, individuality and innocence of the child and women were encouraged to 
remain at home with their children and to love and nurture them.175 This tenderness 
and understanding expressed towards the child was encouraged by philosophers, the 
state and the church. Philosophers described children as “noble savages” capable of 
displaying noble thought and performing noble acts with the appropriate upbringing in 
the home.176 The state and the church depicted the child in popular images as mystical, 
saint like and Christ like.177 In addition, medieval child - rearing practices, such as 
swaddling the child in a corset to keep the child upright and shape its body, were 
replaced by less restrictive practices that allowed the child the freedom to explore.178 
The use of wet nurses was discouraged since it separated mother from the child and 
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further had the potential to interfere with the child’s identity.179 Instead, maternal 
breastfeeding was promoted, most likely in an effort to establish the bond between the 
mother and the child and as demonstration of affection towards the child. Places and 
spaces for privacy and intimacy were also created within the home.180 Rooms within 
the home became smaller in size, acquired specialised functions and catered for 
intimacy.181 A typical home of the well to do would have a nursery, drawing room, 
dressing room and reading room.182 The study was created for the father of the house 
and he would read, pray and store important documents in the study.183 This treatment 
of the home as a place of intimacy and privacy by the state led to perceptions of the 
inviolability of the home.184 
The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries saw the firm entrenchment in society of 
religions such as Catholicism and Protestantism, fostering “inward piety” in addition 
to the pre - existing communal worship.185 These new forms of religion also 
encouraged individual introspection of the conscience through confession, solitary 
meditation and prayer and keeping a private diary.186 These confessions and diaries 
later unearthed a need for the individual to communicate with the self and to know the 
self.187 For this reason, individuals began to engage in activities such as writing and 
painting purely for their own pleasure without the wish that their work be 
published.188 This period also witnessed an excessive consumption of reading material 
such as histories, biographies, magazines, newspapers, sermons, novels and poetry as 
books became more affordable and accessible189 and the literacy rate expanded with 
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the introduction of the printing press.190 This growth of literature and the rise in the 
literacy rate encouraged individuals to record their private thoughts, experiences, and 
to further scrutinise them.191 Diaries represented a place where these private thoughts, 
experiences, desires, emotions and memories could be stored. The diary generated a 
form of individual intimacy and solitude given that it was often written in isolation.192 
A new form of reading also emerged during this time, namely silent reading. Silent 
reading fostered a private relationship between the reader and the book as it allowed 
the reader to engage in solitary reflection on the literature.193 Silent reading further 
separated the reader from what was happening around the reader. All forms of work, 
including intellectual and artistic work became private, intimate and personal 
devotions not intended for public consumption.194 Although the home was the primary 
retreat from the public, the library in the home became a secondary place of retreat 
especially from family and domestic responsibilities.195 The use of the library, coupled 
with silent reading, ensured that reading became a private affair and as such books 
were often found in the more private areas of the home such as the bedroom or the 
study.196 
2.2.6 Early English Cases and Privacy 
It is often said that the seeds of what today is called privacy were first sown in 
England in the early eighteenth century.197 Privacy in early English law often found 
protection in common law principles aimed at protecting other interests. As such, 
privacy found protection in the common law prohibitions against trespass, gossip, 
scolding, burglary, eavesdropping, voyeurism, libel, and slander and the adage that a 
“man’s home is his castle”.198 For example, in Entick v Carrington199, the plaintiff, 
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Entick, brought an action against Carrington and three messengers of the King200 for 
trespassing. The plaintiff declared that the defendants used force and arms to enter his 
house and searched its contents, including the plaintiff’s private papers and books for 
four hours.201 The defendants also seized some of the plaintiff’s belongings, such as 
100 printed charts and 100 printed pamphlets and delivered them to the Earl of 
Halifax’s business premises. The plaintiff’s seized books and papers were received by 
the Earl’s assistant Lovel Stanhope for examination. The defendants denied liability 
on two grounds. First, they argued that they had acted under a warrant signed and 
sealed by the Earl of Halifax, a Lord in the King’s Privy Council and one of the 
principal Secretaries of State.202 The warrant was issued and sealed by Earl Halifax. 
The warrant, according to the Court of the Common Pleas, authorised the defendants 
to: 
“…make a strict and diligent search for the plaintiff, mentioned to in 
the warrant to be the author, or one concerned in the writing, of several 
weekly seditious papers, entitled, the “Monitor or British Freeholder” 
which contained gross and scandalous reflections and invectives upon 
his Majesty’s government and upon both Houses of Parliament, and 
him, the plaintiff having been found, to seize and apprehend and bring 
together with his books and papers in safe custody before the Earl of 
Halifax to be examined concerning thepremises…”.203 
Second, it was argued that their conduct was within the scope of the Constables 
Protection Act of 1750. The Court found that “…neither the Secretary of State nor the 
messengers are within the Act of 1750” for two reasons: 
a) The defendants failed to take a constable with them as required by the warrant; 
and 
b) After the defendants carried away some of the plaintiff’s private books and 
papers they brought them before Lovel Stanhope and not before the Earl 
Halifax.204 
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The Court in addition found the warrant had been erroneously executed and therefore 
invalid, in that there was no summons, examination, hearing and proof (that the 
plaintiff was indeed the author of the alleged libel) preceding issuance of the 
warrant.205 Lord Camden wrote the following in striking down the validity of the 
warrant issued by the Earl of Halifax:  
“Our law holds the property of every man sacred that no man can set 
his foot upon his neighbour’s close without leave. If he does, he is a 
trespasser, though he does no damage at all; if he will tread upon his 
neighbour’s ground, he must justify it by law. The defendant’s have no 
right to avail themselves of the usage of these warrants… and that if 
that would have justified them they have not averred it in their plea… 
We can safely say there is no law in this country to justify the 
defendants in what they have done; if there was, it would destroy all 
the comforts of society, for papers are often the dearest property a man 
can have.”206 
Parliamentarian William Pitt enunciated similar sentiments when he wrote “the 
poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all force of the Crown. It may be frail; 
its roof may shake; the wind may blow through it; the storms may enter but the king 
of England cannot enter; all his forces dare not cross the threshold of the ruined 
tenement.” 207 
The 1741 decision of Pope v Curl208 treated a reliance on privacy as an 
unconventional property claim, but stressed the fact that the individual had some form 
of privacy in relation to any information he or she did not wish to share with the 
public.209 In this case, Curl, an enterprising bookseller, unlawfully obtained and 
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published certain letters to and written by well known literary figures, including 
Alexander Pope and Jonathan Swift. Pope successfully obtained an injunction against 
Curl to prevent him from selling the book, entitled Letters from Swift, Pope and 
Others, to the public.210 Subsequently, Curl brought a motion to dissolve the 
injunction against any sales of the book. The question before the court was whether 
the letters contained in the book were protected by an Act aimed at encouraging 
learning and thereby vested ownership of copies of books of printed books in the 
authors of the relevant books or buyers of such books.211 Curl argued that the Act did 
not extend to letters because “…where a man writes a letter, it is in a nature of a gift 
to the receiver.” The Lord Chancellor found to the contrary and wrote: 
 “…it would be extremely mischievous, to make a distinction between 
a book of letters, which comes out into the world, either by permission 
of the writer, or the receiver of them, and any other learned work. The 
same objection would hold against sermons, which the author may 
never intend should be published, but are collected from loose papers, 
and brought out after his death”.212 
 In other words, with regard to letters, the rights of publication remained with the 
sender of the letter and not with the recipient of the letter.213 The Lord Chancellor 
concluded as follows: “It is only in a special property in the receiver, possibly the 
property of the paper may belong to him; but this does not give licence to any person 
whatsoever to publish them to the world, for at most the receiver has only a joint 
property with the writer.”214 
The Yovatt v Winyard215decision is significant in that it not only held that personal 
secrets are inviolable, but took a step further and highlighted that “privacy”, 
“plagiarism” and “unfair competition” were all included under the concept of 
“property”.  The plaintiff in this matter, a proprietor of medicines (what we would 
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today call a pharmacist), had employed the defendant as an assistant or journeyman.216 
In terms of the employment agreement, the defendant would get a salary and be taught 
generally about the business, but excluding the composition of medicines the plaintiff 
sold. The defendant later left their employment of the plaintiff and started his own 
business selling medicines. Thereafter the plaintiff discovered that the defendant, 
while in his employment, had surreptitiously acquired books of recipes and made 
copies of these to make and sell medicines of the same composition as those the 
plaintiff sold.217 The plaintiff therefore sought an injunction to restrain the defendant 
from continuing to produce medicines from the plaintiff’s recipes and selling them.218 
The Lord Chancellor granted the injunction on the ground that there been a breach of 
trust and confidence.219 
Similarly, in Truck v Priester220, the court reinforced an artist’s or author’s right to 
regulate the use of his work in the public domain (as the right to regulate information 
emanating from his person). The plaintiffs in Truck v Priester were art publishers, 
employed by the defendant, a printer based in Berlin, to make copies of a water-
colour drawing called “Sounding the Charge”.  The defendant did this, but also made 
copies of the drawing for himself without the knowledge and consent of the plaintiff, 
and exported some of the copies to England. The plaintiffs subsequently registered 
their copyright in the drawing under the Act 25 & 26 Vict. c. 68.221 After the 
plaintiff’s registration of their copyright in the drawing, the defendant sold some of 
the imported copies in England. On discovering what the defendant had done, the 
plaintiffs claimed penalties, damages and an injunction.  Lord Esher of the Court of 
Appeal held:  
 “A copyright existed in the picture, and, without the consent of the 
proprietors, copies were made by the defendant. By reason of a 
statutory limitation the plaintiffs cannot sue the defendant for making 
copies, because they were made before registration. But I cannot doubt 
that it was absolutely wrong to make copies of that in which another 
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man had the copyright without his consent…But then after the 
defendant goes on and sells the copies which he made before 
registration, and in respect of that sale the plaintiff can recover 
damages.”222 
Lord Esher thus found that the plaintiffs could not recover damages from the 
defendant for making unauthorised copies before registration of their copyright in the 
drawing, but were entitled to damages for the sale of the copies after the registration 
of their copyright in the drawing.223 
The matter of Prince Albert v Strange and Others224 is perhaps the most famous case 
with regard to early privacy protection. The plaintiffs in this matter were the British 
royal couple, Her Majesty Queen Victoria and her husband, Prince Albert. They 
brought an injunction against the reproduction and cataloguing of their etchings and 
drawings. The royal couple sought to restrain the defendant from cataloguing and 
selling reproductions of etchings done by them at a public exhibition without the royal 
couple’s consent.225 The royal couple argued that the etchings were intended for their 
private use and although copies of the etchings were occasionally made they were 
made using a private press and given to personal friends. The defendant’s legal 
counsel argued that the right to privacy was distinct from the right to property:  
“It has been argued that privacy is the essence of property, and that the 
deprivation of privacy would make it, in fact, cease to be 
property…The notion of privacy is a notion altogether distinct from 
that of property; that another man should or should not see it is not 
property. There is no such property as the exclusive rights of seeing 
and talking about property.”226 
Despite this predictive and compelling argument from Strange’s counsel, the court 
found for the royal couple. The case is famous for laying the legal foundation for the 
protection of privacy. The Vice Chancellor wrote in deciding this case: “Every man 
                                               
222637. 
223637. 
2241 McN. & G. 25 (1849). 
225
 Quoted from Ernst and Schwartz Privacy: The Right to be Let Alone (1962) 20. 
226
 Quoted from Ernst and Schwartz Privacy: The Right to be Let Alone (1962) 20. 
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has a fight to keep his own sentiments, if he pleases. He has certainly a right to judge 
whether he will make them public or commit them only to the sight of his friends. In 
that state the manuscript is, in every sense, his peculiar property; and no man can take 
it from him, or make any use of it which he has not authorized, without being guilty of 
a violation of his property.”227 
In summary, it may be said early English cases recognised an element of privacy 
under the general right to property. These cases later contributed to the general 
recognition of the common law right to privacy. The authors Warren and Brandeis 
used some of these cases to advocate the recognition of a common law right to 
privacy in American jurisprudence. 
2.3 GRADUAL AND SPECIFIC PROTECTION OF THE RIGHT 
TO PRIVACY 
The eighteenth century was marked by a handful of countries enacting laws providing 
remedies for specific violations of privacy. The laws protected private property, 
personal and domestic affairs and state held information. However, none of these laws 
provided for a general right to privacy. In 1766 the Swedish Parliament enacted the 
“Access to Public Records Act”, requiring that all state held information be used 
solely for legitimate purposes. This Swedish law granted public access to government 
documents. This law upheld a principle known as offentlighetsprincipen (the principle 
of publicity) which was incorporated into the Swedish Constitution. In 1819 France 
recognised the action for defamation and further prohibited the publication of private 
facts and set out to fine those who broke this law. France took matters a step further in 
1881 and granted the right of reply in a dispute between an individual and the press. 
Norway went on to prohibit the publication of information relating to personal or 
domestic affairs through a criminal statute in 1899.228 
United States courts have, as far back as 1891, interpreted the Constitution as 
implicitly providing for the right to privacy. The Supreme Court in Union Pacific 
Union Pacific R.R Co v Botsford229 stated that “[n]o right is held more sacred, or is 
                                               
227
 Quoted from Ernst and Schwartz Privacy: The Right to be Let Alone (1962) 20. 
228Michael J Privacy and Human Rights: An International and Comparative Study, with Special 
Reference to Developments in Information Technology (1994) 15. 
229141 US 251 11 S.Ct 1000, 35 L.Ed 734 (1891). 
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more carefully guarded by the common law, than the right of every individual to the 
possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference by 
others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of the law”.230 
German jurists at this stage also contributed towards the rise of privacy protection. 
They contributed towards the creation of German law that treated privacy protection 
as an aspect of personality.231 They further endorsed the theory of personality as the 
true theory of freedom and as such, privacy for Germans became a part of “free 
realisation”. It is important to note that during this period Germans had strong 
attachments to notions of honour and respectability. It was therefore not surprising 
that the law of insult played a major role in legal thought. German jurists “accordingly 
embarked on an impressive reinterpretation of ….traditional law: the ancient Roman 
law of insult which they combined with the law of artistic property to create a solid 
foundation for a new body of personality.”232 The German law of personality was 
therefore reinterpreted and its reinterpretation relied on two main strands of law. The 
first strand was the Roman law of insult, which protected all aspects of honour and 
gave protection against verbal insults and other displays of disrespect. The other 
strand, was the law of urheberrecht or droit moral de l”ateur or the creator’s rights, 
which were partly copyright but included “the right to control the use of one’s work, 
in the name of protecting one’s reputation as an artist”.233 Gareis, an influential 
German writer in the late 1870’s, popularized the idea that personality was a mixture 
of the law of insult and the law of artistic creation. In an 1877 article, Gareis argued 
for “a right for the individual to organize his life as he likes a right to a person’s name 
and to his honor”.234 Gareis’s ideas also influenced a number of cases. Of note is a 
case concerning the prohibition of the distribution of pictures depicting Chancellor 
Otto Bismarck on his deathbed. The case resulted in the introduction of statutory 
                                               
230251. 
231Whitman “The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty” (2004) 113 Yale Law 
Journal 13-14.  
232Whitman “The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty” (2004) 113 Yale Law 
Journal 13-14.  
233Whitman “The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty” (2004) 113 Yale Law 
Journal 13-14.  
234Stromholm Right of Privacy (1967) 29. 
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protection of one’s image.235 Otto von Gierke also advanced the recognition of 
personality rights and argued for the “right to be recognized as a personality” and 
“postulated rights to a person’s body and life, liberty, honor, social position, free 
activity, commercial sphere of activity, name and marks and…intellectual 
property.”236 Later Kohler, like Gareis and Gierke, argued for a general right to 
personality. However, Kohler included in his general right to personality the limited 
right of the individual to a sphere of intimacy, to the name and likeness of a person.237 
In 1907, Kohler published an article on literary copyright in which he defines the right 
of secrecy as protecting the publication of letters, a person’s name and likeness and 
private facts. Like the United States authors Warren and Brandeis,238 Kohler referred 
to the case of Prince Albert v Strange239 as the leading case protecting privacy in the 
unauthorized publication of private documents.240 
To sum up, privacy protection at this stage was largely protected on an ad hoc basis 
using existing law. Moreover, there was growing awareness in legal circles that 
privacy had to be more than just a rule, but a protected right. A pronounced protection 
of privacy was only experienced at the end of the Second World War. The end of the 
Second World War and knowledge of the atrocities committed during this war 
resulted in increased awareness of the need to protect human rights, including the 
right to privacy. 
2.4 INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION OF THE RIGHT TO 
PRIVACY 
The collapse of the Fascist and Nazi regimes and the atrocities committed by these 
regimes before and during the Second World War, gave birth to a need to specifically 
protect individual and fundamental human rights at international and regional 
levels.241 Consequently, on December 10, 1948 the United Nations General Assembly 
                                               
235Whitman “The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty” 113 Yale Law Journal 
(2004) 14. 
236Stromholm Right of Privacy (1967) 29. 
237Stromholm Right of Privacy (1967) 31. 
238Warren and Brandeis “The Right to Privacy” 1890 Harvard Law Review 193. See a more detailed 
discussion of this benchmark article in Chapter 3. 
2391 McN. & G. 25 (1849). 
240Stromholm Right of Privacy (1967) 31. 
241Craig Privacy and EmploymentLaw (1999) 5. 
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adopted and proclaimed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as the yardstick 
for human rights protection. The Declaration also serves as the authoritative guide to 
the interpretation of the United Nations Charter of 1945.242 
Article 12 of the Declaration provides: 
1. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, 
home or correspondence, nor attacks on honour or reputation. 
2.  Everyone has the right to the protection of law against such interference or 
attacks.  
Regional protection of the right to privacy is found in numerous treaties,243 including 
the Council of Europe’s European Convention on Human Rights244 (“ECHR”). Article 
8 of the ECHR provides that:  
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and 
his correspondence.  
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this 
right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a 
democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the 
economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, 
for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others.  
                                               
242
 Brownlie and Goodwin-Gill (eds.) Basic Documents on Human Rights 5th ed. (2006) 23. 
243The Organisation of American States (OAS) has two human rights instruments protecting the right to 
privacy, namely, the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (Approved by the Ninth 
International Conference of American States, Bogota, Columbia 1948) and the American Convention 
on Human Rights (also known as the “Pact of San Jose”, adopted in Costa Rica in 1969). The 
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man was the first international human rights 
instrument adopted months after the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The American 
Declaration protects individual honour, reputation, private life, the inviolability of the home and the 
inviolability of correspondence. The Declaration protects privacy in its various articles: Article V. 
Every person has the right to the protection of the law against abusive attacks upon his honour, his 
reputation, and his private life; Article X. Every person has the right to the inviolability of the home; 
Article XI. Every person has the right to inviolability and transmission of his correspondence. The 
American Convention of Human Rights is more elaborate than the American Declaration in its 
provisions. It protects the individual right to dignity and against arbitrary and abusive interferences of 
an individual’s private life, family, home or correspondence. Unlawful attacks on an individual’s 
honour or reputation are also protected. The Convention obligates the state to protect the individual 
against such interferences and attacks. Article 11 of the Convention reads: “Everyone has the right to 
have his honor respected and his dignity recognized. No one may be the object of arbitrary or abusive 
interference with his private life, his family, his home or correspondence, or of unlawful attacks on 
his honor or reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference 
or attacks.” 
244
 Drafted by the Council of Europe in 1950 and came into force on 3 September 1953. 
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The ECHR further created the European Commission on Human Rights and the 
European Court of Human Rights to oversee the enforcement of the ECHR. The 
Commission and the Strasbourg Court have made a number of progressive decisions 
on the meaning and protection of privacy as articulated in Article 8 of the ECHR. One 
of these decisions is X v Iceland245.246 The Commission in X v Iceland held the 
following on the concept of private life: 
“For numerous Anglo-Saxon and French authors the right to respect 
for “private life” is the right to privacy, the right to live as far as one 
wishes, protected from publicity…however, the right to respect for 
private life does not end there. It further comprises, to a certain degree, 
the right to establish and to develop relationships with other human 
beings, especially in the emotional field for the development and 
fulfilment of one’s personality”.247 
The commission added that: 
“…it cannot, however accept the protection afforded by Article 8 of 
the Convention extends to relationships of the individual with his 
entire immediate surroundings, insofar as they do not involve human 
relationships and notwithstanding the desire of the individual to keep 
such as relationship within the private sphere”.248 
The question before the commission was whether the keeping of a dog contrary to the 
relevant provisions in the city of Reykjavik, belongs to “private life” within the 
meaning of Article 8 of the ECHR. The ECHR, unlike the Declaration, is binding, self 
executing and directly affects national legal systems. Where the treaty is incorporated 
into domestic law, it takes precedence over conflicting domestic legislation.249 
On an international level, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights250 
(“ICCPR”) is perhaps the most important international Covenant protecting privacy. 
                                               
245Application No 6825/74, 87. 
246See also Bruggemann and Scheuten v Federal Republic of Germany (1981) 3 E.H.R.R. 244 253. 
247
 87. 
248
 87. 
249
 Gutwirth Privacy and the Information Age (2002) 35. 
250Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by the General Assembly resolution 
2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966, entry into force March 23 1976.  
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Article 17 of the Covenant protecting the privacy of persons is similarly worded to 
Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  Article 17 states that:  
1. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his 
privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor attacks on honour or reputation. 
2.  Everyone has the right to the protection of law against such interference or 
attacks.  
Article 17 does not limit the concept of privacy to individuals but embraces other 
zones of privacy (“kinship” zone of the family and the “physical zone” of the home 
and correspondence).251 Paragraph 1 of Article 17 further prohibits the arbitrary or 
unlawful interference with an individual’s privacy. The term “unlawful” has been 
defined in the General Comment of the Human Rights Committee to mean “that no 
interference can take place except in cases envisaged by the law. Interference 
authorised by States can only [occur] on the basis of law [complying] with the general 
provisions, aims and objectives of the Covenant.” Further, the term “arbitrary 
interference” includes lawful interferences and such interferences have to also comply 
with the provisions, aims and objectives of the Covenant.252 Paragraph 2 of Article 17 
provides for the protection of the law from interference or attacks on one’s privacy. 
The Committee explained that this provision guarantees against all such interferences 
and attacks emanating from both the state and from natural or legal persons. The 
provision also imposes obligations on the state to adopt laws and measures giving 
effect to the prohibition against such interferences and attacks and protection of the 
right.253 Article 17 of the ICCPR is, like Article 8 of the ECHR binding, self – 
executing and directly affects national legal systems.254 
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 Harris and Joseph (eds.) The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and United 
Kingdom Law (1995) 334. 
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2.5 THE PROTECTION OF PRIVACY AT THE DOMESTIC 
LEVEL 
Today a large number of countries recognise the right to privacy explicitly or 
implicitly in their constitutions.255 The constitutional provisions differ from country to 
country. However, at the minimum, these provisions include rights of the inviolability 
of the home and inviolability of communications. Moreover, some countries such as 
South Africa include in their protection of privacy specific rights to access and control 
of one’s personal information. That being said, the protection of privacy at the 
domestic level by various countries can be divided into three categories. The first 
category of countries recognises the existence of a right to privacy and explicitly 
protects the right to privacy in their respective constitutions. Countries in this category 
include the Republic of South Africa256, Belgium257, Finland258, Namibia259, Spain260 
and Switzerland261. The second category of countries recognises the existence of the 
right to privacy and implicitly protects the right to privacy using other constitutional 
rights. Countries such as Germany262, United States263, Brazil264, Canada265, Sweden266, 
Denmark267, Portugal and India fall within this category. The final category is 
                                               
255
 Remarkably, Mexico implicitly recognised the right to privacy in its 1857 Constitution in articles 13 
and 14 and again in its 1917 Constitution in articles 14 and 16. International Commission of Jurists 
“The Legal Protection of Privacy: A Comparative Study of Ten Countries” (1972) 24 International 
Social Science Journal 418. 
256Section 14 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996. 
257Article 22 of the Belgian Constitution of 1970. 
258Section 10 of the Finnish Constitution of 1999. 
259Article 13 of the Namibian Constitution of 1990. 
260Article 18 of the Spanish Constitution of 1978. 
261Article 13 of the Swiss Constitution of 1999. 
262
 Articles 1 (personality right) and 2 (individual right to free development of one’s personality) of  the 
Basic Law of 1949 
2631stAmendment (religion and expression), 3rd Amendment (quartering of soldiers), 4th Amendment 
(search and seizure), 5th Amendment (right of persons), 9th Amendment (unenumerated rights) and 
penumbras of the Bill of Rights. 
264
 Article 5, X (inviolability of privacy, private life, honour and image of person) of the Constitution 
of 1998. 
265
 Sections 7 (right to life, liberty and security of the person) and 8 (protecting against unreasonable 
searches and seizures) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms of 1982. 
266Article 6 (protects citizens against physical searches and examinations of mail and other confidential 
correspondence and against eavesdropping, telephone tapping and recording of confidential 
communications) of the Constitution of 1974. 
267
 Section 72 (guarantees the inviolability of the house, protects against searches and seizures and 
examination of letters and other papers and secrecy in respect of papers and secrecy in respect of 
postal, telephone and telegraph communications) of the Constitution of 1953. 
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comprised of countries in which there is no constitutional protection of the right to 
privacy. Privacy is instead protected by the common law or a specific privacy act or 
through the incorporation of an international instrument. The United Kingdom has no 
constitution, let alone a protected right to privacy, but privacy is protected by the 
common law doctrine of breach of confidence and the incorporation in domestic law 
of Article 8 of the ECHR. Australia, like the United Kingdom, does not have a 
constitutional right to privacy but protects the right to privacy through its Privacy 
Act268. 
International agreements like the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
and the ECHR that recognise the right to privacy have also been adopted into law by 
certain countries, thus buttressing the protection of privacy in those countries. 
2.6 CONCLUSION 
This chapter sought to broadly trace the legal development of privacy protection by 
dividing it into four stages. The “early conceptions of privacy stage” indicated early 
conceptions of privacy did exist, but these were usually overshadowed by the 
communal tradition prevalent in these societies. Moreover, early conceptions differed 
from one society to another and each society defined, structured and delineated 
notions of privacy differently.269 For example, the early conception of privacy in 
Greek society was associated with a refusal or shunning of public office or 
responsibility, whereas the privacy conceptions of Hebrew society were associated 
mostly with religious activities. A consideration of this period further shows that 
remnants of early conceptions of privacy, particularly those formulated during the 
Renaissance period, have filtered into contemporary notions of privacy. During the 
second broad developmental stage – that of  “gradual and specific protection” -  
privacy was protected on an ad hoc basis using existing law in view of the growing 
awareness in legal circles that privacy had to be more than just a principle or value, 
but a protected right. The protection of privacy then went through a third stage – that 
of “international recognition” –where a series of international and regional legal 
instruments (with varying legal effect) expressly recognised and declared respect and 
protection for a fundamental right to privacy. The last stage of development, one we 
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currently find ourselves in, is marked by the seepage of the protection of privacy into 
various national laws and constitutions. 
It is against this background that more detailed attention may be given to the 
regulation of privacy protection in the countries selected for this study (in chapter 3) 
and to use their approach to privacy (see chapter 4) as basis for the evaluation of 
workplace policies and practices on privacy (chapters 5 and further).  
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CHAPTER 3:  
THE DEVELOPMENT OF PRIVACY PROTECTION IN 
SELECTED COUNTRIES 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter sought generally to trace the legal development of privacy 
protection. The present chapter attempts to narrow the broad picture provided in 
chapter 2 by focussing on the legal development of privacy protection in selected 
countries, namely South Africa, the United States and United Kingdom. This will be 
done by considering case law and legislation that has significantly contributed to the 
development of privacy protection in each country. The selection of these countries is 
motivated by the fact that each country presents a different approach to privacy 
protection. South Africa provides for and protects privacy explicitly through its 
Constitution. The United States has found a way to protect privacy through other 
rights in its constitution, even though there is no explicit mention of this right in its 
Constitution. England has no constitution, yet it protects privacy through common law 
principles and absorption of international human rights instruments. To this end, the 
historical and comparative approaches in this chapter, combined with the insights 
gained in the previous chapter, will assist the discussion of a workable definition of 
privacy in chapter 4 as basis for the further discussion in this dissertation. 
3.2 SOUTH AFRICA 
3.2.1 Privacy Protection Prior to the Constitution 
3.2.1.1 Common Law Protection 
South Africa has one of the newest constitutions in the world, which explicitly 
protects a number of rights, including the right to privacy. The right to privacy in 
South Africa enjoys rich and generous protection under both the common law and the 
constitution. However, this dual protection of privacy has not always been in place. 
Prior to both the Interim270 and Final Constitution271 of South Africa, privacy was 
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protected by the common law only. In terms of the common law, every person’s 
“rights to personality”272are protected by the law of personality273, which in turn is 
regarded as part of the law of delict. As early as 1908, Innes CJ, in examining the 
essentials of an injuria, referred to “rights in personality” in R v Umfaan274 as “those 
real rights, those in rem, related to personality, which every free man is entitled to 
enjoy”. 275  The following personality rights are recognised under the common law: the 
right to physical integrity; the right to physical liberty; the right to good name or 
reputation; the right to dignity or honour; the right to privacy and the right to identity. 
The available remedy in defence of these personality rights is the actio iniuriarum. In 
R v Umfaan276, Innes CJ further laid down the elements of an injuria: “…[the] act 
complained of must be wrongful; it must be intentional; and must violate one or other 
of those real rights, those rights in rem, related to personality, which every free man is 
entitled to enjoy”.277 
The idea of an independent right to privacy, distinct from the general personality 
right, initially was not embraced by South African courts.278  For this reason, certain 
                                                                                                                                      
271Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996. 
272Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Neethling’s Law of Personality (1996) 3. 
273
 Gareis is accepted as the “father of the modern law of personality” after he formulated the notion of 
“a general right to personality” in 1877. Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Neethling’s Law of 
Personality (1996) 7. However before 1877, Donellus, Grotius and Wolff had already begun to lay 
the foundation for the concept of personality.  Some legal scholars credit Donellus for the critical 
development of the concept of personality. Donellus divided German private law into two categories: 
the first category consists of rights that are “truly and properly ours” and the second category consists 
of rights owed to us by others, including rights others owe to us as a result of an agreement or delict. 
Grotius proceeded to elaborate on the elements constituting personality and to what extent those 
elements may be alienated. Grotius asserted that a person could take another’s property where this is 
necessary to preserve life or to obtain “the things without which life cannot be comfortably lived” 
such as food, clothing, water and medicine”. Wolff wrote that “man’s nature is to seek his perfection; 
we are obliged to do what is necessary for us to do; therefore we are obliged to seek our perfection 
and, because we are all connected to one another, the perfection of one person is tied to that of all 
others [and for this reason] whoever seeks to make himself as perfect as possible seeks also what 
others seek and desires nothing at their expense.” Like Grotius, Wolff considered the right to one’s 
life, body, bodily integrity, one’s good reputation and honour as natural rights. However Wolff 
developed this group of inherent rights by including other rights such as inter alia the right to food, 
drink and medical care. Finkin “The Comparative Historical and Philosophical Context: 
Menschenbild: The Conception of the Employee as a Person in Western Law” (2002) 23 
Comparative Labour Law and Policy Journal  577 605. 
274R v Umfaan 1908 TS 62. 
275
 At 66. 
276R v Umfaan 1908 TS 62. 
277
 At 66. 
278
 In Germany the right to privacy is a fundamental part of a person’s general personality right (das 
allgemeines Personlichkeitsrecht) and as such privacy and personality are indistinguishable. Klotzel  
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judgments limited the concept of dignitas279 to dignity or honour280 and self - respect281 
and were further reluctant to recognise the existence of an independent right to 
privacy. In limiting the concept of dignitas to dignity or honour, these decisions made 
insult or contumelia a requirement of the injuria.282 This view of dignitas was also 
accepted in certain criminal law283 and private law284 decisions.285 
                                                                                                                                      
International Privacy, Publicity & Personality Laws (2001) 157. The German general personality 
right has been described as [the] “right to be respected as a person, not to have one’s individuality 
infringed, in one’s right to express oneself (in appearance, writing, and speech), in one’s social 
standing (honour), and in private and intimate spheres of one’s existence.” Finkin “The Comparative 
Historical and Philosophical Context: Menschenbild: The Conception of the Employee as a Person in 
Western Law” (2002) 23 Comparative Labour Law and Policy Journal 577 581. Privacy as a part of 
the general right to personality has been described as “a person’s life at home, within his or her 
family and their private life not only within their own four walls but also – depending on the 
circumstances outside”. Other aspects of the German general right to personality are the individual 
sphere (individualsphare) which protects the personality and the freedom of self-determination and 
the intimate sphere (intimsphare) protecting a person’s thoughts, emotions and their various forms of 
expression. The intimsphare also protects information about an individual’s personal health or 
intimate life. Klotzel International Privacy, Publicity & Personality Laws (2001) 158. 
279
 Innes CJ defined “dignitas” in R v Umfaan 1908 T.S. 62 67 as per Melius de Villiers in The Roman 
and Roman Dutch Law of Injuries (1899) “Every person has an inborn right to tranquil enjoyment of 
his peace of mind, secure against aggression upon his person, against the impairment of that character 
for moral and social worth to which he might rightly lay claim, and of that respect and esteem of his 
fellow men which he is deserving, an against degrading and humiliating treatment; and there is a 
corresponding obligation incumbent on all others to refrain from assailing that to which he has such a 
right.” Innes CJ further discussed the “species” of injuria affecting dignity and why this “species” of 
actions were classified as injuria: “As affecting dignity …insults to chastity…such as indecent 
proposals to a woman; forcible and wrongful intrusion into the [another’s] house was looked upon as 
an injuria, not because it was trespass on the property, but because it was a violation of family 
sanctity of that peace and dignity which a free man was entitled to enjoy.” R v Umfaan 1908 T.S. 62 
67 – 68. 
280
 Botha AJ S v A 1971 (2) SA 293 (T) 297 H accepted  that the recognition of a right to privacy as an 
independent personality right but clouded this recognition by restricting dignitas to dignity or honour 
thereby also negating the existence of an independent  right to privacy. Botha AJ, in addition, stated 
the defendants had intent (dolus eventualis) and must have foreseen that the plaintiff would be 
insulted or hurt by their recklessness. The defendants were charged with bugging the plaintiff’s 
apartment. S v A 1971 (2) SA 293 (T) 299 F. 
281
 For example in R v Holiday 1927 CPD 395 401 the accused was charged with spying on a woman 
while she was undressing through a skylight. Gardiner JP held that “…among the rights of 
personality to which under our civilisation a woman is entitled, is the right to privacy in regard to her 
body…this right was violated in this present case by the accused.” Gardiner JP further held that for 
injuria there must be animus injuriandi “[b]ut this does not mean there must be the intention to 
convey to the mind of the woman the insult”. The intention required according to Gardiner JP is “the 
intention to do the insulting.” R v Holiday 1927 CPD 395 402.Neethling is of the view that by 
requiring that the intention to do insulting be present, Gardiner JP equated dignitas to “self-respect”. 
Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Neethling’s Law of Personality (1996) 7 footnote 34. 
282
 For example Stoffberg v Elliot 1923 CPD 148 (A) 152 Watermeyer J stated “The rule is that unless 
there is an element of insult …then the plaintiff cannot recover unless he proves some actual damage, 
that pecuniary loss or pain and suffering.” See also Walker v Van Wezel 1940 W.L.D. 66 70 in which 
Ramsbottom J concluded “In considering the meaning of the words which are alleged to constitute a 
verbal injury to dignity…the words complained of must be injurious in their natural meaning or in 
such other meaning as they may derive from special circumstances; and where a special meaning is 
attributed to the words the circumstances in which they are said to bear such meaning must be alleged 
and proved. A declaration which alleges the use of words which are incapable of bearing a meaning 
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The locus classicus for the recognition of an independent right to privacy in South 
African is O’Keeffe v Argus Printing and Publishing Co Ltd.286 The plaintiff in O’ 
Keefe, an unmarried woman, brought the actio iniuriarum for the unauthorised use of 
her photograph and name in an advertisement for a company distributing rifles, pistols 
revolvers and ammunition.287 The plaintiff brought the action on the basis that the 
advertisement had violated her dignity or dignitas. The defendant argued that insult 
had to be present in an injuria. Watermeyer AJ preferred to take the view that whether 
an act involves “an insult, indignity, humiliation or vexation depends…upon the 
modes of thought prevalent amongst any particular community or at any period of 
time, or upon those of different classes or grades of society, and the question must be 
left to the discretion of the Court where an action…is brought”.288 In determining 
whether “the plaintiff can be reasonably held to have been subjected to offensive, 
degrading or humiliating treatment” Watermeyer JA considered “modern conditions 
and thought” (namely English and American jurisprudence on the use of a person’s 
name and photograph without consent) and concluded that “[t]he unauthorised 
publication of a person’s photograph and name for advertising purposes [constitutes] 
an aggression upon the person’s dignitas”.289 Neethling criticises the O’Keeffe 
decision for failing to offer a comprehensive definition of privacy, resulting in 
“identity as a personality right [being] equated with privacy”.290 The view of privacy 
                                                                                                                                      
injurious to dignity in either their primary sense or in the circumstances alleged does not disclose a 
cause of action is open to exception”. 
283In R v S 1955 (3) SA 313 (SWA) Hofmeyer AJ stressed the requirement of intent to insult and 
impair one’s dignity in finding the defendant’s act “wrongful and … in contempt of the 
complainant’s personal rights of security, privacy and dignity”. R v S 1955 (3) SA 313 (SWA) 315. 
284
 For instance in Mhlongo v Bailey 1958 (1) SA 370 (W) the issue before the court was whether the 
unauthorised publication of photographs in a popular magazine constituted an aggression upon a 
person’s dignitas. The court found that certain factors should be taken into account in determining the 
issue but further stated that “The remedy [if the photographs are found to constitute an aggression 
upon the plaintiff’s dignitas] should be given only when the words or conduct …involves an element 
of degradation, insult or contumelia”. Mhlongo v Bailey 1958 (1) SA 370 (W) 372 H. 
285Neethling Potgieter and Visser Neethling’s Law of Personality (1996) 7 footnote 34 and 35.  
286O’Keeffe v Argus Printing and Publishing Co Ltd 1954 (3) SA 1954 (3) SA 244 (C). The appellate 
court in Jansen Van Vuuren v Kruger 1993 4 SA 842 (A) also found that the actio iniuriarum protects 
a person’s dignitas and dignitas embraces privacy.  
287Even after the O’Keefe decision the view that the right to the right to privacy should only be 
protected where the intention to insult still found favour in certain decisions. See also Kidson v SA 
Associated Newspapers Ltd 1957 (3) SA 461.  
288Watermeyer AJ referring to Melius de Villiers in The Roman and Roman Dutch Law of Injuries 
(1899).O’Keeffe v Argus Printing and Publishing Co Ltd 1954 (3) SA 244 (C) 248 C -D 
289O’Keeffe v Argus Printing and Publishing Co Ltd 1954 (3) SA 244 (C) 249 D. 
290Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Neethling’s Law of Personality (1996) 240 footnote 20. 
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as an independent right of personality was firmly established in subsequent 
decisions.291 
The current view of the South African common law on privacy is twofold: first, the 
equation of privacy with dignity and identity is outdated and, secondly, privacy is an 
independent personality right.292 Moreover, courts are willing to have regard to the 
“prevailing boni mores” (public opinion) in deciding whether particular 
encroachments constitute a serious impairment of an individual’s dignitas. In S v A293 
two private detectives placed a listening device under the dressing table of the 
complainant at the request of her estranged spouse. The court found the two private 
detectives liable for invading the complainant’s privacy. In reaching this decision, 
Botha AJ reiterated that the right to privacy is included in the concept of dignitas294 
and further that the “infringement of a person’s privacy prima facie constitutes an 
impairment of his dignitas”.295 Botha AJ concluded that the punishment meted out in 
response to a particular encroachment on dignitas is dependent on the “time”, “place”, 
“modes of thought and ways of life prevalent amongst a particular community.” In 
applying this to the facts, it was found that “encroachment on a person’s privacy by… 
a private detective, by means of planting a [listening] device in his apartment and 
listening on his conversations…[amounts] to a serious impairment of [such a person’s 
dignitas]”.296 
Courts are also willing to weigh up competing interests in determining the 
unlawfulness of a factual infringement of a person’s right to privacy. For example, in 
S v I 297, the Appellate Division of Rhodesia found an estranged wife and a private 
detective employed by her not guilty of crimen injuria after they peeped into her 
husband’s room at night. Although the court found their actions in this regard 
                                               
291
 See for example Mr and Mrs “X” v Rhodesia and Publishing Co Ltd 1974 (4) SA 508 (R) and 
Financial Mail v Sage Holdings 1993 (2) SA 451 (A) and Jansen van Vuuren v Kruger 1993 (4) SA 
842 (A).  
292
 The Constitutional Court in Bernstein v Bester 1996 (2) SA 751 accepted that the common law 
recognized the right to privacy as an independent personality right included within the broader 
concept of dignitas.  
293S v A 1971 (2) SA 293. 
294S v A 1971 (2) SA 293 297 H. 
295S v A 1971 (2) SA 293 297 D. 
296S v A 1971 (2) SA 293 299. 
297S v I 1976 (1) SA 781 (RA). 
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amounted to an invasion of privacy, this invasion was seen to be justified given that 
these actions were done with the bona fide intention of obtaining evidence of her 
husband’s adultery. According to Corbett CJ, the court weighed the husband’s privacy 
interest against the wife’s interest in obtaining evidence of her husband’s adultery.298 
The cases of S v A and S v I highlight the grey area between justifiable and 
unjustifiable actions.299 
In Financial Mail (Pty) Ltd v Sage Holdings Ltd,300 Corbett CJ identified two ways in 
which the right to privacy can be breached: through the unlawful intrusion upon the 
personal privacy of another and  the unlawful disclosure of a person’s private facts.301 
The court moreover held that the unlawfulness of a breach of privacy is determined by 
the prevailing boni mores and a general sense of justice perceived by the 
community.302 Nonetheless, in National Media Ltd v Jooste,303 the court cautioned that 
personal facts are not necessarily private facts. Private facts for the court encompassed 
only those facts “whose disclosure will cause mental distress and injury to anyone 
possessed of ordinary feelings and intelligence…”.304 The court further agreed with 
the Financial Mail decision in that the unlawfulness of a factual infringement of a 
person’s right to privacy should be determined by taking into consideration the 
competing interests, contemporary boni mores and the community’s general sense of 
justice.305 The National Media decision defined privacy as “[encompassing] the 
competence to determine the destiny of private facts…The individual concerned is 
entitled to dictate the ambit of disclosure…[and] may prescribe the purpose and 
method of the disclosure…”.306 
                                               
298Financial Mail (Pty) Ltd v Sage Holdings Ltd 1993 (2) SA 451 (A) 462 H – J. 
299Van Niekerk “The Right to Privacy in Employment” (1994) 3 Contemporary Labor Law 105. 
300Financial Mail (Pty) Ltd v Sage Holdings Ltd 1993 (2) SA 451 (A) 1993 (2) SA 451 (A). 
301Financial Mail (Pty) Ltd v Sage Holdings Ltd 1993 (2) SA 451 (A) 462 E – F. 
302Financial Mail (Pty) Ltd v Sage Holdings Ltd 1993 (2) SA 451 (A) 462 E – F. In other words “in 
demarcating the boundary between lawfulness and unlawfulness , the court will have regard to the 
particular facts of the case and judge them in light of the contemporary bona mores and the general 
sense of justice of the community as perceived by the court.” Van Niekerk “The Right to Privacy in 
Employment” (1994) 3 Contemporary Labor Law 105. 
303National Media Ltd v Jooste 1996 (3) SA 262 (A) 270 I –J. 
304Supra. 
305National Media Ltd v Jooste 1996 (3) SA 262 (A) 270 I –J. 
306National Media Ltd v Jooste 1996 (3) SA 262 (A) 271 G – H. 
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The Constitutional Court, in discussing the common law right to privacy, has pointed 
out the following examples of wrongful intrusion and disclosure which have come 
before the courts: illegal entry into a private residence,307 eavesdropping on private 
conversations,308 secretly watching a person undress, 309disclosure of private facts 
acquired by a wrongful act of intrusion, 310and the disclosure of private facts in breach 
of a confidential relationship311. 312 
Prior to the adoption of the Interim Constitution, courts recognised the right to privacy 
as one of the personality rights - “those real rights, those rights in rem related to 
personality, which every free man is entitled to enjoy”313. The courts further regarded 
the invasion of privacy as an impairment of dignitas. Despite recognising the 
existence of the right to privacy, the courts did not expressly attempt to define the 
concept of privacy. Some academics have attempted to offer general definitions of the 
right to privacy, but most of the definitions, according to McQuoid – Mason, were 
synonymous with amongst others “solitude”, “anonymity and reserve”, “intimacy” 
and “being let alone”.314 The definitions, more importantly, also failed to give 
guidance on “the circumstances in which the courts will consider a breach of that right 
as an actionable invasion of privacy”.315 
3.2.2 Constitutional Protection of Privacy 
3.2.2.1 Interim Constitution 
Sachs J described South Africa before the enactment of the Interim Constitution as a 
place where “generations of systemised and egregious violations of personal privacy 
established norms of disrespect for citizens that seeped generally into public 
administration and promoted amongst a great many officials habits and practices 
                                               
307S v I 1976 (1) SA 781 (RA). 
308S v A 1971 (2) SA 293. 
309R v Holiday 1927 CPD 395. 
310Financial Mail (Pty) Ltd v Sage Holdings Ltd 1993 (2) SA 451 (A). 
311Jansen Van Vuuren v Kruger 1993 4 SA 842 (A). 
312Bernstein v Bester 1996 (2) SA 751 789 D – E. See also Woolman, Roux, Klaaren, Stein, 
Chaskalson and Bishop Constitutional Law of South Africa 2nded. (2005) 38 – 7. 
313S v A 1971 (2) SA 293 297. 
314
 McQouid – Mason The Law of Privacy in South Africa (1978) 98 – 99. 
315
 McQouid – Mason The Law of Privacy in South Africa (1978) 98 – 99. 
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inconsistent with the standards of conduct required by the Bill of Rights”.316 The new 
(Interim) Constitution “accordingly requires us to repudiate the past practices which 
were repugnant to the new constitutional values, while at the same time re-affirming 
and building on those that were inconsistent with these values”.317 
In 1993 South Africa enacted its first democratic Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa, Act 200 of 1993. The Bill of Rights provided for a right to privacy in 
section 13. Section 13 read as follows:  
“Every person shall have the right to his or her personal privacy, which 
shall include the right not to be subject to searches of his or her person, 
home or property, the seizure of private possessions or the violation of 
private communications”. 
Section 13 of the Interim Constitution reinforced the importance of a right to 
privacy318 and further enjoined courts to consider its provisions in deciding matters 
affecting privacy. The Interim Constitution also had direct and indirect application. 
That is to say, the right to privacy in the Interim Constitution applied with regard to 
state action and private law disputes.319 
3.2.2.2 Final Constitution 
The Final Constitution320 provides in section 14:  
“Everyone has the right to privacy, which shall include the right not to have; 
a) their person or home searched; 
b) their property searched; 
c) their possessions seized; or 
d) the privacy of their communications infringed.”321 
There are no substantive differences between the privacy provisions in both 
constitutions. The first part of section14 guarantees a general right to privacy and the 
second part protects against specific breaches of privacy. The use of the word 
                                               
316Mistry v Interim Medical and Dental Council of South 1998 (4) SA 1127 1143 B. 
317Mistry v Interim Medical and Dental Council of South 1998 (4) SA 1127 1143 C. 
318Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Neethling’s Law of Personality (1996) 239. 
319Supra. 
320Section 14 of Act 108 of 1996. 
321Section 14 of Act 108 of 1996. 
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“include” in the second part of section 14 indicates that the specific breaches listed are 
not a closed list and accommodates other unlisted breaches of privacy.322 Moreover 
the second part of section 14 is part and parcel of the first part, the general right to 
privacy.323 
Section 2 of the Constitution provides for the supremacy of the Constitution. It 
expressly provides that the Constitution is the supreme law of South Africa and any 
law, or conduct inconsistent with the Constitution is invalid. This means that the Bill 
of Rights is applicable to all law, including the right to privacy.324 The Bill of Rights 
further binds the state and therefore has vertical application. The Bill also binds 
natural and juristic persons and for this reason has horizontal application. The vertical 
and horizontal application of the Bill can be direct or indirect. The direct vertical 
application of the Constitution requires the state to respect the fundamental rights 
housed in the Bill of Rights unless such an infringement is reasonable and justifiable 
in terms of the limitations clause in section 36 of the Constitution. Direct horizontal 
application requires the courts to give effect to specific fundamental rights in applying 
and developing the common law where legislation fails to do as such. Indirect 
application of the Bill of requires that all rules, principles or norms be subjected to 
and construed in light of the spirit, object and purport of the Bill of Rights.325 
The obligation on the courts to develop the common law does not, however, mean that 
courts can alter the common law without first considering inter alia whether such 
development is necessary and the manner in which it should occur.326 It means that the 
court has to “retain those existing common law actions which are in harmony with the 
values of the Constitution”.327 The Constitutional Court, in Bernstein v Bester 
cautioned against projecting “common law principles onto the interpretation of 
                                               
322Devenish A Commentary on the South African Bill of Rights (1999) 138. 
323
 Currie and de Waal Bill of Rights Handbook  5th ed. (2005) 141. 
324
 Chaskalson in Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa 2000 (2) SA 674 (CC) 
698 reinforced the supremacy of the Constitution by stating  “There is…only one system of law and 
within that system the Constitution is the supreme law which all other law must comply.” 
325South African Law Reform Commission Privacy and Data Protection Project 124 Discussion Paper 
109 October 2005. 
326
 Roos The Law of Data (Privacy) Protection: A Comparative and Theoretical Study(2003) 548 
Thesis Submitted at the University of  South Africa 548. 
327
 Woolman, Roux, Klaaren, Stein, Chaskalson and Bishop Constitutional Law of South Africa 2nd ed. 
(2005) 38 - 42. 
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fundamental rights and their limitation…”. The Court differentiated between the 
common law action for invasion of privacy and the constitutional protection of the 
right to privacy. The former, according to the Court, entails a single policy based 
inquiry into whether there has been an unlawful infringement of privacy, while the 
latter entails a dual inquiry into whether the conduct has infringed the constitutional 
right to privacy and, if so, whether the infringement is justifiable in terms of the 
limitations clause.328 The infringement of the constitutional right to privacy is 
established where a subjective expectation of privacy that society considers 
objectively reasonable exists and the justifiability of the infringement is established by 
weighing the individual’s privacy against competing fundamental rights.329 
Section 14 of the Constitution has in effect done the following for the protection of 
privacy: 
1. It has bolstered the existing protection of privacy provided by the common 
law;  
2. It has sealed the status of privacy as an independent and fundamental right;  
3. It has provided for a general right to privacy; 
4. It has created new classes of privacy rights. The new classes of rights created 
by the constitutional are substantive and informational privacy rights. 
Substantive privacy rights protect “personal autonomy” whereas informational 
privacy rights “prevent [disclosure] and access to information”. 
5. It requires courts to develop the common law right to privacy. The 
Constitution enjoins the courts to develop the common law with regard to the 
spirit, purport and object of the Bill of Rights. As previously indicated, this 
means the courts have to retain those common law principles which are in line 
with the Constitution and alter those principles viewed as contrary to the 
values of the Constitution. 330 
                                               
328Woolman, Roux, Klaaren, Stein, Chaskalson and Bishop Constitutional Law of South Africa 2nd ed. 
(2005) 38-21. 
329Supra. 
330Devenish A Commentary on the South African Bill of Rights (1999) 147. See also  
Woolman, Roux, Klaaren, Stein, Chaskalson and Bishop Constitutional Law of South Africa 2nd ed. 
(2005) 38-19. 
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3.2.2.3 Constitutional Court Decisions on the Right to Privacy 
The Constitutional Court has decided a number of cases on the right to privacy, which 
decisions have related to the possession of obscene material,331 the general scope of 
privacy in society,332 sexual orientation,333 searches,334 and in challenging the statutory 
prohibition of prostitution.335 
The Constitutional Court has not as yet dealt with the right to privacy in the 
employment context. The general tenor of the constitutional court as regards privacy 
is that the right to privacy merits respect given its explicit mention in the Constitution. 
However, respect of the right does not mean that it cannot be limited where it is in 
conflict with societal interests. The Constitutional Court has also linked the right to 
privacy to other core rights such as human dignity336 and autonomous identity337 
equality338. 
3.2.2.3.1 Bernstein v Bester 
Bernstein v Bester remains the locus classicus on the constitutional right to privacy. 
Although the decision concerned the Interim Constitution, the decision represents the 
“richest and most comprehensive interpretation of the right to privacy” provided by a 
South African court.339 The issue before the court in Bernstein was the 
constitutionality of sections 417 and 418 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973, providing 
for the examination of persons and the disclosure of documents on company affairs. 
The applicants contended that section 417 and section 418 were unconstitutional on a 
number of grounds. One argument was that these sections violated a cluster of 
interrelated and overlapping constitutional rights, inter alia the right to privacy in 
section 13 of the Interim Constitution. More specifically, the applicants argued that 
section 417 and section 418 of the Companies Act of 1968 violated the privacy of a 
witness by forcing the witness to disclose books and documents the witness would 
                                               
331Case v Minister of safety and Security 1996 (3) SA 165 (CC). 
332Bernstein v Bester NO 1996 (2) SA 751 (CC). 
333National Coalition for Lesbian and Gay Equality v Minister of Justice 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC). 
334Mistry v Interim Medical and Dental Council of South Africa 1998 (4) SA 1127 (CC). 
335S v Jordan 2002 (6) SA 642 (CC). 
336Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences v Hyundai Motor Distributors Pty Ltd: In re 
Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Smit NO 2001 (1) SA 545 (CC). 
337Bernstein v Bester NO 1996 (2) SA 751 (CC). 
338National Coalition for Lesbian and Gay Equality v Minister of Justice 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC). 
339
 De Waal and Currie Bills of Rights Handbook 5thed (2005) 14.2 – 14.3. 
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under normal circumstances like to keep undisclosed and confidential. The applicants 
further argued that the compulsory production of documents under section417 
constituted a seizure within the meaning of section 13.340 Ackerman J reasoned: 
“The truism that no right is to be considered absolute, implies that from 
the outset of interpretation each right is always already limited to every 
other right accruing to another citizen. In the context of privacy this 
would mean that it is only the inner sanctum of a person, such as his or 
her family life, sexual preferences and home environment, which is 
shielded from erosion by conflicting rights of the community. This 
implies that community rights and the rights of fellow members place a 
corresponding obligation on a citizen, thereby shaping the abstract 
notion of individualism towards identifying a concrete member of civil 
society. Privacy is acknowledged in the truly personal realm, but as a 
person moves into communal relations and activities such as business 
and social interaction, the scope of personal space shrinks 
accordingly”.341 
Ackerman J further found that the scope of privacy is “closely related to the concept 
of identity” and rights like the right to privacy are not based on the notion of the 
unencumbered self, but on the notion of what is necessary to have one’s own 
autonomous identity. Bernstein, as the first Constitutional Court judgement to 
interpret the constitutional right to privacy, viewed the right to privacy as a subjective 
expectation that society must consider reasonable. The judgment further established a 
reasonable expectation of privacy existed in the “inner sanctum” and the “truly 
personal realm”,342 but acknowledged that privacy concerns may diminish depending 
on the activities of persons. This is of particular importance with regard to privacy in 
employment. 
                                               
340Bernstein v Bester NO 1996 (2) SA 751 (CC) 784 I – J and 785 A. 
341Bernstein v Bester NO 1996 (2) SA 751 (CC) 784 E - F. 
342De Waal and Currie Bills of Rights Handbook 5thed. (2005) 143. 
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3.2.2.3.2 Mistry v Interim Dental Council of South Africa 
Mistry v Interim Dental Council of South Africa343 concerned section 28 (1) of the 
Medicines and Related Substances Control Act 101 of 1965, which granted inspectors 
of medicines the authority to enter and inspect any premises, place, vehicle, vessel or 
aircraft in which they reasonably believe medicines or substances regulated by the Act 
are housed. The section further authorised these inspectors to seize any books, records 
or documents found in such premises, place, vehicle, vessel or aircraft. The 
applicant’s surgery in Mistry was searched and numerous items seized by 
investigating officers of the Interim Medical and Dental Council of South Africa. At 
issue was the constitutionality of the said section 28(1) of the Act and whether the 
communication of information by one of the investigators to the inspector of 
medicines, or the manner in which the search was conducted, constituted a breach of 
the applicant’s right to privacy. As to the nature of the right to privacy and its 
importance in an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality, the 
court held that “[t]he existence of safeguards to regulate the way in which State 
officials may enter the private domains of ordinary citizens is one of the features that 
distinguish a constitutional democracy from a police state”.344 The Court also held that 
the degree of privacy that a citizen can reasonably expect would vary significantly 
according to the activity that brings him or her in contact with the state.345 The Court 
further observed: 
“[t]the more public the undertaking and the more closely regulated, the 
more attenuated would the right to privacy [be] and the less intense 
[the] invasion” and “[i]n the case of any regulated enterprise, 
proprietor’s expectation of privacy with regard to the premises, 
equipment, materials and records must be attenuated by the obligation 
to comply with reasonable regulations and to tolerate the 
administrative inspections that are an inseparable part of an effective 
regime of regulation”.346 
                                               
343Mistry v Interim Dental Council of South Africa  1998  (4) SA 1127 (CC). 
343S v Jordan 2002 (6) SA 642 (CC). 
344Mistry v Interim Dental Council of South Africa 1998  (4) SA 1127 (CC) 1142 E. 
345Mistry v Interim Dental Council of South Africa 1998  (4) SA 1127 (CC) 1144 C. 
346Mistry v Interim Dental Council of South Africa 1998  (4) SA 1127 (CC) 1145 A. 
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According to the court, in modern industrial society many activities that individuals 
engage in are regulated by the state to ensure that the individual’s pursuits are 
compatible with those of the community.347 Hence, the limitation imposed on the right 
to privacy by the Act protected the general public and honest health professionals:  
“People involved in such undertakings must be taken to know from the 
outset that their activities will be monitored. If they are licensed to 
function in a competitive environment, they accept as a condition of 
their licence that they will adhere to the same reasonable controls as 
are applicable to their competitors. Members of professional bodies, 
for example, share an interest in seeing to it that the standards, 
reputation and integrity of their professions are maintained”.348 
The court concluded that the communication by one of the investigating officers to the 
inspector of medicines had not been a violation of the applicant’s right to privacy for a 
number of reasons. These include: the information communicated had been 
volunteered by a member of the public and not obtained in an obtrusive manner; the 
information related to the way in which the applicant conducted his medical practice 
and did not concern intimate aspects of the applicant’s personal life; the information 
had not been communicated to the press or general public or other persons the 
applicants could reasonably have expected that such information should be withheld 
from but had been communicated to persons charged with carrying out the regulatory 
inspections; and the information constituted information that led to the search and not 
information from a search.349 
3.2.2.3.3 Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences v Hyundai Motor 
Distributors 
In contrast to the Bernstein and Mistry decisions, Investigating Directorate: Serious 
Economic Offences v Hyundai Motor Distributors 350 was decided under the Final 
Constitution. At issue was whether section 28(13) and section 28 (14) read with 
section 29 (5) of the National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998 was inconsistent 
                                               
347Mistry v Interim Dental Council of South Africa 1998  (4) SA 1127 (CC) 1145 B – C. 
348Supra. 
349Mistry v Interim Dental Council of South Africa 1998 (4) SA 1127 (CC) 1155 B – D, 1155 F – G and 
1156 C. 
350Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences v Hyundai Motor Distributors 2001 (1) SA 
545. 
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with the Final Constitution, specifically whether these provisions authorising the 
seizure of documents, records and data breached the right to privacy in section 14 of 
the Constitution. Langa DP held that section 14 does not only relate to the “truly 
personal realm” or “inner sanctum”. In other words individuals still retained their 
privacy when venturing outside the “truly personal realm” or “inner sanctum”: 
“Thus when people are in their offices, in their cars or on mobile 
telephones, they retain the right to be left alone by the state unless 
certain conditions are satisfied. Wherever a person has the ability to 
decide what he or she reveals to the public, the expectation that such a 
decision warrants respect is reasonable and the right to privacy comes 
into play”.351 
The Court further stated: “[p]rivacy is a right which becomes intense the closer it 
moves to the intimate personal sphere of the life of human beings, and less intense as 
it moves away from the core”.352 The court also held that juristic persons enjoyed 
some right to privacy although “their privacy rights cannot be as intense as those of 
human beings”.353 
3.2.2.3.4 National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice 
The Constitutional Court, in National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v 
Minister of Justice,354 considered the constitutional validity of the common law 
blanket prohibition on sodomy criminalising sexual intercourse between men. The 
court held that the criminalisation of sodomy infringed the right to privacy. 
Ackermann J stated that: 
“privacy recognises that we all have a right to a sphere of private 
intimacy and autonomy, which allows us to establish and nurture 
human relations without interference from the outside community. The 
way in which we give expression to our sexuality is at the core of this 
area of private intimacy. If in expressing our sexuality, we act 
                                               
351Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences v Hyundai Motor Distributors 2001 (1) SA 
545 557 B - C. 
352Supra. 
353Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences v Hyundai Motor Distributors 2001 (1) SA 
545 557 F. 
354National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice 1999 (1) SA 6. 
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consensually and without harming one another, invasion of that 
precinct will be a breach of privacy”.355 
Sachs J, in a separate concurring judgment, rejected the idea that the privacy argument 
reinforces the view “that homosexuality is shameful and [deserves protection only 
when confined to the private bedroom]” for two reasons: first, the argument “subjects 
equality and privacy rights to inappropriate sequential order” and second, “it 
undervalues the scope and significance of privacy rights”.356 Sachs J held in this 
regard that rights cannot be compartmentalised or ranked: 
“equality and privacy cannot be separated, because they are both 
violated by anti – sodomy laws…such laws deny equal respect for 
difference, which lies at the heart of equality, and become the basis for 
the invasion of privacy.”.357 
Sachs J also pointed out that “privacy protects people not places” and this right to be 
left alone is not merely “a negative right to occupy a space free from government 
intrusion” but is also a right to get on with your life, express your personality and 
make fundamental decisions about your intimate relationships without penalisation.358 
Privacy, according to Sachs J further imposes a duty in creating an environment in 
which personal realisation can thrive.359 He concluded that although privacy was 
violated by anti – sodomy law, this did not mean that the “the concept of privacy 
should be extended to give blanket libertarian permission for people to do anything 
they like provided that what they do is sexual and is done in private”.360 
3.2.2.3.5 S v Jordan 
The applicants in S v Jordan361 contested the prohibition on prostitution contained in 
section 2 and section 20 (1) of the Sexual Offences Act 23 of 1957. The Court 
supported the reasoning of Sachs J in National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian 
                                               
355National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice 1999 (1) SA 6 30 B. 
356National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice 1999 (1) SA 6  57 E – F. 
357National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice 1999 (1) SA 6  60 D – E. 
358National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice 1999 (1) SA 6  60 D – E. 
359National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice 1999 (1) SA 6  61 A. 
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Equality v Minister of Justice by holding that “the law may continue to proscribe what 
is acceptable and what is unacceptable even in relation to sexual expression and even 
in the sanctum of the home, and may within justifiable limits, penalise what is 
harmful and regulate what is offensive”.362 Ngcobo J stated that “a person who 
commits a crime in private, the nature of which can only be committed in private can 
necessarily claim [a right of privacy]. What compounds the difficulty is that the 
prostitute invites the public generally to come and engage in unlawful conduct in 
private. The law should be as concerned with crimes that are committed in private as 
it is with crimes that are committed in public.” 363 Ngcobo J distinguished the facts in 
S v Jordan from those in National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister 
of Justice in that S v Jordan concerned the commercial exploitation of sex which 
involves neither an infringement of dignity nor unfair discrimination.364 
3.2.3 Summary 
In summary, the preceding discussion on the legal protection of privacy in South 
African has shown that prior to the adoption of the Interim Constitution, South 
African courts recognised the right to privacy as one of the bundle of personality 
rights - “those real rights, those rights in rem related to personality, which every free 
man is entitled to enjoy”.365 The courts further regarded the invasion of privacy as an 
impairment of dignitas. Despite recognising the existence of the right to privacy, the 
courts did not expressly attempt to define the concept of privacy. Attempts by 
academics to offer general definitions yielded unsatisfactory results and failed to point 
the courts towards circumstances in which they should regard the breach of privacy as 
an actionable invasion. 
Privacy is still not defined in the Constitution, but the Constitutional Court did 
initially (in deciding cases under the Constitutional dispensation) speak of protection 
of the “inner sanctum” and “truly personal realm” and by relating privacy to the 
concept of identity (and thus individualising privacy). Under the Final Constitution, 
the Constitutional Court has still not ventured to define privacy and seems to accept 
that privacy is “an amorphous and elusive concept” and as such difficult to define. 
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Even so it has continued to build on the nature of right by linking it with additional 
concepts such as human dignity366 and equality367. Ackermann J explained privacy in 
National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice as “a right to a 
sphere of private intimacy and autonomy, which allows us to establish and nurture 
human relations without interference from the outside community”.368 Perhaps most 
importantly for purposes of the further discussion, the Court has further concluded 
that privacy becomes less intense as an individual moves away from the “inner 
sanctum” or “truly personal realm”369 and explicitly stated that privacy depends on a 
subjective expectation that is objectively reasonable. 
3.3 UNITED STATES 
3.3.1 Development of Privacy Concerns 
The year 1850 marked the transition of America from a rural, agrarian and private 
society to an urban and public society as a result of technological advancements. 
Technological devices such as the reaper, power loom, sewing machine, telegraph, 
and typewriter transformed both city and farm life.370 Increased newspaper circulation 
not only improved the reliability of the means of communication that had previously 
been hearsay, but also generated a hunger for more information. By the end of the 
nineteenth century, the United States printing press had grown to such an extent that 
any literate person had access to daily newspapers.371 The emergence of cheap 
gazettes, journals and tribunals created a small yet significant revolution in social 
curiosity. This hunger for information extended “beyond the local neighbourhood and 
country”372 and subsequently led to the birth of an aggressive press and journalism 
known as the “yellow press”.373 The “yellow press” subscribed to populist journalism, 
                                               
366Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences v Hyundai Motor Distributors Pty Ltd: In re 
Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Smit NO 2001 (1) SA 545 (CC). 
367National Coalition for Lesbian and Gay Equality v Minister of Justice 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC).  
368National Coalition for Lesbian and Gay Equality v Minister of Justice 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) 1538 A – 
B. See also De Waal and Currie Bills of Rights Handbook 5th ed. (2005) 272. 
369Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences v Hyundai Motor Distributors 2001 (1) SA 
545 557F. 
370Hixson Privacy in a Public Society (1967) 16. 
371Hixson Privacy in a Public Society (1967) 16. 
372Hixson Privacy in a Public Society (1967) 16. 
373
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which featured sensational, colourful and interesting news about the lives of the upper 
class and alleged criminals and wholly fuelled this social curiosity.374 
United States constitutional jurisprudence failed to immediately provide the necessary 
relief from this spate of aggressive journalism. United States jurists declined to depart 
from a rigid and literal interpretation of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights; first, 
because of the non-existence of privacy as a right in English common law and in the 
United States Constitution and, secondly, because the Bill of Rights assured aspects of 
privacy such as religious belief and practice.375 However, some social writers such as 
Godkin had already begun to write about the effect of the “yellow press” on personal 
privacy. In 1890 Godkin wrote that: 
“[t]he chief enemy of privacy in modern life is that interest in other 
people and their affairs known as curiosity, which in the days before 
newspapers created personal gossip. As soon in the progress of 
civilization as men left the tent, or wigwam, or tribal dwelling, and 
retreated into private houses, a desire on the part of their neighbours to 
know what was going on in the private houses sprang up rapidly, and 
had flourished ever since the world over”.376 
He further wrote“[i]n all this the advent of the newspaper, or rather of a particular 
class of newspaper, had made a great change. It has converted curiosity into what 
economists call an ineffectual demand and gossip into a marketable commodity”.377 
Godkin further adds that: 
“ [i]n other words gossip about private individuals is now printed, and 
makes its victim, with all his imperfections on his head, known to 
hundreds or thousands of miles away from his place of abode; and, 
                                               
374Hixson Privacy in a Public Society (1967) 28. 
375Wagner DeCew In Pursuit of Privacy – Law, Ethics and the Rise of Technology (1997)15. 
According to Wagner DeCew up until 1890, the law had been wary of protecting emotional harm 
because of: first, the difficulty associated with assessing damages for emotional harm and second, the 
subjective nature of findings based on the state of an individual’s mind.  
376
 Godkin “The Rights of the Citizen: IV. To His Own Reputation” (1890) Scribner’s Magazine  66. 
377Hixson Privacy in a Public Society (1967) 29. Godkin further stated that “the eagerness of men to 
know [all he can about his neighbour’s private life]… finds defence in that the love of gossip is after 
all human and that everything that is human concerns us deeply. The most absorbing topic for the 
bulk of mankind must always be other men’s doings and sayings, and it can hardly be denied that 
there is some substance in this apology.” Godkin “The Rights of the Citizen: IV. To His Own 
Reputation” (1890) Scribner’s Magazine  66. 
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what is worst of all, brings to his knowledge exactly what is said about 
him, with all its details. It thus inflicts what is, to many men, the great 
pain of believing that everybody he meets in the street is perfectly 
familiar with some folly, or misfortune, or indiscretion, or weakness, 
which he had previously supposed had never got beyond his domestic 
circle”.378 
3.3.2 Early Privacy Cases 
One of the earliest mention of privacy concerns appeared in Judge Thomas Cooley’s 
Treatise on the Law of Torts, in which he wrote the following with regard to personal 
immunity: “The right to one’s person may be said to be a right to be let alone”.379 
However, even before Judge Cooley’s legal treatise, the Supreme Court in Wheaton v 
Peters380 had already alluded to the “right to be alone” when the copyright over twelve 
books known as the “Wheaton reports” containing reports of cases argued and 
decided in the United States Supreme Court from 1816 to 1827, was contested. The 
court observed that “[t]he defendant asks nothing-wants nothing, but to be let alone 
until it can be shown that he has violated the rights of another”.381 Privacy concerns 
were also raised in two nineteenth century American cases, namely, Newell v 
Witcher382 and De May v Roberts383.  
In Newell v Witcher384 the defendant, a married man, entered the room in which the 
plaintiff was sleeping for the night, sat on her bed and urged her to have sexual 
intercourse with him. The defendant argued that his entry into the plaintiff’s room did 
not meet the requirements of trespass because the room in which the plaintiff was 
sleeping for the night was in his home. Redfield J, however, was of the opinion that 
the defendant’s actions, although carried out in his own house, amounted to trespass 
                                               
378
 Godkin “The Rights of the Citizen: IV. To His Own Reputation” (1890) Scribner’s Magazine  66. 
379Ernst and Schwartz Privacy: The Right to be Let Alone (1962) 49. 
380Wheaton v Peters 33 U.S. 591(1834). The court was of opinion “that no reporter has or can have any 
copyright in the written opinions delivered by this court; and that the judges thereof cannot confer on 
any reporter any such right”. Wheaton v Peters 33 U.S. 591(1834) 668. 
381Wheaton v Peters 33 U.S. 591(1834) 634. 
382Newell v Witcher 53 Vt 589, 1880 WL 4800 (Vt.). 
383De May v Roberts 46 Mich. 160, 9 N.W. 146 154. 
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as the plaintiff had a right to some privacy, even though she had not been sleeping at 
home in her own bedroom. Redfield J stated the plaintiff’s: 
“right to her private sleeping room…was as ample and exclusive 
against the inmates of the house, as if entry had been made into her 
private dwelling house…Her right of quiet occupancy and privacy was 
absolute and exclusive; the entry by stealth into the night into the room 
the plaintiff was sleeping in for the night without licence or justifiable 
cause, was a trespass; and if with felonious intent, was a crime”.385 
The court in De May v Roberts expressly mentioned that there existed a legal right to 
privacy, especially as regards the home and in certain events taking place in that 
home. In De May v Roberts a physician permitted a friend to accompany him in 
attending to the plaintiff who was in labour. The plaintiff assumed the physician’s 
friend was also a physician, so she voiced no objections to him being within hearing 
or seeing distance of her. The court found both men guilty of deceit for not disclosing 
to the plaintiff that the physician’s friend was not a physician. The court found that 
the occasion for the plaintiff “was a most sacred one and no one had a right to intrude 
unless invited or because of some real and pressing necessity...”. 386 Based on the 
sacred nature of the occasion and perhaps the existing notion of the sanctity of the 
home, the court concluded that the plaintiff “had a legal right to privacy of her 
apartment at such a time and the law secures to her this right by requiring others to 
observe it, and to abstain from its violation”.387 
3.3.3 Common Law 
The right to privacy in United States common law has its roots in the famous Harvard 
Law Review article by the authors Warren and Brandeis.388 The article took the 
argument that the right to privacy was separate from the rights of property, contract 
and trust. The article was supposedly borne out of Warren’s annoyance with the 
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387De May v Roberts 46 Mich. 160, 9 N.W. 146 149. 
388Warren and Brandeis “The Right to Privacy” (1890) Harvard Law Review 193. The article was 
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interest of the Boston yellow press in his family’s social activities. The article drew its 
influence from two sources.389 
First, Warren and Brandeis credited Judge Cooley’s treatise on torts. As stated earlier, 
Judge Cooley spoke of the “right to be let alone” as a matter of personal immunity: 
“The right to one’s person may be said to be a right of complete immunity”.390 
Second, Warren and Brandeis cited Godkin and his Scribner’s Essay on privacy in 
which he traced the history of man’s desire for privacy from the days of communal 
life in Native American wigwams to the industrialisation of his time.391 Godkin wrote: 
“To have a house of one’s own is the ambition of nearly all civilized 
men and women, and the reason which most makes them enjoy it is the 
opportunity it affords of deciding for themselves how much or how 
little publicity should surround their lives”.392 
According to Warren and Brandeis the right to privacy sought to protect the plaintiff’s 
“right to be let alone”.  Warren and Brandeis wrote about privacy as “an inviolate 
personality” right that would protect “thoughts, emotions and sensations…whether 
expressed in writing or in conduct, in conversation, in attitudes, or in facial 
expression”.393 This did not mean that the authors rejected the property aspects of 
privacy, but the authors simply sought a distinct right.394 They also argued that “the 
intensity and complexity of life” and modern enterprise and invention “ripened the 
time for the courts and judges to redefine the nature of personal rights to protect 
appearance, sayings, acts and …personal relations, domestic or otherwise”.395 
The recognition of a distinct right to privacy, according to the authors, would not 
require the law to be rewritten because at that time case law had already come close to 
                                               
389Wagner DeCew In Pursuit of Privacy – Law, Ethics and the Rise of Technology (1997) 29. 
390Wagner DeCew In Pursuit of Privacy – Law, Ethics and the Rise of Technology (1997) 30. 
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recognising a legally enforceable right.396 The authors further argued in favour of a 
legal remedy for the anguish caused to an individual where the injury had not been to 
property or contractual rights.397 This extension of jurisprudence as pleaded by 
Warren and Brandeis would protect the feelings of individuals who had been 
subjected to some form of intrusion.398 To support their argument, Warren and 
Brandeis referred to cases in which “protection had been afforded against wrongful 
publication” where the “jurisdiction” that was asserted had been based on an “alleged 
breach of an implied contract or of a trust or confidence”.399 In sum, the authors 
believed that these cases were really protecting privacy and as such there was no need 
for the courts to recognise a ‘new’ right to privacy. The authors in effect argued that 
everyone should own the facts relating to his or her own private life.400 It is sometimes 
argued that the purpose of Warren and Brandeis’s article, in calling as it did for the 
recognition of a general right to privacy, was to serve as a conduit for the authors to 
express their frustrations towards the press.401 The authors felt the press were 
“overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of propriety and of decency.402 
Gossip is no longer the resource of the idle and of the vicious, but has become a trade, 
which is pursued with industry as well as effrontery”. Warren and Brandeis further 
believed “modern enterprise and invention have through invasions upon [the 
individual’s] privacy subjected [the individual] to mental pain and distress, far greater 
than could be inflicted by mere bodily injury”.403 
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Though the article initially had little effect upon the law, it encouraged courts to start 
thinking about privacy protection at common law level.404 For instance, in the 1905 
Georgia Supreme Court case of Pavesich v New England Insurance Company405, 
Cobb J outlined the development of the right to privacy and conceded that before 
1890: 
 “every adjudicated case, both in this country and in England, which 
might be said to have involved a right of privacy, was not based upon 
the existence of such right, but was founded upon a supposed right of 
property, or a breach of trust or confidence, or the like, and that 
therefore a claim to a right of privacy, independent of a property or 
contractual right, or some right of a similar nature, had, up to that time, 
never been recognized in terms in any decision”.406 
Cobb J further differed from the judgment in Robertson v Rochester Folding Box 
Co407, in which it was held that a right to privacy does not exist or will never exist as a 
legal and enforceable right.408 Parker CJ argued in Robertson that the incorporation of 
the right to privacy in United States law would “result not only in vast amount of 
litigation, but in litigation bordering upon absurd”. He added that if the right to 
privacy were to be “established as a legal doctrine [it would be impossible to confine 
it] to the restraint of the publication of a likeness, but [it would also have to include] 
publication of a word picture, a comment upon one’s looks, conduct, domestic 
relations or habits”.409 Parker CJ further refused the existence of a right to privacy 
with reference to decided cases in both United States and England: every case relied 
upon to support the existence of the right was based on other grounds and no 
reference to the existence of the right is made by common law commentators or 
                                               
404Wagner DeCew In Pursuit of Privacy – Law, Ethics and the Rise of Technology (1997) 17. Although 
the article had minimal effect on the law it was accepted by New York’s lower courts. See Schuyler v. 
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407Robertson v Rochester Folding Box Co 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442. 
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writers on common law principles of equity.410 In contrast, in Pavesich Cobb J found 
that the existence of the right to privacy can reasonably be inferred from common law 
commentaries and judgments that really protected the right to privacy based on 
principles derived from the law of property, trust and contract. The learned judge 
further found the proper precedent in the circumstances to have been the dissenting 
judgment of Gray J in Robertson. Gray J held at 561:  
“[t]he right of privacy, or the right of the individual to be let alone, is a 
personal right, which is not without judicial recognition. It is the 
complement of the right to the immunity of one’s person. The 
individual has always been entitled to be protected in the exclusive use 
and enjoyment of that which is his own. The common law regarded his 
person and property as inviolate, and he has the absolute right to be let 
alone. The principle is fundamental and essential in organized society 
that every one, in exercising a personal right and in the use of his 
property, shall respect the rights and properties of others. He must so 
conduct himself, in the enjoyment of the rights and privileges which 
belong to him as a member of society, as that he shall prejudice no one 
in the possession and enjoyment of those which are exclusively his. 
When, as here, there is an alleged invasion of some personal right or 
privilege, the absence of exact precedent, and the fact that early 
commentators upon the common law have no discussion upon the 
subject, is of no material importance in awarding equitable relief.”  
Even after the progressive argument by Cobb J in favour of the recognition of a right 
to privacy in Paveisch, American courts continued to be split over whether or not the 
right to privacy existed.411 
The courts were ultimately convinced to adopt a common law right to privacy by two 
events. The first was the inclusion of the right in the first Restatement of Torts and the 
second Restatement of Torts. The Restatement adopted the view that “the law of 
privacy has not developed as a single tort, but as a complex of four [related] kinds of 
invasion of four different interests [with a common focus on the plaintiff’s “right to be 
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let alone”] of the plaintiff, which are tied together by the common name, but 
otherwise have nothing in common except that each represents an interference with 
the right of the plaintiff to be alone”. The four kinds of invasions described by the 
Restatement are: 
1. Intrusion upon seclusion; 
2. Appropriation of likeness; 
3. Public disclosure of private facts and; 
4. False light publicity. 
The second event was the publication of Prosser’s article on the right to privacy 
(referred to in chapter 1). Prosser essentially identifies from the reported cases on 
privacy four distinct categories of invasions namely: appropriation of one’s name or 
likeness412; intrusion upon the seclusion of another413; public disclosure of private 
facts414 and placing another in a false light before the public415. 416 
3.3.4 Constitutional Protection of Privacy 
The United States Constitution does not explicitly protect a right to privacy. The 
constitutional protection of privacy in the United States is the product of a long line of 
Supreme Court decisions, in which the Court went beyond the literal and sometimes 
narrow meaning of the constitutional language to strike down federal or state 
legislation, thereby in effect recognising a constitutional right to privacy.417 The 
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discussion here will focus on only a select number of Supreme Court decisions that 
paved the way towards the constitutional protection of privacy. The Supreme Court 
has recognised that a right of privacy exists, or a guarantee of areas or zones of 
privacy, exist in the Constitution, namely in the First Amendment guaranteeing 
freedom of thought and expression418; the Fourth Amendment affirming the right of 
persons to be secure in their persons and the Fifth Amendment creating a zone for the 
individual in against self – incrimination clause419; in the penumbras of the Bill of 
Rights420 and in Ninth Amendment which provides that the enumeration of certain 
rights in the Constitution shall not be interpreted to deny or disparage others.421 
3.3.4.1 Boyd v United States 
Perhaps the earliest Supreme Court case to recognise that the United States 
Constitution protects a right to privacy is Boyd v United States.422 The Supreme Court 
interpreted privacy rights as generalisations of two maxims, namely “a man’s home is 
his castle” or “sanctity of the home” which were regarded as enforceable legal 
principles by the English common law.423 The court identified the “…Bill of Rights 
with its vigorous circumscription of state power [as the point of departure for 
understanding privacy].” The Court in Boyd explained the right to privacy as “the 
right against unlawful searches and seizures. It is thus the right that inheres in us as 
free and sovereign political actors, masters in our own houses, which the state is 
ordinarily forbidden to invade.” The court cited with approval Lord Camden’s opinion 
in Entick v Carrington and then proceeded to state: 
                                                                                                                                      
with the freedom to contract; Trustees of Dartmouth College v Woodward 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 
(1819) where the court struck down New Hampshire’s attempt to legislatively control Dartmouth 
College; Meyer v Nebraska 262 U.S. 390 (1923) in which the Court held that state could not prevent 
the education of foreign languages at an elementary school;  and Pierce v Society of Sisters 268 U.S. 
510 (1925) in which the Supreme Court struck done legislation which required all children to attend 
public school. 
418Stanley v Georgia 394 U.S. 557 (1969). 
419Katz v United States 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
420Griswold v Connecticut 381 U.S. 477 (1965). 
421Griswold v Connecticut 381 U.S. 477 (1965). 
422Boyd v United States 116 U.S. 616 (1886) 616. 
423Boyd v United States 116 U.S. 616 (1886) 616.For Whitman the history of modern privacy rights in 
America should ideally begin with the Boyd decision and not with the “right to be let alone” as 
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“[t]he principles laid down in [Entick v Carrington] affect the very 
essence of constitutional liberty and security. They reach farther than 
the concrete form of the case then before the court, with its 
adventitious circumstances; they apply to all invasions on the part of 
the government and its employees of the sanctity of a man’s home and 
the privacies of life. It is not the breaking of his doors, and the 
rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offence; 
but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, 
personal liberty and private property, where that right has never been 
forfeited by his conviction of some public offence …Breaking into a 
house and opening boxes and drawers are circumstances of 
aggravation; but any forcible and compulsory extortion of a man’s own 
testimony or of his private papers to be used as evidence to convict him 
of crime or to forfeit his goods, is within the condemnation of that 
judgment”.424 
3.3.4.2 Griswold v Connecticut 
Griswold v Connecticut425 was the first of many United States Supreme Court 
decisions to articulate constitutional privacy.426 The appellants in Griswold were fined 
for contravening a Connecticut statute prohibiting the use of contraception for giving 
medical advice to a married couple on preventing conception. Douglas J found that 
various guarantees in the Bill of Rights create zones of privacy, namely, the First 
Amendment guaranteeing right of association; the Third Amendment prohibiting the 
quartering of soldiers in any house in times of peace without the consent of the owner; 
the Fourth Amendment affirming the right of persons to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures; the Fifth 
Amendment creates a zone for the individual against self – incrimination; and the 
Ninth Amendment which provides that the enumeration of certain rights in the 
                                               
424Boyd v United States 116 U.S. 616 (1886) 616. 
425Griswold v Connecticut 381 U.S. 477 (1965). 
426
 The reasoning in Griswold was later used by the court in Einsenstadt v Baird405 U.S. 438 (1972) 
the Court protected the distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons, thereby extending the 
decisions regard sexual conduct beyond the marital relationship. The Court stated the following “If 
the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from 
unwarranted government intrusion into matters, so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision 
whether to bear or beget a child.” Einsenstadt v Baird 405 U.S. 438 (1972) 453. 
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Constitution shall not be interpreted to deny or disparage others. The Court concluded 
that marriage was covered within the zone of privacy created by several constitutional 
guarantees and the legislation concerned “seeks to achieve its goals by means of 
having a maximum destructive impact upon the marriage”.427 
3.3.4.3 Katz v United States 
In Katz v United States428, the Supreme Court formulated the “reasonable expectation 
test” of the right to privacy. In Katz, the defendant received a conviction in a United 
States district court for violating a statute proscribing interstate transmission by wire 
communication of bets and wagers, after the FBI had listened to and recorded 
conversations the defendant had from a public telephone booth. The defendant 
appealed this decision on the basis that the recordings had been obtained in violation 
of the Fourth Amendment. However, the Court of Appeals rejected this argument 
because there was no physical entrance by the FBI into the public telephone booth 
while the defendant was conducting the telephone conversations in question. The 
United States Supreme Court chose to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals. 
The Court found that the government’s listening and recording of the defendant’s 
conversations while using a public telephone booth violated his right to privacy and 
constituted a search and seizure within the ambit of the Fourth Amendment. Stewart J 
reasoned that the defendant, in entering the telephone booth did not seek “to avoid the 
intruding eye” but “the uninvited ear”. Stewart J added that the defendant: 
“did not shed his right to [privacy] simply because he made his calls 
from a place where he might be seen. No less that an individual in a 
business office, in a friend’s apartment, or in a tax cab, a person in a 
telephone booth may rely upon protection of the Fourth 
Amendment.”429  
The Supreme Court thus altered the face of United States privacy protection in two 
ways. First, the Court departed from the narrow stance taken in Olmstead v United 
States430 that the Fourth Amendment limited only searches and seizures of tangible 
objects (i.e. that trespass without the seizure of tangible material objects fell outside 
                                               
427Griswold v Connecticut  381 U.S. 477 (1965) 484. 
428Katz v United States 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
429Katz v United States 389 U.S. 347 (1967) 352. 
430277 U.S. 438, 471 - 485 (1928). 
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the ambit of the Fourth Amendment). The Court instead construed the Fourth 
Amendment as governing not only the seizure of tangible material objects but as also 
governing the recording of words. The Fourth Amendment, according to Court, 
“protects people not simply areas against unreasonable searches and seizures”.431 
Second, the court balanced the interest of individuals from governmental intrusion 
against the state’s interest in protecting society from criminals. The two pronged 
reasonable expectation test - resulted from this. Harlan J expressed the test as follows:  
“…[F]irst, that a person has exhibited an actual (subjective) 
expectation of privacy and second, that the expectation be one that 
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable (objective). Thus, a 
man’s home is, for most purposes, a place where he expects privacy 
but objects, activities, or statements that he exposes to the plain view 
of outsiders remain unprotected because he expresses no intention to 
keep them to himself. On the other hand, conversations in the open 
would not be protected against being overheard, for the expectation of 
privacy under the circumstances would be unreasonable”.432 
3.3.4.4 Stanley v Georgia 
The question before the court in Stanley v Georgia433 was whether a state of Georgia 
statute criminalising the possession of obscene material violated the First 
Amendment. The state contended that the possession of obscene material is not 
consistent with the right to free thought and expression guaranteed by the First 
Amendment (.i.e. the First Amendment did not protect obscenity). The Court 
acknowledged that the government had a legitimate interest in regulating the 
commercial distribution of obscenity but found that insofar as it punished the mere 
private possession of obscene material by an adult, the state violated the First 
Amendment. In reaching this finding, the Court noted that it had been established the 
Constitution protected that right to receive information and ideas regardless of their 
social worth. In asserting this right, the individual was at liberty to “read or observe 
what he [or she] pleases to satisfy his [or her] intellectual needs in the privacy of his 
[or her] home.” In so doing, the individual “is asserting the right to be free from state 
                                               
431Katz v United States 389 U.S. 347 (1967) 353. 
432Katz v United States 389 U.S. 347 (1967) 353. 
433Stanley v Georgia 394 U.S. 557. 
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inquiry into the contents of his library”.434 The Court added that United States 
“constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the power to 
control men’s minds.”435 The Court further construed the First Amendment to mean 
that “a State has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books 
he may read or what films he may watch”436. 437 
3.3.5 Summary 
In summary, the development of legal protection in the United States began with the 
invention of the printing press. The printing press increased individual access to 
information. In 1890 the authors Warren and Brandeis called for the recognition of a 
common law right to privacy. This and other events encouraged certain courts to 
argue for the recognition and development of a right to privacy in the United States 
jurisprudence. At common law level, these developments, as well as the inclusion of 
privacy in the Restatement of Torts and Prosser’s classification of privacy into four 
distinct categories convinced the courts to develop a common law right to privacy 
(albeit in a negative ay as a bundle of related torts). Thereafter, the United States 
Supreme Court held that the United States Constitution, which does not explicitly 
protect or guarantee the right to privacy, guaranteed zones of privacy through its 
various amendments. Again, perhaps most importantly for the further discussion, the 
United States Supreme Court formulated the reasonable expectation test which 
balances privacy interests against other competing interests. 
                                               
434Stanley v Georgia 394 U.S. 557 565. 
435Stanley v Georgia 394 U.S. 557 565. 
436Stanley v Georgia 394 U.S. 557 565. 
437
 See also Lawrence v Texas 539 U.S. 558 (2003). The court in Lawrence found a Texas statute 
criminalising sexual relations between two persons of the same sex unconstitutional. The court stated 
the following: “…[This] case[ involves] two adults who, with full and mutual consent from each 
other engaged in sexual practices common to the homosexual lifestyle…[they] are entitled to respect 
for their private lives. The State cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by making 
their sexual conduct a crime. Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full 
right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the government. It is a promise of the 
Constitution that there is a realm of personal liberty which the government may not enter”. Justice 
Kennedy in delivering the opinion of the court also cited with approval decisions of the European 
Court of Human Rights and other foreign jurisdictions that affirmed the rights of homosexual adults 
to engage in sexual conduct.  Lawrence v Texas 539 U.S. 558 (2003) 578. 
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3.4 UNITED KINGDOM  
3.4.1 Privacy Prior to the Incorporation of the ECHR 
Prior to the incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights438 (“ECHR”) 
into English domestic law, there was no explicit recognition of a right to privacy in 
English law. Before the incorporation of the ECHR into domestic law, Britain had 
neither a statutory nor common law right to privacy.439 English law did, however, 
provide and continues to provide remedies for invasions of privacy in the absence of a 
written constitution.440 For some commentators the remedies provided for privacy 
protection were “patchy, incomplete and hidden within a large number of disparate 
laws”.441 
Various authors give the following as reasons for the absence of a statutory or 
common law right of privacy in English law: 
a) The absence of a written constitution within which to use a liberal 
interpretation to find a right to privacy. The United States, as mentioned, 
possesses a written constitution, which has allowed for an interpretation it in 
favour of an implied right to privacy in view of the First, Fourth, Fifth and 
Ninth Amendments. A written constitution therefore aids the extension and 
the scope of other fundamental rights by analogy and implication.442 
b) Restricted focus on the development of existing related rights. English law has 
historically focussed on the protection of property and physical rights, rather 
than on the protection of social rights or on the creation of new types of rights 
such as the right to privacy. Consequently, most of the law protecting privacy 
in theory protects the property and physical rights of individuals.443 
c) Deference to the supremacy and sovereignty of parliament. 
                                               
438
 Drafted by the Council of Europe in 1950 and came into force on 3 September 1953. 
439
 Carnegie “Privacy and the Press: The Impact of Incorporating the European Convention on Human 
Rights in the United Kingdom” (1998) 9 Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 311 
311. 
440
 Krotoszynski “Autonomy, Community, and Traditions of Liberty: The Contrast of British and 
American Privacy Law” 1990 Duke Law Journal 1398 1404. 
441
 Shorts and De Than Human Rights Law in the UK (2001) 535. 
442
 That is to say, because English rights emanate from different and individual sources it becomes 
difficult to argue that other fundamental rights exist within those individual sources. Shorts and De 
Than Human Rights Law in the UK (2001) 535. 
443
 Shorts and De Than Human Rights Law in the UK (2001) 535. 
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d) Fears that changes to existing law may result in legal uncertainty.444 
Some legal commentators have argued that, even before the incorporation of the 
ECHR, Britain could have developed a right to privacy within the framework of its 
existing common law.445 Some of these commentators argue that if the United States 
(with Warren and Brandeis the catalysts) was capable of claiming a common law right 
to privacy and base this claim on an English case (Prince Albert v Strange446), surely 
English jurisprudence could reach the same conclusion by relying on the existing 
principles of trespass, nuisance, copyright and confidence. 447 
3.4.1.1 Parliamentary Attempts to Create a Right of Privacy 
The English Parliament has made several (unsuccessful) attempts to address the right 
to privacy. The Younger Committee made perhaps the most well known attempt. This 
Committee was given the primary task of reviewing privacy under English law.448 The 
terms of reference of the Younger Committee were “[t]o consider whether legislation 
is needed to give further protection to the individual citizen and to commercial and 
industrial interests against intrusions into privacy by private persons and 
organisations, or by companies, and to make recommendations”.449 In its 1972 report, 
the Committee concluded that England did not require a general right to privacy as the 
existing doctrine of breach of confidence was able to protect privacy.450 The Younger 
Committee primarily based its conclusion on two reasons: first, the concept of privacy 
is difficult to define and, secondly, it is difficult to balance privacy interests against 
                                               
444
 Krotoszynski “Autonomy, Community, and Traditions of Liberty: The Contrast of British and 
American Privacy Law” 1990 Duke Law Journal 1398 1404. 
445
 Legal commentators such as Arnheim The Handbook of Human Rights Law: An Accessible 
Approach to The Issues and Principles (2004) 176 and Shorts and De Than Human Rights Law in the 
UK (2001) 536 use this reasoning to advance arguments in favour of the development of English 
privacy law. 
4461 McN. & G. 25 (1849). 
447Arnheim The Handbook of Human Rights Law: An Accessible Approach to The Issues and 
Principles (2004) 176 and Shorts and De Than Human Rights Law in the UK (2001) 536. 
448
 Before the English parliament authorised the Younger Committee in 1972 to look into the creation 
of a right of privacy, a number of bills in the 1960’s purported to create a general right to privacy. 
These bills were however unsuccessful for a number of reasons and one of those reasons was that the 
Bills accorded courts too much discretion. Carnegie “Privacy and the Press: The Impact of 
Incorporating the European Convention on Human Rights in the United Kingdom” (1998) 9 Duke 
Journal of Comparative and International Law 311 317. 
449Wacks Privacy and Press Freedom (1995) 4. 
450
 Carnegie “Privacy and the Press: The Impact of Incorporating the European Convention on Human 
Rights in the United Kingdom” (1998) 9 Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 311 
317. 
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other competing interests.451 The second major committee charged with looking into 
developing a privacy tort, was the Calcutt Committee on Privacy and Related Matters. 
The Calcutt Committee’s terms of reference were “to consider what measures 
(whether legislative or otherwise) are needed to give further protection to individual 
privacy from the activities of the press and improve recourse against the press for the 
individual citizen.”452 In its 1990 report, the Calcutt Committee also concluded there 
was no need for a right of privacy in tort law and based its conclusion on a number of 
practical and legal reasons453.454 
3.4.1.2 Judicial Reluctance towards Recognising Privacy 
Judicial decisions prior to the incorporation of the ECHR “lacked any notion of 
privacy” and expressed a reluctance to recognise a general right to privacy.455 Certain 
judges, such as Vice Chancellor Sir Robert Megarry in Malone v Metropolitan Police 
Commissioner opined that the creation of a right to privacy was a task to be borne by 
parliament and not by judges.456 The view that the general right to privacy could not 
be developed by the courts was not shared by some English judges. For instance, Lord 
Keith in the House of Lords decision of Attorney General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd 
and Other (No 2),457 suggested, in discussing the law of breach of confidence, that a 
                                               
451
 MacCormick “Privacy: A Problematic” (1974) 1 British Journal of Law and Society 75. 
452
 Munro “Press Freedom – How the Beast was Tamed” (1991) 54 The Modern Law Review 104. 
453Munro “Press Freedom – How the Beast was Tamed” (1991) 54 The Modern Law Review 104 107. 
454
 Krotoszynski attributes the failure of these Committees to the fact that their terms of reference were 
restricted to private intrusions of privacy and not extended to governmental intrusions of privacy. The 
problem with British law for Krotoszynski is not a lack of a general right to privacy per se but “a lack 
of a right to privacy that can be asserted against the state.” Krotoszynski “Autonomy, Community, 
and Traditions of Liberty: The Contrast of British and American Privacy Law” 1990 Duke Law 
Journal 398 406. 
455
 192. The following UK decisions that have held there is no right to privacy in English law: see R v 
Khan (Sultan) [1997] AC 558 (at issue was whether the covert installation of electronic device 
amounted to trespass, damage to property and an invasion of privacy) Bernstein v Skyviews Ltd. 
[1978] Q.B. 479 (at issue was whether a flight over property for the purpose of taking aerial 
photographs amounted to trespass or invasion of privacy) and Wainright and Another v Home Office 
[2003] UKHL 53 (question before court was whether strip search of mother and her son on a prison 
visit infringed their right to respect for private life). 
456Malone v Metropolitan Police Commissioner  [1979] 1 Ch. 344. The question before the court in 
Malone v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1979] 1 Ch. 344 was whether tapping of post office 
telephone by police lawful on grounds of right to property, privacy and confidentiality. 
457Morris v Beardmore [1981] A.C. 446 464. 
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tort of privacy could be developed by the courts.458 In addition, Lord Scarman in 
Morris v Beardmore459 declared that: 
“[i]n formulating my reasons for allowing the appeal…I have 
deliberately used an adjective which has an unfamiliar ring in the ears 
of common law lawyers. I have described the right of privacy as 
“fundamental”…it is apt to describe the importance attached by the 
common law to the privacy of the home. It is still true as was said by 
Lord Camden C.J. in Entick v Carrington (1765) 19 State Tr. 1029, 
1066, that: “No man can set his foot upon my ground without my 
licence, but he is liable to an action, though the damage be 
nothing;…If he admits the fact, he is bound to show by way of 
justification, that some positive law has empowered or excused 
him.”460 
Lord Scarman concluded: “The present appeal is concerned exclusively with the 
suspect’s right to privacy of his home…The appeal turns on the respect which 
parliament must be understood… to pay to the fundamental right of privacy in one’s 
own home, which has for centuries been recognized by the common law”. Lord 
Scarman here is suggesting that there is no need to develop a right to privacy as the 
right already exists in English law and (even though English courts do not expressly 
describe the right as a “the right of privacy”) is clearly recognised by the common law 
and international law. 461 
3.4.2 Remedies for Privacy Invasions Prior to the ECHR 
As previously indicated, in the absence of a written constitution and legislation 
explicitly protecting privacy, English law provided remedies for various privacy 
                                               
458
 See discussion on law of breach of confidence below which discusses the findings of the court in 
Attorney General Guardian Newspapers Ltd and Others. 
459Morris v Beardmore [1981] A.C. 446 cited in Fiddick “The Human Rights Bill [House of Lords], 
Bill 119 of 1997-98: Privacy and the Press” 98/25Research Paper Home Affairs Section House of 
Commons Library 7. 
460Morris v Beardmore [1981] A.C. 446464. 
461Morris v Beardmore [1998] All ER 446 464. See also Fiddick “The Human Rights Bill [HL], Bill 
119 of 1997-98: Privacy and the Press” Research Paper 98/25Home Affairs Section House of 
Commons Library 7. 
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invasions. Two of these remedies are the torts of trespass to land and goods and the 
doctrine of breach of confidence.462 
3.4.2.1 Tort of Trespass to Land and Goods 
The tort of trespass to land and goods essentially protects individuals against direct 
intrusions into their home.463 Lord Camden in Entick v Carrington confirmed the 
existence of the tort of trespass relating to goods in English law: 
“Our law holds the property of every man sacred that no man can set 
his foot upon his neighbour’s close without his leave. If he does, he is a 
trespasser, though he does no damage at all; if he will tread upon his 
neighbour’s ground, he must justify it by law and concluded “[t]he 
defendants have no right to avail themselves of the usage of these 
warrant…”.464 
English common law has always treated the right to freedom from interference with 
personal property as a predominant interest and the remedy for this earliest form of 
tort was a writ of trespass.465 This treatment of individual property rights as 
fundamental gave birth to the English maxim, “An Englishman’s home is his castle”. 
Donaldson LJ in McLorie v Oxford466 traced the importance of this maxim in English 
common law to Seymane’s Case467 : “That an Englishman’s home is his castle” is one 
of the few principles of the law known to every citizen and was affirmed as early as 
1604 in Seymane’s Case… and reaffirmed as recently as 1980 in Morris v 
Beadmore468…”. 469 
                                               
462
 Clayton and Tomlinson “Privacy and Freedom of Expression” (2001) 6-7. 
463
 Clayton and Tomlinson “Privacy and Freedom of Expression” (2001) 6 – 7. 
464
 In Entick v Carrington Lord 1558-1774 All ER Rep 45.  
465
 In Entick v Carrington 1558-1774 All ER Rep 45 Lord Camden confirmed the existence of the tort 
of trespass relating to personal goods in English law: “Our law holds the property of every man 
sacred that no man can set his foot upon his neighbour’s close without his leave. If he does, he is a 
trespasser, though he does no damage at all; if he will tread upon his neighbour’s ground, he must 
justify it by law and concluded “[t]he defendants have no right to avail themselves of the usage of 
these warrant…”. 
466McLorie v Oxford [1982] 1 QB 1290 1296. 
467Seymane’s Case  [1558-1774] All E.R. Rep. 
468Morris v Beardmore [1981] A.C. 446. 
469McLorie v Oxford [1982] 1 QB 1290 1296. 
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In Seymane’s Case470Sir Edward Coke held that “…the house of everyone is to him as 
his castle and fortress, as well for his defence against injury and violence, as for his 
repose….”.471 Sir Coke further held “[t]hat the house of everyone is not a castle or 
privilege but for himself, and shall not extend to protect any person who flies to his 
house or goods of any other…for the privilege of his house extends only to him and 
his family, and his own proper goods …”.472 
3.4.2.2 Doctrine of Breach of Confidence 
The doctrine of breach of confidence evolved from the decision of Albert v Strange. 473 
In Albert v Strange, one of the grounds on which the Court allowed the injunction to 
remain was that there had been a breach of confidence or trust on the part of the 
defendant. The doctrine has since found expression in a number of decisions. Malone 
v Metropolitan Police Commissioner.474 
One of the leading cases on the doctrine of breach of confidence in English law is 
Attorney General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd and Others (No 2)475. The matter 
concerned the book Spycatcher, written by an ex officer of MI5 (British security 
service), which purported to be the memoirs of the ex officer’s 20 years in MI5. The 
Attorney General (AG) sought to prevent or restrict publication of the book and 
publication of any comment or reports of its contents, on the ground of national 
security and that publication represented a breach by the ex - officer of the duty of 
confidence he owed to his country. On appeal, Sir John Donaldson described breach 
of confidence as a right to have the confidentiality of information maintained, which 
arises out of contract (whereby one party undertakes to maintain the confidentiality of 
information made available to them by another party), or arises as a necessary or 
traditional incident of a relationship between the confidant and confider (e.g. priest 
and penitent, doctor and patient, lawyer and client, banker and customer and husband 
and wife).476 
                                               
470Seymane’s Case [1558-1774] All E.R. Rep 63. 
471Seymane’s Case  [1558-1774] All E.R. Rep 63. 
472Seymane’s Case [1558-1774] All E.R. Rep 65. 
4731 McN. & G. 25 (1849). 
474Malone v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1979] Ch. 344. 
475Attorney General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd and Others (No 2) [1988] 3 All ER 545. 
476Attorney General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd and Others (No 2) [1988] 3 All ER 545 595 and 596. 
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In the House of Lords decision of Attorney General v Guardian Newspaper Ltd. (No 
2), Lord Keith, in considering whether detriment to the confider of confidential 
information is an essential ingredient of the cause of action alluded to the right to 
privacy:  
“The Crown’s case on all the issues which arise invokes the law of 
confidentiality…The law has long recognized than an obligation of 
confidence can arise out of particular relationships. Examples are the 
relationships of doctor and patient, priest and penitent, solicitor and 
client, banker and customer. The obligation may be imposed by an 
express and implied term in a contract but it may also exist 
independently of any contract on the basis of an independent equitable 
principle of confidence: see Saltman Engineering Co Ltd v Campbell 
Engineering Co Ltd (1948) [1963] 3 All ER 413. It is worthy of some 
examination whether or not detriment to the confider of confidential 
information is an essential ingredient of his cause of action in seeking 
to restrain by injunction a breach of confidence. Presumably that may 
be so as regards an action for damages in respect of a past breach of 
confidence. If the confider has suffered no detriment thereby he can 
hardly be in a position to recover compensatory damages. However, 
the true view may be that he would be entitled to nominal damages. 
Most of the cases have arisen in circumstances where there has been a 
threatened or actual breach of confidence by an employee or ex- 
employee of the plaintiff, or where information about the plaintiff’s 
business affairs has been given in confidence to someone who has 
proceeded to exploit it for his own benefit: an example of the latter 
type of case is Seager v Copydex Ltd [1967] 2 All ER 415, [1967] 1 
WLR. In such cases the detriment to the confider is clear, since the 
breach involves no more than an invasion of personal privacy. Thus in, 
Margaret Duchess of Argyll v Duke of Argyll [1965] 1 All ER 611, 
[1967] Ch 302 an injunction was granted against the revelation of 
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marital confidences. The right to personal privacy is clearly one which 
the law should in this field seek to protect”.477 
Lord Keith is suggesting in the last sentence that a tort of breach of privacy could be 
developed by the courts.478 Several commentators have suggested that breach of 
confidence cannot effectively protect privacy interests and, as such, English courts or 
parliament should look into the creation of a tort based on breach of independent right 
of privacy.479It is true that the tort of breach of confidence is perhaps the closest 
relative of privacy as far as both actions prevent the public disclosure of private or 
personal information. At first glance, privacy and breach of confidence may seem 
similar and even overlap at times, but ultimately the two actions are different. The 
difference primarily is that the underlying issue in case of breach of privacy is 
publicity whilst at issue in case of breach of confidence is disclosure.480 Schreiber 
argues the tort of breach of confidence should not protect invasions of privacy and an 
independent tort of invasion of privacy should be recognised in English law.481 The 
recognition of a an independent invasion of privacy will permit the growth and 
development of each action and ultimately a less strenuous protection of privacy, in 
Schreiber’s words: “[it] will enable breach of confidence to grow without jeopardizing 
the right to privacy, and will likewise allow for the protection of privacy to develop 
without affecting the action in breach of confidence. Confidence cannot transmogrify 
into privacy, the courts or Parliament must facilitate the emergence of privacy 
independently of confidence”.482 
Schreiber advances seven arguments in support of this: first, the jurisprudential 
beginnings of breach of contract and privacy are different. Privacy is a natural law 
right to self - determination, that inheres in every human being and is enforceable 
against everyone regardless of whether they are known to us or not, whereas breach of 
confidence is a relationship based action, i.e. an action based on the existence of a 
                                               
477Attorney General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd and Others (No 2) [1988] 3 All ER 545 639. 
478
 Fiddick “The Human Rights Bill [House of Lords], Bill 119 of 1997-98: Privacy and the Press” 
98/25   Research Paper Home Affairs Section House of Commons Library 6. 
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 Shorts and De Than Human Rights Law in the UK (2001) 550. 
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 Shorts and De Than Human Rights Law in the UK (2001) 550. 
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 Schreiber “Confidence Crisis, Privacy Phobia: Why Invasion of Privacy Should be Independently 
Recognised in English Law” (2006) 2 Intellectual Property Quarterly 160. 
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relationship of trust between parties;483 secondly, privacy can be and deserves to be 
treated as a common law tort and a constitutional right whereas breach of confidence 
is simply a common law tort;484 thirdly, the protection of privacy through breach of 
confidence has resulted in the dilution of the action;485 fourthly, because breach of 
confidence is a commercially orientated action, it should by and large protect 
commercial information or confidences; privacy is a human right and aims to protect 
personal information;486 fifthly, breach of confidence may constitute inadequate 
protection for privacy invasions;487 sixthly, breach of confidence cannot adequately 
protect privacy because it fails to give effect to the privacy provisions of Human 
Rights Act and the ECHR;488 lastly, the protection of privacy through breach of 
confidence fails to accord privacy its due recognition as an independent and important 
right in society.489 
3.4.3 Privacy Protection Post the ECHR 
The ECHR was the first convention signed under the Council of Europe. In 1998 
Britain incorporated the ECHR into English law with the enactment of the Human 
                                               
483
 Schreiber “Confidence Crisis, Privacy Phobia: Why Invasion of Privacy should be Independently 
Recognised in English Law” (2006) 2 Intellectual Property Quarterly 160 168. For Schreiber for 
privacy to have carry some weight and have meaning it needs to be more than a tort, it needs to be 
strengthened by constitutional recognition. For this reason, the use of breach of contract to protect 
privacy in English law creates two problems: first, it “creates two types of privacy unrelated at law, 
requiring separate definition...” and second, “[breach of contract is] tied to a constitutional law and 
must evolve with it. Thus the constitutional law of privacy (e.g. ECHR, Article 8) will determine the 
path of the common law breach of confidence….” Schreiber “Confidence Crisis, Privacy Phobia: 
Why Invasion of Privacy Should be Independently Recognised in English Law” (2006) 2 Intellectual 
Property Quarterly 160 169. 
484Supra. 
485
 Schreiber “Confidence Crisis, Privacy Phobia: Why Invasion of Privacy Should be Independently 
Recognised in English Law” (2006) 2 Intellectual Property Quarterly 160 171. For example there are 
3 requirements for the breach of contract action (the information must have a necessary quality of 
confidence; the defendant must have known or ought to have known that the information was 
imparted in confidence; there must have been a breach of that information) however the first and 
second requirements have been dissolved by courts in privacy cases resulting in an “uncertain and 
indeterminate action”.  Schreiber “Confidence Crisis, Privacy Phobia: Why Invasion of Privacy 
should be Independently Recognised in English Law” (2006) 2 Intellectual Property Quarterly 160 
170. 
486
 Schreiber “Confidence Crisis, Privacy Phobia: Why Invasion of Privacy Should be Independently 
Recognised in English Law” (2006) 2 Intellectual Property Quarterly 160 177 – 178. 
487
 Schreiber “Confidence Crisis, Privacy Phobia: Why Invasion of Privacy Should be Independently 
Recognised in English Law” (2006) 2 Intellectual Property Quarterly 160 180- 181.  
488
 Schreiber “Confidence Crisis, Privacy Phobia: Why Invasion of Privacy Should be Independently 
Recognised in English Law” (2006) 2 Intellectual Property Quarterly 160 190. 
489Supra. 
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Rights Act490.491Prior to the Human Rights Act English law had no single document 
housing individual and fundamental rights.492 
3.4.3.1 Article 8 of the ECHR 
Article 8 of the ECHR provides: 
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and 
correspondence. 
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this 
right except such as in accordance with the law and is necessary in a 
democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the 
economic well being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, 
for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others. 
Article 8 (1) outlines the interests that are protected by the Article, being an 
individual’s private life, family life, home and correspondence and further places an 
obligation on the state to “respect” those interests. Article 8(2) goes on to provide the 
circumstances under which states may lawfully interfere with the respect they are 
required to have for an individuals’ private and family life, the individual’s home and 
correspondence.  
3.4.3.2 Meaning of “Private Life” in Article 8 
In Niemetz v Germany493it was held that the meaning of “private life” in Article 8 
extends beyond the Anglo-American idea of privacy with its emphasis on secrecy of 
personal information and seclusion. In this regard, courts have held certain areas to 
constitute private life within the meaning of Article 8: physical and moral integrity of 
                                               
490Act of 1998. 
491
 For Hoffman and Rowe, the Convention was incorporated into the English legal system: first, to 
avoid the cost and delay involved in taking a case to the European Court in the absence of a local 
remedy; second, to allow Convention rights to enter full into English law and  lastly, to allow judges 
to contribute to Convention jurisprudence. Hoffman and Rowe Human Rights in the United Kingdom: 
A General Introduction to the Human Rights Act 1998 (2003) 29. 
492Hoffman and Rowe Human Rights in the United Kingdom: A General Introduction to the Human 
Rights Act 1998 (2003) 17. 
493Niemetz v Germany [1992] EHRR 97. 
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a person494; personal identity495; personal information496; personal sexuality497; and 
personal or private space498.  
3.4.3.3 Privacy Protection under Article 8 
The incorporation of the ECHR into English domestic law has ignited debate on the 
existence of a common law right to privacy.499 However, Article 8 presents two 
                                               
494
 “Private life” within the meaning of Article 8 also covers a person’s his or sexual life, protects 
against physical or sexual assaults on a person(X and Y v Netherlands (1985) 8 EHRR 235). It has 
also been held to cover some forms of intrusive testing such as compulsory blood testing (X v Austria 
(1979) 18 DR 154, EComm HR) and urine ( Peters v Netherlands (1994) 77-A DR 75, EComm HR). 
495
 Also at the root of private life is the capacity of the individual to formulate a perception of himself 
or herself and to choose his or her personal identity.  
496
 In Z v Finland (1997) 25 EHRR 371 at 405 the court emphasized that “…the protection of personal 
data, not least medical data, is of fundamental importance to a person’s enjoyment of his or her right 
to respect for private and family life as guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention”. The Court added 
that respecting the confidentiality of health data is a vital principle in the legal systems of all states to 
the Convention and that this confidentiality went beyond respecting the privacy of a patient but also 
encompassed preservation of the patient’s confidence in the medical profession and in health 
services. Both the storing and release of information relating to an individual’s private life in a secret 
police register have been found to constitute an interference with the person’s right to respect for his 
or private life(Leander v Sweden (1987) 9 EHRR 433).   
497
 Private life also encompasses an individual’s personal relationships with others including social and 
sexual activities with others. See Dudgeon v United Kingdom (1981) 4 EHRR 149 the court described 
sexual activity as very intimate and private and in Lustig-Prean v United Kingdom (1997) 7BHRC 65 
homosexuality as a sexual preference was held to fall under private life and this was confirmed by the 
court in. The court found in Lustig-Prean v United Kingdom (1997) 7 BHRC further found only 
weighty and convincing evidence could justify with the private life of certain members of the armed 
forces by investigating and dismissing them on the basis of their homosexuality. 
498
 A breach of private life can be invoked in places where an individual has exclusive rights of 
enjoyment, such as the home, on the ground that there has been an infringement of private space 
which is to be enjoyed free from interference. The difficulty arises in considering whether private 
space includes those areas in which the applicant has no exclusive rights of ownership like the 
workplace and whether private space includes those areas in which the individual has no exclusive 
rights of ownership like the workplace. The Court in Klass v Germany (1979-80) 2 EHRR 214 230 
stated in this regard that although telephone conversations are not expressly mentioned in paragraph 1 
of Article 8, it considers that such conversations are covered by the notions of “private life” and 
“correspondence” referred to by the provision. In Halford v United Kingdom (1997) 24 EHRR 523 
the Court stated that it was clear from the Court case law that telephone calls made from business 
premises as well as from home may be covered by notions of “private life” and “correspondence” 
within the meaning of Article 8(1). In Klass v Germany, Malone v United Kingdom, Huvig v France 
(1990) 12 EHRR 528, A v France (1994) 17 EHHR 462 and Kopp v Switzerland (1999) 27 EHRR 91. 
The applicant in Halford, formerly an Assistant Chief Constable, complained that calls she made 
from her home and office telephones were intercepted by the police in order to gather information to 
use against her in sex discrimination proceedings she was instituting against the police. The Court 
held she had a reasonable expectation of privacy for calls made from both telephones more so 
because she had been assured that she could use her both her office telephone for personal purposes 
including a sex discrimination claim she was pursuing against her employer and as Assistant Chief 
Constable she has sole use of her office and telephones in that office, one of which had been 
designated for her private use. In Anderson v Sweden (1992) 14 EHRR 615 the court held telephone 
conversations between family members were covered by the concepts of “family life” and 
“correspondence”  in Article 8 (1).  
499
 Carnegie ‘Privacy and the Press: The Impact of Incorporating the European Convention on Human 
Rights in the United Kingdom’ (1998) 9 Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 311. 
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problems in its protection of privacy. First and foremost, Article 8 does not protect 
privacy.500 The use of the word “respect” in the article means the obligation merely 
guarantees a “respect” for these rights501 and does not protect privacy of family or the 
home or correspondence of the individual.502 Second, a technical interpretation of the 
whole ECHR (including Article 8), points to the fact that the ECHR is intended to 
have a vertical effect and not a horizontal effect.503 The question then arises whether 
Article 8 of the ECHR imposes positive or negative obligations. If positive obligations 
flow from Article 8, then the state is obliged to take steps to protect individuals from 
the negative effects of inaction and further require that third parties take positive 
action where there is a possibility of interference with an individual’s life.504 On the 
other hand, if negative obligations flow from Article 8, such obligations prohibit the 
state from committing any acts that might unduly infringe an individual’s private 
life.505 
The European Court has read the provisions of Article 8 as encompassing both 
positive and negative obligations. In Airey v Ireland506 it was held that “…although 
the object of Article 8 is chiefly aimed at protecting the individual against arbitrary 
interference by public authorities, it does not merely compel the state to abstain from 
such interference: in addition to this primary negative undertaking, there may be 
positive obligations inherent in an effective respect for private or family life”.507  The 
Court in Hokannen v Finland 508 further found that although the boundaries between 
the State’s positive and negative obligations under Article 8 do not lend themselves to 
precise definition, the applicable principles are similar – in both contexts due regard 
must be paid to the fair balance that has to be struck between the competing interests 
                                               
500
 Arnheim The Handbook of Human Rights Law: An Accessible Approach to The Issues and 
Principles (2004) 176. 
501Clayton and Tomlinson Privacy and Freedom of Expression (2001) 46. 
502Clayton and Tomlinson Privacy and Freedom of Expression (2001) 46. 
503Supra. 
504Clayton and Tomlinson Privacy and Freedom of Expression (2001) 46. 
505Supra. 
506Airey v Ireland (1979-80) 2 EHRR 305 319. 
507
 See also X and Y v Netherlands (1985) 8 EHRR 235 and Marckx v Belgium (1979) 2 EHRR 330. 
Clayton and Tomlinson Privacy and Freedom of Expression (2001) 47. 
508Hokannen v Finland  (1995) 19 EHRR 139. 
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of the individual and the community as a whole, and in both contexts the State is 
recognized as enjoying a certain margin of appreciation.509 
Article 8(2) provides for the justification of an interference with the right to privacy 
and the home.510 It states:  
[t]here shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise 
of this right except such as in accordance with the law and is necessary 
in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public 
safety or the economic well being of the country, for the prevention of 
disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others.  
Conduct that has been found to constitute “interferences” include, amongst others, 
house searches and seizures,511 storage and release of personal information on an 
applicant512 and interception of telephone conversations.513 In Leander v Sweden514 the 
following principles were established in respect of the phrase “in accordance with the 
law”: 
 “[the expression] requires…that the interference must have some basis 
in domestic law. Compliance with domestic law, however does not 
                                               
509Hokannen v Finland  (1995) 19 EHRR 139 168-169. 
510
 Clayton and Tomlinson Privacy and Freedom of Expression (2001) 36-37. 
511Klass v Germany (1979-80) 2 EHRR 214. 
512Leander v Sweden (1987) 9 EHRR 433. 
513
 Malone v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1979] 1 Ch 344 ,Huvig v France (1990) 12 EHRR 
and Ludi v Switzerland (1992) 15 EHRR 173. 
514Leander v Sweden (1987) 9 EHRR 433. See also Hewitt and Harman v United Kingdom (1992) 14 
EHRR 657 664. In Hewitt the Court stated that the phrase “in accordance with the law” goes beyond 
mere compliance with the domestic law. In The Sunday Times v United Kingdom [1979-80] 2 EHRR 
245 271, the Court outlined two of the requirements flowing from the expression: “ Firstly, the law 
adequately accessible in the sense that the citizen must be able to have an indication that is adequate 
in the circumstances of the legal rules applicable to a given case. Secondly, a norm cannot be 
regarded as “law” unless it is formulated with sufficient precision to enable the citizen to regulate his 
conduct. He must be able – if need be with appropriate advice – to foresee, to a degree that is 
reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail. Those 
consequences need not be foreseeable with absolute certainty: experience shows this to be 
unattainable. Again, whilst certainty is highly desirable, it may be bring in its train excessive rigidity 
and the law must be able to keep pace with changing circumstances. Accordingly, many laws are 
inevitably couched in terms which to, to a greater or lesser extent, are vague and whose interpretation 
and application are questions of practice.” 
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suffice: the law in question must be accessible…and its consequences 
[must be] foreseeable [for the individual concerned]”515. 
The Court has found that the following requirements flow from the expression “in 
accordance with the law”: 
1. Acts or activities complained of must have a basis in domestic law.516 
2. The law must be accessible and foreseeable.517 
3. A law conferring discretion (such as a norm) may be foreseeable provided the 
scope of its discretion and the manner of its exercise are clear518.519 
Article 8 further requires public authorities to prove that the interference was 
“necessary in a democratic society”. The Court in Handyside v United Kingdom520 
noted that “…whilst the adjective “necessary”…is not synonymous with 
“indispensable”, neither has it the flexibility of such expressions as “admissible”,  
“useful”, “ordinary” or “desirable” and it implies the existence of a “pressing social 
need”. The court further noted that “…it is for the national authorities to make the 
initial assessment of the reality of the pressing social need implied by the notion 
“necessity”, in this context”.521 In terms of assessing this “necessity”, States have a 
“certain margin of appreciation” or a degree of flexibility.522 Thus the margin of 
appreciation recognises that States may take differing approaches to similar issues.  
For Hoffmann and Rowe the idea of a margin of appreciation is: 
“appropriate because states that are bound by the Convention cover the 
whole of Europe and have different cultures and histories, different 
dominant religions, different traditions about how people should 
                                               
515Leander v Sweden (1987) 9 EHRR 433 at 450. 
516Leander v Sweden (1987) 9 EHRR 433. 
517The Sunday Times v United Kingdom [1979-80] 2 EHRR 245 271. 
518Malone v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1979] 1 Ch 344 . 
519
 See also Clayton and Tomlinson Privacy and Freedom of Expression (2001) 53-55. 
520Handyside v United Kingdom (1976) 1 EHRR 754. In Handyside the applicant, an English publisher, 
was charged and convicted under the Obscene Publications Act of 1959 for possessing obscene 
books. The Court held that there had been interference by a public authority with the applicant’s 
freedom of expression but such interference was justified in terms of Article 10(2) of the Convention, 
which is worded similar to Article 8(2). See also Clayton and Tomlinson Privacy and Freedom of 
Expression (2001) 53 - 55. 
521Handyside v United Kingdom (1976) 1 EHRR 754. 
522See Handyside v United Kingdom (1976) 1 EHRR 754 for an exhaustive discussion of the 
implications of the margin of appreciation afforded to contracting states. 
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behave and when and to what extent interference is necessary. In some 
areas, there may be no consensus across Europe about what should be 
tolerated and what should not, and that would suggest to the judges 
popular feelings about their citizens about a particular issue”.523 
It is normally on complex moral issues (such as abortion or the treatment of 
transsexuals) that states have a margin of appreciation afforded by the ECHR.524 
The phrase “legitimate aim” implies that the domestic law at issue is justified for one 
or more exceptions listed (that is national security, public safety, the economic well-
being of the country, the prevention of crime and disorder, the protection of health or 
morals and the protection of rights and freedoms of others) under the second 
paragraph of Article 8(2).525 Hence, where a state fails to show that an exception 
justified its interference, Article 8 is violated.526 
3.4.3.4 ECHR and Right to Privacy in English Law 
Several legal commentators have argued that the idea that there is no right to privacy 
in English law is no longer valid, particularly in light of certain decisions which, 
according to them, are indicative of the existence of a right to privacy in English law. 
In Morris v Beardmore527Lord Scarman declared the following regarding privacy in 
English law post the ECHR: “the right enjoys the protection of the European ECHR 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1953) (“the ECHR”), 
which the United Kingdom has ratified and which the United Kingdom permits to 
those within its jurisdiction and the individual right of petition: see articles 8 and 
25”.528 
                                               
523
 Shorts E and De Than C Human Rights Law in the UK (2001) 615. 
523Supra. 
523
 Shorts E and De Than C Human Rights Law in the UK (2001) 615. 
523Supra. 
523
 Shorts E and De Than C Human Rights Law in the UK (2001) 615. 
524Supra. 
525
 Shorts E and De Than C Human Rights Law in the UK (2001) 615. 
526
 Shorts E and De Than C Human Rights Law in the UK (2001) 615. 
527Morris v Beardmore [1981] A.C. 446. 
528Morris v Beardmore [1981] A.C. 446  464. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
98 
 
3.4.3.4.1 Kaye v Robertson 
These commentators further contend that the Kaye v Robertson529decision did not 
establish that there was no right to privacy in English law or that there was no room 
for developing such a right using existing principles. Rather, it is argued that in that 
case Lord Justice Glidewell was lamenting the inability of English judges to rely on 
the  right to privacy found in the Human Rights Act530 and further found that the 
enactment of the Human Rights Act introduced a right to privacy in English law.531 
In Douglas v Hello,532Lord Justice Bingham, agreeing Lord Justice Glidewell’s words 
in Kaye v Robertson, observed that that case highlights the failure of both the common 
law of England and statute to protect personal privacy and individual citizens.533 Also 
in agreement, Lord Justice Leggatt, commended United States law for responding to 
the need for privacy, a need which English judges are unable to fulfil should 
circumstances arise. Lord Justice Leggatt further asserted that the right had been 
disregarded so long in English law that the only body that can effectively recognise it 
is the legislature.534 
3.4.3.4.2 Hellewell v Chief Constable of Derbyshire 
The second case is that of Hellewell v Chief Constable of Derbyshire535. In May 1989 
the plaintiff, who had 32 previous convictions, 19 of which were for theft, was 
arrested and taken to a police station and charged with (attempted) theft. The plaintiff 
was fingerprinted, photographed and subsequently convicted of the offences. In 1992, 
an organization of shopkeepers, concerned about the level of shoplifting, asked the 
                                               
529Kaye v Robertson [1991] FSR 62. The plaintiff in Kaye v Robertson was a well-known actor who 
had undergone extensive surgery at Charing Cross Hospital after a piece of wood during a storm 
smashed through his car windscreen and struck him on the head. The first defendant was the editor of 
a tabloid newspaper named the “Sunday Sport” and the second defendant was the publisher of the 
same newspaper. A journalist and photographer acting under the instructions of the first defendant 
gained access to Kaye’s private hospital room, interviewed, and photographed the plaintiff before 
being ejected by security staff. The defendants then expressed their intention to publish the article on 
the plaintiff. The plaintiff, through a friend sought to prevent publication of the article through an 
interlocutory injunction alleging malicious falsehood, libel, passing off and trespass to the person. 
The injunction was granted and the defendants appealed. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in 
part and discharged the injunction but substituted with a new order. 
530Act of 1998. 
531Kaye v Robertson [1991] FSR 62 66. 
532Douglas v Hello! Ltd [2006] QB 125. 
533Douglas v Hello! Ltd [2006] QB 125 236 paragraph 114. 
534Douglas v Hello! Ltd [2006] QB 125236 paragraph 115 
535Hellewell v Chief Constable of Derbyshire [1995] 1 WLR 804. 
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police to supply photographs of individuals known to be causing trouble in the area so 
that their staff would recognize them. The police provided a number of photographs, 
including one of the plaintiff, which had been taken when he was in police custody. 
The police also told the shopkeepers to only show the photographs to their staff but 
not to display the photographs publicly. The plaintiff learnt of the use being made of 
the photograph and applied for an injunction restraining the Chief Constable from 
disclosing his photograph to the public. Justice Laws, in granting the application, held 
that a duty of confidence could arise when the police took a photograph of a suspect at 
a police station in circumstances where his consent was not required, but where the 
photograph was used reasonably for the prevention and detection of a crime, the 
investigation of alleged offences or the apprehension of suspects or persons 
unlawfully at large, the police would have a public interest defence to any action for 
breach of confidence. Justice Laws concluded that the police in disclosing the 
plaintiff’s photograph had acted entirely in good faith for the prevention or detection 
of a crime and had distributed it only to persons who had reasonable need to make use 
of it. The court further gave an example to illustrate that the tort of breach of 
confidence contains all the necessary elements for the fair protection of privacy. In 
other words, the court was convinced that privacy interests are protected in particular 
instances under the law of confidentiality: 
“If someone with a telephoto lens were to take from a distance with no 
authority a picture of another engaged in some private act, his 
subsequent disclosure of the photograph would, in my judgment as 
surely amount to a breach of confidence as if he found a stolen letter or 
diary in which the act was recounted and proceeded to publish it. In 
such a case, the law would protect what might reasonably be called a 
right to privacy, although the name accorded to the cause of action 
would be breach of confidence”.536 
                                               
536Hellewell v Chief Constable of Derbyshire [1995] 1 WLR 804 807. 
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3.4.3.4.3 Thompson and Venables v News Group Newspapers 
In the third case, Thompson and Venables v News Group Newspapers,537 the 
limitations of the development of breach of confidence in protecting rights of privacy 
under Article 8 were recognised. Dame Elizabeth Butler –Sloss stated that: 
“[u]nder the umbrella of confidentiality there will be information 
which may require a special quality of protection. In the present case 
the reason for advancing that special quality is that, if the information 
is published , the publication is likely to lead to grave and possibly 
fatal consequences …the court has jurisdiction, in exceptional cases, to 
extend the protection of confidentiality of information…where not to 
do so would be likely to lead to serious physical injury, or to death, of 
the person seeking that confidentiality, and there is no other way to 
protect the applicants other than by seeking relief from court”.538 
The approach in Thompson and Venables was adopted in Naomi Campell v Mirror 
Group Newspapers Ltd539 in which decision Justice Morland found that celebrities and 
public figures are entitled to some privacy: 
“Although many aspects of the private lives of celebrities and public 
figures will inevitably enter the public domain…it does not follow that 
even with self-publicists every aspect and detail of their private lives 
are legitimate quarry for the journalist. They are entitled to some space 
of privacy…the media to conform with Article 8 should respect 
information about aspects or details of private life of celebrities and 
public figures which they legitimately choose to keep private, certainly 
                                               
537Thompson and Venables v News Group Newspapers [2001] EWHC 32 (QB). The claimants in 
Thompson and Venables had killed a two-year-old boy when they were both aged ten and a half years 
old and were both subsequently convicted and detained for the crime. The shocking and distressing 
facts of their case were widely publicized. Injunctions restricting the information which the media 
had been entitled to publish during their detention came to an end on their eighteenth birthdays, the 
claimants therefore sought injunctions against specific newspaper publishers and against the whole 
world to restrain the solicitation or publication of information as to the physical appearance, 
whereabouts or movements, their new identities upon release and personal and historical information 
on their care, treatment and progress during their minority. The claimants sought the injunctions on 
the basis that they were necessary to protect their right of confidentiality and rights to life and 
freedom from persecution and harassment conferred by the Convention. 
538Thompson and Venables v News Group Newspapers [2001] EWHC 32 (QB)162. 
539Naomi Campell v Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd [2003] EMLR 39. 
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“sensitive personal data”, unless there is an overriding public interest 
duty to publish…”. 540 
The court further held that the development of the law of confidentiality since the 
Human Rights Act541came into force has seen information described as “confidential” 
in instances where it had not been confided by one person to another, but where it 
relates to an aspect of an individual’s private life which he does not choose to make 
public. The court added that the unjustifiable publication of such information should 
be described as breach of privacy rather than breach of confidence.542 
3.4.3.4.4 Douglas v Hello! Ltd 
The fourth case, Douglas v Hello! Ltd,543 touches on the reluctance of some English 
courts to interpret the provision under Article 8 of “private life” as protecting the right 
to privacy. Instead, such courts prefer to adhere to the conclusions of the Younger 
Committee and protect all privacy interests, including those which clearly necessitate 
a right to privacy be recognised and protected, with the tort of breach of confidence. 
These courts further ignore the fact that the tort of breach of confidence has 
shortcomings in that it cannot effectively remedy those cases in which no prior 
confidential relationship existed between the parties.544 
In Douglas, the first and second claimants were the film stars Michael Douglas and 
Catherine Zeta-Jones. The third claimant was the publisher OK! Magazine. The 
defendant was the publisher of Hello! Magazine. The claimants had entered into an 
agreement under which the third claimant was given exclusive rights to publish 
photographs of their wedding in 2000. The first and second claimants further 
requested their guests and employees not to take photographs or videos, and were 
required to pass through a security check at which a notice prohibiting photography 
and videos was posted. The third claimants later learned that the defendant intended to 
publish an article containing photographs of the wedding and applied for an injunction 
                                               
540Naomi Campell v Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd [2003] EMLR 3946. 
541Act of 1998. 
542Naomi Campell v Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd [2003] EMLR 3946. 
543Douglas v Hello! Ltd [2006] QB 125. 
544
 Carnegie ‘Privacy and the Press: The Impact of Incorporating the European Convention on Human 
Rights in the United Kingdom’ (1998) 9 Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 311 
320. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
102 
 
restraining publication. The claimants, in support of or alternatively to their breach of 
confidence action argued the first and second claimants had a right to privacy under 
English law by virtue of the Human Rights Act and Article 8 of the ECHR, Lord 
Justice Sedley, as a point of departure, considered the question whether there is a right 
to privacy in English law in the context of the case, as it had been established that an 
intruder with whom no relationship of confidence existed took the photograph. Had a 
guest or an employee of a contractor taken the photographs, there would have been 
cause for a breach of confidence action. Lord Justice Sedley held that English law: 
“…has reached a point at which it can be said with confidence that the 
law recognizes and will appropriately protect a right of personal 
privacy. The reasons are two-fold: First, equity and the common law 
are today in a position to respond to an increasingly invasive social 
environment by affirming that everybody has a right to some private 
space. Secondly, the Human Rights Act requires the courts to give an 
appropriate effect to respect for private and family life set out in 
Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms”.545 
3.4.3.5 The European Court’s Interpretation of Article 8 
The European Court seems to be taking the opposite direction in terms of its 
interpretation of Article 8. The Court prefers to interpret Article 8 as protecting the 
right to privacy. For instance in Peck v United Kingdom546, Peck was captured on 
CCTV (Closed Circuit Television) walking through his local town centre, wielding a 
large knife in the process of committing suicide. The police were alerted to the 
situation because of the CCTV footage and recovered the knife from the applicant. 
The CCTV footage, owned by the local council, was released to the local press to 
demonstrate the effectiveness of CCTV in preventing crime and enabling the police to 
respond to situations. A photograph of Peck was used in the publicity material and at 
all times Peck’s face was not masked. The footage was also given to the BBC and a 
commercial broadcast news agency who both took inadequate steps to mask Peck’s 
identity. Peck made media appearances to speak out against the publication of the 
footage and photographs from the CCTV.  
                                               
545Douglas v Hello! Ltd [2006] QB 125235 paragraph 111. 
546Peck v UK  (2003) Application No. 4464/98. 
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The court, referring to PG and JH v United Kingdom547, noted that there are a number 
of elements [such as gender identification, name, sexual orientation and sexual life] 
important to a consideration of whether a person’s private life is impacted on outside 
a person’s home or private premises: 
“Since there are occasions when people knowingly or intentionally 
involve themselves in activities which are or may be recorded or 
reported in a public manner, a person’s reasonable expectations as to 
privacy may be significant …A person who walks down the street will, 
inevitably, be visible to any member of the public who is also present. 
Monitoring by technological means of the same public scene (for 
example a security guard viewing through closed circuit television) is 
of a similar character. Private life considerations may arise however 
once any systematic or permanent record comes into existence of such 
material from the public domain. The monitoring of the actions of an 
individual in a public space by use of photographic equipment, which 
does not record the visual data, does not, as such, give rise to an 
interference with the individual’s private life. On the other hand, the 
recording of the data and systematic or permanent nature of the record 
may give rise to such considerations”.548 
The court further observed that Peck did not complain that the collection of data 
through the CCTV monitoring his movements and the creation of a permanent record 
amounted to an interference with his private life.549 Rather, he argued that it was the 
disclosure of that record of his movements to the public in a manner in which he 
could not have foreseen that amounted to interference. The court concluded that 
disclosure of the relevant footage constituted a serious interference with the 
applicant’s right to respect for his private life. The court based its conclusion on the 
following factors: Peck was walking in a public street and was not there to participate 
in a public event; it was late at night and Peck was distressed and perturbed; he was 
not charged with any offence; the footage of the aftermath of his suicide attempt was 
disclosed to the media and the applicant’s identity is some instances was not 
                                               
547PG and JH v United Kingdom  (2001) Application No. 44787/98S57.  
548PG and JH v United Kingdom  (2001) Application No. 44787/98S57 (2001) paragraph 57. 
549Peck v UK  (2003) Application No. 4464/98 paragraph 60. 
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masked.550 In determining whether the disclosure was “necessary in a democratic 
society”, the court considered whether the reasons adduced to justify the disclosure 
were “relevant and sufficient” and whether the measures were proportionate to 
legitimate aims. The court found that Peck’s voluntary media appearances did not 
diminish the seriousness of the interferences or reduce the correlative requirement of 
care concerning disclosures.551 
3.4.4 Summary 
Prior to the incorporation of the ECHR into English domestic law, there was no 
statutory or common law right of privacy. Moreover, English courts expressed both a 
reluctance to recognise a general right to privacy or under the umbrella of the tort of 
breach of confidence. After the incorporation of the ECHR, some English courts 
continued to rely on the tort of breach of confidence to protect privacy interests, but 
other courts emphasised the limitations in relying on breach of confidence. The latter 
courts further observed Article 8 of the ECHR as protecting a right to privacy. The 
European Court’s interpretation of the Article 8 phrase of “private life” as including 
“privacy” has led some legal commentators to conclude there is a general right to 
privacy in English law.  
3.5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter sought to narrow the broad discussion in chapter 2 on the general 
development of the legal protection of privacy by concentrating on the development 
of the legal protection of privacy in selected countries, namely South Africa, England 
and the United States, because they protect the privacy of their citizens in distinct and 
varying ways. This already shows that privacy as a concept is elusive and that there is 
hardly agreement on exactly what it entails, nor the extent to which and how it should 
be protected.  
In South Africa, privacy now is protected through a combination of explicit protection 
in the Constitution and the common law (applicable legislation will be discussed in 
the chapters to follow). The United States has found a way to protect zones of privacy 
through other rights in its constitution even though there is no explicit mention of the 
                                               
550Peck v UK  (2003) Application No. 4464/98 paragraph  62. 
551Peck v UK  (2003) Application No. 4464/98 paragraph 86-87. 
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right to privacy in its Constitution. In addition, common law protection exists for 
privacy infringements. The discussion also showed that England has no constitution 
and does not recognise that there is a right to privacy, yet it protects privacy through 
other common law principles and an international human rights instrument.  
Looking ahead to the discussion to follow, perhaps the most important insight to be 
gathered, especially from the experience in South Africa (in the new constitutional 
dispensation) and the United States is what courts have said about the meaning of 
privacy. It seems as if the prevailing view is that, for purposes of legal protection, 
privacy cannot be accurately defined, but that it is a context –dependent right and that 
the phrase “right to privacy” is actually a misnomer. Rather, existence of the right is 
made subject to the expectation of privacy – subjectively held and objectively 
reasonable.  This seems to imply that the existence of the right (and its infringement) 
already becomes dependant on a balancing of interests. But that is not all, the review 
of case law in this chapter shows that even if the right does exist, and even though it is 
infringed, a further balancing of rights takes place to enquire into the justification for 
that infringement (that is especially true in the constitutional context.) As such, the 
right to privacy becomes a rather tenuous right. Looking ahead to the further 
discussion in this dissertation, which aim to locate the right to privacy in the 
workplace and the policies and practices employers engage in, one can already submit 
that the right to privacy faces a battle for survival in that context. After all, employers, 
as the owners of the means of production and with a legitimate interest in directing 
their affairs will more often than not argue that their policies and practices do not 
infringe on privacy (as the right, being dependent on the reasonableness of the 
expectation, does not exist in the particular circumstances of the matter) or, to the 
extent that these policies and practices do infringe on privacy, that their conduct was 
justified in light of their legitimate concerns.  
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CHAPTER 4: 
A WORKABLE DEFINITION OF PRIVACY 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Many people (as do courts and legislators) have an idea of what privacy is, but cannot 
adequately and satisfactorily define it. Chapter 2 gave an overview of the historical 
development of privacy protection whereas Chapter 3 presented a brief comparative 
overview of the development of privacy protection in South Africa, the United States 
and the United Kingdom, discussions which, to some extent, already illustrate this 
point. In view of these developments, this chapter critically assesses the possibility of 
a universal workable definition of privacy for purposes of the further discussion. In 
particular, the purpose of this chapter is to consider the concept and value of privacy, 
discuss the various conceptions of privacy advanced by proponents of privacy, outline 
the criticisms levelled against the notion of privacy and endeavour to identify a 
workable definition of privacy. 
4.2 THE DIFFICULTIES IN DEFINING PRIVACY 
The majority of commentators “proclaim privacy as a supremely important human 
good, as a value somehow at the core of what makes life worth living”552. As such, 
commentators generally think and talk about privacy as a useful concept. Although 
there is broad consensus on the distinctness and importance of privacy, there are 
those, such as the reductionists, who do not think and talk of privacy as a useful, 
coherent and distinct concept.553 For proponents of privacy, privacy is useful because 
it “denote[s] something distinct and coherent”. Privacy is further useful, distinct and 
coherent where there are losses of privacy, invasions of privacy and actionable 
violations of privacy.554 
4.2.1 The Meaning of Privacy 
There is not only broad consensus about the importance and distinctness of privacy, 
but also about the fact that privacy cannot be clearly and satisfactorily defined. In fact, 
                                               
552Whitman “The Two Western Cultures of Privacy” (2004) 113 Yale Law Journal 1153. 
553
 Gavison “Privacy and the Limits of Law” (1980) 89 Yale Law Journal  421 422.  
554
 Gavison “Privacy and the Limits of Law” (1980) 89 Yale Law Journal  421  422 – 423. 
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it has been said that, “[t]he term “privacy” is notoriously difficult to define”.555 The 
view as to the difficulty of defining privacy is shared by both critics and proponents of 
privacy. Michael, for example, states that “of all human rights in the international 
catalogue, privacy is perhaps the most difficult to circumscribe and define”.556 
Similarly, Parker observes that “[c]urrently there is no consensus in legal and 
philosophical literature on a definition of privacy”.557 Thomson writes that “[p]erhaps 
the most striking thing about the right to privacy is that nobody seems to have any 
clear idea what [privacy] is”.558 Posner laments that “[m]uch ink has been spilled in 
trying to clarify the elusive and ill defined concept of privacy”.559 For Wacks, “an 
acceptable definition of privacy remains elusive” and the concept of privacy “has 
become too vague and the concept of privacy is “nebulous”, thereby undermining the 
value of privacy and [impeding] its effective legal protection”.560 Laurie also finds 
“the concept of privacy… problematic” and goes on to state that “the problems it 
causes relates to its definition, its function, its nature, its usefulness, its value and its 
protection”.561 
Post mentions that “privacy is a value so complex, so entangled in competing and 
contradictory dimensions, so engorged with the various distinct meanings, that I 
sometimes despair whether it can be usefully addressed at all”.562 Gutwirth argues that 
privacy is virtually impossible to define because “it has multiple meanings. It is not a 
tangible object that can easily be corralled into a confined definition”.563 Whitman 
attributes the complexity in defining privacy to the fact that it takes “disconcertingly 
diverse forms”564 and “the sense of what must be kept “private”, of what must be 
                                               
555
 Posner “Privacy, Secrecy and Reputation”  (1979) 28 Buffalo Law Review 1 3. 
556Michael Privacy and Human Rights: An International and Comparative Study, with Special 
Reference to Developments in Information Technology (1994) 1. 
557Parker “A Definition of Privacy” (1974) 27 Rutgers Law Review 275. See also Posner “Privacy, 
Secrecy and Reputation” (1979) 28 Buffalo Law Review (1979) 1 2.  
558Thompson “The Right to Privacy”(1975) 2 Philosophy and Public Affairs 95.  
559
 Posner An Economic Theory of Privacy in Schoeman ed. Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy: An 
Anthology (1984) 333. 
560Wacks Privacy: Volume I The Concept of Privacy (1993) xii. 
561
 For Laurie the scope of privacy is so wide ranging that is it is almost impossible to examine the 
concept in its entirety. Laurie Genetic Privacy (2002) 1. 
562Post “Three Concepts of Privacy” (2001) 89 Georgetown Law Review 2087  2087. 
563Gutwirth Privacy and the Information Age (2002) 29. 
564Whitman “The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty” (2004) 113 Yale Law 
Journal  1151. 
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hidden before the eyes of others, seems to differ strangely from society to society”.565 
Gutwirth adds that privacy “is not a natural element nor is it a part of reality. It is 
neither eternal nor universal and it has different consequences in different situations” 
and “[p]rivacy only exists in context, meaning privacy is a relative, contextual 
concept”.566 
Gross contends that it is not the function of the law to determine what privacy is. The 
function of the law, according to Gross, is to identify “situations of privacy that will 
be afforded legal protection or will be made private by virtue of legal protection”,  
because “privacy…is a creature of life in a human community and not the contrivance 
of a legal system concerned with its protection”567. This, of course, begs the question, 
if it is not the function of the law to determine what privacy is, what or who 
determines what privacy is? In answering this question, the value of privacy becomes 
important. This value determines the meaning given to privacy in a particular context. 
At the same time, this means that the question of what privacy is, is devoid of any 
moral consideration, because privacy is not an “eternal” or “universal” concept and 
has “different consequences in different situations”. 
4.2.2 The Value of Privacy 
In contrast to the approach mentioned above, Gavison is of the view that the value of 
privacy can only be determined after it has been established “what privacy is, and 
when and why losses of privacy are undesirable”.568 The value of privacy can be 
gleaned from an examination of its positive functions;569 the values served by 
privacy;570 and those aspects of human life that would be impossible or unlikely in the 
total absence of privacy.571 
                                               
565Whitman “The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty” (2004) 113 Yale Law 
Journal  1151 1153. 
566Gutwirth Privacy and the Information Age (2002) 29.  
567
 Gross “The Concept of Privacy” (1977) 42 New York University Law Review 36. Whitman contends 
“[p]rivacy law is not the product of logic. But neither is it [the] product of “experience” or of 
supposed “felt necessities” that are shared in all modern societies.” Whitman also observes privacy to 
be a “product of local anxieties and local ideals”. Whitman “The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: 
Dignity Versus Liberty” (2004) 113 Yale Law Journal  1151 1219. 
568
 Gavison “Privacy and the Limits of Law” (1980) 89 Yale Law Journal  421 425. 
569
 Gavison “Privacy and the Limits of Law” (1980) 89 Yale Law Journal  421 441. 
570
 Gavison “Privacy and the Limits of Law” (1980) 89 Yale Law Journal  421 442. 
571
 Gavison “Privacy and the Limits of Law” (1980) 89 Yale Law Journal  421 443. 
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Commentators on privacy have determined the value of privacy by identifying 
differing functions of privacy and values served by privacy. The functions and values 
of privacy identified further circumscribe the meaning of privacy. For example, Benn 
asserts that, in the absence of privacy the following ideals would be inconceivable: the 
ideal of personal relations;572 the ideal of the politically free man573 and the ideal of the 
morally autonomous man.574 Privacy, for Benn, thus implies a general respect for 
persons.575 
Privacy serves a number of values and in the absence of privacy these values would 
be non – existent. These values include happiness, justice, liberty, dignity and 
autonomy. McCloskey contends that privacy is grounded on values such as human 
happiness, justice and liberty.576 The values served by privacy are inextricably linked 
to its functions.  
One of the most important functions of privacy is the creation and maintenance of 
social and personal relations. Personal relations would be inconceivable in the 
absence of privacy, because personal relations are by their very nature private.577 
In so much as privacy functions to create relations with others, it also functions to 
limit access to the individual in order to insulate the individual inhibitive effects of 
close proximity with others.578 In this regard, Rachels argues that we need to regulate 
or vary our behaviour with different people according to the different types of human 
                                               
572
 The ideal of personal relations relates to relations between persons we consider important and 
valuable i.e. personal relations. These include relations with friends, lovers and family members. 
Personal relations relationships according to Benn are by their very nature private and “could not 
exist if it were not possible to create excluding conditions.” Benn Privacy, Freedom and Respect for 
Persons in Pennock and Chapman  (eds.) Privacy: Nomos XIII (1984) 17. 
573
 The ideal of the politically free man recognises the individual has to exist “in a minimally regulated 
society”, subject to the power of others within reasonable and legally safeguarded limits. However, 
the ideal also recognises the individual possesses a breadth of choice in the way he lives despite 
social obligations. Benn Privacy, Freedom and Respect for Persons in Pennock and Chapman (eds.) 
Privacy: Nomos XIII (1984) 21. 
574
 The ideal of the morally autonomous man, recognises the individual can be principled as such 
capable of carrying out morally responsible action. Benn Privacy, Freedom and Respect for Persons 
in Pennock and Chapman (eds.) Privacy: Nomos XIII (1984) 24. 
575
 Benn Privacy, Freedom and Respect for Persons in Pennock and Chapman (eds.) Privacy: Nomos 
XIII (1984) 26. 
576McCloskey  “The Political Ideal of Privacy” (1971) 21 Philosophical Quarterly 303 311. 
577
 Benn Privacy, Freedom and Respect for Persons in Pennock and Chapman (eds.) Privacy: Nomos 
XIII (1984) 17. 
578
 Gavison “Privacy and the Limits of Law” (1980) 89 Yale Law Journal  421 446 - 447. 
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relationships we have with them.579 This means we need to control who has access to 
us because “[i]f we cannot control who has access to us sometimes including and 
sometimes excluding various people, then we cannot control the patterns of behaviour 
we need to adopt or the kinds of relations with other people that we will have”.580 
In addition, privacy is credited with perfecting political understanding.581 In a 
democracy, privacy encourages individuals to deliberate on and make political 
decisions. Moreover, a respect for privacy in a democracy attracts the participation of 
talented individuals in government.582 
McCloskey is of the view that an invasion of privacy causes feelings of outrage, 
shame, hurt and humiliation. For this reason, privacy is viewed by some of its 
proponents as a mechanism for insulating the individual from such feelings.583 
Gavison also shares the view that privacy protects individuals from societal ridicule 
and censure.584 Rachels argues that privacy protects a number of interests, including 
interests in keeping information on embarrassing or shameful aspects of life and 
behaviour from others.585 Gross similarly sees privacy as protecting certain types of 
information, specifically information concerning our individuality (our identity, 
appearance, personality traits, character, talents, habits and weaknesses amongst 
others) and our lives (our past, present and future, our feelings, what we own and our 
desires or needs).586 In this sense, by preventing unwanted shameful and embarrassing 
exposures concerning an individual privacy further enhances human dignity.587 
In considering “why privacy is commonly considered a right or a value to be 
protected by law,” Negley suggests that “privacy is necessary to ensure that the 
                                               
579
 Rachels “Why Privacy is Important” (1975)  6 Philosophy and Public Affairs 323 327 – 328. 
580
 Rachels “Why Privacy is Important” (1975)  6 Philosophy and Public Affairs 323 331. 
581
 Weinstein The Uses of Privacy in the Good Life in Pennock and Chapman (eds.) Privacy: Nomos 
XIII (1984)96. 
582
 Gavison “Privacy and the Limits of Law” (1980) 89 Yale Law Journal  421 455 - 456 
583McCloskey “The Political Ideal of Privacy” (1971) 21 Philosophical Quarterly 303 311. 
584
 Gavison “Privacy and the Limits of Law” (1980) 89 Yale Law Journal  421448. 
585
 Rachels “Why Privacy is Important” (1975)  6 Philosophy and Public Affairs 323. 
586
 Gross “The Concept of Privacy” (1977) 42 New York University Law Review 36 172-174. 
587
 Gavison “Privacy and the Limits of Law” (1980) 89 Yale Law Journal  421 455. 
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individual has the possibility of moral choice and action”.588 Also, in this regard, 
privacy equips the individual with the ability to exercise moral judgment in an open, 
pluralistic and tolerant society.589 
Privacy creates the personhood of persons and promotes individuality of persons. 
Reiman asserts that “privacy is necessary for the creation of “selves” out of human 
beings”.590 Reiman describes a “self” as partly “a human being who regards his 
existence – his thoughts, his body, his actions – as his own”.591  As such, privacy 
constitutes an essential ingredient in the creation of personhood in developing persons 
and further “confirms and demonstrates” the personhood of developed persons.592 
Privacy, understood in this sense, is “a condition of the original and continuing 
creation of “selves” or “persons”593 and the right to privacy therefore “protects the 
individual’s interest in becoming, being and remaining a person”.594 
4.3 PROPONENTS OF PRIVACY 
Notwithstanding general agreement on the fact that privacy cannot be satisfactorily 
defined, several proponents of privacy595 have made attempts to define or at least 
propose a conception of privacy. The various definitions or conceptions have focused 
on privacy as a psychological condition,596 a form of control,597 a claim,598 and a 
                                               
588Negley “Philosophical View on the Value of Privacy” (1966) 31 Law and Contemporary Problems 
319. 
589
 Gavison “Privacy and the Limits of Law” (1980) 89 Yale Law Journal  421 450. 
590
 Reiman “Privacy, Intimacy and Personhood” (1976)  6 Philosophy and Public Affairs 26 40. 
591
 Reiman “Privacy, Intimacy and Personhood” (1976)  6 Philosophy and Public Affairs 26 39.  
592Supra. 
593
 Reiman “Privacy, Intimacy and Personhood” (1976)  6 Philosophy and Public Affairs 26 40. 
594Supra. 
595
 “Proponents of privacy” are those writers who have found privacy to be a useful and coherent 
concept and have accordingly attempted to define it or offer an approach towards understanding it. It 
is important to note in this regard, that some writers do not find privacy to be a useful and coherent 
concept and for this reason have not defined or attempted to define the concept. See discussion on 
“Criticisms of Privacy”. 
596
 For Weinstein privacy is a psychological condition of being apart from others. Weinstein The Uses 
of Privacy in the Good Life in Pennock and Chapman (eds.) Privacy: Nomos XIII (1984) 94.  
597
 Fried has defined privacy as “the control we have over information about ourselves”. Fried An 
Anatomy of Values: Problems of Personal and Social Choice (1970) 141. Gross also defines privacy 
as “the condition under which there is control over acquaintance with one’s personal affairs by the 
one enjoying it”. Gross Privacy and Autonomyin Pennock and Chapman (eds.) Privacy: Nomos XIII 
(1984) 169. 
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right599.600 Thus, although commentators agree that privacy is distinct and coherent, 
there is disagreement as to what makes privacy distinct and coherent.601 
4.3.1 Theoretical Approaches to Privacy 
Proponents of privacy have advanced different approaches or conceptions of privacy. 
Solove identifies six dominant approaches or conceptions of privacy postulated in 
legal and scholarly literature: 
a) The right to be let alone; 
b) Limited access to the self  
c) Secrecy; 
d) Control over information; 
e) Personhood; and 
f) Intimacy.602 
Each one of these approaches to, or concepts of, privacy will be discussed below by 
focussing on the definition of privacy in terms of the different conceptions, what the 
value of privacy is in terms of each conception, as well as criticisms levelled at each. 
4.3.1.1 Right to be Let Alone 
The phrase the “right to be let alone” was coined by Judge Cooley in his 1880 
Treatise on Torts.603 Judge Cooley used the phrase to articulate that physical touching 
was a tort injury. The phrase was later adopted by Warren and Brandeis, when they 
authors defined privacy as the “right to be let alone” in their seminal article on 
privacy.604 
                                                                                                                                      
598
 Westin defines privacy as “the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for 
themselves when, how and to what extent information about them is communicated to others”. 
Westin  Privacy and Freedom (1970) 7 - 8. 
599
 Van Den Haag for example, views privacy as “the right not to let others participate in one’s 
activities” or right to exclude others from participating in your life activities. Van Den Haag On 
Privacy in Pennock and Chapman  (eds.) Privacy: Nomos XIII (1984) 149. 
600
 Parker “A Definition of Privacy” (1974) 27 Rutgers Law Review  275  276. 
601
 Schoeman Privacy: Philosophical Dimensions of the Literature in Schoeman ed. Philosophical 
Dimensions of Privacy: An Anthology (1984)  6. 
602This discussion on the various conceptions of privacy relies heavily on Solove’s article titled 
“Conceptualising Privacy” (2002) 90 California Law Review 1087. Solove deals with the different 
conceptions of privacy and identifies six primary conceptions of privacy. 
603
 Godkin “The Rights of the Citizen: IV. To His Own Reputation” (1890)  Scribner’s Magazine  66. 
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4.3.1.1.1 Meaning 
Proponents of this conception of privacy define it as the “right to be alone”. Privacy, 
understood in this sense, is a form of “immunity”, “solitude”, or “seclusion”.605 
4.3.1.1.2 Value 
The conception locates the value of privacy in its ability to provide the individual with 
physical space away from others. 
4.3.1.1.3 Criticism 
Even though the conception of privacy as the “right to be let alone” has made a 
profound contribution to the development of privacy, it has been the subject of much 
criticism. 
Solove argues that the conception “merely describes an attribute of privacy” and 
neglects to indicate how privacy should be valued or to identify instances where the 
individual should “be let alone”.606 
Thomson argues that the conception restricts violations of privacy to those violations 
which can be proved and not all violations of privacy can be proved. Thompson uses 
the following example to illustrate the shortcoming of this conception: Y uses an X - 
ray hearing device to hear everything X says via the walls of X’s house. Y would 
admit to using the device to listen to X’s conversation, but Y would deny her conduct 
violated X’s privacy because she operated the hearing device at a distance and did not 
go anywhere near X (she let him alone and did not even touch him).607 
The conception has also been criticised for being antiquated, “archaic” and 
“belonging to the period when physical space was very limited – when people lived in 
such crowded conditions that to get some privacy required withdrawal to an isolated 
spot [in the] countryside”.608  The phrase the “right to be let alone” was apt during a 
time in human history when individuals generally lacked physical space. This is no 
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 Solove “Conceptualizing Privacy” (2002)  90 California Law Review1087 1102. 
606
 Solove “Conceptualizing Privacy” (2002)  90 California Law Review1087  1102. 
607Thompson “The Right to Privacy” (1975) 4 Philosophy and Public Affairs 295. 
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longer the case in modern society because the “opportunities for physical privacy are 
so much greater” and “abundant”.609 
Parker observes that privacy in this sense may result in every loss of privacy 
qualifying as not being let alone. That is to say, there are numerous instances in which 
not being let alone will not necessarily result in a loss of privacy.610 
4.3.1.1.4 Conclusion 
The conception of privacy as the “right to be alone” has its roots in Warren and 
Brandeis’s 1890 article on privacy. As fundamental as the conception may be, it has a 
number of shortcomings: first, it does not indicate how privacy should be valued; 
second, it obscures the fact that not every violation is a violation of privacy; third, it 
overlooks the fact that not being let alone does not always result in a loss of privacy; 
lastly, it is outdated in its sense of privacy as seclusion or solitude.611 
4.3.1.2 Limited Access to the Self 
The conception of privacy as the limited access to oneself is closely related to the 
“right to be let alone”. The conception under discussion recognises the individual’s 
desire for concealment and in being apart from others.612 
4.3.1.2.1 Meaning 
Proponents of this conception often describe privacy as a condition. Simmel, for 
example, defines privacy as a condition in which our interests are sovereign and we 
have ownership over all our initiatives.613 Gross suggests privacy is “the condition of 
human life in which acquaintance with a person or with affairs of his life which are 
personal to him is limited”.614 Similarly, Weinstein writes of privacy as the “condition 
                                               
609
 Posner “Privacy, Secrecy and Reputation” 1979 28 Buffalo Law Review 1  4. 
610
 Parker “A Definition of Privacy” (1974) 27 Rutgers Law Review 275 276. 
611
 Gavison also criticises the conception in so far as it is similar with the conception of privacy as non-
interference by the state in personal decisions, for two reasons. First, the discussion of privacy as 
non-interference by the state in personal decisions obscures the fact privacy is a claim for legal 
protection against other individuals by the state. Second, the conception restricts privacy claims to 
interests concerning personal decisions. Gavison “Privacy and Limits of Law” (1980) 89 Yale Law 
Journal 421 438. 
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 Solove defines solitude as “a form of seclusion, of withdrawal from other individuals, of being 
alone”. Solove “Conceptualizing Privacy” (2002)  90 California Law Review 1087 1102. 
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 Simmel Privacy Is not an Isolated Freedom in Pennock and Chapman (eds.) Privacy: Nomos XIII 
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of voluntary limitation of communication to or from certain others for the purpose of 
conducting an activity in pursuit of a perceived good” or simply a “condition of being 
apart from others”.615 
4.3.1.2.2 Value 
Privacy, in terms of this conception, allows individuals to be apart from others by 
limiting access to themselves and information about themselves. In this regard, 
Weinstein finds privacy to be similar to “alienation, loneliness, ostracism, and 
isolation” in that they all represent conditions or states “of being apart from others.”616 
Privacy is however different from the conditions of loneliness, shame, ostracism, 
alienation and unhappiness because, unlike such conditions, privacy is sought after 
and desirable: “alienation is suffered, loneliness is dreaded, and ostracism and 
isolation are borne with resignation or panic”.617 
Although Van Den Haag subscribes to the conception under discussion, Van den 
Haag prefers to see privacy as a right, namely, a “right not to let others participate in 
one’s activities, be it only by watching or publicizing them”.618 Privacy thus enables 
an individual to exclude others from watching, using and invading his private realm 
and to control his or her living space, image, expression and communications.619 
In attempting to show that privacy is a distinct and coherent concept, Gavison 
advances a limited access conception of privacy. In Gavison’s view, privacy is 
“related to our concern over our accessibility to others: the extent to which we are 
known to others, the extent to which others have physical access to us, and the extent 
to which we are subjects of others”.620 More importantly, Gavison rejects the idea of 
“privacy as a claim, a psychological state, or an area that should not be invaded” and 
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of “privacy as a form of control”. Gavison prefers instead to see privacy as a neutral 
concept comprised of secrecy, anonymity and solitude.621 
4.3.1.2.3 Criticism 
The main point of criticism against the conception of privacy as limited access to 
oneself is its failure to identify instances in which access to the self violates privacy, 
given that access to the self does not always result in a violation of privacy. That is to 
say, a violation of privacy occurs only when others have access to those aspects of an 
individual’s life or affairs which are personal or private.622 
4.3.1.2.4 Conclusion 
Privacy in terms of the limited access conception is a condition which enables 
individuals to be apart from others by way of limiting access to themselves and 
information about themselves. The conception however fails to identify situations in 
which access to the self will result in a violation of privacy. 
4.3.1.3 Secrecy 
Some commentators conceive of privacy as a sense of secrecy, or the concealment of 
information. This conception of privacy has been identified as a subset of the limited 
access conception.623 That being said, the conception of privacy as secrecy is narrower 
than the limited access conception, because it entails only an aspect of access to the 
self, namely, the concealment of personal facts.624 
4.3.1.3.1 Meaning 
Posner defines privacy as the withholding or concealment of particularly personal 
information625and his analysis of privacy identifies one of the interests privacy 
embraces as the concealment of information.626 This interest of concealment of 
information is invaded “whenever private information is obtained against the wishes 
of the person to whom the information pertains”.627 
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4.3.1.3.2 Value 
The value of privacy according to this conception is that it enables individuals to keep 
certain information private. Friedrich, in focussing on the public or political 
implications of privacy, also links privacy to secrecy and defines privacy as “a special 
form of secrecy” prevalent in all social relations.628 Friedrich further makes a 
distinction between functional and dysfunctional secrecy. Functional secrecy is seen 
as secrecy necessary in certain circumstances (for example with regard foreign and 
military diplomacy). Dysfunctional secrecy on the other hand, is usually not required 
as it concerns morally objectionable or dubious circumstances (for example in the 
case of fraud or corruption).629 
4.3.1.3.3 Criticism 
The conception of privacy as secrecy has been criticised for not taking cognisance of 
the fact “that individuals [may] want to keep things private from some people but not 
others”.630 In this sense the conception equates secrecy with total non - disclosure and 
overlooks that, as individuals, “ordinarily we deal with an interest in selective 
disclosure” and “not with an interest in non – disclosure”.631 Commentators such as 
Beardsley recognise this and conceive of privacy as tantamount to selective 
disclosure, which finds expression in the following statement: “[D]o not seek or 
disseminate information about X which X does not wish to have known or 
disseminated”632. 
Posner is further of the view that “when people decry lack of privacy, what they want 
[is] more power to conceal information about themselves that others might use to their 
disadvantage”.633 Posner reasons that people conceal personal facts about themselves 
in order to “mislead others”634 and “to manipulate other people’s opinion of them”635or 
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to “manipulate the world around them by selective disclosure of [personal] facts about 
them”.636 In other words, for Posner, privacy is a tool individuals use to manipulate 
and defraud others. 
This conception of privacy has been further criticised for equating privacy with 
secrecy. For Wagner DeCew “privacy and secrecy are not co extensional.” Wagner 
DeCew provides two reasons as to why privacy is not tantamount to secrecy. First, 
secret information is not always private. For instance, secret treaties or military plans 
are kept from the public, but this does not make them private because authorised 
military personnel can view them. Secondly, not all private matters (such as one’s 
debts or behaviour) are tantamount to secrets. Such information may be publicised for 
the public benefit. Solove agrees with Wagner DeCew in this regard and argues that 
the disclosure of secrets does not necessarily result in violations of privacy and some 
violations of privacy do not involve a disclosure of secrets.637 
4.3.1.3.4 Conclusion 
The conception of privacy as secrecy locates the value of privacy in the fact that it 
enables individuals to keep certain information private. The conception, however, 
equates secrecy with total non –disclosure, thus overlooking the fact “that individuals 
[may] want to keep things private from some people but not others”.638 The notion of 
privacy as a form of secrecy further (incorrectly) equates privacy with secrecy. 
4.3.1.4 Control over Information about Oneself 
The majority of commentators prefer to conceive of privacy as control over 
information about oneself. In so doing, proponents of this conception often refer to 
privacy as a claim, form of control or condition. 
4.3.1.4.1 Meaning 
Parent prefers to view privacy as a condition “of not having undocumented personal 
information about oneself possessed by others” and as such “a person’s privacy is 
diminished exactly to the degree that others possess this kind of knowledge about 
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him”. 639Westin also subscribes to this conception and identifies privacy as a claim by 
“individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to 
what extent information about them is communicated to others”.640  Parker and Gross 
see privacy as a form of control. Parker sees privacy as “control over when and by 
whom parts of us can be seen or heard, touched, smelled or tasted by others”641 whilst 
Gross sees privacy as “control over acquaintance with one’s personal affairs”.642 
4.3.1.4.2 Value 
The value of privacy in terms of this conception is the ability to keep information 
about ourselves from others. 
4.3.1.4.3 Criticism 
As already indicated, proponents of this conception often construe privacy a claim, a 
psychological state or form of control.643 Gavison, in arguing that privacy is a distinct 
and coherent concept, advances a neutral conception of privacy, which rejects the 
construction of privacy as a claim, a psychological state, as a form of control or as an 
area that should not be invaded.644 
Similar to Gavison, Parker is of the opinion that privacy cannot be defined as a 
psychological condition or state given that some losses of privacy have no effect on 
an individual’s psychological state or consciousness.645 This is especially the case 
where an individual’s privacy is temporarily invaded without his knowledge.646 Parker 
further finds that defining privacy as a form of power or control is problematic, 
because not every loss or gain of control over information about us is tantamount to a 
loss or gain of privacy.647 Furthermore, some losses or gains of privacy are not related 
to information about ourselves.648 
                                               
639
 Parent Privacy, Morality and the Law in Barendt (ed.) Privacy (2001) 297. 
640
 Westin Privacy and Freedom (1967) 7 -8. 
641
 Parker “A Definition of Privacy” (1974) 27 Rutgers Law Review 238 275. 
642
 Gross “The Concept of Privacy” (1977) 42 New York University Law Review 172-174. 
643
 Gavison “Privacy and Limits of Law” (1980) 89 Yale Law Journal 421 453. 
644
 Gavison “Privacy and Limits of Law” (1980) 89 Yale Law Journal 421 453. 
645
 Parker “A Definition of Privacy” (1974) 27 Rutgers Law Review  275 278. 
646
 Parker “A Definition of Privacy” (1974) 27 Rutgers Law Review 275 278. 
647
 Parker “A Definition of Privacy” (1974) 27 Rutgers Law Review  275 279-280. 
648
 Parker “A Definition of Privacy” (1974) 27 Rutgers Law Review  275 279-280. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
120 
 
Like the conception of privacy as a form of secrecy, the conception under discussion 
represents a (too) narrow subset of the limited access conception, in that it excludes 
non informational aspects of privacy such as the right to make decisions regarding 
one’s body, health and sexual conduct.649 The conception, at the same time, is 
overbroad in that it fails to adequately define the types of information individuals 
should have control over.650 The conception also fails to define what is meant by 
“control” in relation to personal information. Nonetheless, theorists often construe 
“control” over personal information as “ownership” in such information. The 
assignment of ownership over personal information is an extension of personality.651 
For Solove, assigning ownership to personal information is problematic, because 
information (unlike physical property) can easily be transmitted and, once transmitted, 
such information can be possessed in the mind of many other persons.  Moreover, 
ownership rights in personal information rarely rest in one person, particularly given 
the fact that such information is often created in relationships with others.652 
4.3.1.4.4 Conclusion 
This conception of privacy as control over personal information is perhaps too narrow 
in that it excludes non – informational aspects of privacy. It is further perhaps too 
broad in that it fails to sufficiently define the types of information individuals should 
have control over and what is meant by “control”. The conception also assigns 
ownership over information. The assignment of ownership over information is 
problematic because of the nature of information. Information, unlike physical 
property, is easy to transmit, can be possessed by more than one person and its 
ownership often rests in more than one person. 
4.3.1.5 Personhood 
Professor Freund coined the term “personhood” on the basis of Warren and 
Brandeis’s notion of the “inviolate personality”. He further made the following 
observation regarding usage of the term “personhood” in privacy jurisprudence:  
“[personhood is] sometimes called privacy, inaptly it would seem…; 
autonomy perhaps, though that seems too dangerously broad. But the 
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idea is that of personhood in the sense of those attributes of an in 
individual which are irreducible in his selfhood”.653 
In Rubenfeld’s view, the essence of “personhood” encompasses those “acts, faculties 
or qualities so [necessary] to our identity as persons [and] human beings that they 
must remain inviolable, at least against the state.”654 Rubenfeld identifies two strands 
to “personhood”: the first concerns our identity as persons and the second concerns 
our identity as individual’s i.e. personal identity.655 Privacy is often linked to the latter. 
Rubenfeld states that at the heart of the personhood and privacy relationship is the 
notion that the individual should be at liberty to “define himself” without state 
interference. Personhood further equates the right to privacy with the right to “self 
definition”.656 Rubenfeld further observes that the link between “personhood” and 
privacy has been forged to such an extent that personhood is seen as either the 
underlying principle of privacy or a synonym for the right to privacy.657 
For Solove, the articulation of privacy as a form of protecting personhood stands apart 
from other conceptions of privacy “because it is constructed around a normative end 
of privacy, namely the protection of integrity of the personality”.658 
4.3.1.5.1 Meaning 
This conception has been criticised for not adequately defining privacy. However, 
Rubenfeld has suggested that “the right to privacy is not the freedom to do certain, 
particular acts determined to be fundamental through some ever – progressing 
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normative lens…[i]t is [instead] the fundamental freedom not to have one’s life too 
totally determined by a progressively more normalising state.” 659 
4.3.1.5.2 Value 
Bloustein believes, similar to Warren and Brandeis, that privacy tort cases involve a 
single tort and that the social value or interest at stake in privacy violations is 
“spiritual” in nature.660 It is not a social value, nor does it concern interests in property 
or reputation. In Bloustein’s view, the “spiritual” interest at stake in privacy violations 
includes individuality, “liberty as individuals to do as we will”, personal dignity and 
integrity.661 Bloustein further observes that a lack of privacy and continual public 
scrutiny deprives the individual of individuality and human dignity:  
“Such an individual merges with the masses. His opinions, being 
public tend never to be different; his aspirations, being known, tend 
always to be conventionally accepted ones; his feelings, being openly 
exhibited, tend to lose their quality of unique and personal warmth and 
to become the feelings of every man. Such a being, although sentient, 
is fungible; he is not an individual”.662 
Reiman argues that the right to privacy is “fundamentally connected to personhood”663 
and “protects the individual’s interest in becoming, being and remaining a person”.664 
Reiman describes privacy as: 
“…a very complicated… social ritual by means of which an 
individual’s moral title to his existence is conferred…an essential part 
of the complex social practice by means of which [a] social group 
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recognises – communicates to [an] individual – that his existence is his 
own…this a precondition of personhood.” 665 
The complex social ritual of privacy serves two purposes for Reiman. First, it conveys 
to the individual that he has exclusive moral rights over his person. Second, it 
“confirms” and “demonstrates” respect for other persons.666  For this reason, for an 
individual to qualify as a person according to Reiman, the individual has to recognise 
his capacity to control his destiny and further recognise that he possesses a moral right 
to control his destiny.667 
Benn suggests that the principle of privacy is grounded upon the principle of respect 
for persons. Like Reiman, Benn is of the opinion that for an individual to qualify as a 
person, that individual must inter alia possess the capacity to shape his destiny. Benn 
explains a person to be “a subject with a consciousness of himself as [an] agent 
capable of having projects, and assessing his achievements in relation to [his 
projects].”668 Respecting an individual as a person entails recognising that individual 
as “a chooser, as one attempting to steer his own course through the world, adjusting 
his behaviour as his perception of the world changes, correcting course as he 
perceives his errors”. Respecting a person means recognising that every human being 
“is entitled to minimal degree of consideration” for his choices and courses he 
chooses to travel through the world.669 
4.3.1.5.3 Criticism 
The personhood conception of privacy, in particular those United States privacy cases 
“espousing a personhood theory of privacy”,670 have been criticised for focussing on 
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liberty and autonomy instead of privacy. The conception has also been critiqued for 
allowing “personhood” and privacy to remain “ill – defined”.671 Rubenfeld criticises 
the personhood conception for not defining the concept of personal identity and those 
“acts, faculties or qualities so [necessary] to our identity as persons [and] human 
beings that they must remain inviolable, at least against the state”.672 As such, most 
actions taken by individuals could be said to involve an element of self - definition. 
Although Rubenfeld aptly pinpoints the primary flaw with the personhood conception, 
Rubenfeld fails to remedy this flaw by advancing a definition of personal identity. 
Rubenfeld merely offers an alternative definition of privacy as “the fundamental 
freedom not to have one’s life too totally determined by a progressively more 
normalising state”. 673 
Posner is also critical of the conception of privacy as a sense of personhood or 
individuality, particularly for suggesting that the absence of privacy negates any 
expression of individuality.674 Posner argues that history teaches us that even in those 
societies in which privacy was perceived negatively or in a restricted way, such as 
ancient Greek and Roman society, individuals were able to express their individuality 
and creativity. 675 
4.3.1.5.4 Conclusion 
The conception of privacy as personhood views privacy as protecting an individual’s 
personhood and identity. The conception has been criticised for equating privacy in 
this sense with liberty and autonomy. A further criticism relates to the suggestion that 
the absence of privacy negates expression of individuality. Furthermore, this approach 
has also not adequately defined privacy, personhood and the concept of personal 
identity, as well as those inviolable aspects of an individual’s identity. 
4.3.1.6 Intimacy 
The conception of privacy as a form of intimacy places the value of privacy primarily 
in the creation and maintenance of personal relationships.676 Murphy asserts in his 
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essay on “Social Distance and the Veil” that through “aloofness, removal and reserve” 
individuals are able to establish social relationships and maintain social interaction 
with others.677 For Murphy, privacy is realised through expressions or displays of 
distance in social relationships. Intimate relationships, according to Murphy, are 
demanding of expressions of distance because such relationships are the “most affect 
laden and central to the life of the individual, most difficult to maintain, and most 
ambivalent.”678 Gerstein writes that “privacy and intimacy seem to go together” and 
argues “intimate relationships could not exist if we did not continue to insist on 
privacy for them”.679 
4.3.1.6.1 Meaning 
Gerety defines privacy as “an autonomy or control over the intimacies of personal 
identity” and argues “intimacy [is] necessary for the proper invocation of the concept 
of privacy”.680 Gerety furnishes a number of definitions for intimacy. Intimacy, 
according to Gerety, is “the chief restricting concept in the definition of privacy”681 
and “always the consciousness of the mind in its access to its own and other bodies 
and minds, insofar, at least, as these are generally and specifically secluded from 
access of the uninvited”.682 Intimacy is further “a kind of knowledge…personal, 
immediate, and consented to…and…private”.683 
4.3.1.6.2 Value 
Rachels684 also gives an account of the value of privacy that is centred on the creation 
and maintenance of interpersonal relationships. According to Rachels, privacy is 
important to us because it protects a number of interests, including interests in gaining 
advantage in competitive situations and keeping embarrassing aspects of our life or 
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behaviour private.685 For this reason, Rachels argues “a close connection [exists] 
between our ability to control who has access to us and to information about us, and 
our ability to create and maintain different sorts of social relationships with different 
people” and, as such, “privacy is necessary if we are to maintain the variety of social 
relationships with other people that we want to have”.686 
Fried also explores the meaning and significance of privacy in its relation to love, 
friendship and trust.687 Fried is of the view that privacy is implicated in notions of 
respect, self – respect, love, friendship, affection and trust.688 For Fried, the existence 
of privacy is crucial to these notions and these notions are inconceivable without 
privacy. Fried notes in this regard:  
“To respect, love, trust, feel affection for others and regard ourselves 
as objects of love, trust and affection is at the heart of our notion of 
ourselves as persons among persons, and privacy is a necessary 
atmosphere for these attitudes and actions, as oxygen is for 
combustion”.689 
4.3.1.6.3 Criticism 
Solove criticises Gerety’s attempt to place conceptual limits on privacy with broad 
terms, namely, “identity” and “autonomy”.690 This, according to Solove, results in the 
word “intimacy” being a substitute for the word “privacy”. Solove further criticises 
the formulation of privacy as intimacy for being too narrow, in that it focuses 
exclusively on intimate human relationships and the feelings produced by such 
relationships, to the exclusion of other ends facilitated by privacy outside of 
interpersonal relationships.691 
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Reiman criticises the suggestion by Fried and Rachels that intimate information is 
information we want to keep others from accessing, because such a suggestion 
assumes intimacy makes the revelation of personal information significant, whereas 
the context of caring is what really makes the sharing or revelation of such 
information significant. This context of caring is located in the “reciprocal desire 
[relating to] present and future and intense and important experiences… [t]he more 
one knows about the other, the more one is able to understand how the other 
experiences things, what they mean to him, how they feel to him. In other words the 
more each knows about the other, the more they are able to really share an intense 
experience instead of merely having an intense experience alongside each other.”692 
4.3.1.6.4 Conclusion 
The conception of privacy as intimacy tends to be too broad, particularly where the 
scope of “intimacy” is inadequately defined. The conception is also narrow in its 
focus on intimate human relationships and the feelings produced by human 
relationships.693 
4.4 A PRAGMATIC APPROACH TO PRIVACY 
Even though there clearly exists disagreement as to what makes privacy distinct and 
coherent, there exists broad consensus on the core realities of privacy namely that 
privacy is “dynamic”, “fluid”, “contextual” and “evolving”. A number of 
commentators have raised practicable approaches to privacy in their attempt to define 
privacy.694 These approaches accept the dynamic and evolving nature of privacy and 
offer an understanding of privacy, which embraces the nature and core realities of 
privacy. 
Craig proposes a functional approach which “recognises that the role of the right to 
privacy is to protect certain aspects of life from public scrutiny”.695 For Craig efforts 
by commentators to provide “greater specificity to the concept of privacy” and to 
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devise a “perfect privacy definition” have proved futile.696 For this reason, Craig 
argues that the focus should be on developing a workable legal definition of privacy 
as opposed to an ideal legal definition of privacy.697 
A workable definition of privacy, according to Craig, has to take into account the 
following: firstly, the yardstick for determining the sufficiency of any conception of 
privacy should be legal certainty rather than legal perfection; secondly, privacy is a 
dynamic and evolving concept and as such it occurs in varied contexts, can be 
compromised in diverse circumstances and its interests can evolve; thirdly, the quest 
to define privacy should not overshadow the legal protection of privacy.698 
Gutwirth’s approach recognises an important aspect of privacy, namely, that privacy 
is context specific. Gutwirth’s approach begins with the basic premise that privacy has 
a plethora of meanings and it cannot “be corralled into a confined definition”.699 
Gutwirth further asserts that privacy cannot be conjured up by listing a series of 
human activities -“[i]t is not a natural element, nor is it a part of reality. It is neither 
eternal nor universal and it has different consequences in different situations”.700 
Solove recommends a pragmatic approach to “understanding privacy rather than a 
definition or formula for privacy”.701 Solove advances pragmatism as an approach to 
understanding privacy because it avoids conceptualising702 privacy through “necessary 
and sufficient conditions” and “rigid conceptual boundaries and common 
denominators”. The pragmatic approach, instead, “emphasises the contextual and 
dynamic nature of privacy”.703 
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In terms of the pragmatic approach, privacy is an aspect of practices such as customs, 
norms and traditions and activities such as letter writing, engaging in sexual activity 
and conversing with a therapist. Solove adds:  
“[u]nderstanding privacy requires us to look to specific ways in which 
privacy manifests itself within [such] practices and the degree to which 
privacy is linked to the purposes of [such practices]. When we state 
that we are protecting “privacy”, we are claiming to guard against 
disruptions to certain practices. Privacy invasions disrupt and 
sometimes annihilate certain practices. Practices can be disrupted in 
certain ways, such as interference with peace of mind and tranquillity, 
invasion of solitude, breach of confidentiality, loss of control over facts 
about oneself, searches of one’s property, threats to or violations of 
personal security, destruction of reputation, surveillance.”704 
Privacy in this sense is “the practices we want to protect and the protections against 
disruptions to these practices.”705 These social practices cannot for Solove be reduced 
into the public or private sphere because the practices we consider private have 
evolved over time and the divide between public and private practices is often blurred 
or nebulous. Solove states “[t]o say things are private is imprecise because what it 
means for them to be private is different today than what it was in the past.”706That is 
to say, Solove’s pragmatic approach recognises that “what was privacy yesterday is 
not necessarily privacy tomorrow” and places emphasis on the contextual and 
dynamic nature of privacy. 
Privacy is unquestionably a fluid and dynamic concept that is impossible to place in a 
mould to be used in the same manner over and over again. Any workable definition of 
privacy in this age of large scale and complex technological developments has to 
embrace this particular attribute of privacy.  
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4.5 THE APPROACH TO PRIVACY IN SELECTED 
COUNTRIES 
4.5.1 Introduction 
This section will consider the approaches taken by the countries under review to the 
notion of privacy. 
4.5.2 South Africa 
The South African common law recognises the right to privacy as an independent 
personality right. Further, a person’s privacy is breached when there has been an 
unlawful intrusion on his or her personal privacy or an unlawful disclosure of private 
facts concerning such a person. The Constitutional court in Bernstein v Bester707  
identified a number of instances which amount to a breach of privacy in terms of the 
common law: entry into private residence, the reading of private documents, the 
disclosure of private facts acquired through an unlawful intrusion and the disclosure 
of private facts in breach of confidentiality. For this reason, the common law seems to 
subscribe primarily to the limited access to the self and control over information 
conceptions of privacy.  
This is also true of the general right to privacy provided for in the Constitution, which 
primarily conceives of privacy as the limited access to the self and the control over 
information about oneself. The right protects the privacy of an individual’s person or 
home, their property, possessions and communications. The Constitutional Court has, 
however, extended the scope of the constitutional privacy provision to protect 
personhood and intimacy.  
In Bernstein v Bester the court viewed privacy as protecting personhood when it 
observed that privacy can be reasonably expected in the “truly personal realm” and in 
the “inner sanctum”.708 This inner sanctum includes family life, sexual preferences 
and the home environment. The court further observed that the scope of privacy is in 
close relation with the concept of identity and that privacy is based on the “notion of 
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what is necessary to have one’s autonomous identity” and not on the “notion of the 
unencumbered self”.709 
In Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences v Hyundai Motor 
Distributors710 the Constitutional Court described privacy as the right to be let alone 
when it pointed out individuals did not lose their right to privacy once they ventured 
outside the “truly personal realm” and “inner sanctum”. The Court in this regard 
stated that “when people are in their offices, in their cars or on mobile telephones, 
they retain the right to be left alone by the state”. 711 
In National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice712 adopted a 
personhood conception of privacy when it stated that privacy “recognises that we all 
have a right to a sphere of private intimacy and autonomy”. The court further 
advanced a conception of privacy as a form of intimacy. The court in this regard 
stated privacy: 
“allows us to establish and nurture human relations without 
interference from the outside community. The way in which we give 
expression to our sexuality is at the core of this area of private 
intimacy.”713 
In this case, and in a separate concurring judgment, Sachs J observed that “privacy 
protects people not places” and further described privacy as the right to be left alone, 
which went beyond being “a negative right to occupy a space free from government 
intrusion” but also protected personhood. Privacy protected personhood in providing 
for “a right to get on with your life, express your personality and make fundamental 
decisions about your intimate relationships without penalisation.”714 
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Although S v Jordan715 also concerned the intimate activity of sex, the Constitutional 
Court refused to afford the concerned intimate activity the privacy protection it 
previously afforded to other forms of intimacy. The Court’s refusal was based on the 
fact that the sexual expression involved was not “nurturing relationships or taking life 
affirming decisions about birth, marriage or family” but was instead done for 
commercial gain. The Court held in this regard: 
“[b]y making the sexual services available for hire to strangers in the 
marketplace, the sex worker empties the sex act of much of its private 
and intimate character. She is not nurturing relationships or taking life 
– affirming decisions about birth, marriage or family; she is making 
money.” 716 
4.5.3 United States 
In evaluating the approach in the United States to privacy protection, it should be said 
that privacy protection occurs both at the common law and constitutional level. 
Privacy under the common law has been described as “the right to be let alone”. 
Warren and Brandeis emphasised the legal recognition of “a privacy right that gives 
an individual the power to control absolutely the limits of publicity about him or 
herself” or the protection of an inviolate personality.717 In 1960, Prosser’s description 
of the law of privacy into four distinction kinds of tort invasion also referred to the 
need to control access and information about oneself.718 
The Fourth Amendment has also been invoked in protecting privacy interests, 
particularly in unreasonable seizures.719 The Supreme Court in Katz v United States720 
clarified that the Fourth Amendment protected people and not places. Therefore, the 
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early recognition and protection of privacy concerned the protection of personal 
information and linked privacy to the concepts of liberty and personhood.721 
Whitman asserts that “suspicion of the state” is the cornerstone of United States 
privacy jurisprudence and, as such, the United States privacy conception has been 
moulded around the idea that the “state is the prime enemy”. Whitman observes: 
“American “privacy” law, however ingenious its elaborations, always 
tends to imagine the home as the primary defence, and the state as the 
primary enemy…[w]here American law perceives a threat to privacy, 
it is typically precisely because the state has become involved in the 
transaction”.722 
For this reason, the United States privacy protection tradition according to Whitman 
espouses the core value of liberty, particularly liberty against the state or freedom 
from state intrusions. Furthermore, United States privacy anxieties are focussed on 
“maintaining a kind of private sovereignty within the walls of our homes”.723 
In 1886 the decision of Boyd v United States deduced a right to privacy from the 
Fourth Amendment: 
“[a]t its origin, the right to privacy is the right against unlawful 
searches and seizures. It is thus a right that inheres in us as free and 
sovereign political actors, masters in our own houses, which the state is 
ordinarily forbidden to invade.” 724 
The Court in Boyd further cited with approval Lord Camden’s proclamation on the 
“sanctity of the home” in Entick v Carrington and in so doing advanced an 
understanding of “privacy” rights as generalisations of the principle of the “sanctity of 
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the home”.725 Three years later, in Union Pacific Railway Co. v Botsford,726the Court 
extended the sanctity of the home to the individual right “to the possession and 
control of his own person free from all restraint or interference of others unless by 
clear and unquestionable authority of law”.727 
The understanding of privacy as protecting the “sanctity of the home” was later 
extended to privacy decisions involving “attributes of personhood” namely marriage, 
procreation, contraception and child rearing. The Supreme Court espoused in such 
decisions a conception of privacy as personhood. For example, Douglas J stated in 
Griswold v Connecticut 728that the constitutional right to privacy protected “zones” of 
privacy and, protected in these zones of privacy, was the intimacy shared between 
individuals in certain relationships such as between man and wife and doctor and 
patient. Subsequently, in Einsenstadt v Baird,729 Brennan J wrote that the right to 
privacy is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted 
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the 
decision of whether or not to have a child. Later, in Lawrence v Texas,730 Kennedy J, 
in protecting homosexual relations between adults, stated that the right to liberty 
under the Due Process Clause prevented government intrusion in this personal realm 
of the individuals concerned. 
The conception of personhood was articulated in Planned Parenthood v Casey731. In 
Casey the Supreme Court stated that the constitutional right to privacy encompassed: 
“matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person 
may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and 
autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own 
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery 
of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the 
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attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the 
State”.732 
The constitutional right to privacy in United States law protects the individual’s 
interest in independently making certain types of decisions, whereas the common law 
right to privacy protects the individual’s interest in avoiding the disclosure of personal 
information.733 
4.5.4 United Kingdom 
There is no right to privacy in English law. However, Article 8 of the ECHR provides 
for an individual’s right to respect for his private and family life, his home and 
correspondence. The European Court has held in Niemetz v Germany734 that the 
meaning of “private life” in Article 8 went beyond the Anglo-American idea of 
privacy with its emphasis on secrecy of personal information and seclusion to include: 
the physical and moral integrity of a person, including his or sexual life; the capacity 
of the individual to formulate a perception of himself or herself and to choose his or 
her personal identity; the protection of personal information; personal relationships 
with others including social and sexual activities with others; and an individual’s 
personal or private space or any place or space in which the individual has exclusive 
rights of enjoyment, such as the home.  
4.6 CRITICS OF PRIVACY 
Although there is broad consensus about the importance and distinctness of privacy, 
some commentators735 suggest that privacy rhetoric is misleading because the 
violation of privacy actually involves the violation of some other interest. These 
commentators further assert that for a true understanding of privacy, the rhetoric 
surrounding it has to be ignored and the focus should be on the particular interest in 
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question. 736 They conclude that there is nothing distinctive and integrated about 
privacy cases, as these cases concern “diverse and disparate” issues. Other 
commentators argue that there is nothing morally distinctive about privacy claims, 
because the moral justification of privacy claims cannot be defended by principles 
distinctive to privacy.737 Commentators denying the coherence and distinctiveness of 
privacy are referred to as reductionists because they reduce privacy to some other 
right or interest.738 
One of the earliest reductionist positions on privacy was advanced by Prosser.739 
Prosser stated in his analysis of the privacy tort that Warren and Brandeis not only had 
erred in observing that the law of privacy involved a single tort, but also in identifying 
the interest at stake in violations of privacy as the “inviolate personality”.740 Prosser, 
after examining more than three hundred cases, concluded that the law of privacy 
comprises “four distinct kinds of torts”741 and “four different interests”742. 743 Prosser 
concluded that privacy is not a single coherent and distinct value, but a complex of 
different interests - mental, reputation and proprietary interests.744 
Botswick, in cataloguing privacy cases in different classes, also reduces privacy to 
other rights.745 Botswick reduces privacy into three separate and distinct rights, 
namely repose, sanctuary and intimate decision. Botswick, like Prosser, is of the view 
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that the rubric of “privacy issues” does not sufficiently recognise and protect the 
different interests at stake in privacy concerns.746 
Thompson suggests that privacy interests are reducible into other rights such as 
property rights and personal rights and argues against the coherence and 
distinctiveness of privacy.747 Thompson writes “…the right to privacy is itself a 
cluster of rights and [is not] a distinct cluster of rights [but] intersects with the cluster 
of [personal rights and property rights].” Thompson concludes that privacy is a 
“derivative” right that can be justified without “ever once mentioning the right to 
privacy”.748 
Schoeman contends that the right to privacy breeds “deceit and hypocrisy” in that it 
conceals wrongdoings by individuals and prevents wrongdoers from being held 
morally responsible for their wrongdoings.749 Schoeman further contends that privacy 
impedes necessary moral debate on different practices.750 For this reason, certain 
practices are deemed to be legal simply because they have been left “unexamined” 
and “unexposed” when in fact they are illegal.751 More so, privacy enables individuals 
to conceal their true position. In this regard Schoeman concludes that: 
“[p]rivacy may be seen as a culturally conditioned sensitivity that 
makes people more vulnerable than they would otherwise be to 
selective disclosures and the sense of comparative inferiority and 
abject shame – a sense engendered by ignorance about the inner lives 
of others”.752 
Reductionists primarily criticise the distinctiveness and coherence of privacy. Moral 
idealists and realists, on the other hand, criticise the moral effects of privacy on the 
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individual and society.753 Moral idealists and realists associate privacy with negative 
attributes such as “hysteric neurosis”, “anonymity”, “unbridled individualism”, or 
“alienation” and “loneliness”.754 They also view privacy as breeding violence, fear and 
shame. They further view privacy as depressing social relations and erecting artificial 
boundaries between individuals.755 
Moral idealists and realists further contend that the seeds of privacy were sown by 
bourgeois efforts to alienate themselves from the rest of society. Consequently, 
privacy is a product of ethnic and social class distinction.756 The proposition that 
privacy is borne of ethnic and class distinction finds support amongst those writers 
who suggest that Warren and Brandeis - particularly Warren who is said to have been 
a member of the Boston blue blood in the 1890’s - were in fact expressing their 
frustrations at interest in their private affairs which they preferred not to be pursued 
by the public when they wrote their seminal article on privacy. That is to say, the 
authors intended to vent their frustrations at the prying eyes and ears of the “yellow 
press” and did not intend to contribute towards the development of privacy in United 
States common law.757 
Moral realists assert that privacy furnishes individuals with an excuse not to fulfil 
their social obligations and to not involve themselves with other people. Moral 
idealists construe privacy as a paradigm shift from the human essence of “personal 
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wholeness” or “social communion” to feelings of loneliness, shame, alienation and 
unhappiness.758 
Posner suggests an economic approach to privacy, and as such defines privacy as the 
“concealment of information”.759 Posner’s economic approach views privacy and 
prying or curiosity as intermediate economic goods which people use “as inputs into 
the production of income or some other broad measure of utility of welfare”. Prying 
or curiosity provides individuals with valuable and accurate pictures of friends or 
colleagues for subsequent use in social and professional dealings,760 whilst privacy 
enables individuals to “manipulate by misrepresentation other people’s opinion of 
them” or to “control others’ perceptions and beliefs” regarding them.761 As such, for 
Posner, privacy enables individuals to manipulate private information and defraud 
others with this private information.762 
Etzioni observes “[a]lthough we cherish privacy in a free society, we also value other 
goods. Hence, we must address the moral, legal, and social issues that arise when 
serving the common good entails violating privacy”.763 Etzioni is therefore of the view 
that we are “justified in implementing measures that diminish privacy” particularly for 
the realisation of the common good. Etzioni further asserts that the “best way to 
curtail the need for government control and intrusion is to have somewhat less 
privacy” in order to serve the common good.764 
4.7 CONCLUSION 
The literature on the privacy as a concept indicates that there two schools of thought 
with respect to the value or usefulness of privacy. There are proponents of privacy 
who proclaim privacy as a useful value that is distinct and coherent. On the other 
hand, the reductionists, who assert that privacy is incoherent and further, contend that 
there is nothing morally distinctive about privacy claims, because privacy can be 
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protected through other interests, or reduced to some underlying right or interest such 
as freedom from mental stress, property and reputation. That being said, the majority 
of commentators proclaim privacy as a value at the core of human existence and well 
being. The majority of commentators also, however, lament the fact that privacy is 
difficult to define. Some of these commentators propose that the difficulty in defining 
privacy has played a role in undermining its value and usefulness and has further 
impeded its effective legal protection. What is clear is that privacy has multiple 
meanings and can therefore take diverse forms to such an extent that a sense of what 
is private and what should be kept private differs from society to society. There is 
definitely truth in the observation and remark by most mainstream legal and 
philosophical commentators that privacy will have different consequences in different 
situations. For this reason it is a concept that is neither eternal nor universal, it is a 
relative and contextual concept. The value of privacy lies in the function of privacy, 
the values privacy promotes and those aspects of human life that would be impossible 
or unlikely in the absence of privacy. Privacy serves a number of functions including 
the creation and maintenance of social and personal relations, limiting access to the 
individual and perfecting political understanding. Privacy promotes and is grounded 
on values such as happiness, justice and liberty. In the absence of privacy, ideals like 
persona relations, the politically free man and the morally autonomous man would not 
in existence. 
Notwithstanding general agreement on the fact that privacy cannot be satisfactorily 
defined, several proponents of privacy have made attempts to define or at least 
propose a conception of privacy.  
There are different definitions or conceptions advanced by proponents of privacy. 
Although the majority of commentators agree that privacy is distinct and coherent, 
there is disagreement as to what makes privacy distinct and coherent. There are a 
number of approaches to or conceptions of privacy postulated in legal and 
philosophical literature, namely the right to be let alone, limited access to the self, 
secrecy, control over information, personhood  and intimacy. The right to be let alone 
is perhaps the most commonly postulated and one of the earliest conceptions of 
privacy. The conception locates the value of privacy in its ability to provide the 
individual with physical space away from others. One of the criticisms levelled at this 
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conception is that it is merely descriptive of an attribute of privacy. The conception 
has also been criticised for being antiquated, “archaic” and conception was 
appropriate during a time in human history when individuals generally lacked 
physical space but now that is no longer the case because the “opportunities for 
physical privacy are so much greater” and “abundant”. As fundamental as the 
conception may be, it has a number of other shortcomings: first, it does not indicate 
how privacy should be valued765; secondly, it obscures the fact that not every violation 
is a violation of privacy766; thirdly, it overlooks the fact that not being let alone does 
not always result in a loss of privacy767; lastly, it is outdated in its sense of privacy as 
seclusion or solitude.768The majority of commentators prefer to conceive of privacy as 
control over information about oneself. In so doing, proponents of this conception 
often refer to privacy as a claim, form of control or condition. Even so, this 
conception is also open to criticism. Ultimately, the pragmatic approach is perhaps the 
more realistic and workable approach to privacy because the approach embraces the 
dynamic and evolving nature of privacy. In terms of this approach privacy is seen as a 
dynamic and evolving concept, it occurs in varied contexts, can be compromised in 
diverse circumstances and its underlying interests may evolve. Put differently, privacy 
is an aspect of customs, norms and traditions that may change from time to time and 
activities that we want to protect from disruptions and interferences. 
The different conceptions have all featured at different times, to different degrees and 
in different contexts in case law across the jurisdictions under review. To go back to 
what was said at the end of Chapter 3, perhaps the most important point remains that 
whatever the nature of privacy, or its value, it is still regarded to be a fluid concept 
and to exist only where there is a reasonable expectation of privacy. In this sense, the 
different conceptions may play a role to assist in locating the right in a particular 
context. At the same time, these conceptions may inform the justifiability of 
infringement where the right has been found to exist. However, the overarching 
approach – a reasonable expectation coupled with a pragmatic approach informed by 
contemporary customs and norms – may well not only make for uncertainty in many 
                                               
765
 Solove “Conceptualizing Privacy” (2002)  90 California Law Review 1087  1102. 
766
 Thompson “The Right to Privacy” (1975) 4 Philosophy and Public Affairs 295 295. 
767
 Parker “A Definition of Privacy” (1974) 27 Rutgers Law Review  275 276. 
768
 Posner “Privacy, Secrecy and Reputation” (1979) 28 Buffalo Law Review 1  4. 
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contexts (it is indeterminate in advance), but lopsided certainty in other contexts, such 
as the workplace. It is to privacy in the workplace that the remainder of this 
dissertation is devoted. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
143 
 
 
CHAPTER 5: 
PRIVACY IN THE WORKPLACE 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 2 of this dissertation provided an overview of the privacy protection in early 
societies and identified the extent to which privacy was protected in those societies. 
That chapter also sought to illustrate that the seeds of what we view or refer to as 
privacy today were sown at a very early period, this notwithstanding the fact that the 
development of the concept and its concomitant protection progressed at a slow pace. 
Chapter 3 proceeded to investigate the development of privacy protection in   
countries selected for purposes of this study and critically assessed the current status 
of the general protection of privacy in these countries. Chapter 4 considered the 
numerous conceptions of privacy, outlined the criticisms levelled at each conception 
and assessed the possibility of a universal workable definition of privacy, or at least a 
practicable approach to privacy. 
The goal of the next four chapters is to consider the  issue that constitutes the heart of 
this research, namely, the extent to which privacy is protected in the workplace given 
advancements in technology and the implications (if any) for the right to privacy as 
such. In this regard, it may be said that privacy in the workplace has grown in 
importance as technology has enabled new forms of testing and monitoring of 
employees. Employee monitoring is not necessarily a new trend,769 but modern 
technology has enabled sophisticated forms of testing or monitoring of employees. 
These forms of testing or monitoring include drug tests, obtaining employees’ credit 
history, HIV testing, genetic testing, background checks, psychological testing, 
polygraph tests, keystroke monitoring, listening to telephone calls and voicemail, 
reading e-mail, monitoring computer, telephone and fax usage, use of electronic 
devices to track the location of employees, searching offices and workplaces as well 
                                               
769For instance, prior to the introduction of current technology, which enables the monitoring of 
employees, employers monitored their employee use of company resources by using onsite managers 
and supervisors whose job was to physically observe and monitor employees at work to ensure that 
they were being productive and efficient. Kesan “First Principle Examination of Electronic Privacy in 
the Workplace” in Blanpain (ed.) On-line Rights for Employees in the Information Society: Use and 
Monitoring of E-mail and Internet at Work (2002) 258. 
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as the use of video surveillance devices to monitor employees.770 Use of these 
technological advancements has emphasized the tension between two conflicting sets 
of principles. On the one hand there is the principle of inviolability of the employee’s 
right to privacy - employees do not cede their rights to privacy and dignity when they 
sign an employment contract. On the other hand, there is the right of the employer to 
enjoy its property and exercise its managerial powers of command to protect its 
property against abuse that might cause direct or indirect damage to the employer’s 
business.771 
As a first step towards evaluating the implications of new technology for privacy in 
the workplace,  the aim of this chapter is to set the tone and briefly consider, in turn, 
what is meant by the phrase “privacy in the workplace”,  the arguments for and 
against the need for privacy protection in the workplace,  a number of policies and 
practices in the workplace that typically threaten or pressurise the protection of 
privacy in the workplace, as well as the  implication of these policies and practices for 
privacy. In conclusion, it will be argued that there is indeed a need for privacy 
protection in the workplace, particularly in light of technological advancements. The 
following chapter (chapter 6) will provide a synopsis of what the selected countries 
have done in protecting privacy in the workplace in light of   the policies and practices 
identified in this chapter. Chapters 7 and 8, in turn, will  respectively focus in depth 
on  two of  further employer practices and policies, namely e – mail/internet 
monitoring and genetic testing, these being the most recent and, arguably, the most 
technologically advanced of the policies and practices identified. It is important to 
bear in mind that the selection of the practices considered in the chapters to follow 
was guided by an emphasis on challenges to privacy, which relate to technological 
developments and foster new and unique demands for the accommodation of privacy 
in the workplace. 
                                               
770Solove and Rotenburg Information Privacy Law (2003) 618. 
771Reinhard “Information Technology and Workers’ Privacy: A Comparative Study: Part III: Recurring 
Questions of Comparative Law; Information Technology and Worker’s Privacy: Information 
Technology and Worker’s Privacy: Enforcement” (2002) 23 Comparative Labour Law & Policy 
Journal 527. 
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5.2 ARGUMENTS FOR PRIVACY PROTECTION IN THE 
WORKPLACE 
In order to determine what is meant by the phrase “privacy in the workplace”, it is 
important to first examine the arguments raised on behalf of employees in favour of 
the protection of their right to privacy in the workplace. Broadly speaking, employees 
insist on the protection of their privacy in the workplace for the following four 
reasons772: 
a) Employees argue that the protection of the right to privacy in the workplace 
preserves their autonomy (that is, the ability to choose freely and 
independently one’s own goals and relations).773 For this reason, their 
autonomy may be unreasonably affected where (for example) a management 
policy threatens to penalise employees for conduct outside the workplace. The 
problem of employer control over employees’ private lives becomes 
complicated as the boundaries between off duty and on duty time and conduct 
becomes blurred.774 More and more employees spend a lot of time in the 
workplace and the workplace becomes a second home, yet at the same time 
technology enables decentralisation of the workplace.775 
b) Certain commentators such as Craig have linked privacy to the individual 
dignity, health and well-being of employees. Employees contend that all 
forms of employer practices may adversely affect the dignity and well- being 
of employees.776 
c) It is also argued that privacy is inherent in notions of respect, love, friendship 
and trust and that close relationships are only a possibility if individuals 
accord each other a measure of privacy.777 The employment relationship 
transcends the contractual framework and operates on a social level as a 
relationship based on good faith, trust, respect and loyalty. As such, some 
                                               
772Craig Privacy and Employment Law(1999) 20 -26. 
773Supra. 
774Supra. 
775Supra. 
776Craig Privacy and Employment Law (1999)  20 -26. 
777Supra. 
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employees may construe employer policies infringing on their privacy 
interests as an attack on their dignity, respect and loyalty by employers.778 
d) Employees further argue that privacy breeds diversity and its protection not 
only works against conformist pressures, but also nurtures the development of 
fresh ideas, beliefs and attitudes.779 Pluralism (industrial pluralism) plays a 
vital in the workplace where innovation is pivotal to any successful 
enterprise. Industrial pluralism is unlikely to be achieved where employers 
implement policies inhibiting employee autonomy. As such, any threat to the 
privacy of individuals, regardless of whether they are in the workplace or at 
home, is a cause for serious concern for both employee and employer.780 
It appears from these arguments that the phrase “privacy is in the workplace” in the 
first place denotes a retention by the employee of a sense of autonomy, dignity and 
well being in the workplace. It may further be linked to the existence of the elements 
of good faith, trust, respect and loyalty within the employment relationship, 
recognised as such by the contractual basis of any employment relationship. Privacy 
in employment further ensures that the individual is free from conformist pressure and 
able to develop of fresh ideas, beliefs and attitudes which are pivotal to industrial 
pluralism. As such, ‘privacy in the workplace’ is shorthand for, and a reflection of, 
individual concerns, the contractual nature of the employment relationship, and good 
business sense. 
5.3 ARGUMENTS AGAINST PRIVACY PROTECTION IN THE 
WORKPLACE 
In contrast, employers and the public may endeavour to justify curtailing employee 
privacy for the following reasons: 
a) The improvement of economic conditions. Employers are concerned about the 
way employees perform at work since this is linked to the efficiency and 
profitability of their enterprises. Employers want to hire competent workers 
who are unlikely to cause workplace disruptions or be careless or reckless 
while they work (thus exposing the employer to liability).  Employers want 
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 Craig Privacy and Employment Law (1999) 20 -26 
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employees who are not likely to suffer health and personal problems that will 
result in employees being absent from work or being unproductive;781 
b) The protection of the health and safety of employees, consumers and the 
public.782 Employers will often raise safety concerns to justify, for example, 
drug or medical testing. Moreover, under health and safety legislation (and, in 
some jurisdictions, in terms of the common law), employers are obligated to 
provide a safe working place and protect the health of employees;783 
c) The deterrence of and control over employee abuse of the employment 
relationship.784 Employers have justified, for example, search and surveillance 
policies on the basis of the need to deter employee abuse of employer 
facilities and to identify perpetrators of such abuse... In short, employers may 
wish to engage in searches and surveillance to investigate misconduct;785 and 
d) The need to comply with legislation.786 Legislation sometimes authorises 
employers to implement privacy invasive policies. Other legislation compels 
employers to train and monitor its employees to ensure that they are 
competent to perform their specific jobs. Such legislation holds the employer 
responsible where the employer fails to train or monitor employees, especially 
when the concerned jobs impact on the safety of others. For instance, in 
professions involving child care there is pressure on employers to scrutinize 
an employee’s past and previous work experience to reduce the risk of 
employee misconduct.787 
In summary, it may be said that the arguments against privacy protection do not really 
focus on the employee and the individual relationship of that employee with the 
employer (as do the arguments in favour of privacy protection). Rather, arguments 
against privacy protection focus on the freedom of the employer to run its business 
and to exclude its possible liability, the more so where every employer operates in an 
environment concerned with the safety of employees and the public.   
                                               
781
 Solove and Rotenburg Information Privacy Law (2003) 619. 
782
 Supra. 
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 Solove and Rotenburg Information Privacy Law (2003) 619. 
784
 Supra. 
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 Solove and Rotenburg Information Privacy Law (2003) 619.  
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 Supra. 
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5.4 IDENTIFICATION OF POLICIES AND PRACTICES 
Technological developments have increased the ability of employers to monitor and 
survey their employee’s performance in the workplace. As already alluded to, this 
chapter briefly identifies and examines some of the most prevalent technology 
enabled employment practices and policies, namely background checks, polygraph 
testing, psychological testing, drug testing and HIV/AIDS testing. This part of the 
chapter will provide an illustration of how these practices and policies may invade the 
privacy of employees, while Chapter 6 will focus on the manner in which selected 
countries have addressed the privacy concerns raised by these practices and policies. 
It bears repeating that chapters 7 and 8 will focus in detail on two further employer 
practices and policies impacting on privacy, namely e – mail/internet monitoring and 
genetic testing. Furthermore, it should again be noted that the selection of the 
practices and policies in this and subsequent chapters is not meant to provide a 
comprehensive list, but was guided by the emphasis on those challenges to privacy, 
which arise from technological developments and which foster new and unique 
demands for the accommodation of privacy in the workplace.  
5.4.1 Background Checks 
Background checks entail that employers acquire(and often store) information about 
an employee’s credit history, employment history, school records, criminal 
convictions and medical history from the employee and third parties (such as previous 
employers, insurance companies and credit bureaus). Employers usually acquire such 
information during the recruitment and selection stages of employment. However, 
employers have also been known to undertake such checks during employment.788 
Employers primarily conduct background checks to determine the suitability of an 
employee for a specific job or position. Such checks are commonplace for positions 
requiring high levels of trust, honesty and integrity such as in banking, security and 
financial management. These checks may infringe on an employee’s privacy rights, 
particularly where the checks result in the disclosure of personal information that 
bears no relevance to the employment position or the suitability of an applicant for a 
                                               
788
 For example the applicants in Smith and Grady v United Kingdom [1999] ECHR 72 and Lustig-
Prean v United Kingdom (1997) 7 BHRC 65 underwent investigations (which included detailed 
interviews with each of them and with third parties on matters relating to their sexual orientation and 
practices  into their homosexuality) whilst employed. 
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position.789 In so much as the checks may implicate an individual’s privacy interests, 
employer’s (in particular United States employers) conduct the checks to prevent   
liability for the illegal or negligent acts of an employee in terms of the doctrine of 
negligent employment.790 Similarly, United Kingdom and South African employers 
may be held liable under the doctrine of vicarious liability. For example, the employer 
in the United States decision of Tallahassee Furniture Co. Inc.v Harrison791 was held 
liable for negligent employment after an employee brutally stabbed and bludgeoned a 
client (Harrison) while delivering furniture to her home. South African and United 
Kingdom courts have also held employers liable for the negligent and intentional acts 
of their employees in terms of the principle of vicarious liability, where the concerned 
employees’ conduct is determined to be sufficiently related to the business of the 
employer. For example, the House of Lords in Lister and Others v Hesley Hall Ltd792,  
held a school liable for the sexual abuse of some of its students by a warden in its 
employment, because the wardens’ conduct was sufficiently related to the obligations 
the school owed to children placed in its care. Similarly, in K v Minister of Safety and 
Security793 the South African Constitutional Court found the conduct of three 
policemen who assaulted and raped a woman sufficiently related to the business of the 
employer to render the employer liable. 
                                               
789
 The applicants in Smith and Grady v United Kingdom and Lustig-Prean v United Kingdom 
members of the Royal Air Force and the Royal Navy (respectively) complained of investigations into 
their homosexuality and their subsequent discharge on the sole ground of their homosexuality 
constituted a violation of their right to respect for their lives protected by Article 8 of the ECHR. The 
government argued that admitting homosexuals to the armed forces would have a significant and 
negative impact on the fighting power, morale of armed forces personnel and the operational 
effectiveness of the armed forces. The European Court of Human Rights was of the view that “the 
investigations…into the applicants homosexuality, which included detailed interviews with each of 
them and with third parties on matters relating to their sexual orientation and practices…constituted a 
direct interference with the applicant’s right to respect for their private lives.” The Court added that 
“Their consequent administrative discharge on the sole ground of their sexual orientation also 
constituted an interference with that right”. The Court further found there was a lack of concrete 
evidence provided by the government to substantiate the alleged damage to morale and fighting 
power that any change in policy would entail, that is, the admission or presence of homosexuals to 
the armed forces. In other words the Court found that neither the investigations conducted into the 
applicant’s sexual orientation nor their discharge on the grounds of their homosexuality was justified 
under Article 8 of the ECHR. 
790
 Tallahassee Furniture Co. Inc. v Harrison 583 So.2d 744, 747 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991). 
791
 Tallahassee Furniture Co. Inc. v Harrison 583 So.2d 744, 747 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991). 
792
 [2002] 1 AC 215 (HL). 
793
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5.4.2 Psychological Testing 
A psychological test has been described as ‘an observation of a sample of human 
behaviour made under standard controlled conditions which results in a linear 
evaluation called a score’.794 Psychological tests are used in the employment context 
to assess the suitability of an applicant’s personality for a particular position.795 For 
example, the employer in Soroka v Dayton Hudson Corporation796 required applicants 
for the position of store security officer to undergo psychological testing in order to 
identify rational and emotionally stable applicants. The employer viewed good 
judgment and emotional stability as ideal personality traits for the position.797 
Employers use various psychological tests in the workplace, including personality 
tests, honesty tests and projective testing. Personality tests are aimed at identifying a 
person’s “personal characteristics, thoughts, feelings and behaviour” through related 
questions.798One example of a personality test is the Minnesota Multiphasic 
Personality Inventory, which consists of over 500 numbered statements which the test 
subject has to decide are true, false, and mostly true or mostly not true. The statements 
relate to “opinions, attitudes, observable behaviour and feelings” and a test subject’s 
responses to the statements represent personality characteristics such as depression, 
hysteria, social introversion and paranoia.799 Honesty tests also consist of written tests. 
However, unlike personality tests they are aimed at identifying a particular personality 
trait, in particular honesty or integrity.800 The test results represent applicants’ attitude 
towards dishonesty and whether they are likely to engage in dishonest or 
counterproductive behaviour. Projective tests require applicants to engage in various 
mental exercises, from drawing a person or human figure, through the interpretation 
                                               
794
 Hoffman “Pre – placement Examinations and Job Relatedness: How to Enhance Privacy and 
Diminish Discrimination in the Workplace”(2001) 49 University of Kansas Law Review 517 539. 
795
 Hebert Employee Privacy Law (2009) § 7: 1. 
796235 Cal. App. 3d 654 (1991). 
797
 Camara “Using Personality Testing in Pre-Employment Screening: Issues Raised in Soroka v 
Dayton Hudson” (2000) 6 Psychology, Public Policy and Law1164 1165. See also International 
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers 856 F 2d 1174 (CA 8 1998) which involved the psychological 
testing of employees who were security risk at a nuclear power plant and McKenna v Fargo 451 F. 
Supp. 1355 involving the personality testing of applicants for fire fighting positions in order to 
determine their ability to withstand stress. 
798
 Hebert Employee Privacy Law (2009) § 7: 1. 
799McKenna v Fargo 451 F. Supp. 1355, 1359 – 1360.  
800
 Hebert Employee Privacy Law § 7: 1. 
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of drawings and pictures to the completion of sentences.801 The Rorschach Inkblot 
Test is an example of a projective test. The test consists of a series of inkblots in 
various shapes, colours and forms which test subjects are required to interpret. The 
responses of the test subjects are analysed to reveal “emotional and personality 
traits”.802 The widespread use of personality tests as a way of identifying suitable 
employees has raised concerns relating to their validity and reliability.803 Furthermore, 
and particularly relevant to this study, personality tests infringe the privacy interests 
of test subjects because they consist of questions which are highly personal and 
sensitive in nature.804 
The United States Supreme Court in Osborn v United States805 explained why the use 
of personality tests raised privacy concerns: ‘Personality tests seek to ferret out a 
man’s inner most thoughts on family, life, religion, racial attitudes, national origin, 
politics, atheism, ideology, sex, and the like’.806 The appellants in Soroka v Hudson, 
for example, argued that some of the questions they were required to respond to in a 
personality test aimed at assessing their emotional stability, were related to religious 
                                               
801
 Hebert Employee Privacy Law § 7: 1. 
802McKenna v Fargo 451 F. Supp. 1355, 1360. 
803Critics of psychological and personality have argued that the tests are actually not an accurate 
predictor of employee performance. They further contend that the tests were developed for 
diagnosing psychological disorders and not best candidates for a job. Moreover in certain countries 
there are no rules regarding the analysis and validation of test procedures. To make matters worse no 
credentials are generally required for individuals and companies that develop and market the tests. 
Menjoge “Testing the Limits of Anti – discrimination Law: How Employers Use of Pre-employment 
Psychological and Personality Tests Can Circumvent Title VII and the ADA” (2003) 82 North 
Carolina Law Review 326, 332. See also Ecker “To Catch A Thief: The Private Employer’s Guide to 
Getting and Keeping an Honest Employee” (1994) 63 University of Missouri at Kansas City Law 
Review 251 259 and Hebert LC “Employee Privacy Law” (2009) § 7: 3. Other critics have argued the 
tests may discriminate against subjects in the following ways: first, the tests may contain questions 
that employers would normally be prohibited from asking in the pre-employment interview; second, 
the tests may eliminate candidates on the basis of specific traits traditionally possessed by persons of 
a certain group; and third the tests may be standardized in a way that reflects the cultural bias against 
those persons who do not fit into the middle-class, racial and religious norm. Menjoge ”Testing the 
Limits of Anti – discrimination Law: How Employers Use of Pre-employment Psychological and 
Personality Tests Can Circumvent Title VII and the ADA” (2003) 82 North Carolina Law Review 
326. See also the matter of Griggs v Duke Power Co. 91 S.Ct. 849. In Griggs, the Supreme Court 
held that the employer was prohibited by provisions of the Civil Rights from requiring a high school 
education or the passing of a standardised general intelligence test as a condition of employment 
because neither requirement was shown to be significantly related to successful job performance. The 
court found that both requirements operated to disqualify Negroes at a substantially higher rate than 
white applicants, and only white employees formerly had filled the jobs in question as part of a long-
standing practice of giving preference to whites.   
804
 Hebert Employee Privacy Law (2009) § 7: 4.50. 
805
 385 U.S. 323 (1966). 
806
 342.  
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beliefs and sexual orientation and as such had no bearing on their emotional stability 
or ability to perform the job of store security officer. For this reason, the appellants 
argued, the personality testing they were required to undergo violated their 
constitutional right to privacy. The appellants in Soroka were required to respond to 
questions related to religious attitudes such as: “I believe there is a Devil and a Hell in 
afterlife” and “I believe my sins are unpardonable”. The appellants were also required 
to respond to questions related to sexual orientation such as: “I have been in trouble 
because of my sex behaviour” and “Many of my dreams are about sex”.807 
5.4.3 Polygraph Testing 
The polygraph is a lie detection device measuring and recording physiological 
changes in blood pressure, heart rate, pulse rate, respiration and perspiration. A 
polygraph machine usually consists of a sphygmograph, pneumograph tubes and 
electrodes.808 The sphygmograph is strapped around a subject’s arms and measures 
heart beat, blood pressure and pulse rate. The pneumograph tubes are positioned on 
the chest and abdomen and measure the subject’s respiration. The electrodes are 
placed on two of the subject’s fingers to measure perspiration.809 The polygraph relies 
mainly on the subject’s physiological reactions to a set of questions to draw an 
inference on the subject’s truthfulness.810 There has been much debate as to whether 
the polygraph can produce empirically and scientifically reliable results.811 Employers 
turn to polygraphs in the belief that the tests “detect and deter employee theft and 
                                               
807
 79 – 80. 
808
 Hebert Employee Privacy Law (2009) § 6:2. 
809
 Hebert Employee Privacy Law (2009) § 6:2. 
810
 Hebert Employee Privacy Law (2009) § 6:2. 
811
 The US in its 1983 Office of Technology Assessment concluded that there was limited evidence for 
establishing the validity of polygraph testing. The assessment further concluded that polygraph 
accuracy may be affected by a series of factors including: the training, orientation and experience of 
the examiner, the examinee’s emotional stability and intelligence, the use of countermeasures and the 
examinee’s willingness to be tested. Finkin Privacy in Employment Law (2003) 117. Similar concerns 
regarding the reliability and accuracy of polygraph testing have been expressed by South African 
legal commentators. See for example Christianson M “Polygraph Testing in South Africa 
Workplaces: Shield and Sword in the Dishonesty Detection versus Compromising Privacy Debate” 
(2000) 21 Industrial Law Journal 17 and Tredoux and Pooley “Polygraph Based Testing of 
Deception and Truthfulness: An Evaluation and Commentary” (2001) 22 Industrial Law Journal 819. 
The authors correctly point out that polygraphs do not measure the presence or absence of deception 
or lying (in fact there is no known instrument that directly records whether a subject is lying or 
deceptive) but merely measure a subject’s physiological activity. 
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other employee misconduct, including drug abuse, industrial espionage, and crime”.812 
The widespread use of polygraph testing is especially evident in industries requiring 
high levels of trust and honesty, such as information technology, retail, security, 
criminal investigation and banking.813 Certain companies go as far as making the 
passing of a polygraph test a decisive factor in pre-employment selection and others 
include provision for testing in their employment contracts, in that the employment 
contract will require the employee to submit to the test on demand by the employer.814 
Employers commonly require employees to under polygraph testing as part of the pre 
– employment process for a number of purposes. Employers may use polygraph tests 
for pre – employment screening to verify information given by an applicant; to 
determine if an applicant had engaged in any misconduct with their previous 
employer or to determine if an employee has engaged in any unlawful activities such 
as theft and fraud.815 Employers may also subject employees to random or periodic 
testing for the purpose of determining whether employees are engaged in counter- 
productive behaviour or to deter theft in the workplace. Polygraph tests in 
employment may also be used as part of an investigation into an employee’s 
misconduct.816The right to privacy of individuals may be violated by the use of 
polygraphs particularly where the questions asked relate to personal information. It 
has been argued that the use of these polygraph tests in employment implicates the 
privacy of employees in a number of ways: 
a) these tests attempt to penetrate the inner domain of individual belief in 
violation of the distinction between conduct and belief;817 
                                               
812
 Hebert Employee Privacy Law (2009) § 6:5. See also Christianson “Truth, Lies and Polygraphs: 
Detecting Dishonesty in the Workplace” (1998) 18 Contemporary Labour Law 1. 
813
 Christianson “Polygraph Testing in South Africa Workplaces: Shield and Sword in the Dishonesty 
Detection versus Compromising Privacy Debate” (2000) 21 Industrial Law Journal 17. 
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 Christianson “Polygraph Testing in South Africa Workplaces: Shield and Sword in the Dishonesty 
Detection versus Compromising Privacy Debate” (2000) 21 Industrial Law Journal 17. 
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 Hebert Employee Privacy Law (2009) § 6:5.  
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 The court in the US decision of Long Beach City Employees Association v City of Long Beach41 
Cal.3d 937, 227 Cal.Rptr. 90 Cal. 198 , 944 stated the following regarding the inner domain of the 
individual “If there is a quintessential zone of human privacy it is the mind. Our ability to exclude 
others from our mental processes is intrinsic to the human personality. In their seminal article on the 
right to privacy, Warren and Brandeis stated: the common law secures to each individual the right of 
determining, ordinarily, to what extent his thoughts, sentiments, and emotions shall be communicated 
to others”. The court further added that it was for the reason that “A polygraph examination is 
specifically designed to overcome this privacy by compelling communication of thoughts, 
sentiments, and emotions which the examinee may have chosen not to communicate”. 
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b) they interfere with the individual’s sense of autonomy and reserve through use 
of a machine or instrument which senses an employee’s emotional responses 
to personal questions; and 
c) these tests increase the psychological power employers have over individuals 
seeking employment or already employed.818 
5.4.4 Drug and Alcohol Testing 
Employers engage in drug and alcohol testing to identify users of illicit drugs and 
alcohol in the workplace, deter individuals in the workplace from using drugs and 
alcohol and to reduce the incidence of drug and alcohol related problems such as 
accidents and illnesses.819 Drug tests are able to detect the presence of drugs such as 
“opiates, phencyclidine (PCP), cocaine, methamphetamine, amphetamine, 
Phenobarbital and marijuana”.820 There are five known methods of drug testing. 821 
Urinalysis is the most common and preferred method, because urine samples can be 
easily obtained and urine retains the presence of drugs for longer periods of time than, 
for example, blood.822 Urinalysis as a method of drug testing has privacy implications. 
The act of urination has been described as highly personal and private. First, in the 
leading United States decision of National Treasury Employees Union v Von Raab the 
court observed that ‘[t]here are few activities in our society more personal or private 
than the passing of urine. Most people describe it by euphemisms if they talk about it 
at all. It is a function traditionally performed without public observation; indeed, its 
                                               
818
 Christianson “Truth, Lies and Polygraphs: Detecting Dishonesty in the Workplace” (1998) 18 
Contemporary Labour Law 12. Some of the psychological power play present in the use of polygraph 
in the employment scenario were referred to by the court in State v Community Distributors Inc. (See 
note 19) when the court stated “Admittedly, [the] defendant did not physically compel its employees 
to submit to lie detector tests. Nor did [the] defendant orally threaten its employees with loss of their 
jobs if they did not submit to the tests. From a realistic viewpoint, however, defendant-employer 
stands in the supreme bargaining position and, should it please, may adopt a ‘take it or leave it’ 
attitude toward prospective and present employees...Compelling psychological factors nonetheless 
enter into a situation wherein someone who wants a job is asked if he will volunteer to take a lie 
detector test. The court does not envision…that prospective or current employees would initiate the 
administering of a lie detector test. The requests and suggestions clearly come from the employer.” 
The defendant in State v Community Distributors Inc., an owner and operator of drugstore, was 
convicted in Freehold Township Municipal Court of statutory violations in influencing, requesting or 
requiring employees, as condition of employment or continued employment, to take or submit to lie 
detector tests. See also SACCAWU obo Chauke v Mass Discounters (2004) 13 CCMA [2004] 6 
BALR 767 (CCMA). 
819
 Hebert Employee Privacy Law (2009) § 2:5. 
820
 Hebert Employee Privacy Law (2009) § 2:5. 
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 Hebert Employee Privacy Law (2009) § 2:5. 
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performance in public is generally prohibited by law as well as social custom.’ 
Secondly, urinalysis can reveal more than the presence of illegal drugs, it can also 
reveal what medications an employee is taking823 and consequently reveal “a host of 
medical facts including whether or not [an employee] is epileptic, pregnant or 
diabetic”.824 Thirdly, the manner in which urine samples are collected may intrude on 
the privacy of employees, particularly where the samples are to be provided under 
direct observation to prevent adulteration or substitution of the sample. Some United 
States courts have held that the requirement of direct observation in the collection of a 
urine sample for drug testing heightened the existing invasive and intrusive nature of 
the testing825.826 Fourthly, the results of a drug test are not always treated as 
confidential medical records given that they are often shared with third parties such as 
supervisors, prospective employers, health insurers and management. For example, 
post – incident drug testing after an occupational accident have to be shared with 
insurance companies to provide information whether industrial injuries benefits have 
to be paid out.827 
Blood samples can also be examined for the presence of drugs and are better 
indicators of recent drug use than urine samples. That being said, blood samples are 
not often used to detect drugs, because the drawing of a blood sample is a complex 
procedure that involves “a physical intrusion into the body” which is best done by 
trained persons.828 
Another method of drug testing is hair sample analysis. Hair retains the presence of 
drugs for longer periods than urine or blood.829 Nonetheless, the collection of hair 
samples for drug analysis is not entirely unproblematic.830 For example, an 
individual’s hair sample may test positive for marijuana as a result of exposure to 
                                               
823
 Supra. 
824
 Skinner v Railway Labour Executives Association 489 US 602 (1989) 617. 
825
 See American Federation of Government Employees v Sullivan 744 F Supp 294, 305 (D DC 1990) 
and American Federation of Government Employees v Thornburgh 720 F Supp 154, 155 n 1 (ND Cal 
1989). 
826
 Hebert Employee Privacy Law (2009) § 3:15. 
827
 Rothstein “Workplace Drug Testing: A Case study in the Misapplication of Technology” (1991) 5 
Harvard Journal of Law and Technology 65 77 – 79. 
828
 Hebert Employee Privacy Law (2009) § 2:4. 
829
 Hebert Employee Privacy Law (2009) § 2:4. 
830
 Hebert Employee Privacy Law (2009) § 2:4. 
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marijuana smoke that has become embedded in the hair. In other words, a positive 
drug test based on hair sample analysis is not always an indication of the personal use 
of drugs.831 
The collection of saliva samples for drug analysis is one of the less invasive and 
intrusive methods of drug testing. The method is also a good indicator of present drug 
usage and intoxication.832 
Sweat analysis is another less invasive method that may reveal the presence of drugs. 
However, as is the case with hair samples, exposure to drugs from environmental 
sources may affect sweat samples and consequently yield an incorrect positive test 
result.833 
All the aforementioned forms of testing raise privacy concerns about the way in which 
sample are obtained, not to mention the information gathered by the testing.834 
The information obtained through drug tests, even though at first glance not private, 
may further concern the off duty conduct of employees in the privacy of their homes. 
In other words, drug tests are able to expose and reveal aspects of the personal life of 
employees (including any illegal activities they may wish to engage in) outside of 
working hours. This means that while employers may be entitled to monitor the 
conduct of employees while on duty, these tests may well ignore the fact that 
employees have privacy interests outside the workplace.835 
The United States district court, in Beattie v St Petersburg836 recognised that drug tests 
may deprive employees of their privacy interests in off duty conduct (in this case fire 
fighters) and in this regard stated that drug tests “reveal activities of a fire fighters’ 
personal life. The fire fighters have a legitimate interest in keeping their personal life 
shielded from the government’s prying eyes, especially when the activity revealed is 
frowned upon by a large segment of the community and may constitute a crime. In 
order to pass constitutional muster the City must demonstrate a compelling interest 
                                               
831
 Hebert Employee Privacy Law (2009) § 2:4. 
832
 Hebert Employee Privacy Law (2009) §2:4. 
833
 Hebert Employee Privacy Law (2009) § 2:4. 
834Supra. 
835
 Hebert Employee Privacy Law (2009) § 2:4. 
836733 F Supp 1455 (MD Fla 1990). 
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that outweighs these privacy concerns”.837 These compelling interests may, as already 
indicated, be based on the identification of users of illicit drugs in the workplace; the 
deterrence of individuals from using drugs in the workplace; and to reduce the 
incidence of drug related problems such as accidents and illnesses.838 
 
Drug testing in employment typically occurs at the following stages: 
a) Pre – employment testing. Pre – employment testing occurs where applicants 
are required to undergo drug testing as a condition of employment. For 
example, in the United States case of Willner v Thornburgh,839 an applicant 
for the position of attorney in the Antitrust Division of the Department of 
Justice was required to undergo pre – employment drug testing as a condition 
of employment. The Department argued that the testing was justified by an 
interest in promoting a public image of integrity and in minimising the costs 
of hiring and retention.840 
b) Periodic routine testing. Routine testing may occur periodically as part of an 
annual physical examination or in response to a triggering event such as 
promotion or transfer. For example, the employees in National Treasury 
Employees Union v Von Raab,841 had applied for promotion to positions 
requiring them to carry firearms and handle classified materials. They were 
required to undergo routine testing. The Court stated that for routine testing to 
be constitutional it had to be sufficiently justified by a compelling interest 
(such as an interest in public safety, interest in the integrity of the workforce 
and interest in protecting sensitive information); conducted in a manner that 
preserves the privacy interests of employees and with prior notice of testing to 
employees.842 
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838
 Hebert Employee Privacy Law (2009) § 2:5. 
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841
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c) Post accident testing.  In Skinner v Railway Labour Executives’ 
Association,843the court upheld the post accident testing of railway crew 
involved in serious accidents because of the governmental interest in 
determining the cause of rail accidents and in deterring future accidents by 
ferreting out drug abuse by employees in safety sensitive positions. Courts are 
also likely to uphold post accident testing where the employee was 
responsible or at fault with respect to an accident, the accident was grave in 
nature and the employees’ duties implicate safety concerns. 844 
d) Random testing. Random testing occurs randomly, without prior notice, any 
number of times and is not based on a triggering event or a reasonable 
suspicion. As a consequence, courts have found random testing more 
intrusive than other types of drug testing.845In the United States, employers 
have justified this type of testing based on safety concerns and courts have 
upheld the random testing of employees in safety sensitive positions such as 
air traffic controllers, water treatment plant operators, crane operators, 
physicians and dentists846. 847 The employer in Chetty and Kaymac 
Rotomoulders (Pty) Ltd,848 for example, conducted random drug tests on 
employees, The arbitrator took issue with the manner in which the testing 
took place, specifically with the fact that the employer dismissed one of the 
employees (in a safety sensitive position concerned with the manufacture of 
fuel tanks for the motor industry) after he admitted his drug problem to the 
employer and expressed willingness to let the employer assist him with his 
problem; 
e) Reasonable suspicion testing.849 Employers may engage in reasonable 
suspicion testing of employees where they suspect an employee had been 
using drugs or is under the influence of drugs. In the United States, courts 
uphold reasonable suspicion testing of employees where an employer can 
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 489 US 602 (1989). 
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 See Skinner v Railway Labour Executives’ Association. 
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 See Transportation Institute v United States Coast Guard 727 F Supp 648 (D DC 1989).Hebert 
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prove that his or her suspicion was based on “the existence of illustrative 
facts” that would guide a reasonable person to suspect that an employee has 
been using drugs or is under the influence of drugs. Symptoms of drug use 
and direct observation of drug use or possession have been accepted by courts 
as facts that can guide an employer to engage in reasonable suspicion 
testing.850 
5.4.5 HIV/AIDS Testing 
Notwithstanding global efforts to manage and contain the HIV/AIDS epidemic, it 
continues to grow. Less than two decades ago, in 1990, around 8 million people were 
estimated to be living with HIV/AIDS globally. Today the number of people with the 
epidemic has increased to nearly 35 million.851 The latest global HIV/AIDS statistics 
published by UNAIDS/WHO estimate that at the end of 2007, 33, 2 million people 
were living with HIV/AIDS, 2,5 million people were infected with HIV during 2007 
and 2,1 million people died of AIDS during the same year. 852 
According to the UNAIDS/WHO report, sub–Saharan Africa continues to be the most 
affected region in the world, because 22,5 million individuals are reported to be living 
with HIV/AIDS in the region and in 2007 an estimated 1, 7 million people were 
infected with HIV/AIDS in the region. A further estimated 1, 6 million people died of 
the pandemic in sub – Saharan Africa during 2007. This means that 76 % of global 
AIDS deaths in 2007 occurred in the sub – Saharan region. The sub-region of 
Southern Africa accounts for 68 % of individuals living with HIV/AIDS globally and 
76 % of global AIDS deaths.853 
A further reality in these regions is that the majority of people living with HIV/AIDS 
are “between the ages of 15 and 49 - in the prime of the working lives”. As such, the 
epidemic has adversely affected all sectors of society in these regions with negative 
social and economic consequences. A 2001 report - “The Economic Impact of 
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HIV/AIDS in Southern Africa” - expounded on the major impact of HIV/AIDS on 
labour productivity, economic growth and social development: 
“The spread of HIV/AIDS reduces labour productivity, raises private 
and public consumption, and thereby reduces income and savings, with 
lower savings, the rate of investment falls, reinforcing the decline in 
economic growth. The loss of labour productivity occurs because a 
larger share of the work force becomes debilitated and dies causing 
organizations to lose workers with critical skills. Skilled personnel are 
lost and valuable labour time is consumed when workers become 
debilitated, and work schedules are disrupted when organizations 
replace workers and managers who are ill or have died. The loss of 
capacity reduces economic growth.” 
HIV/AIDS tests are designed to determine if an individual has been infected with the 
HIV virus and as such do not detect the virus in individuals, but rather to establish the 
presence of HIV virus antibodies in an individual’s blood. As such, when a person 
tests positive for the virus, it is an indication of the fact that the person has HIV 
antibodies in their blood. Blood samples, as well as saliva and urine samples can be 
tested to reveal the presence of HIV antibodies. Research has indicated that the testing 
of urine samples for HIV antibodies is more reliable and accurate than the testing of 
saliva samples. In fact, the testing of urine samples is as accurate as the testing of 
blood samples and may also become as prevalent as blood testing given that the virus 
cannot be transmitted through urine.854 
5.4.5.1 Arguments for Workplace HIV/AIDS Testing 
In response to the spread and the devastating effects of the epidemic employers (in 
order to provide a safe work environment and maintain productivity in the age of 
HIV/AIDS) often resort to mandatory HIV/AIDS testing in the recruitments stages or 
during employment. Employers usually justify the HIV/AIDS testing of employees by 
arguing that: 
a) the employer has a freedom of choice as to whom to hire, which freedom is 
founded on the legal principles of freedom of association and freedom to 
contract;
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b) it is well known that the risk of occupational transmission of the HIV virus is 
unlikely, but this does not mean the risk is non-existent. For this reason, some 
employers feel they have a responsibility to prevent occupational transmission 
of the virus by testing both prospective and existing employees. This 
occupational safety argument has led to health care workers being prevented 
from performing certain duties in countries such as the United States. Certain 
United States decisions have held that HIV positive medical workers who 
pose a less than significant risk of transmitting the virus can be prevented 
from performing certain invasive procedures.855 The argument has also been 
extended to military officials856 and persons employed in emergency 
services;857 
c) HIV positive persons, although not yet symptomatic, may experience psycho-
neurological symptoms such as dementia. As such, in some occupations (for 
example in the case of an aircraft/airline pilot and mine lift operator) a sudden 
onset of AIDS dementia may be very risky; 
d) the employment of persons with HIV has costs associated with recruitment, 
training and support of such employees;858 
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 See for example Doe v University of Maryland Medical System Corporation 50 F 3d 1261 (1995) 
where the court stated the following in this regards “[a]lthough there may presently be no 
documented case of surgeon-patient transmission such transmission is clearly possible”. Doe was a 
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e) in service industries, such as restaurants and hotels, the employment of HIV 
persons may give rise to irrational fears amongst clientele or co-workers.859 
5.4.5.2 Arguments against Workplace HIV/AIDS 
The following arguments have been raised in opposition to the testing of employees 
for HIV/AIDS: 
a) Requiring an employee or a prospective employee to undergo an HIV test as a 
general condition of employment may infringe an individual’s constitutional 
rights, such as the right to physical integrity and privacy. These inherent and 
constitutionally protected rights should trump the employer’s right to 
contractual freedom in those instances where an employee’s HIV positive 
status has no bearing on the job;860 
b) The risk of occupational transmission argument is valid only where an 
employee is exposed or will be exposed to procedures constituting possible 
modes of transmission, such as surgical procedures in the case of a surgeon. 
However, even in such high-risk occupations employees can take the 
necessary precautions. Moreover, in most occupations (including the 
exposure prone occupations) the risk of occupational transmission is often 
low;861 
c) HIV is not a reliable or conclusive indicator of dementia; in fact, psychometric 
testing is perhaps the better indicator of any neurological impairment; 862 
d)  HIV positive employees may continue to be productive members of society 
(by paying taxes, paying for their own medical aid and by supporting their 
families and dependants) for a long period of time after contracting the virus. 
Moreover, the costs associated with employing HIV positive persons are 
similar to those borne by commitments to equality and the prohibition on 
unfair discrimination;863 
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e) The fear and antagonism surrounding HIV/AIDS cannot justify the 
discrimination against individuals living with the illness, particularly in those 
countries with a history of discrimination. Ngcobo J, in Hoffmann v South 
African Airways864 aptly stated the following in this regard and with particular 
reference to South Africa: “Prejudice can never justify unfair discrimination. 
This country has recently emerged from institutionalised prejudice…Our 
constitutional democracy has ushered in a new era – it is an era characterised 
by a respect for human dignity of all human beings. In this era, prejudice and 
stereotyping have no place.” 865 
Further consideration of HIV/AIDS testing of employees, also in the South African 
context, will be given in Chapter 6. 
5.5 CONCLUSION 
The need for privacy is not created by people. Instead it inheres in all people. Privacy 
is something that all persons yearn. Without it, people would cease to flourish and 
probably perish or deteriorate. The arguments advanced in favour of the protection of 
privacy emphasise this value of privacy as well as its constituent elements (outlined in 
Chapter 4). In the workplace, and despite the existence of arguments to the contrary, 
privacy protection is essential because it preserves and maintains the autonomy, 
dignity and well being of employees in an environment where the employer in general 
yields more influence and authority than the employee. Furthermore, privacy is 
inherent in the notions of good faith, loyalty, respect and trust which underpin the 
employment relationship. In addition, privacy breeds diversity and nurtures the 
development of fresh and different ideas, beliefs and attitudes, which are crucial for 
innovation and creativity in individuals. At the same time, employers (and, indirectly, 
the public) often have a legitimate interest in policies and practices that may impact 
on privacy.  
In this chapter, a number of these policies and practices engaged in by employers 
were identified. The way in which these policies and practices impact on privacy and 
the extent to which they do so were also described. What these policies and practices 
have in common, is that all of them are based on recent and continued technological 
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advances. As such, it seems clear that the biggest continuous threat to privacy in the 
workplace remains developments in science and technology. At the same time, it may 
be said, even at this early stage, that it does not appear as if the challenge lies in a 
changed conception of privacy and the values it seeks to protect. Rather, it would 
seem that technological developments demand no more than a continuous balancing 
of the interests of employer and employee in the different contexts created by new 
policies and practices made possible by technology. In what follows, specific attention 
will be given to how different jurisdictions have responded to what may be termed 
this ‘contextual challenge’ to the accommodation of privacy in the workplace. As 
mentioned, Chapter 6 will elaborate on legal responses across the different 
jurisdictions to the challenges raised by the policies and practices identified in this 
chapter, while Chapter 7 and 8 will focus on the contextual challenge raised by the 
most recent advances in technology – e-mail/ internet monitoring and genetic testing. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

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CHAPTER 6: 
A COMPARATIVE SURVEY OF POLICIES AND 
PRACTICES IMPACTING ON PRIVACY IN THE 
WORKPLACE 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter briefly considered the meaning of the phrase “privacy in the 
workplace” and also gave brief consideration to the arguments for and against the 
need for privacy protection in the workplace. The chapter then went on to identify a 
number of policies and practices in the workplace that typically threaten or pressurise 
privacy in the workplace. The general impact of these policies and practices on 
privacy was discussed and it was found that these policies and practices, to an extent 
which depends on the manner and circumstances in which they are used, infringe on 
an individual's privacy. Finally, it was argued that there is indeed a need for privacy 
protection in the workplace, particularly in light of technological advancements.  
As a further step in exploring the relationship between technological developments 
and privacy in the context of the workplace, this chapter provides a more elaborate 
and comparative discussion of the policies and practices identified in the previous 
chapter. This is done by:  
a) first,  providing a brief introduction or overview of the extent to which a 
particular policy or practice is used in three selected jurisdictions, namely 
South Africa, the United Kingdom (as part of the European Community) and 
the United States; 
b) second,  briefly examining the legislation, if any,  regulating or impacting on 
the use of the particular policy or practice in these jurisdictions;  
c)  third,  reviewing  a selection of cases (where available) in respect of each 
jurisdiction  to form a  picture of how courts and tribunals in that jurisdiction 
have approached the application and impact of the policy or practice in 
question; and  
d) lastly, analysing the extent to which privacy is protected in light of the use of 
that particular policy or practice across the different jurisdictions. 
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6.2 BACKGROUND CHECKS 
The previous chapter explained that background checks in essence entailed the 
acquisition and storage by an employer of information about an employee, which 
information ranges from an employee’s credit history to an employee's criminal 
convictions or medical records. Because the range of information that an employer 
can obtain in this manner is so vast, it was submitted that employers should restrict 
background checks on employees to only that information which has a bearing on the 
position sought or occupied by the employee.  For instance, it would be prudent and 
arguably justifiable for an employer to do a background check on employees applying 
for the position of driver (only) to determine whether they have been convicted of any 
traffic related or drug related offences (as opposed to an extensive background check 
likely to disclose other personal information which has no bearing on whether or not 
the concerned employee will be a suitable and fit driver). 
6.2.1 South Africa 
Grogan is of the view that background checks are used by South African employers 
primarily to ensure the veracity of information given by an applicant for a position.866 
Grogan adds that a high premium is placed on dishonest conduct in employment 
because it is capable of destroying or causing irreparable harm to the trust on which 
the employment relationship is founded.867 Dishonest conduct can “consist of any act 
or omission which entails deceit. This may include withholding information from the 
employer, or making a false statement or misrepresentation with the intention of 
deceiving the employer.”868 
Grogan’s views are supported by a number of South African decisions, which depart 
from the premise that the employment relationship is one requiring the utmost trust. 
As such, any conduct of a dishonest nature, constitutes a breach of this relationship.869 
Included in this expectation of trust, is a duty on the parties to disclose material facts 
before entering into a contract of employment. It follows that the non- disclosure of 
                                               
866Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices2nd ed. (2007) 301. 
867Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices2nd ed. (2007) 301. 
868Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices2nd ed. (2007) 301. 
869
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material facts by a party may well result in the other party justifiably terminating the 
contract.870 A number of Labour Court and Commission for Conciliation Medication 
and Arbitration (“CCMA”) decisions have upheld the dismissal of employees where 
misrepresentation or non–disclosure by an employee was found to have destroyed the 
relationship of trust between the employee and the employer.871 
6.2.1.1 Legislation 
There is no legislation regulating the use of background checks by employers as such. 
However, there is legislation that ensures that employers conducting background 
checks on individuals do not discriminate against individuals. Section 6(1) of the 
Employment Equity Act872 (“EEA”) prohibits direct or indirect unfair discrimination 
in any employment practice or policy on various grounds. The EEA’s definition of an 
“employment practice or policy” in section 1 “includes advertising a position and the 
selection criteria for employment”. To avoid any suggestions of unfair discrimination 
during the selection stages of employment an employer should not request 
information about an employee that has no bearing on the inherent requirements of the 
job or the suitability of an applicant for a position.873 
6.2.1.2 Case Law 
There are no reported decisions directly related to the use of backgrounds checks by 
employers in South Africa. However, the Labour Court and CCMA have often 
pronounced on misrepresentation and non-disclosure by employees of their 
qualifications, previous misconduct under an old employer, or previous convictions.874 
These pronouncements suggest that South African tribunals are likely to uphold the 
dismissal of employees who misrepresent themselves or fail to disclose material facts, 
particularly if those employees are occupying positions requiring high levels of trust, 
honesty and integrity. In fact, the Labour Court has gone so far as to disregard the 
materiality of a misrepresentation and uphold the dismissal of an employee simply on 
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 See for example Hoffmann v Monis’s Wineries Ltd 1948 (2) SA 163 (C) and Dilks v Postma’s 
Diamond Prospect Ltd 1921 (WLD). Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 
2nded. (2007) 301. 
871Decisions such as De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd v CCMA & Others (2000) 21 ILJ 1051 (LAC) 
and Mlotshwa/SABC (1) [2002] 12 BALR 1292 (CCMA). 
872Act 55 of 1998. 
873Van Niekerk The Right to Privacy in Employment (2001) Unpublished Paper presented at seminar 
for Advanced Diploma in Labour Law hosted by Rand Afrikaans University 5. 
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the basis that the employee stood in a unique relationship of trust and honesty with the 
employer. In Hoch v Mustek Electronics875 the applicant was dismissed for 
misrepresenting her qualifications. The Court upheld the dismissal of the applicant 
notwithstanding the fact that the applicant had been working for the employer for a 
considerable number of years and had been honest and trustworthy in her work and 
notwithstanding the fact that her disputed qualifications were irrelevant to her 
position. The Court held that because the applicant “stood in a unique relationship of 
trust and confidence” towards her employer,876 her employer was justified in 
considering her misrepresentation material enough to “have irreparably damaged the 
unique trust relationship” they once shared.877 
The applicant in Wium v Zondi & Others878 had been previously convicted of theft and 
had failed to point this out in his curriculum vitae when applying for a position as 
deputy principal of a school. For this reason, the employer charged the employee with 
making a false statement and subsequently dismissed the employee. The employee 
argued that he was entitled to conceal his previous conviction because the appeal 
against the conviction was pending and he assumed the employer was aware of his 
conviction by virtue of the fact that his previous and potential employer both were in 
the field of education. Ntsebeza AJ reasoned that the dismissal of the employee was 
an appropriate sanction for his intentional non-disclosure seeing as his act of 
dishonesty in this regard had resulted in a breakdown of the relationship of trust 
between the employee and the employer.879 
Although Mashava v Cuzen & Woods Attorneys880 did not involve the non-disclosure 
of previous misdeeds, the decision is nonetheless important in that the Labour Court 
weighed the employee’s non-disclosure of her pregnancy against her constitutional 
right to privacy. The employer in Mashava dismissed the employee for dishonesty in 
that she concealed the fact that she was pregnant. The employee claimed her dismissal 
was based on her pregnancy and, as such, automatically unfair in terms of section 
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187(1)(e) of the Labour Relations.881 Landman J reasoned that the employee had tried 
to conceal her condition for the sole reason that she feared her employer would treat 
her disadvantageously and her fear had to be “measured against [her] right to privacy 
and [the] duty to relinquish that privacy”. Landman J found that there is no duty on an 
employee to inform an employer of her pregnancy except where such information is 
in an employee's interest or in the interests of her unborn child.882 
6.2.2 United Kingdom 
The practice of screening employees during recruitment and selection is a long 
standing tradition in the United Kingdom. The creation of the Criminal Records 
Bureau in 2002 to manage and organise aspects of employee screening confirms the 
widespread practice engaged in by employers to check whether applicants have any 
previous convictions rendering them unsuitable for certain positions. It is important to 
note that the Bureau’s primary aim is to prevent the abuse of children and vulnerable 
persons and for this reason the information it discloses to various organisations is 
limited and related to achieving this aim. As a consequence, the Bureau discloses only 
information related to a person’s criminal background and then only pertaining only 
to persons who want to work with children and vulnerable adults. As such, the Bureau 
would not be in a position to, for example, disclose criminal record information about 
persons who want to work in the financial sector.883 
The Rehabilitation of Offenders Act884 limits the disclosure of previous convictions by 
applicants to allow them unprejudiced access to employment. The Exceptions Order 
provides that after a certain period of time has elapsed certain convictions, referred to 
as ‘spent’ convictions, need not be disclosed to an employer.885 “Unspent” convictions 
are those convictions which an individual is under a duty to reveal because the period 
of time required to attain “spent status” has not passed. The general rule is that 
applicants with ‘spent’ convictions have a right, when asked about previous 
convictions, to indicate that they have no criminal record during a job interview 
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 Act 66 of 1995. 
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 698 B – C. 
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 Thomas “Employment Screening and the Criminal Records Bureau” (2002) 31 Industrial Law 
Journal 55 – 56. 
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 Act of 1974, (Exceptions Order 1975). 
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 The period of time which must elapse for a conviction to become “spent” is dependent on a number 
of factors including the nature of the offence and the sentence given for the particular offence. 
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(unless the type of employment falls within the ambit of the Exceptions Order of the 
Rehabilitation of Offenders Act).886 However, applicants are under a duty to disclose 
‘unspent’ convictions to potential employers when requested to do so. 
6.2.2.1 Legislation 
Apart from the impact of the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act887 discussed above, the 
Data Protection Act888 (“DPA”) generally regulates the processing of personal889 and 
sensitive data. Part I of the DPA defines “personal information” as information about 
a living person and includes any expression of opinion about the individual and any 
indication of the intentions of the data controller or any other person in respect of the 
individual. “Sensitive information” is described, in Part I of the DPA, as information 
concerning an individual’s racial or ethnic origin; political opinions; commission or 
alleged commission of any offence; proceedings for any offence committed or alleged 
to have been committed; trade union membership; sexual life; religious beliefs or 
other beliefs of a similar nature; and physical or mental health. The term “processing” 
in the DPA is defined as, in relation to information or data, obtaining, recording or 
holding the information or data or carrying out any operation or set of operations on 
the information or data including, amongst others, the retrieval, consultation or use of 
the information or data or the organisation, adaptation or alteration of the information 
or data. The scope of the DPA with respect to the regulation of the processing of 
personal and sensitive data is also extended through a wide definition of the term 
“data controller” in Part I of the DPA as a person who alone or jointly with others 
determines the purposes for which and the manner in which any personal data is 
processed or is to be processed. The DPA’s wide and far reaching definition of "data 
controller" invariably suggests that it applies to both private and public sector 
employers. Perhaps the most important aspect to the DPA is that it places a duty on a 
                                               
886
 An applicant will, however, be required to disclose “spent” convictions if he or she intends applying 
for a position in the following categories: professional occupations (e.g. barristers, accountants, 
opticians and vets); administration of justice (judges, police officers and prison and traffic wardens); 
regulated occupations (e.g. directors of insurance companies and firearm dealers); caregivers and 
child minders (e.g. old age nurse, nanny and teachers); and national security providers (e.g. air traffic 
controllers). http://www.emplaw.co.uk (2007-02-05). 
887
 Act of 1974. 
888
 Act of 1988. 
889
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data controller to comply with the data protection principles in relation to all personal 
data with respect to which he, she or it is the data controller.890 
Generally speaking, the DPA does not prevent employers from processing sensitive 
data. The DPA merely limits the circumstances under which such data can be 
processed. The DPA recognises that employers may process sensitive data with regard 
to individuals in order to assess their suitability for employment and requires that 
employers, prior to processing such data, should obtain the explicit and voluntary 
consent of their employees.891  This denotes that the consent to the processing must be 
voluntary by the related individual and such individual must not feel coerced to give 
his or her consent. This further means that the related individual must not be penalised 
for refusing to give his or her consent to the processing.892 
The voluntary consent requirement in section 4 of the DPA ensures that an individual 
has some autonomy and control over his or her personal information and furthermore 
advances the conception of privacy as limited access to oneself (see chapter 3 above). 
This approach describes privacy as, amongst other things, a condition in which 
acquaintance with a person or a person's personal affairs is limited by the person him- 
or herself. As indicated above, the DPA requires employers, when processing 
sensitive data, to obtain the explicit and unequivocal consent of employees, failing 
which the processing becomes unfair and, more importantly, unlawful. The DPA 
takes matters a step further and requires employers to notify employees of all intended 
purposes of the information processed, even where the intended purposes appear 
obvious.893 The DPA sets out a number of requirements to be met by employers before 
they can collect, store, use, disclose or process sensitive personal information 
concerning employees. This includes the requirement that before employers collect 
and use sensitive personal information they must do so only if a  legal right or 
obligation requires them to do so for purposes of ensuring the health, safety and 
welfare of  employees and the selection of safe and competent employees and a safe 
working environment.894 
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It is apparent from the DPA’s definition of the terms “personal information” and 
“sensitive information” that United Kingdom employers conducting background 
checks on employees have a duty to observe and comply with the data protection 
principles of the DPA, simply because these checks undoubtedly relate to the 
processing of data of an individual. In fact, United Kingdom employers implementing 
any of the policies and practices discussed in this chapter – also those impacting on 
employees during employment - have to ensure that the manner in which they employ 
these policies and practices complies with the DPA data protection principles, again 
because the employment of the said policies and practices entail a processing of 
personal and sensitive data as defined in the DPA. In this regard, the Information 
Commissioner has issued comprehensive and explanatory guidelines, in the form of 
the Employment Practices Data Protection Code of 2005 895 (“Employment Practices 
Code”) and the Supplementary Guidance (“Employment Practices Code 
Supplementary Guidance”) in order to assist compliance by employers and the 
adoption of good practice. The Employment Practices Code also aims to strike a 
balance between, on the one hand, the legitimate expectations of workers that 
personal information about them will be handled properly and, on the other hand, the 
legitimate business interests of employers.896 
With respect to applications for employment, the Employment Practices Code guides 
employers to seek only relevant and necessary information for purposes of reaching a 
recruitment decision. The Employment Practices Code further requires employers to 
limit the collection of criminal record information to offences that have a direct 
bearing on the suitability of an applicant for a particular position.897 The Employment 
Practices Code recognises that employers may need to verify the accuracy of 
information given by applicants and as such provides that employers inform 
                                               
895
 The Employment Practices Code is intended to assist and guide employers to comply with the legal 
requirements of data protection. Although the Employment Practices Code has no legal status and is 
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requirements of the DPA. Given that the Employment Practices Code covers amongst others 
successful and unsuccessful applicants and former applicants and affects recruitment and selection 
exercises by employers, UK employers are obligated to consider its provisions when conducting 
background checks on individuals. 
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applicants of the fact that their information may need to be verified. The Employment 
Practices Code Supplementary Guidance also discourages employers from requiring 
applicants to obtain their records from third parties as a condition of employment.898 
Of particular importance is the fact that the Employment Practices Code 
Supplementary Guidance emphasises that obtaining information about an applicant 
from the CRB or Disclosure Scotland amounts to an intrusion into that particular 
individual’s privacy and, as such, should be only be done during the final stages of the 
employment process (i.e. once the applicant has been shortlisted and only if it is 
necessary in light of the nature and character of the position concerned).899 
Although the Employment Practices Code provides guidelines on pre – employment 
vetting, the Employment Practices Code warns employers that vetting is more 
intrusive than verification. The Employment Practices Code Supplementary Guidance 
requires that an employer's decision to vet an employee should be proportionate to the 
risks that the employer is likely to face. As such, an employer who wants to safeguard 
against risks such as breaches of national security, theft or disclosure of trade may be 
justified in vetting its employees.900 The Employment Practices Code recommends 
that employers inform applicants early on in the recruitment process that vetting may 
take place at a later stage.901 The Employment Practices Code further advises against 
the use of vetting as a means of gathering intelligence on an employee and that it 
should be used as a means of obtaining specific information concerning an 
employee.902 Moreover, the signed consent of an applicant must be obtained especially 
where vetting involves the release of documents or information from a third party.903 
6.2.2.2 Case Law 
The appellant in Kawol v Craig Homes Ltd904 was employed as a nurse, a profession 
which is exempt from the provisions of the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act. The 
employee worked largely unsupervised at night and further supervised junior staff in 
his position of unit manager. It subsequently emerged (after the employer conducted a 
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criminal record search) that the employee had failed to disclose his previous 
conviction for assault occasioning actual bodily harm in his application form for 
employment. The employee was dismissed after a disciplinary hearing for failing to 
disclose his previous conviction to the employer.  
The employment tribunal upheld the decision of the employer to dismiss the 
employee, not only in view of the requirements of the Rehabilitation of Offenders 
Act, but also because the application form for employment that the employee was 
required to complete  plainly indicated that he had to make this disclosure. The appeal 
tribunal found that the employer had no choice but to dismiss the appellant because of 
the nature of the business they owned, which required them to exercise care in the 
staff they chose and employed. The appeal tribunal further found the decision to 
dismiss the appellant justified because it was not based on his conviction, but on his 
failure to voluntarily disclose his conviction, a fact which destroyed or breached the 
trust and confidence the employer had in him.  
The employee in X v Y905 was employed as a development officer by a charity 
organisation that, amongst other things, organised activities for young offenders and 
those at risk of offending. The employee was arrested, following an incident with 
another male in a public toilet whilst off duty, and taken to a police station where he 
signed a caution in which he acknowledged he had committed an offence in terms of 
the Sexual Offences Act906. The employee chose not disclose this incident to his 
employer. The employer  became aware of the incident six months after its occurrence 
and dismissed the employee for gross misconduct in that he had committed a criminal 
offence with a direct bearing on his employment and for  failing to disclose his  
offence to the employer. The employee filed a complaint with the employment 
tribunal arguing that he had been unfairly dismissed in a manner inconsistent with 
respect for private life under Article 8 of the ECHR and in breach of the prohibition of 
discrimination in Article 14 of ECHR.  
The employment tribunal upheld the dismissal on the ground that the conduct in 
question was  a criminal offence,  not trivial in nature and  showed an inappropriate 
lack of self control and serious lack of judgment, which had a direct bearing on his 
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employment in a position which dealt mainly with vulnerable youngsters. The 
conduct had also undermined the employer’s trust and confidence in the employee. 
With respect to the question whether the dismissal was incompatible with Articles 8 
and 14 of the ECHR, the employment tribunal held there were no headings under 
which these claims could be brought in terms of the Human Rights Act.907 In any 
event, the argument was held to be irrelevant because the employee acknowledged 
that he should have told his employer of his conviction and caution and elected not to 
do so. This, in itself, could be construed as an acknowledgment by the employee that 
he was wrong to have withheld the information about his conviction and caution from 
his employer.  
On appeal, the appeal tribunal directed its attention to whether the dismissal of the 
employee breached Article 8 of the Human Rights Act. The applicant submitted that 
the conduct in question took place outside his work life and in his private life and his 
dismissal therefore involved a breach of right to respect for his private life. The appeal 
tribunal found that the conduct in question was not covered by the right to respect for 
private life in terms of Article 8 as the conduct in question was not private. Rather, it 
was a transitory sexual encounter between two strangers in a place to which the public 
had and were permitted access to. 
The court of appeal came to a similar conclusion, namely, that the conduct concerned 
did not take place in the employee’s private life. The court of appeal further 
determined that because the conduct under discussion was a criminal offence, it would 
be of legitimate concern or interest to the public and as such could not be labelled as a 
purely private matter. In this sense, the employer had a legitimate concern or interest 
in knowing of the employee’s conduct because it set off alarm bells regarding the 
employee and his suitability for the type of employment at issue. 
6.2.3 United States 
It appears from case law that United States employers do carry out background checks 
on applicants. It further emerges from case law that employers may and are in certain 
instances compelled to take into consideration an individual’s criminal record in 
making appointments, particularly where the conviction relates to or has any bearing 
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on the position sought by the applicant. In the event that that an applicant's criminal 
record is significantly unrelated to the position sought by the applicant and the 
employer still investigates this, the employer faces the risk of contravening federal 
and state antidiscrimination legislation that explicitly prohibits employers from 
discriminating against individuals with criminal records.908 
6.2.3.1 Legislation 
There is no legislation directly regulating the use of background checks by employers 
in United States law. However, as pointed out above, employees can protect and 
preserve their privacy interests by using the Fourth Amendment (in relation to which 
it has been held that it protects people and not just places from unreasonable 
searches). It may be argued that an unwarranted background check by an employer 
amounts to a search and, perhaps, a seizure (if the employer decides to store the 
information acquired in conducting a background check on a particular employee). In 
this regard, United States courts have given the words “unreasonable search and 
seizures” in the Fourth Amendment a wide and purposive meaning to include other 
forms of intrusions such as drug testing and HIV/AIDS testing.909 However, a number 
of states prohibit persons with criminal convictions from seeking employment in 
positions related to or in connection with caring for children, nursing and education.910 
As a consequence, employers are legally obliged to carry out background checks 
aimed at discovering if an applicant has any criminal record in respect of certain 
positions.911 Despite this, it is  submitted that employees who have been subjected to 
background checks  they feel were unwarranted or unjustified in light of the nature or 
character of the employment they sought, may be able to use constitutional protection, 
particularly, the Fourth Amendment the challenge these checks. In Griswold v 
                                               
908Scales “Employer Catch – 22: The Paradox between Employer Liability for Employee Criminal Acts 
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Connecticut 912 the Fourth Amendment was held to protect both individuals and places 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, where individuals argue that their privacy 
interests were violated  
6.2.3.2 Case Law 
Although the United States is a highly litigious society, the different policies and 
practices impacting on privacy have only featured in a handful of cases.  This does not 
mean that there is no case law pertaining to the issue of background checks.  In certain 
states, employers may be held liable under claims of negligent employment and 
negligent retention if they knew or should have known of an employee’s propensities 
and the employer’s negligence in employing or retaining that employee caused harm 
to third parties. The employer in Tallahassee Furniture Co. Inc. v Harrison 913 was 
found to have failed in its duty of care in hiring an employee who had been previously 
convicted of serious crimes (including aggravated assault), after the employee (a 
furniture delivery man) brutally stabbed and bludgeoned a client whilst delivering 
furniture to her home. The employer was found liable because it had failed to 
interview the employee, ask him for references or to ask him to fill out a job 
application.914 Religious employers may also be held liable under the doctrine of 
negligent employment. In Jones v Trane915 the court held a church could be held liable 
in terms of the doctrine of negligent employment where it is shown that “the church 
placed or continued to place a clergy man in contact with boys despite actual or 
constructive notice of the priest’s perverted proclivities”.916 
6.2.4 Analysis 
The discussion above shows that employers carry out background checks on 
applicants and current employees to not only determine their suitability but also to 
avoid liability for the conduct of their employees. At the same time, all three 
jurisdictions impose limitations on the freedom of employers to do so, even though 
                                               
912Griswold v Connecticut 381 U.S. 477 (1965). 
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914
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these limitations are uneven across the three jurisdictions. These limitations range 
from direct regulation of access to certain types of information (such as criminal 
records in the United Kingdom) relating to specific categories of employment (as in 
some states of the United States), regulation of the access and use of personal data (in 
the United Kingdom), the indirect application of the principles of unfair 
discrimination (across all three jurisdictions) and the application of constitutional 
protections (in the United States). The question whether employees are under a duty 
to make disclosures where employers neglect to conduct background checks depends 
on the materiality of the disclosure. A disclosure is considered sufficiently material 
where if it can influence an employer’s employment decision and has a bearing on the 
position concerned. 
6.3 PSYCHOMETRIC TESTING 
The previous chapter described how psychological tests are used in the employment 
context to assess the suitability of an applicant’s personality for a particular position. 
It was pointed out that some of these tests, such as the MMPI test, consists of 
statements relating to, amongst other things, an individual's opinions, attitudes, 
beliefs, behaviour and feelings and could determine, on the basis of a test subject’s 
responses, the individual's personality (even, for example, whether the individual 
suffered from depression, hysteria or paranoia). Much like polygraph testing, these 
tests may infringe an individual's privacy in that they are able to reveal a person's 
inner thoughts and feelings. However, unlike polygraph testing  which tends to reveal  
specific information about an individual (such as whether or not he, for example, 
committed a specified  act), personality tests are structured in such a way that they are 
able to give the person administering the test a wide range of information concerning 
the person taking the test. 
6.3.1 South Africa 
Published research indicates that certain South African employers, particularly those 
in the banking, insurance and security industries917 use psychological tests for training 
and development, selection and recruitment, team development and succession 
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planning purposes.918 Perhaps the most commonly used form of psychological testing 
is psychometric tests. Psychometric tests concern the “larger project of assessment 
which includes forms of evaluation such as structured and unstructured interviews, 
self assessment and projective techniques like the Rorschach Inkblot Test”.919 
Consequently, psychometric tests measure not only psychological traits but also 
occupational abilities and skills.920 Research further indicates South African 
employers do not use psychometric tests in isolation but in combination with other 
methods, such as interviews and simulation exercises.921 
6.3.1.1 Legislation 
Although South African courts have yet to deal with the issue of psychometric testing 
in the employment context, South Africa has legislation specifically regulating such 
testing in employment in the form of section 8 of the EEA. Section 8 of the EEA 
explicitly prohibits psychometric testing and other similar assessment of employees 
unless the test: 
a) has been shown to be scientifically valid and reliable; 
b) can be applied fairly to all employees; and 
c) is not biased against any employee or group. 
Section 8 of the EEA aims to prevent the psychometric testing of employees which is 
discriminatory and unjust in nature. According to Grogan, the prohibition on 
psychometric testing does not apply to all forms of pre – employment testing and 
would not, for example, prohibit tests designed to establish a person's knowledge of a 
specific area or field.922 
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The Health Professions Act923 (“HPA”) allows only registered psychologists924 to 
perform “psychological acts” which are defined in sections 37(2)(a)(c)(d) and (e) of 
the Act as being: 
a) The evaluation of behaviour or mental processes or personality adjustments or 
adjustments of individuals or groups of persons, through the interpretation of 
tests for the determination of intellectual abilities, aptitude, interests, 
personality make-up or personality functioning, and the diagnosis of 
personality and emotional functions and mental functioning deficiencies 
according to a recognised scientific system for the classification of mental 
deficiencies; 
b) The use of any method or practice aimed at aiding persons or groups of 
persons in the adjustment of personality, emotional or behavioural problems 
or at the promotion of positive personality change, growth and development, 
and the identification and evaluation of personality dynamics and personality 
functioning according to psychological scientific methods; 
c) The evaluation of emotional, behavioural and cognitive processes or 
adjustment of personality of individuals or groups of persons by the usage 
and interpretation of questionnaires, tests, projections or other techniques or 
any apparatus, whether of South African origin or imported, for the 
determination of intellectual abilities aptitude, personality make-up, 
personality functioning, pscyhophysiological functioning or psychopathology; 
d) The exercising of control over prescribed questionnaires or tests or prescribed 
techniques, apparatus or instruments for the determination of intellectual 
abilities, aptitude, personality make-up, personality functioning, 
pscyhophysiological functioning or psychopathology;  
e)  The development of and control over the development of intellectual abilities 
aptitude, personality make-up, personality functioning, pscyhophysiological 
functioning or psychopathology.925 
                                               
923Act 56 of 1974. 
924Section 56. The HPA not only regulates the use of psychological tests by psychologists but also the 
use of such tests by psychometrists and psychotechicians amongst others in for example assisting 
speech and occupational therapy patients. 
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Because this definition of psychological tests is couched in such wide terms it may be 
argued that it includes the use of psychometric tests in the employment context. This 
means that an employer wishing to administer psychometric tests would have to 
employ the services of a trained psychologist to do so on its behalf.926 The 
Professional Board of Psychology on the Classification of Psychometric Measuring 
Devices, Instruments, Methods and Techniques provides in its policy that use of a 
psychometric instrument, or any instrument “that assesses intellectual or cognitive 
ability of functioning, aptitude, interest, personality make-up or personality 
functioning”, amounts to a psychological act.927 The policy further requires that before 
a psychometric instrument may be used in the workplace an employer should assure 
itself of that instrument’s validity, reliability and fairness. Scientific proof of this must 
be provided to the employer by the person making use of the psychometric instrument 
(i.e. the psychometric test).928 
The Psychometrics Committee, as mandated by the Professional Board for 
Psychology, further regulates the use of psychometric tests.929 The Committee is not 
only responsible for the classification of psychological tests but is also responsible for 
the accreditation of tests. It also endeavours to inform the public of any danger 
associated with the use or misuse of tests, questionnaires, techniques, apparatus or 
instruments.930 What this all means is that there is a statutory duty on South African 
employers making use of psychological tests to ensure a number of things: first, that 
the test has been classified as valid and reliable by the Psychometrics Committee; 
second, that the test has been accredited and certified by the Board; third, to ensure 
that the tests and persons administering the tests meet the requirements of the HPA; 
                                               
926Paterson and Uys “Critical Issues in Psychological Test Use in the South African Workplace” (2005) 
31 (3) SA Tydskrif vir Bedrysfsielkunde 12 – 22. 
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929Christianson “The Testing of Employee: The Selective Prohibition of Medical, Psychological and 
Other Testing in terms of the Employment Equity Act” (1999) Vol. 9 Contemporary Labour Law 11 
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930Christianson “The Testing of Employee: The Selective Prohibition of Medical, Psychological and 
Other Testing in terms of the Employment Equity Act” (1999) Vol. 9 Contemporary Labour Law 11 
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fourth, that the test can be applied fairly to all employees; and fifth, that the test is not 
biased against any employee or group.931 
6.3.1.2 Case Law 
There are no clear judicial guidelines about the principles applicable to the use of 
psychometric tests in the employment context. However, a handful of decisions have 
addressed the use of these tests in employment. Psychometric testing as a precondition 
for applicants for the position of team leader at a leading brewery came before the 
CCMA in X and SA Breweries Ltd.932 The employee alleged that the employer’s 
failure to promote the employee amounted to an unfair labour practice (in terms of 
section 186(2)(a) of the Labour Relations Act933 (“LRA”). The employee had been 
required to meet five criteria for the position of team leader, which included 
psychometric testing. The employee managed to meet only four of the five criteria. 
The results of his psychometric test came back as “not recommended” and, on this 
basis, the employee was not appointed to the position concerned. The employee 
contended that he met the criteria for team leader because he possessed the necessary 
qualifications and had acted in the position for some time. The employer argued that 
the tests were administered as part of company policy pertaining to promotions. The 
employer further argued that the tests were designed by experts and administered by 
independent psychologists for a valid business purpose. The arbitrator, in analysing 
the evidence and arguments, found that the decision by the employer to use 
psychometric testing along with other criteria amounted to a sound business decision.  
The employer in FAWU & Others v SA Breweries Ltd934 had used a general adult 
education test (“ABET”) for purposes of determining the suitability of its employees 
for posts in a new operation and to retrench those who did not do well in the test. The 
Court found that the use of ABET constituted an unfair basis for selecting employees 
for retrenchment because it was not workplace specific and did not in actual fact test 
whether employees who had years of practical experience in the old operation could 
adequately perform in the new operation. The Court was also critical of ABET for 
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 Christianson “The Testing of Employee: The Selective Prohibition of Medical, Psychological and 
Other Testing in terms of the Employment Equity Act” (1999) Vol. 9 Contemporary Labour Law 11 
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 Act  66 of 1995 
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being too generalised and for having a negative impact on older black employees who 
were products of an inferior education. The Court further held that pre – employment 
tests would be acceptable only if the employer showed the tests were “professionally 
proven, predictive or significantly correlated with important elements of work 
behaviour which compromise or are relevant to the job or jobs” in respect of which 
employees were evaluated.935 
6.3.2 United Kingdom 
The Employment Practices Code recognises that employers may need to administer 
psychological tests on applicants during recruitment and selection, but does not 
provide guidelines on how selection testing (such as psychological testing) should be 
undertaken by employers.936 It is unclear to what extent psychometric testing is carried 
out in the United Kingdom by employers, but it appears from the literature that it is 
firmly established in certain workplaces.937 Employers use the tests for, amongst other 
things, recruitment and selection, job profiling and team building purposes.938 
6.3.2.1 Legislation 
There is no legislation directly regulating the use of psychometric or psychological 
tests in workplaces in the United Kingdom. Notwithstanding the fact that the 
Employment Practices Code does not provide employers with detailed guidelines on 
how to carry out psychometric testing in the workplace, it does  remind employers 
that such testing must comply with the data protection principles of the DPA (this Act 
was discussed earlier in the chapter in the context of background checks). The DPA 
requires such testing not to be discriminatory in nature and to be lawful and fair.939 As 
such, the DPA requirements are similar to the requirements of section 8 of South 
Africa’s EEA. This means that employers in the United Kingdom, like their South 
African counterparts, will have to ensure that the psychometrics tests that they use in 
the workplace are scientifically valid and reliable, can be applied fairly and in a non – 
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discriminatory manner to all employees and are not biased against any employee or 
group. 
The results of psychological tests may qualify as sensitive personal information in 
terms of section 2 of the DPA, particularly where the tests comprise of questions 
which promise to reveal information about an individual’s political opinions, religious 
beliefs and sexual life. As previously indicated, the DPA does not prohibit the 
processing of personal sensitive data, but limits the processing of such data to 
instances where employers are required to process the data in order to exercise or 
perform a legal right or obligation. 
Section 12 of the DPA deals with the situation where an employment decision is taken 
by the employer solely on the basis of the results of a psychological test to be taken by 
applicants. Employers are mandated to inform applicants that the results of the 
psychological test shall constitute the sole basis of the employment decision.940  
Applicants are afforded a number of rights. First, applicants have a right to make 
representations which must be considered before a final decision is taken. Secondly, 
applicants have a right to request the employer to explain the rationale behind the 
decision it took.941 Thirdly, applicants have a right to request the employer to 
reconsider its decision on a different basis, particularly where applicants have been 
rejected or treated differently from other applicants.942 Applicants are not allowed to 
exercise these rights if the results of the psychological test constitute one of a number 
of factors considered by the employer in taking the employment decision.943 More 
importantly, the Employment Practices Code advises employers to ensure that 
psychological tests are administered and their results interpreted only by qualified 
persons or persons with appropriate training.944 
At policy level, professional bodies such as the British Psychology Society (“BPS”) 
has also tried to develop an industry standard and to provide best practice guidelines 
on the use of psychometrics in the workplace, aimed at assuring quality, fairness and 
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ethics in the use of these tests.945 In this regard, for instance, an employer who is 
interested in carrying out psychometric testing in his or her workplace may consult the 
BPS's directory of Chartered Psychologists to gain independent advice from a BPS 
registered psychologist about the use of such testing.946 
6.3.2.2 Case Law 
There appears to be few reported cases directly addressing the issues of psychological 
testing and privacy in the employment context. However, the issue of psychometric 
testing or assessments in the context of discrimination has been considered by United 
Kingdom tribunals and the European Commission. 
The Employment Appeal Tribunal decision in Teva (United Kingdom) V 
Goubatcher947 concerned a race discrimination claim brought against an employer 
after the employee was not promoted to the position of deputy team leader. The 
employer had chosen to appoint a candidate who had scored 2 more marks more at the 
interview and 3 marks more in written tests than the employee. The Employment 
Tribunal reasoned that an adverse inference could be drawn from the employer's 
conduct as it had failed to provide adequate and satisfactory reasons for its decision to 
prefer another candidate over the employee. The Employment Tribunal concluded that 
the employer had discriminated against the employee on racial grounds. The 
Employment Appeal Tribunal took the Employment Tribunal to task for a number of 
reasons: first, for not explaining how its factual findings had led to its conclusions 
(particularly how it arrived at the conclusion that the employer's reasons for failing to 
appoint the employee were racially motivated); secondly, for approaching the issue of 
the burden of proof erroneously because it had negated to explain why the difference 
in the scores between the successful candidate and the employee was not treated as a 
decisive factor against a finding of discrimination; and thirdly, for mistakenly 
assuming that an unsatisfactory explanation on the part of the employer translated into 
a presumption of racial discrimination. 
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The applicant in the European decision of Neophytos Neophytou v Commission of the 
European Communities948 had applied for the position of administrative assistant. 
Candidates for the position were required to undergo 3 pre - selection tests, 2 written 
tests and an oral test. In order to be admitted to the written tests, candidates  had to 
obtain a pass mark in respect of each of the pre – selection tests (which were in 
written form) and only candidates who obtained the highest marks for the written and 
oral tests were included on the shortlist. The applicant in question contended that the 
selection criteria applied to him was unjustifiably different to those applied to the 
other candidates. The applicant based  his contention on a number of arguments, 
which included that the competition notice had stated that candidates who obtained 
the highest marks in all written and oral tests (including the pre - selection tests) 
would be on the shortlist (and not only  candidates with  the highest marks for the 
written and oral tests only). The Civil Service Tribunal dismissed his claim and found 
that an appointing authority had the discretion to require candidates to undergo pre – 
selection test for purposes of identifying candidates who qualified for the written and 
oral tests, which would determine the suitable candidate for the position. 
Although the decision did not delve into whether or not  use of the tests was 
discriminatory, the decision nonetheless appears to suggest that employers have a 
fairly unfettered discretion to use psychometric testing to shortlist candidates or to 
identify which candidates qualify for the written and oral tests which will finally 
determine who should be employed.  
6.3.3 United States 
Personality or psychological tests were first used by the United States military in both 
World Wars to identify soldiers who were likely to ‘freeze’ or experience shell shock 
in battle.949 The tests were subsequently developed for use by employers in the 
employment context. According to the United States Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (“EEOC”) a number of United States employers use psychometric tests 
which assess, amongst other things, reasoning, perceptual speed and accuracy, 
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memory, reading comprehension and arithmetic skills.950 For instance, in EEOC v 
Ford Motor Co. and United Automobile Workers of America951 the use of a written 
test for skilled trades apprentice positions in Ford Motor Company came under 
scrutiny. In this case a nationwide class action was instituted on behalf of African 
Americans who were rejected for apprentice positions at Ford Motor Company after 
taking the test. The test used in this case is known as the Apprenticeship Training 
Selection System and is a cognitive test that seeks to evaluate mechanical aptitude by 
measuring verbal, numerical, and spatial reasoning.  
The EEOC rightly cautions that although the use of these tests can be effective in 
determining which employees are qualified for a position, their use may violate anti - 
discrimination legislation. This is particularly so where an employer uses tests which 
intentionally or unintentionally (in their effect) discriminates on the grounds of race, 
colour, religion, sex and national origin and thus violates Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act952 (“Title VII”).953 Notably in this regard, is that the use of psychological testing in 
the United States played a significant role in the development of the notion of indirect 
discrimination (also called the “disparate impact model” of discrimination endorsed in 
Griggs v Duke Power Co954. For instance, the applicants in EEOC v Ford Motor Co. 
and United Automobile Workers of America (mentioned above) contended that, 
although the ATSS had been validated over a decade before the action was instituted, 
statistics indicated that it had a significant disparate impact in excluding African 
American applicants. A settlement was reached between the parties as Ford agreed to 
replace the ATSS with a less discriminatory employment selection procedure and to 
pay $8.55 million in monetary relief. 955 
6.3.3.1 Legislation 
The use of personality tests increased markedly after the enactment of the Employee 
Polygraph Testing Act956 (“EPPA”).957 The EPPA restricts the use of polygraph tests 
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in the employment context958 and was enacted in response to complaints and evidence 
of the abuse of such tests by employers in the private sector. As such, the EPPA 
specifically prohibits the use of polygraph tests and similar devices by private sector 
employers.959 The legislative history of the Act indicates honesty tests are not covered 
by the Act’s prohibition. To be precise, the Act expressly excludes honesty tests in its 
definition of the term “lie detector”. 960 
Title VII permits psychometric or psychological tests (and other forms of employment 
tests such as physical ability tests, sample job tests and medical tests) provided such 
tests are not designed, intended or implemented to discriminate on the grounds of 
race, colour, religion, sex or national origin.961 Title VII further prohibits employers, 
from adjusting the scores of, using different cut-off scores for, or otherwise altering 
the results of, employment related tests, including psychometric tests, on the basis of 
race, colour, religion, sex, or national origin.962 
Both disparate treatment (direct) and disparate impact (indirect) discrimination are 
prohibited under Title VII in relation to the use of the tests.963 Disparate treatment 
discrimination refers to intentional discrimination based on race, colour, religion, sex 
and national origin. An employer is prohibited from, for example, requiring only its' 
black employees from undergoing a psychometric test aimed at assessing their reading 
comprehension and not requiring its' white employees to undergo a similar test.964 
Disparate impact discrimination, on the other hand, refers to discrimination which 
appears neutral but has the effect of disproportionately excluding persons based on 
race, colour, religion, sex and national origin. This would involve the use of 
psychometric tests which have such an effect and are not job related and inconsistent 
with business necessity.965 The disparate impact model of discrimination recognises 
that although certain employment practices and policies are implemented without the 
                                                                                                                                      
957
 Stabile “The Use of Personality Tests as a Hiring Tool: Is the Benefit Worth the Cost?” (2002) 4 
University of Pennsylvania Journal of Labour & Employment Law 279 282. 
958
 § 2002 (1) – (4). 
959
 § 2002 (1) – (4). 
960Hebert Employment Privacy Law (2009) § 7:10. 
96142 U.S.C. § 2000e -2(h). 
96242 U.S.C. § 2000e -2(l). 
963SEC. 2000e – 2(a) and (e) and SEC. 2000e – 2(j). 
964SEC. 2000e – 2(h).http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/factemployment_procedures.html (2009-05-23). 
965http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/factemployment_procedures.html (2009-05-23). 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
189 
 
intention of discriminating against anyone or a group, their effect or impact is to 
exclude certain individuals or groups “disproportionately in comparison with other 
privileged groups”.966 It is however important to bear in mind that Title VII expressly 
excludes all state owned entities from the ambit of the Act.967 
The Americans with Disabilities Act 968 (“ADA”) prohibits the discrimination against 
employees by both public and private sector employers on the basis of disability. 
Provisions of the ADA further restrict the medical examination of employees and job 
applicants.969 Of particular importance, the ADA’s restrictions apply to any employee 
and job applicant (not just disabled employees and applicants).970 As such, the ADA 
may have implications for the use of psychological testing by employers if 
psychological tests qualify as “medical examinations” in terms of the Act. That said, 
the Act and its regulations offer no definition for the term “medical examinations”. 
The Act does, however, define the term “disability” to include psychological disorders 
and as such courts may consider a psychological examination administered, with the 
purpose of determining the suitability of an individual for a position, to be a medical 
examination. 971 
On the contrary, it is also possible that courts may not consider psychological testing 
administered for the sole purpose of identifying individuals with undesirable 
personality traits to constitute medical examinations covered by the ADA. This is so, 
particularly in light of The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) 
Enforcement Guidance on Pre – Employment Inquiries under Americans with 
Disability Act of 1995. The EEOC’s enforcement guidance excludes these tests from 
the definition of “medical examination”. The enforcement guidance suggests 
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psychological tests administered for the purpose of ascertaining an individual’s 
general psychological health or the presence of a mental disorder or impairment are 
“medical examinations” within the scope of the ADA, whereas psychological tests 
administered for the purpose of ascertaining personality traits such as honesty, 
preferences and habits fall outside the definition of “medical examinations” as defined 
in the Act972.973 
In addition to the abovementioned federal legislation, several states have enacted their 
own statutes regulating psychological and honesty testing. The majority of state 
legislation does not prohibit employers entirely from requiring employees to submit to 
psychological tests. The legislation instead restricts the manner in which employer 
may use psychological testing.974 To illustrate, Alaska prohibits state employers from 
requiring employees to submit to psychological testing that is structured in such a way 
as to elicit information unrelated to  employment requirements, namely, information 
that is related to an individual’s sexuality or an individual's  religious beliefs or 
practices, or political affiliation.975 California expressly prohibits both public and 
private sector employers from requiring an applicant to submit to a psychological 
examination before a conditional offer of employment is made.976 Other states such as 
New York and Pennsylvania require the psychological testing of employees in 
specified positions or occupations. The New York statute, for example, requires that 
applicants for positions as correctional officers be subjected to at least three 
psychological instruments.977 Pennsylvania, on the other hand, requires candidates for 
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lethal weapons training to be subjected to psychological testing for purposes of 
excluding individuals that are mentally unfit or unstable.978 
6.3.3.2 Case Law 
Griggs v Duke Power Co979 concerned a group of black employees who brought a 
class action against an employment practice implemented by their employer, Duke 
Power Company (“DPC”). The employer required a high school education or the 
passing of standardised general intelligence tests (i.e. psychometric tests) as a 
condition of employment in or for the transfer between jobs. The two tests that 
employees were required to pass were the Wonderlic Personnel Test, which purports 
to measure general intelligence, as well as the Bennett Mechanical Comprehension 
Test,980 which purports to measure mechanical aptitude.981 The employees in Griggs v 
Duke Power Co alleged that the practice was a violation of Title VII. At issue was 
whether an employer was prohibited by the Civil Rights Act from requiring a high 
school education or the passing of  general standardised intelligence and aptitude tests 
as a condition of employment in or transfer to jobs where: 
1. neither standard is shown to be significantly related to successful job 
performance; 
2. both requirements operate to disqualify black employees at a substantially 
higher rate than their white counterparts; and 
3. the jobs in question formerly had been filled only by white employees as part 
of a longstanding practice of giving preferences to whites.982 
The District Court found that although the employer had, prior to the enactment of the 
Civil Rights Act, implemented a policy which openly discriminated on the basis of 
race in the employment and assignment of its employees, the policy had now ceased. 
The District Court also found that because the Civil Rights Act was forward looking 
in nature, the impact of prior inequalities was beyond its reproach.983 The District 
Court concluded that there was no racial motive or purpose underlying the adoption of 
the requirements of a high school diploma and the passing of the tests and, in any 
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case, these requirements had been applied fairly to both black and white employees 
alike.984 
The Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court in finding that in the absence of a 
discriminatory purpose, the requirement of a high school education or the passing of 
standardised general intelligence tests as a condition of employment in or transfer of 
jobs was permitted by the Civil Rights Act. It further rejected the claim that because 
these requirements operated to exclude a markedly disproportionate number of black 
employees, they were unlawful under the Civil Rights Act unless it could be shown 
that they were job related.985 In other words, the employer had adopted the 
requirements of a high school diploma and the passing of standard intelligence tests 
without the intention to discriminate against black people. 
Ultimately, the United States Supreme Court pointed out the object of Title VII was to 
achieve equality in employment opportunities for all races and to remove employment 
barriers which had the effect, in the past, of favouring white employees over other 
employees. As such, employment practices and procedures or tests which appear 
neutral on their face or in terms of their intent had to be eradicated because they 
perpetuated discriminatory employment practices and policies.986 The United States 
Supreme Court agreed that DPC’s intent may not have been to discriminate against 
blacks “but good intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem 
employment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as “built – in headwinds” 
for minority groups and are unrelated to measuring job capability”.987 The Supreme 
Court held this after it determined that neither requirement was job related because the 
evidence showed that employees who had not met either requirement continued to 
perform satisfactorily in their jobs.988 
In Mckenna v Fargo989 applicants for the position of fire fighter were required, in 
terms of a New Jersey statute, to undergo psychological testing for the purpose of 
selecting applicants likely to withstand the psychological pressures of fighting fires 
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and living in close quarters. The applicants led evidence indicating the psychological 
tests they were required to undergo consisted of questions which inquired into 
“religious beliefs, political opinions, reading habits, sexual preferences, social beliefs, 
familial relationships”. The applicants argued that the tests violated their 
constitutional right to privacy. The Court observed that the “degree and character of 
disclosure” required by the personality tests amounted to an intrusion on the privacy 
interest in non-disclosure of personal information:  
“The evaluation looks deeply into an applicant’s personality …fire 
fighter candidates are called upon to reveal the essence of their 
experience of life, the collective stream of thoughts and feelings that 
arise from the ongoing dialogue which individuals carry on between 
the world and themselves in the privacy of their being. It involves a 
loss of the power individuals treasure to reveal or conceal their 
personality or their emotions as they see fit, from intimacy to 
solitude”.990 
In balancing the  interest of the employer in promoting an efficient fire department 
and the applicants’ interest in preserving aspects of their personality, the Court 
concluded that the employer not only had a compelling interest in promoting an 
efficient fire department, but also in its psychological evaluation and hiring 
procedure: 
“… the psychological evaluation and hiring procedure taken as a whole 
is useful in identifying applicants whose emotional make – up makes 
them high risk candidates for the job of fire fighting. Because fire 
fighting, like police work, involves life – endangering situations, the 
State interest is of the highest order…a fireman who loses emotional 
control endangers his own life as well as those of other firemen. While 
a psychological evaluation intrudes on an applicant’s privacy, it may 
save him from risk of losing his life. The life of a community, as well, 
depends, at the most basic level, on whose job it is to protect the 
community from physical forces, like fire, that have escaped from the 
control that makes them productive. Property, and security of the 
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community, as well as lives, are at stake in improving the fire 
department”.991 
In Redmond v City of Overland Park992, the plaintiff, a probationary police officer, 
alleged that the defendants (city, police officials and consulting psychologists and 
psychiatrists) violated her constitutional right to privacy in discussing and exchanging 
her personal information with one another. The Court established that because the 
plaintiff had signed a release permitting the psychiatrists to disclose her records to the 
police department she had no privacy interest in the psychiatrist’s or psychologists 
records. The Court further reasoned that the police officials had an interest in 
disclosing and obtaining information concerning the plaintiff as they had to ensure the 
plaintiff’s ability and fitness to serve as a police officer.993 Finally, the Court found 
that the city was justified in requiring the plaintiff to undergo psychological testing994 
as it also had an interest in ensuring the plaintiff was fit to serve as a police officer 
and this interest outweighed her “narrow” privacy interest in preventing the disclosure 
of the personal information.995 
The appellants in Soroka v Hudson996 were required to submit to a personality test for 
the position of store security officer for a large retail chain. The purpose of the test 
was to screen out emotionally unfit candidates and consisted of over 700 true or false 
questions, some of which related to religious attitudes and sexual orientation. The 
applicants argued that the questions posed in the test were not job related and violated 
their constitutional right to privacy. The court found that although the employer had 
an interest in employing emotionally stable persons for the position of store security 
officer, such an interest was not furthered by requiring applicants to respond to 
questions relating to religious attitudes and sexual orientation.997 
                                               
991
 1381. 
992
 672 F. Supp. 473. 
993
 483. 
994
 Supra. 
995
 484. 
996
 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 77. 
997
 86. 
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6.3.4 Analysis 
Employers argue that the use of psychological testing enables them to employ suitable 
employees. However, the tests infringe the privacy interests of test subjects because 
they may consist of questions which are highly personal and sensitive in nature. South 
Africa (as do the other jurisdictions under review) has discrimination legislation (the 
EEA) regulating the use of these tests in employment. However, the legislation 
primarily aims to protect applicants and employees against the biased use of these 
tests. In other words, the legislation does very little to protect the privacy interests of 
applicants and employees. In addition, South African courts have yet to deal with the 
issue of the privacy concerns raised by the use of the tests. The United Kingdom’s 
DPA directly restricts the use of the tests in employment and the Employment 
Practices Code and the Employment Practices Code Supplementary Guidance provide 
United Kingdom employers with detailed guidelines in using the tests. This, to some 
extent, addresses concerns about the protection of the privacy interests of applicants 
and employees. The United States experience shows that privacy in the current 
context can be protected through use of discrimination legislation or reliance on the 
constitutional protection of privacy. At the same time, it is clear that United States 
courts have been willing to uphold (highly invasive) testing of employees in safety 
sensitive positions. 
6.4 POLYGRAPH TESTING 
The polygraph relies mainly on a subject’s physiological reactions or changes in 
blood pressure, heart rate, pulse rate, respiration and perspiration to a set of questions 
to draw an inference on the subject’s truthfulness. There has been much debate as to 
whether the polygraph can produce empirically and scientifically reliable results.998 
                                               
998
 The US in its 1983 Office of Technology Assessment concluded that there was limited evidence for 
establishing the validity of polygraph testing. The assessment further concluded that polygraph 
accuracy may be affected by a series of factors including: the training, orientation and experience of 
the examiner, the examinee’s emotional stability and intelligence, the use of countermeasures and the 
examinee’s willingness to be tested. Finkin Privacy in Employment Law (2003) 117. Similar concerns 
regarding the reliability and accuracy of polygraph testing have been expressed by South African 
legal commentators. See for example Christianson “Polygraph Testing in South Africa Workplaces: 
Shield and Sword in the Dishonesty Detection versus Compromising Privacy Debate” (2000) 21 
Industrial Law Journal 17 and Tredoux and Pooley “Polygraph Based Testing of Deception and 
Truthfulness: An Evaluation and Commentary” (2001) 22 Industrial Law Journal 819. Tredoux and 
Pooley correctly point out that polygraphs do not measure the presence or absence of deception or 
lying (in fact there is no known instrument that directly records whether a subject is lying or 
deceptive) but merely measure a subject’s physiological activity. 
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This uncertainty about the validity and reliability of polygraph testing has to some 
extent filtered through to case law on the admissibility of the results of polygraph 
testing as evidence.  
6.4.1 South Africa 
In South Africa, the results of polygraph tests have, on occasion, been used as 
evidence against employees in disputes about unfair dismissal. Before Sosibo & 
Others v Ceramic Tile Market999 commissioners and arbitrators treated the issue of the 
admissibility of the evidence provided by polygraph tests inconsistently. On the one 
hand, some commissioners showed a reluctance to readily accept the admissibility of 
polygraph tests1000 while other commissioners accepted the admissibility of the tests, 
such as in SACCAWU obo Sydney Fongo v Pick ‘n’ Pay Supermarkets1001 (where the 
commissioner was prepared to accept that polygraph tests provide “96% of the truth”). 
South African tribunals have even gone so far as to construe an employee’s oral or 
written agreement to undergo a polygraph test as a waiver of that employee’s right to 
privacy.1002 As correctly observed by the commissioner at the time Sosibo & Others v 
Ceramic Tile Market1003 was decided, there is no clear approach to the admissibility of 
polygraph test results. There are instead divergent approaches to the admissibility of 
polygraph test results, summarised as follows: 
a) polygraph test evidence is unreliable and inadmissible and no adverse 
inference is to be drawn if an accused employee refuses to undergo such a 
test;1004 
                                               
999
 (2001) 22 ILJ 811 (CCMA). 
1000
 See Jacob v Unitrans Engineering(1999) KN21921(the commissioner stated that it would be 
absurd to assume that a man is guilty simply because he exercises a legitimate right to refuse to 
submit to a test or answer a questionnaire). See also Sosibo & Others v Ceramic Tile Market (2001) 
22 ILJ 811 (CCMA), Stern Jewellers and SACCAWU (1997) NP144 and Mahlangu v CIM Deltak 
(1986) 7 ILJ 346 (IC). 
1001
 (2000) FS 15555. 
1002
 In Mncube an employee had been dismissed on charges relating to theft, bribery, fraud, dishonesty, 
forgery and bringing the name of the employer into disrepute. In order to resolve the dispute the 
employee consented to a polygraph. The commissioner held that the applicant had consented to the 
polygraph test and consequently concerns about privacy and free will did not feature in the 
circumstances  
1003
 (2001) 22 ILJ 811 (CCMA). 
1004
 Kroutz v Distillers Corporation Ltd 1999 8 BLLR 912 (CCMA) and Jacob v Unitrans Engineering 
(1999) KN21921. 
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b) polygraph test evidence is not admissible if there is no evidence on the 
qualifications of the polygraphist and if the polygraphist is not called to give 
evidence;1005 
c) polygraph test evidence is admissible as expert evidence but cannot on its own 
prove an accused employee’s guilt. That is to say, polygraph tests alone 
cannot prove a person’s guilt without corroborative evidence to support the 
inference of guilt;1006 
d) polygraph test evidence may be taken into account where there is no other 
supporting evidence. 
6.4.1.1 Legislation 
Section 8 EEA prohibits psychological and similar assessments in employment unless 
the assessments are unbiased, scientifically valid and reliable and can be applied fairly 
to all employees. For polygraph tests to fall within the ambit of the EEA they have to 
be classified as psychological or similar assessments. Polygraph tests are clearly not 
psychological assessments as they measure a subject’s physiological reactions to draw 
an inference of truthfulness. It is further unlikely that a polygraph test can qualify as a 
“similar assessment”, again and in contrast to psychological or psychometric tests, 
because they do not measure personality traits. Moreover, because the scientific 
validity and reliability of polygraph testing remains a matter of debate, polygraph 
testing is likely to fall outside the provisions of the EEA.1007 
Christianson has argued that the use of polygraph testing in the South African 
workplace and the inconsistent way in which polygraph testing has been treated, 
warrant the enactment of legislation similar to that of the United States EPPA, 
designed to control the use of polygraphs by employers.1008 Legislation similar to the 
United States EPPA in South Africa would require that guidelines be created for 
                                               
1005Kleyhans v Tremac Industries 2001 5 BALR 469 (CCMA) and Stern Jewellers v SACCAWU (1997) 
NP 144. 
1006Metrorail v SATAWU obo Makhubela 2000 5 BALR 599 (IMSSA) ;Ndlovu v Chapelat Industries 
(Pty) Ltd 1999 8 BALR 996 (IMSSA) and Smith v Canoa Eastern Cape (2000) 12 BALR 1436 
(CCMA). 
1007Christianson “Polygraph Testing in South Africa Workplaces: Shield and Sword in the Dishonesty 
Detection versus Compromising Privacy Debate” (2000) 21 Industrial Law Journal 17 36. See also 
PETUSA obo Van Schalkwyk v National Trading Company (2000) 21 ILJ 2323 (CCMA). 
1008Christianson “Polygraph Testing in South Africa Workplaces: Shield and Sword in the Dishonesty 
Detection versus Compromising Privacy Debate” (2000) 21 Industrial Law Journal 17 36. See also 
PETUSA obo Van Schalkwyk v National Trading Company (2000) 21 ILJ 2323 (CCMA). 
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adjudicators pertaining to the admissibility, reliability and weight to be given to 
polygraph test results in an effort to create consistency and uniformity.1009 Despite a 
preference for the cautionary approach in Sosibo, some decisions have continued to 
make unequivocal pronouncements on the inadmissibility of polygraph test results 
and even to question the role of polygraphers as expert witnesses as nothing more 
than subjective opinion. In Steen v Wetherlys (Pty) Ltd1010  the commissioner held that: 
“[t]o date there is nothing either in the body of research or in the 
authority of any case law to convincingly suggest that polygraphers are 
in fact expert witnesses or that they are medically qualified to interpret 
the physiological responses of witnesses…In addition such evidence is 
inconclusive, and does no more than to indicate that the subject was in 
a heightened state of general emotional arousal. It does distinguish 
anxiety, stress/tension or indignation from guilt…The polygraphist is 
often a stranger and the test may be given in an unfamiliar 
environment. This alone may cause increased nervousness and 
physiological responses in the body. A further factor is the natural fear 
in the mind of the innocent that the tests results may not correctly 
reflect his innocence.”1011 
6.4.1.2 Case Law 
In Sosibo the commissioner found that a number of previous decisions approached the 
question of the admissibility of polygraph tests with caution and prudence. For 
                                               
1009
 Tredoux and Pooley “Polygraph Based Testing of Deception and Truthfulness: An Evaluation and 
Commentary” (2001) 22 Industrial Law Journal 819 839. Christianson on the other hand is of the 
view that legislation such as the EPPA would be unnecessary and undesirable in that it would accord 
too much significance to a technique that should be utilized as an occasional tool.  
Christianson “Truth, Lies and Polygraphs: Detecting dishonesty in the Workplace” (1998) 18 
Contemporary Labour Law 1 10. 
1010
 [2006] 2 BALR 222 (CCMA). 
1011
 227 A - C. The commissioner in Steen further questioned the role of polygraphers as expert 
witnesses: “In essence the research shows that polygraphers are deemed to be expert 
witnesses…while there is nothing to show that they are in fact expert witnesses. They may very well 
be self-appointed or self-acclaimed “experts’ in an industry that does not have objective standards 
against which results of the interpretation thereof can be tested…The polygraphist is able to conclude 
only two things – the results suggest “deception’ or “no deception’. The polygrapher thereafter 
guesses what the result means for he has no medical or pharmaceutical training or knowledge to assist 
him in his analysis of the result, and is simply not able to determine what effect any medication, 
mood swing or emotional state may have on the results recorded.” See also MEWUSA obo Mbonambi 
v S Bruce CC t/a Multi Media Signs [2005] 8 BALR 809 (MEIBC) where the arbitrator concluded an 
employee cannot be convicted on the strength of a polygraph test alone and additional circumstantial 
evidence was needed to justify admission and acceptance of the polygraph test results. 
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instance, in Mahlangu v CIM Deltak1012 the court concluded that voice analysis tests 
conducted by persons not registered as psychologists were unscientific, unreliable and 
illegal. In Mncube v Cash Paymaster Services (Pty) Ltd1013 it was accepted that the 
polygraphist who conducted the test was qualified but the question was raised whether 
the evidence was reliable. The commissioner in Sosibo further observed that there was 
no clear approach as to the admissibility of polygraph test results. There were instead 
divergent approaches to the admissibility of polygraph test results, already referred to 
above. In Sosibo it was also observed that generally tribunals take a cautionary 
approach to the reliability of polygraph evidence, in that polygraph tests alone cannot 
prove a person’s guilt without corroborative evidence to support the inference of guilt. 
It was furthermore noted that such a cautionary approach is also followed in foreign 
jurisdictions such as the United States. In Sosibo 3 reasons (as they related to the facts 
in issue) were identified as justification for such an approach:  
a) The person administering the tests, while an expert in the polygraph field, was 
neither a qualified doctor nor psychologist;  
b) The tests were simply an indicator of deception and could not give details on 
the extent of the misconduct; 
c) The sole reliance on the polygraph results was insufficient to discharge the 
onus on the employer in terms of s192 of the Labour Relations Act of 1995 to 
prove the dismissal was fair. 1014 
6.4.2 United Kingdom 
Polygraph testing in the United Kingdom has been mostly used in criminal 
investigations and much of the published research on polygraph testing concerns the 
use of these tests in criminal investigations. The British Psychological Society 
(“BPS”) defines a polygraph as “a set of equipment that accurately measures various 
sorts of [mental] and bodily activity such as heart rate, blood pressure, respiration, and 
palmar sweating”.1015 The BPS, in its Working Party Report1016 strongly questioned 
the reliability and accuracy of polygraph testing and found that published reports on 
                                               
1012
 (1986) 7 ILJ 346 (IC). 
1013
 (1997) 5 BLLR 639. 
1014
 (2001) 22 ILJ 811 (CCMA) 522 - 523. 
1015
 The British Psychological Society A Review of the Current Scientific Status and Fields of 
Application of Polygraphic Detection Working Party Final Report (6 October 2004). 
1016
 The British Psychological Society A Review of the Current Scientific Status and Fields of 
Application of Polygraphic Detection Working Party Final Report (6 October 2004).  
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the use of polygraph testing in the employment context pointed to its ineffectiveness 
in identifying employees who are likely to engage in counter - productive behaviour 
or criminal activity in the workplace.1017 As such, polygraph testing may not meet the 
DPA requirement that data be processed fairly and lawfully, because its scientific 
validity and reliability is questionable.1018 
6.4.2.1 Legislation 
As indicated in the earlier discussion of both background checks and psychometric 
testing, the DPA regulates the processing of personal and sensitive data.1019 It was 
also pointed out that the DPA does not prevent employers from processing sensitive 
data, but limits the circumstances under which such data can be processed. The use of 
polygraph tests entails the processing of personal and sensitive data by an employer, 
because these tests give information to employers about the commission of an offence 
by an employee or information that is to form part and parcel of the proceedings to 
determine whether any offence has been committed. This of course, is said on the 
assumption that the polygraph test is used to determine whether an employee 
committed a specific offence against the employer. United Kingdom employers 
making use of polygraph testing will have to observe the DPA requirements in 
relation to the processing of personal and sensitive data. In this regard, the DPA 
requires an employer to obtain the explicit and unequivocal consent of an employee 
before subjecting an employee to a polygraph test, failing which the use of the 
polygraph in such an instance will be unfair and unlawful. The DPA would also 
require the employer to notify an employee of all intended purposes of the results 
which the polygraph test will produce, even where the intended purpose appears 
obvious. Notably, the Employment Practices Code does not provide employers with 
detailed guidelines on using polygraph tests in the workplace. This could be due, as 
                                               
1017
 According to the authors Grubin and Madsen the report came about after the BPS assembled a 
working group to investigate the reliability, validity and ethical concerns associated with the use of 
the polygraph in the employment vetting process and in criminal investigations. Grubin and Madsen 
“Lie Detection and the Polygraph: A Historical Review” 2005 16 (2) The Journal of Forensic 
Psychiatry & Psychology 357 – 369, 365. 
1018
 Supra. 
1019
 Notably, the Court of Appeal in Durant v Financial Services Authority [2003] EWCA Civ 1746 
clarified what was meant by “personal information”. The court explained that personal data was not 
merely information bearing or mentioning an individual’s name but information that has affected the 
data subject’s privacy. The Court further explained the question of whether information is personal 
data depends on the ambit of such information in a “continuum of relevance and proximity to the data 
subject”.  
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already mentioned, to reigning doubt about the reliability and accuracy of polygraph 
testing in the employment context. 
6.4.2.2 Case Law 
According to Grubin and Madsen, and unlike the position in the United States, the use 
of polygraph tests in the United Kingdom has generally not been pronounced. This is 
evidenced by the fact that there exists very little case law concerning the use of 
polygraph testing by United Kingdom employers.1020 
That being said, and although  there is little case law on the use of the polygraph in 
the United Kingdom employment context, the issue of polygraph testing in the context 
of  Article 8 (regulating privacy) of the European Convention on Human 
Rights1021(“ECHR”) was considered in the decision of R. (on the application of C) v 
Ministry of Justice1022. The complainant in this matter sought to quash a condition 
imposed on him on his release from prison, namely, that he submit to polygraph 
testing. The complainant had been convicted of two counts of rape and indecent 
assault (one of his victims was his minor daughter). The condition provided that the 
complainant had “[t]o comply with any instructions given by [his] supervising officer 
requiring [him] to attend for a polygraph session, to participate in polygraph sessions 
and examinations as instructed by or under the authority of [his] supervising officer 
and to comply with any instructions given to [him] during a polygraph session by the 
person conducting the polygraph session…”. The condition was imposed in terms of 
the Offender Management Act1023, which provides that an offender manager may in 
appropriate circumstances impose the polygraph condition. In this case, the offender 
manager had considered the seriousness of the offences and the unreliability of the 
complainant in initially admitting the offences and later denying them, as well as a 
general concern that the complainant will be loathe to voluntarily disclosing 
information during his supervision. The complainant argued that the polygraph 
condition was contrary to his rights in Article 8 of the ECHR. The complaint was 
dismissed by the Court. First, the Court agreed that the imposition of the condition 
engaged Article 8 and involved a serious intrusion upon the complainant's private life, 
                                               
1020
 Grubin and Madsen “Lie Detection and the Polygraph: A Historical Review” 2005 16 (2) The 
Journal of Forensic Psychiatry & Psychology 357 – 369, 365. 
1021
 Drafted by the Council of Europe in 1950 and came into force on 3 September 1953. 
1022
 [2010] H.R.L.R 3, [2009] EWHC 2671 (Admin). 
1023
 Act of 2007. 
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but found the intrusion to be justified as part of a comprehensive arrangement for the 
supervision and rehabilitation of offenders who had committed very serious sexual 
offences. The Court further found that, given the seriousness of the original offences 
committed by the complainant, his conduct and his attitude towards his convictions, it 
was not disproportionate for him to be subjected to the polygraph condition. This 
decision shows that there is a close link between polygraph testing and privacy 
concerns, but that, under appropriate circumstances; justification for testing outweighs 
these privacy concerns. 
6.4.3 United States 
Polygraph testing in the United States is regulated by the Employee Polygraph 
Testing Act1024 (“EPPA”) and varied state legislation. The EPPA was enacted in 
response to concerns about the abuse of polygraph tests in private sector employment 
and the validity and reliability of the tests. The Act prohibits most private employers 
from using polygraph tests before or during employment but allows for employers to 
request an employee to take a polygraph in connection with an on-going investigation 
if there is reasonable suspicion that the employee was involved in the incident; and 
then only if an employer provides the employee with a written statement describing 
the basis of the reasonable suspicion.1025 It is important to bear in mind that the EPPA 
regulates the use of polygraph testing in the private sector and not the public sector.1026 
6.4.3.1 Legislation 
The EEPA prohibits private sector employers from “directly or indirectly” “requiring, 
suggesting, or causing” an employee or applicant to submit to a polygraph test.1027 
Courts have chosen to construe this aspect of the prohibition strictly to mean that an 
employer may not request or even suggest an employee voluntarily submit to a 
polygraph test.1028 In addition, courts have noted that an employee’s request to take a 
polygraph test in an effort to exonerate himself or herself, for example, does not 
constitute a waiver of the employee’s rights.1029 Furthermore, an employer may not 
“indirectly” require an employee to submit to a polygraph test by using other entities 
                                               
1024
 Act of 1998. 
1025
 § 2002 (1) – (4). 
1026
 § 2006. 
1027
 § 2002 (1) – (4). 
1028
 Polkey v Transtecs 404 F. 3d 1264 (2005). 
1029
 Blackwell v 53rd – Ellis Currency Exchange 852 F. Supp. 646. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
203 
 
to make the request or suggestion. The EPPA further prohibits an employer from 
“using or asking about the results of polygraph tests taken by individuals” and “from 
discharging, disciplining, discriminating or taking adverse action” against an 
employee or applicant on the basis of polygraph test results.1030 This prohibition has 
been read to mean that an employer may not take or threaten to take adverse action 
against an employee or applicant based on the results of the test1031.1032 
Courts have, despite the EPPA’s prohibitions, upheld a private sector employer’s 
decision to submit its employees to polygraph testing, particularly those employees in 
safety and security sensitive positions. In Stehney v Perry1033, for example, the court 
upheld the polygraph testing of an employee in the private sector because she 
performed safety sensitive research for a federal agency charged with national 
security. The matter concerned an employee of a private non-profit body who 
performed sensitive research in cryptography for the federal National Security 
Agency (“NSA”). The employee was dismissed after losing her security clearance and 
declining to submit to a periodic polygraph test authorised by the NSA. The court 
found that the NSA’s interest in using polygraphs to conduct national security 
background checks outweighed the employee’s privacy interests. 
The EEPA does not disallow government, state and local government entities from 
requiring the polygraph testing of individuals.1034 For this reason, public employers 
may require or suggest that employees and applicants submit to polygraph testing. 
Nonetheless, courts may afford protection to public sector employees required to 
undergo polygraph testing, if the employee can establish the questions he or she was 
expected to respond to not only fell within the protected zone of privacy, but were 
also unrelated to an applicant’s ability to perform in a particular position. The 
applicant in Thorne v City of El Segundo1035, for example, was required to undergo 
polygraph testing on application for the position of police officer. The Court found the 
testing had violated her constitutional right to privacy because the employee had been 
                                               
1030
 § 2002 (1) – (4). 
1031
 Lyles v Flagship Resort Development 371 F. Supp 2d 597 (2005). 
1032
 Hebert Employment Privacy Law (2009) § 6: 12. 
1033
 101 F. 3d 925 (3d Cir. 1996). 
1034
 § 2006. 
1035
 726 F. 2d 459 (1983). 
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asked a large number of questions regarding her sexual life and past sexual 
relationships. 
The EPPA further permits federal government to require  polygraph testing of experts, 
consultants, or employees of contractors with government agencies concerned with 
national security, intelligence and counter intelligence such as the National Security 
Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Central Intelligence Agency and the 
Departments of Energy and Defence.1036 
The Act provides private sector employers with the “ongoing investigation” 
exemption from its requirements. The exemption allows employers to require 
employees to submit to polygraph tests “in connection with an ongoing investigation 
involving economic loss or injury to the employer’s business such as theft, 
embezzlement, misappropriation, or an act of unlawful industrial espionage or 
sabotage”.1037 The EPPA further exempts certain private employers, namely 
employers offering security services and drug security (that is manufacturing, 
distributing or dispensing controlled substances) except where the results of the 
polygraph or the refusal to take a polygraph test constitutes the sole basis for acting 
against an employee or applicant.1038 
The use of polygraph testing in employment is further regulated by state legislation. 
Broadly, state legislation may directly or indirectly regulate the use of polygraphs in 
employment.1039 States such as Connecticut directly regulate the use of polygraphs in 
employment by prohibiting both private and public sector employers from requesting 
or requiring an employee or applicant to submit to polygraph testing. The Connecticut 
statute further prohibits employers from relying on the results of a polygraph test or 
an employee’s refusal to take a polygraph tests in taking adverse employment action. 
The statute only permits the use of polygraph testing with respect to the employment 
of non-civilian employees of the police and correctional department.1040 Iowa’s statute 
does not prohibit all polygraph testing in employment but merely prohibits private and 
public sector employers from requesting or requiring an employee or applicant to 
                                               
1036
 Hebert Employment Privacy Law (2009) § 6: 12. 
1037
 § 2002 (1) – (4). 
1038
 Hebert Employment Privacy Law (2009) § 6:21. 
1039
 Supra. 
1040Hebert Employment Privacy Law (2009) § 6:27. 
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submit to a polygraph test as a condition of continuing employment or of 
employment.1041 Other states, like Alabama, only regulate the licensing of polygraph 
examiners and the instrument used in conducting a polygraph test, but do not regulate 
or circumscribe the circumstances under which the polygraph testing can be 
conducted.1042 States indirectly regulating the use of polygraph testing in employment 
place a restriction on the nature of questions an employee or applicant may be asked 
during the testing by for instance, prohibiting questions on an individual’s private life 
which are in no way related to the position sought by the individual.1043 
Title VII may be violated under the disparate treatment theory if an employer uses 
polygraph tests in a discriminatory manner or to discriminate against minority 
employee or applicants.1044 The issue of whether being required to undergo polygraph 
testing amounts to “materially adverse” employment action under Title VII came 
before the Court in Alford v South Carolina Department of Corrections.1045 The 
employee in Alford contended the employer had required him to undergo polygraph 
testing in retaliation for a racial discrimination claim he had made. The Court held 
that the requirement did not constitute a materially adverse employment action 
because it was unlikely to affect a reasonable person’s decision to make a racial 
discrimination claim.1046 
Even though the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 do not directly regulate the 
use of polygraphs, the Act does restrict employers from enquiring about physical 
disabilities. According to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s 
Enforcement (“EEOC”) on Pre – employment Inquiries Under the American with 
Disabilities Act, polygraph tests are excluded from the Act’s definition of “medical 
examinations”.1047 The enforcement guidance prohibits employers from making 
enquiries (prior to administering a polygraph test) related to the existence of factors 
that might adversely affect the results of the test1048 By, for example, enquiring about 
                                               
1041Hebert Employment Privacy Law (2009) § 6:35. 
1042Hebert Employment Privacy Law (2009) § 6:22. 
1043
 Hebert Employment Privacy Law (2009) § 6:21 
1044Smith v American Service Co. of Atlanta 611 F. Supp 321 (1984). 
10452006 WL 1997434 (D.S.C. 2006). 
1046Hebert Employment Privacy Law (2009) § 6: 12 6:19. 
1047
 Section 12102. 
1048
 Hebert Employment Privacy Law (2009) § 6:20. 
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an applicant’s physical condition or any medication an applicant may be taking. The 
EEOC’s Enforcement Guidance on Disability Related Inquiries and Medical 
Examinations also excludes polygraph tests from the Act’s definition of “medical 
examination”. However, the guidance prohibits employers from making enquiries 
related to disability during the polygraph test.1049 
6.4.3.2 Case law 
In Hester v City of Milledgeville1050 a group of fire fighters challenged the 
constitutionality of the city’s requirement that fire fighters undergo polygraph tests 
consisting of control questions. The city argued that the use of control questions 
improved the accuracy of the polygraph test results and was aimed at promoting 
public safety by ferreting out drug abuse in the department. The Court stated that, 
generally, the use of “control questions” tailored to “evoke a deceptive or nervous 
response from everyone tested” violated the constitutional right to privacy. However, 
the nature of questions concerned did not implicate the constitution because they 
avoided personal issues related to “marriage, family and sexual relations”.1051 
The appellant in Thorne v City of El Segundo left her employment as a clerk – typist 
and applied for a promotion to city police officer. As part of the application process 
the appellant was required to undergo a polygraph test. The evidence before the Court 
indicated her employment was conditioned on her answering questions about her sex 
life because, prior to polygraph test, the appellant was given information indicating 
questions about her sexual behaviour would constitute a significant part of the overall 
test.1052 The Court observed that the off – duty personal activities of an individual had 
no relationship to his or her job performance and are protected by the constitutional 
guarantee of privacy.1053 The Court held that the questioning of the appellant regarding 
her sex life and reliance on the information obtained about her sex life violated her 
privacy.1054 
                                               
1049
 Hebert Employment Privacy Law (2009) § 6:20. 
1050
 777 F. 2d 1492 (11th Cir. 1985). 
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 1497. 
1052
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Moreover, in Polsky v Radio Shack1055 and State v Community Distributors Inc1056, the 
courts recognised that an employee’s willingness to sign a waiver for taking a 
polygraph test should not be seen as voluntary consent, since the employee may be 
driven by an economic compulsion to sign the form, leaving him or her little 
choice.1057  The Court in Chesna v United States Department of Defense1058, however, 
found that the employee had “knowingly waived his right to privacy” because the 
evidence showed he had signed a consent form to undergo polygraph testing. Further, 
the employee did not argue that he was explicitly deceived, ordered, harassed or 
intimidated against his will to waive his rights.1059 
6.4.4 Analysis 
Polygraph tests may infringe the privacy of employees because they essentially 
attempt to penetrate the private inner domain of an individual “by compelling 
communication of thoughts, sentiments, and emotions which the examinee may have 
chosen not to communicate”.1060  There is no legislation in South Africa regulating the 
use of polygraph tests in employment and South African courts have yet to address 
the privacy implications raised by the use of these tests. Polygraph testing in the 
United Kingdom appears to be conducted primarily in the criminal context. As such, 
there seems be little or no need for legislation regulating the use of these tests in 
employment and, to the extent that regulation is necessary, the DPA seems to offer 
some protection. The use of polygraph tests in United States employment is regulated 
by the EPPA. However, the EPPA only restricts the use of these tests in private sector 
employment. As such, public sector employers are largely unregulated with respect to 
the use of the tests in employment (barring reliance on constitutional protection of 
privacy). Moreover, United States courts are likely to uphold the use of the tests for 
employees in safety sensitive positions and questions are work-related. Discrimination 
                                               
1055
 666 F. 2d 824. In Polsky v Radio Shack, Polsky brought a claim after she was discharged because 
of the results of a polygraph test . Polsky argued that the results of the test were obtained in violation 
of a Pennsylvania statute prohibiting an employer from requiring an employee to submit to a 
polygraph examination as a condition for employment or continuation of employment. 
1056
 123 NJ Super.589, 304 A.2d, 213 N.J. Co. 1973. 
1057
 Christianson “Polygraph Testing in South African Workplaces: Shield and Dishonesty versus 
Compromising Privacy Debate” (2000) 21 ILJ 16 30. 
1058
 850 F. Supp 110 (D. Conn. 1994) 
1059
 116. 
1060
 Long Beach City Employees Association v City of Long Beach 41 Cal.3d 937, 227 Cal.Rptr. 90 Cal. 
198 , 944. 
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legislation offers only roundabout protection and its application very much depends 
on the questions asked during testing. Generally speaking, it also seems as if privacy 
concerns raised by polygraph testing is, to some extent at least, balanced by courts’ 
continued reluctance to rely on the results of polygraph testing as evidence of 
employees’ wrongdoing. 
6.5 DRUG AND ALCOHOL TESTING 
The previous chapter discussed how employers engage in drug testing in order to 
identify users of illicit drugs or substances in the workplace and to deter individuals in 
the workplace from using drugs. This, of course, serves to reduce the incidence of 
drug related problems such as accidents and illnesses.1061 The chapter also indicated 
that some forms of blood testing, such as urinalysis, were more intrusive than others 
because urinalysis, for example, requires an employee to perform the act of urination 
which has been described by courts as highly personal and private. Moreover, some 
commentators observe that urinalysis tends to reveal more than the mere presence of 
illegal drugs such as the types of medication an employee is taking and whether an 
employee is epileptic, pregnant or diabetic. The manner in which urine samples are 
collected also has the potential to intrude on the privacy of employees, especially 
where the samples are to be provided under direct observation to prevent adulteration 
or substitution of the sample. 
6.5.1 South Africa 
South African employers engage in routine and random drug and alcohol testing of 
employees. It appears from published research that breath alcohol testing is more 
common than drug testing or blood alcohol testing. Recent research into the 
management of intoxication in the construction sector revealed that sectors such as 
construction, private transport and government lacked clear and comprehensive 
policies on drug and alcohol and engaged in minimal alcohol testing.1062 The study 
further found that where such policies exist, their implementation is inconsistent and 
ineffective.1063 
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 Evans “How to Manage Intoxication Compliance” Transport World Africa: Multiple Transport 
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1063Supra. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
209 
 
6.5.1.1 Legislation 
Medical testing is defined in section 1 of the EEA as including “any test, question, 
inquiry or other means designed to ascertain or which has the effect of enabling the 
employer to ascertain any medical condition”. For drug testing to qualify as “medical 
testing” in terms of the EEA the drug or alcohol dependency of the test subject has to 
constitute a “medical condition”. It is unclear if drug or alcohol dependency 
constitutes a medical condition because the EEA does not define the term “medical 
condition” and the issue has yet to be addressed by our courts. One argument in 
favour of such an interpretation is that alcohol and drug addiction, as far as dismissal 
is concerned, is regarded as medical incapacity. Furthermore, the Code of Good 
Practice: Key Aspects on the Employment of people with Disabilities seems to make 
it clear that drug and alcohol dependence, which is not based on current use of illegal 
substances or alcohol and where the employee is in rehabilitation, may qualify as a 
disability. At the same time, foreign jurisdictions, such as the United States, have 
excluded drug testing from the definition of medical testing in the context of disability 
legislation.1064 While drug addiction is not a protected condition under the Americans 
with Disabilities Act, a person who uses alcohol is protected if he or she qualified to 
perform the essential functions of the job.1065 
Mention must be made that medical testing is regulated by section 7 of the EEA. The 
section prohibits medical testing unless legislation requires or permits such testing or 
the testing is justifiable in the light of medical facts, employment conditions, social 
policy, the fair distribution of employee benefits or the inherent requirements of a job.  
Section 8 of the Occupational Health and Safety Act1066 (“OSHA”) places a duty on 
employers to provide and maintain a safe and healthy working environment. In terms 
of this duty, employers have to take steps to eliminate and mitigate threats to the 
safety and health of employees. The regulations issued in terms of OSHA deal 
expressly with the issue of intoxication in the workplace. The regulations  require 
employers to prevent persons who are or seem to be under the influence of drugs and 
alcohol access to the workplace and to prevent persons on prescribed medicines from 
perform their duties if the side effects of such medication pose a threat to  health and 
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 American With Disabilities Act of 1990 as Amended 
1065http://www.ada.gov/copsq7ag.htm (2009 - 05 - 16). 
1066Act 85 of 1993. 
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safety in the workplace. This means that employers may prevent persons under the 
influence of drugs, alcohol and prescribed medication from performing work that 
threatens the safety and health of themselves and others. It is difficult to see how 
employers can meet the requirements of these regulations without infringing on the 
privacy of their employees by requiring employees to disclose medical conditions 
(such as AIDS and depression) which they would otherwise prefer to remain 
undisclosed.1067 
6.5.1.2 Case Law 
South African arbitrators have relied on signs of mental and physical impairment to 
establish that an employee in under the influence of drugs. Similarly, employers place 
reliance on: 
“visual evidence regarding the employee’s gait, manner of speech and 
other physical characteristics’ in proving an employee’s degree of 
intoxication. The breathalyser test may be used to add weight to 
evidence or support other evidence led pointing to an employee’s state 
of intoxication”.1068 
Arbitrators appear divided about the evidentiary weight to be placed on breathalyser 
tests.1069 However, it is apparent from the cases that the results of a breathalyser test 
are not conclusive and need to be supported by other relevant physical 
characteristics.1070 
The Labour Appeal Court stated the following with regard to determining an 
employee’s state of intoxication:  
“intoxication is a matter of degree…[an employee] would only be 
‘under the influence of alcohol’ if he was no longer able to perform the 
                                               
1067
 Nell “The Employer’s Dilemma: Intoxication and Legislation” (2005) Vol 1 Risk Management 13. 
1068
 Cane Carriers (Pty) Ltd and Govender (1989) ARB 8.11.10 referred to in Grogan South African 
Law of Unfair Dismissal (2002) 303 footnote 74. 
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obo Davids/Bosal Africa (Pty) Ltd [1999] 10 BALR 1240 (IMSSA) where the court found that an 
employee could be held liable for his state of intoxication even though he was able to operate a heavy 
duty crane for three hours with alcohol in his blood without causing an accident. See also Exactics – 
Pet (Pty) Ltd v Patelina NO & Others [2006] 6 BLLR 551 (LC). On the other hand other arbitrators 
have relied on eye witness accounts of an employee’s physical condition as evidence of an employee 
being under the influence of alcohol. 
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tasks entrusted to him, and particularly the driving of a heavy vehicle, 
with the skill expected of a sober person. Whether an employee is, by 
reason of the consumption of intoxicating liquor, unable to perform a 
task entrusted to him by an employer must depend on the nature of the 
task. A farm labourer may still be able to work in the fields although he 
is too drunk to operate a tractor. Consumption of alcohol would make 
an airline pilot unfit for his job long before it made him unfit to ride a 
bicycle. The question…is, therefore, whether the respondent's faculties 
were shown in all probability to have been impaired to the extent that 
he could no longer properly perform the ….[tasks he or she is 
employed to do].”1071 
In Chetty and Kaymac Rotomoulders (Pty) Ltd1072, an employee in a safety sensitive 
position, challenged his dismissal after testing positive for drugs after a random drug 
test. Prior to the testing the employee had confided in his superiors about his drug 
dependency problem and further sought help for his problem. The employee argued 
that the testing was not random but aimed at dismissing employees known to have a 
drug dependency problem. The arbitrator took issue with the manner in which the 
tests were conducted, particularly with the fact that the employee had not been offered 
the assistance he had been promised after disclosing his drug problem but had been 
merely dismissed.  
The employer in Yende and Cobra Watertech1073 had a zero tolerance policy with 
respect to being under the influence of drugs at work, was aware of the applicant’s 
cannabis dependency problem and had attempted to assist the employee with 
rehabilitation instead of dismissing him. The employee tested positive for cannabis 
and was dismissed by the employer for being under the influence of drugs while 
performing his duties. The arbitrator found the employee’s dismissal substantively 
unfair because the purpose of the test was not to see if the employee was performing 
                                               
1071
 Tanker Services (Pty) Ltd v Magudulela [1998] JOL 1786 (D) 2 – 3. 
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his duties under the influence of drugs but rather to see if the employee’s dependency 
had decreased.1074 
The employee in Mayer and Mind Pearl1075 was dismissed for possession and use of 
drugs in the workplace after a fellow employee reported observing him consume 
drugs in his work cubicle. The employee denied consuming drugs while at work and 
stated that he had volunteered to take a blood drug test, but the employer did not 
require him to take one. The commissioner upheld the dismissal of the employee after 
hearing expert evidence on the symptoms associated with the use of drugs and 
evidence from other employees confirming that the employee’s performance and 
behaviour were consistent with symptoms described by the expert witness. Of 
importance, the commissioner pointed out that there was no obligation on the 
employer to require an employee to submit to a drug test particularly where there was 
sufficient evidence to suggest an employee was using drugs. 
6.5.2 United Kingdom 
The Employment Practices Code includes good practice recommendations on the 
collection and handling of information from drug testing, which suggests that drug 
testing does occur in the United Kingdom workplace. Information obtained from drug 
testing is considered sensitive data in terms of the DPA and as such invokes the 
sensitive data rules limiting the circumstances in which the information can be 
processed.1076 The processing of sensitive information in terms of the DPA requires 
that the information be processed for a lawful purpose.1077 An employer, for example, 
will have satisfied one of the data protection conditions if it requires employees to 
submit to drug tests in order to meet its health and safety obligations.1078 The 
Employment Practices Code guides employers to consider whether the intrusion on 
the privacy interests of employees is justified for health and safety reasons.1079 
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6.5.2.1 Legislation 
The Employment Practices Code Guidance suggests drug testing be used only where 
less intrusive means such as a cognitive ability test or performance assessment cannot 
provide real evidence of impairment or potential impairment.1080 
With respect to the different types of drug tests, the Employment Practices Code 
Guidance cautions employers that regular or periodic drug testing is unlikely to be 
justified unless the testing is conducted on employees in safety critical positions or 
there is a reasonable suspicion of drug or alcohol use. The Employment Practices 
Code Supplementary Guidance further advises employers to conduct post incident 
testing only where there is evidence that an employee was responsible for an 
incident.1081 The Employment Practices Code further cautions employers that random 
testing of all employees can rarely be justified because different employees pose 
different risks depending on the nature of their duties1082: “For example, a train driver 
or signal engineer whose actions are impaired through exposure to alcohol or drugs 
would generally pose a significantly greater safety risk than would a ticket inspector 
or rail enquiries clerk”.1083 Employers have to ensure, in conducting random drug 
tests, that the criteria for the testing is genuinely random.1084 Employers are further 
advised to avoid testing employees for the purpose of detecting illegal use except 
where the illegal use breaches the employment contract and can damage the 
employer’s business.1085 In other words, employers should ideally conduct drug testing 
for the purpose of ensuring safety at work rather than for detecting illegal use of 
drugs. Of particular importance, employers have to inform employees of the type of 
drugs the tests will detect.1086 Employers have to further inform employees of their 
alcohol and drug policy and the consequences of breaching the policy.1087 
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6.5.2.2 Case Law 
Various decisions involving drugs and alcohol policies in the workplace have been 
considered by the Employment Appeal Tribunal.1088 
At issue in South West Trains Ltd v Mr SA Ireland1089 was the dismissal of an 
employee who was employed as a trainman guard. The respondent’s duties were 
considered as safety critical by the appellant and entailed collecting fares from 
customers, being responsible for passengers on the train and guard duties. The 
respondent was informed of the employer’s drug policy and he indicated that he 
understood the purpose of the drug policy (which sought to ensure that no employee 
reported for duty or carried out their duties under the influence of drugs or alcohol). 
The policy further informed employees that the punishment for a positive result was 
an automatic dismissal. After the respondent was randomly sampled for drugs along 
with other employees, his body sample was found to contain traces of cannabis and 
benzodiazepines and he was automatically dismissed on the basis of the positive test 
result. An employment tribunal found dismissal of the respondent to be unfair. The 
tribunal reasoned that because the aim of the policy was safety concerns and not 
moral concerns, there was no evidence indicating the traces of drugs in the 
respondent’s body sample affected his ability to carry out his duties satisfactorily. The 
EAT, without referring to the ECHR and its privacy provisions housed in Article 8, 
disagreed with the decision of the employment tribunal. The EAT held that the 
tribunal had ignored evidence from a medical practitioner that the respondent was 
unfit for duty because of the traces of drugs identified in his body and  deemed the 
employer’s conduct reasonable in the circumstances. 
Article 8 of the ECHR was briefly considered in O’Flynn v Airlinks The Airport 
Coach Co Ltd.1090 The employee’s duties in O’Flynn were considered safety critical as 
they included driving vehicles and serving hot meals in and around an airport. The 
employer’s drug policy informed employees they could be subjected to random 
screening and that a positive result was tantamount to gross misconduct punishable by 
dismissal. O’Flynn was dismissed after she disclosed her drug use before her urine 
sample could be screened following a random workplace drugs test. The employment 
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tribunal found her dismissal fair and the EAT confirmed the tribunal’s decision on the 
basis of three factors: first, O’Flynn was aware of the policy and its contents and had 
not contested its implementation; second, O’Flynn’s duties raised safety issues; and 
third, the policy did not interfere with O’Flynn’s Article 8 rights, except in requiring 
that she report for duty drug free. However, any interference with her Article 8 rights 
would be justified by the fact that her duties raised safety issues. 
An in - depth discussion of the relationship between Article 8 and employer drug and 
alcohol policies was undertaken by the Privy Council in Whitefield v General Medical 
Council1091 and the European Court of Human Rights in Wretlund v Sweden.1092 The 
appellant in Whitefield, a registered medical practitioner, appealed against conditions 
imposed on his registration by the respondent, the Health Committee of the General 
Medical Council, after the Committee determined that his fitness to practise was 
seriously impaired by reason of severe depressive illness. The conditions imposed on 
the appellant included a total prohibition on his alcohol consumption and compliance 
with arrangements for random testing of his blood and urine. The appellant contended 
the condition imposing a total ban on his consumption of alcohol interfered with the 
right to respect for private life and the effect of the ban was to deprive him of 
enjoyment of social drinking on family occasions. The appellant further contended his 
Article 8 rights were infringed by the condition that subjected him to random blood 
testing of his blood and urine. The Privy Council rejected all of the appellant’s 
contentions based on ECHR rights. In respect of the condition banning his total 
consumption of alcohol, the Privy Council held:  
‘[T]the appellant’s claim to private life was reduced to the extent that 
as a doctor he has brought (and is likely to bring) his private life into 
contact with public life or into close connection with other potential 
interests. His “right” to an unrestricted social life must give way to the 
wider public interest in ensuring that he does not present a risk to his 
patients.’  
The Court further held that even if the condition were found to constitute an 
interference with Article 8 (1), such interference would be justified under Article 8 
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(2). With regard to the condition subjecting the appellant to random blood testing of 
his blood and urine, the Court was confident that by virtue of Article 8 (2), the 
condition in question was imposed pursuant to a legitimate aim and was necessary and 
proportionate: 
‘The Committee was entitled to provide for testing (including random 
testing) to establish whether or not he had been drinking and to ensure 
that the appellant knew he was to be subject to such tests and that he 
might need help in overcoming his addiction as recommended by his 
medical supervisor.’ 
At issue in Wretlund was the admissibility of a complaint by the applicant that her 
employer company’s compulsory drug and alcohol testing policy infringed on her 
right to respect for her private life under Article 8 of the ECHR. The applicant was an 
office cleaner for a nuclear power plant owned by a company, OKG. Although the 
applicant’s duties placed her in a low risk area for radioactivity and did not oblige her 
to undergo radiological examinations, she was required to undergo drug and alcohol 
tests every third year. The applicant contended such tests were not justified in relation 
to her duties and breached her right to respect for her private life under Article 8. The 
court a quo found that the applicant was obliged to participate in the drug test but not 
the alcohol test. The court a quo further reasoned the effect of Article 8 was not a 
general prohibition on drug testing, but a balancing of competing interests. Upon 
balancing the applicant’s and the company’s interests, the court a quo found first, that 
OKG’s interest in having a drug – free plant outweighed those of the applicant, given 
that the risks specific to running a nuclear plant were far – reaching and, secondly, 
that it was unrealistic to expect OKG, in implementing its policy, to distinguish 
between employees working in high risk areas within the plant and employees 
working in low risk areas. The ECHR declared her application as inadmissible. The 
ECHR agreed with the decision of the court a quo and held the requirement that she 
undergo the drug tests pursued legitimate aims under Article 8 (2), which included 
public safety and the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. The ECHR 
further agreed with the court a quo that OKG’s compulsory blood testing was a 
measure necessary in a democratic society, because the running of a nuclear power 
plant required very high levels of security and the use of drugs among employees 
could threaten security. Finally, the ECHR found the implementation of the policy to 
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be reasonable and that due regard was given to the applicant’s interest by ensuring 
that the tests were carried out in private, the tests results were disclosed only to 
persons involved in the policy and the test results were to detect employee drug use 
and for no other purpose.1093 
6.5.3 United States 
In an attempt to ensure drug free workplaces, public and private sector employers in 
the United States employ drug testing. United States courts appear to look favourably 
on government efforts to regulate workplace drug use by testing employees, 
particularly in safety or security sensitive positions.1094 Even before the Supreme 
Court pronounced on the reasonableness of workplace drug testing under the Fourth 
Amendment in Skinner and Von Raab1095, United States courts had established that 
certain government employees have a diminished or lowered expectation of privacy in 
this context.1096 
6.5.3.1 Legislation 
A number of federal statutes indirectly regulate drug testing in the public sector. The 
Rehabilitation Act1097defines an “individual with handicaps” as one with “physical or 
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mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such a person’s major 
life activities”.1098 Alcoholism and drug addiction have been included in the Act’s 
definition of “physical or mental impairment” and working constitutes a “major life 
activity”.1099 Consequently, alcoholics and drug addicts would qualify as 
“individual[s] with handicaps” to the extent that their impairments prevents or limits 
their ability to carry out employment.1100 
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”) prohibits the discrimination 
against qualified persons with disabilities. The Act defines qualified persons with 
disabilities as persons “with a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits 
a major life activity, but who is able, with reasonable accommodation, to perform the 
essential functions of the position in question”.1101 On the basis of the ADA’s 
definition of a person with disabilities, an employee whose drug addiction has an 
adverse effect on his or her ability to work can qualify as disabled. It is however 
important to note that the ADA excludes employees or applicants currently engaging 
in the use of illegal drugs from its coverage.1102 
The Drug –Free Workplace Act1103 also indirectly regulates drug testing by public 
employers. The Act in essence places an obligation on federal contractors and 
recipients of federal grants to make “a good faith effort to provide a drug - free 
workplace”, failing which their contracts and grants can be suspended or terminated. 
The Act does not require an employer to engage in drug testing in order to provide a 
drug free workplace, but the Act “encourages” federal contractors and grant recipients 
to resort to drug testing in an effort to meet the requirements of the Act and in so 
doing secure their federal contracts and grants.1104 
A number of states in the United States have enacted legislation directly or indirectly 
regulating drug testing in employment. Oklahoma’s Standards for Workplace Drug 
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and Alcohol Testing Act1105 directly regulates the circumstances under which and the 
manner in which drug testing in employment can be conducted by both private and 
public sector employers.1106 The statute permits employers to require applicants to 
submit to pre – employment testing provided a conditional offer of employment has 
been made and the testing is required for the position.1107 Of particular importance, the 
statute prohibits testing in the absence of a detailed written policy including specifics 
such as testing procedures, sample handling and purpose of the test.1108 Moreover, 
some of the statute’s provisions protect the privacy interests of employees and 
applicants. For example, the statute prohibits direct observation of the act of urination 
in the process of urine collection and requires an employer to keep information 
collected in relation to the testing confidential.1109 Rhode Island has adopted a similar 
statute regulating the circumstances under which and the manner in which drug 
testing may be conducted in employment. The Rhode Island statute permits public 
sector employers to conduct pre – employment testing on applicants for positions in 
law enforcement, correctional services and fire fighting. Private sector employers may 
also conduct pre – employment testing to the extent that it is consistent with the 
requirements of the statute. The statute generally prohibits the testing of employees 
unless reasonable grounds exist to suggest the employee’s ability to perform his or 
duties is impaired by the use of drugs. Further protection for employees is found in 
the requirement that employers refer employees who test positive for drugs to 
professional assistance. An employer may only dismiss an employer who tests 
positive if further tests reveal the employee is still engaging in illegal drug use.1110 
The South Carolina statute does not directly regulate testing but instead encourages 
employers to implement drug prevention programmes and an employer may, as part 
of the programme, require that employees submit to drug testing.1111 Pennsylvania’s 
statute concerning unemployment benefits compensation also indirectly regulates 
testing. The statute provides that an employee who fails to submit to or pass a drug 
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test is not eligible to receive benefits to the extent that his or her unemployment is a 
result of his or her refusal to take a test or failure of the test.1112 
6.5.3.2 Case Law 
Public sector drug testing infringes employees’ Fourth Amendment rights to be free 
from unreasonable search and seizure by the government.1113 
The Supreme Court in Skinner v Railway Labour Executives Association1114 and 
National Treasury Employees Union v Von Raab1115 determined that drug testing was 
a search a seizure under the Fourth Amendment because the collection and analysis of 
urine samples intrudes upon the privacy expectations of the individuals tested.  
Certain public sector employers have argued that there is a distinction between the 
drug testing of applicants and employees in the same position. This was the argument 
made by the employer in Wilner v Thornburgh1116 on the basis of the following three 
reasons: first, the drug testing of an applicant is less intrusive because applicants are 
often notified of the testing and as such are able to refuse to submit to the testing by 
withdrawing their job application; second, job applicants have lesser reasonable 
privacy expectation  than employees; third, employers do not have opportunities to 
observe applicants outside of the pre – employment stage. 
The District Court refused to recognise that there was a distinction between the drug 
testing of applicants and employees. The Court found that the exhaustive background 
investigation that applicants for the position underwent could serve the government’s 
interest as opposed to drug testing.  
The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court’s decision and  found that applicants 
had lesser privacy expectations than employees, because they were informed of the 
requirement for testing and given notice of the testing and as such had control over 
whether or not they would submit to the testing. The Court of Appeals further found 
that the fact that applicants underwent an exhaustive background investigation and 
                                               
1112
 Hebert Employment Privacy Law (2009) § 4:21.50. 
1113Marculewicz “Some Tough Questions for Challenges to Pre – employment Drug Testing” (1994) 10 
Journal of Contemporary Health Law & Policy 243 251. 
1114
 489 US 602 (1989). 
1115
 489 US 656 (1989). 
1116
 738 F Supp 1 (D DC1990), reversed 928 F2d 1185 (CA DC 1991). 
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were required to provide information of any drug use further diminished their privacy 
expectations.  
Some United States courts have also upheld the testing of public sector employees 
regardless of whether their duties entail safety sensitive work. In Loder v Glendale1117 
the California Supreme Court upheld the pre – employment drug testing of applicants 
for city positions regardless of the nature of the positions. The Court upheld the 
testing on the basis of the government’s interest in, amongst others, avoiding 
absenteeism and diminished productivity. 
The Fourth Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable search and seizure by 
government do not however extend to drug testing in the private sector. The 
constitutional claim by public sector employees and job applicants that drug testing 
violates their right to privacy does not also extend to private sector employees. 
However some state courts have extended the reasoning in Skinner and Von Raab to 
justify the testing of private sector employees in safety sensitive positions.1118 
This means that private sector employers can require their employees to undergo drug 
testing even as a condition of an offer of employment as was the case in Wilkinson v 
Times Mirror Corporation.1119 In Wilkinson the California Court of Appeal found a 
requirement by a private publishing company that prospective employees submit to a 
pre – employment drug test did not violate the California state constitution right to 
privacy provision. The Court held that although the testing infringed on the privacy of 
the applicants, its intrusiveness was lessened by the following factors: first, applicants 
for employment in a private business should have reasonably expected to take a pre – 
employment medical examination which included a drug test; second, the publishing 
company’s policy informed prospective employees the job offer was conditioned on 
consent to a drug test; and third, the medical examination was designed in such a way 
that it minimised intrusions into individual privacy. 
                                               
111714 Cal 4th 846 (1997). 
1118
 For example a New Jersey Supreme Court in Hennessey v Morin Coastal Eagle Point Oil Company 
129 N.J. 81 (1992) 475 found the discharge of an “at will employee” (employed as a lead plumber 
whose responsibilities included managing the flow of gasoline ) lawful after the employee tested 
positive after a random drug lawful. The Court held that the public’s interest in ensuring that 
employees in safety sensitive positions are drug free trumped the rights of the “at – will employee”.  
1119215 Cal. App. 3d 1034 1990. 
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The Supreme Court in Skinner and Von Raab determined that drug testing was a 
search a seizure under the Fourth Amendment because the collection and analysis of 
urine samples intrudes upon the expectation of privacy. The Court further affirmed 
that ‘where a Fourth Amendment intrusion serves a special governmental need, 
beyond the normal need for law enforcement, it is necessary to balance the 
individual’s privacy expectation against the Government’s interest to determine 
whether it is impractical to require a warrant or some level of individualised suspicion 
in a particular context’.1120 At issue in Skinner was the blood and urine sample testing 
(authorised by the Federal Railroad Administration regulations) of railroad crews 
involved in certain accidents and employees violating certain safety rules.1121 Justice 
Kennedy reasoned as follows: first, the taking of a blood or urine sample might be 
characterized as a Fourth Amendment seizure, since it may be viewed as a meaningful 
interference with the employee’s interest in his bodily fluids, therefore intruding upon 
expectations of privacy that society recognises as reasonable; second, the 
Government’s interest in regulating the conduct of railroad employees to ensure 
safety, like its supervision of probationers or regulated industries, or its operation of a 
government office, school, or prison, ‘likewise presents ‘special needs’ beyond 
normal law enforcement that may justify departures from the usual warrant and 
probable-cause requirements1122; third, the privacy expectation of the concerned 
employees were diminished by reason of their participation in an industry that is 
rigorously regulated to ensure safety, a goal which is linked to the health and fitness 
of its employees; fourth, the compelling Government interests served by the testing 
regulations would be significantly hindered if railroads were required to point to 
                                               
1120
 Von Raab supra 665. See also Skinner supra 619. 
1121
 In Von Raab the union and union president brought action against United States Customs Service to 
obtain injunction and to challenge constitutionality of drug-testing program that analyzed urine 
specimens of employees who applied for promotion to positions involving interdiction of illegal 
drugs, requiring them to carry firearms or handle classified materials. Justice Kennedy found: first, 
Custom Service’s drug-testing program was subject to reasonableness requirement of Fourth 
Amendment; second, the a warrant was not required by the Customs Service in order for it to conduct 
a drug testing program and; lastly, requiring suspicion less drug testing of employees involved in 
handling illegal drugs or carrying firearms was reasonable under Fourth Amendment. 
1122
 This particular reasoning in Skinner is sometimes known as the “special needs doctrine” given the 
court found established the existence of special needs which rendered the drug testing of railroad 
crews permissible. Wefing “Employer Drug Testing: Disparate Judicial and Legislative Responses” 
(2000) 63 Albany Law Review 799 807.  
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specific facts giving rise to a reasonable suspicion of impairment prior to testing an 
employee.1123 
On the contrary, the United States Supreme Court in Chandler v Miller1124 found that 
the government had failed to show there were ‘special needs’ justifying the testing of 
candidates for state office. At issue was a Georgia statute that required candidates for 
designated state offices to certify that they have taken a urinalysis drug test within 30 
days prior to qualifying for nomination or election and that the test result was 
negative. Candidates for high office in Georgia brought an action before the Supreme 
Court challenging the constitutionality of the statute requiring candidates to submit to 
and pass the drug test to qualify for state office. The Supreme Court in Chandler 
confirmed that the requirement of drug testing infringed the candidate’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy. As to whether this infringement could be justified by a 
compelling state interest the court held: “…the proffered special need for drug testing 
must be substantial – important enough to override that individual’s acknowledged 
privacy interest, sufficiently vital to suppress the…normal requirement of the 
individualized suspicion”. The Court found the testing programme to be 
unconstitutional for several reasons: 
a) The state of Georgia failed to demonstrate that there was a real problem with 
illegal drug use among candidates for state office; 
b) The program failed to identify candidates who violated anti-drug laws; 
c) The program was not a credible means to deter users of illicit drugs from 
seeking election; 
                                               
1123
 After the articulation of the “special needs doctrine” in Skinner and Von Raab some courts 
extended the doctrine to cover the drug testing of employees in security – sensitive positions. See 
Harmon v Thornburg 878 F.2d 484 (D.C. Cir. 1989) and National Federation of Federal Employees 
v Cheney 884 F.2d 603 (D.C. Circ. 1989) where the court upheld the testing of Department of Justice 
employees and of civilian employees in the Department of Defence respectively. The courts in both 
decisions upheld the testing on the basis of the nature of employment. In Harmon the court upheld the 
random testing of employees with top secret national security clearances and in Cheney the court 
upheld the testing of persons in positions which are most critical in times of safety, integrity or 
sensitivity of information. Remy “The Constitutionality of Drug Testing of Employees In 
Government Regulated Private Industries” (1991) 34 Howard University Law Journal 633 649. 
1124
 520 US 305 (15 April 1997). 
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d) The state further offered no reason as to why ordinary law enforcement 
methods were insufficient for the apprehension of candidates addicted to 
illicit drugs.1125 
6.5.4 Analysis 
Drug testing in the workplace appears to be an accepted policy or practice. Drug 
testing, particularly urinalysis, has raised privacy concerns because the act of 
urination is by its very nature considered to be private. Urinalysis may also reveal 
more than just the presence of illicit drugs in a test subject’s body given that it can 
reveal medical conditions such as depression. Employers have been known to require 
that employees give urine samples under observation so as to prevent adulteration of 
the sample and this also raises privacy concerns. At the same time, as intrusive and 
evasive as drug testing particularly urinalysis is, employers have found them to be a 
useful and necessary precaution particularly for those employers in safety sensitive 
positions. 
It is unclear whether the EEA regulates drug testing in South African employment and 
South African courts have addressed the issue of drug testing in employment, but only 
to address the question of whether the results of the testing justified the dismissal of 
an employee.  
It is unclear to what extent drug testing is carried out by United Kingdom employers. 
However, it is clear that it is an accepted practice and is regulated by the DPA and the 
Employment Practices Code. The Employment Practices Code’s Guidance provides 
employers with comprehensive guidelines on how to go about testing employees for 
drugs in the least intrusive manner. 
United States courts have dealt extensively with the issue of drug testing and it 
appears United States courts are likely to uphold the testing for employees in the 
public sector regardless of whether their positions implicate safety concerns. The 
United States has both federal and state legislation regulating the use of drug tests.  
                                               
1125
 See also Baron v Hollywood 93 F Supp 2d 1137 (SD Fla 2000) and Robinson v City of Seattle 102 
Wash. App. 795, 10 P 3d 452, 16 E.R. Cas. (BNA) 1405 (2000). 
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6.6 HIV/AIDS TESTING 
The previous chapter discussed how the arguments advanced by employers to justify 
the HIV/AIDS testing of employees were increasingly making way for a growing 
need to protect and preserve, amongst other rights, the rights to privacy and dignity of 
persons suffering from the HIV/AIDS pandemic in light of the fear, antagonism and 
misconceptions surrounding HIV/AIDS. The South African decision of Hoffmann v 
SAA emphasised this when it alluded to the fact that negative and misguided 
conceptions of HIV/AIDS had caused deep anxiety and considerable hysteria against 
those infected and, as such, ill – informed public perceptions and the policies of others 
should not be allowed to detract from the constitutional rights of employees not to be 
discriminated against and their rights to privacy and dignity.1126 
6.6.1 South Africa 
South Africa has one of the highest HIV/AIDS rates on the globe. At the end of 2005, 
an estimated 5,5 million South Africans were living with HIV according to 
UNAIDS/WHO, 2 million of whom were unaware of their HIV positive status.1127 
UNAIDS/WHO further estimates that 1000 HIV related deaths occur daily in South 
Africa.1128 This means total HIV/AIDS deaths in South Africa have increased by 79% 
from 1997 to 2004. The rising AIDS deaths in South Africa have decreased the 
average life expectancy to less than 50 years in three South African provinces – 
namely the Eastern Cape, Kwazulu – Natal and Free State.1129 
The South African Law Commission, in its discussion paper on “Aspects of the Law 
Related to AIDS: Pre-employment Testing”, stated that although HIV/AIDS cannot be 
transmitted casually and transmission in the workplace was unlikely, the virus would 
nevertheless have a dramatic effect on the workplace and the economy given that 
many of those who were affected by the virus constitute the economically active 
population. The virus has had a marked impact on investment in training, cost of 
labour and productivity of workplaces and on sero - negative individuals (as their time 
                                               
1126
 1374 – 1376. 
1127
 UNAIDS/WHO 2006 AIDS Epidemic Update. 
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 http://www.avert.org/aidssouthafrica.htm (2007-01-25). 
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 UNAIDS/WHO 2006 AIDS Epidemic Update. 
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is spent caring for and supporting sick spouses, dependents and other family 
members).1130 
As previously mentioned, the common law right to privacy in South African law 
derives from the right to dignity which is inextricably linked with the right to bodily 
and psychological integrity.1131 Hence, in terms of South African common law, a 
prospective employee or employee who is HIV positive enjoys the right to privacy 
like any other person under the common law.  The common law right to privacy 
serves to protect the individual’s dignity and personality by forbidding unjustifiable 
intrusions into the private sphere of either business or social life. The significance of 
this right in the workplace translates into the following: 
1. an employer may not lawfully coerce the prospective employee or employee to 
take an HIV test and; 
2. the employer may not disclose the HIV status of a prospective employee or 
employee without the concerned person’s consent.1132 
6.6.1.1 Legislation 
Section 14 of the Constitution1133 explicitly recognises the right to privacy and for this 
reason affords individuals protection against unwarranted HIV testing/disclosures in 
the workplace. The constitutional right to privacy ensures that privacy is not given a 
narrow meaning, but a broad meaning adopted by constitutional jurisprudence, subject 
to international human rights norms. South Africa has legislation shielding the 
employee from unwarranted HIV/AIDS testing in the workplace in the form of the 
Employment Equity Act1134 and the South African Code of Good Practice and Key 
Aspects of HIV/AIDS.1135 
The EEA constitutes the first piece of legislation in South Africa that offers protection 
specifically to employees living with HIV against unfair discrimination and 
                                               
1130
 South African Law Commission Aspects of the Law Related to AIDS: Pre-employment HIV Testing 
Project 85 Discussion Paper 72  http://www.doj.gov.za/salrc/dpapers.htm (2005-02-05). 
1131
 Stanley “Note: May I Ask You a Personal Question?” The Right to Privacy and HIV Testing in the 
European Community and the United States” (1997) 65 Fordham Law Review 2775 2791. 
1132Ngwena “HIV in The Workplace: Protecting the Rights to Equality and Privacy (1999) 15 South 
African Journal of Human Rights 513 533. 
1133Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996. 
1134Act 55 of 1998. 
1135Code of Good Practice on Key Aspects of HIV/AIDS and Employment (2001) 22 Industrial Law 
Journal 62 -75. 
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unauthorised testing. The scope of the definition given to medical testing is wide 
enough to include any test question, inquiry or other means designed to ascertain or 
which has the effect of aiding an employer to ascertain whether an employee has any 
medical condition. The scope of the definition given to “testing” is commendable in 
that it goes beyond physical testing to extend to indirect means of ascertaining an 
employee’s HIV status. Section 7(2) of the Act prohibits the testing of an employee or 
prospective employee unless the Labour Court deems such testing justifiable.1136 
The South African Code of Good Practice on Key Aspects of HIV/AIDS,1137 borne out 
of the recommendations of the Southern African Development Community 
HIV/AIDS Code on Employment,1138 provides there should be no compulsory testing 
of employees. Of importance, the code recognises that protection of the human rights 
and dignity of people with HIV/AIDS is essential to the prevention and control of the 
epidemic. The code further reinforces the role of the Labour Court to police 
HIV/AIDS testing in the workplace. Under the heading of confidentiality and 
disclosure, the code further provides that all persons with HIV/AIDS have the legal 
right to privacy and an employer therefore must not disclose the HIV status of its 
employees.  
South Africa, like the United States and Australia, excludes members of the National 
Defence Force, Secret Service and National Intelligence1139 from benefiting from 
blanket prohibitions on HIV/AIDS testing, whereas countries like Canada1140 and 
                                               
1136
 Heywood and Hassan “The Employment Equity Act and HIV/AIDS: A Step in The Right 
Direction” (1999) Industrial Law Journal 845 851. 
1137
 Code of Good Practice on Key Aspects of HIV/AIDS and Employment (2001) 22 Industrial Law 
Journal 62 -75. 
1138
 The Code of Good Practice on Key Aspects of HIV/AIDS and Employment recommends that 
SADC member’s states (Zimbabwe, Zambia, Botswana, Swaziland, Namibia, Mauritius, Angola, 
Lesotho, Malawi, Tanzania and South Africa) should develop tripartite national codes on HIV/AIDS 
and Employment that shall be reflected in the law.  
1139
 Other organs of state such the Department of Correctional Service and the South African Police 
stopped pre-employment HIV/AIDS testing in 1997. Heywood and Hassan “The Employment Equity 
Act and HIV/AIDS: A Step in The Right Direction” (1999) Industrial Law Journal 845 852. 
1140
 See Thwaites v Canada (Canadian Armed Forces) [1993] C.H.R.D. No. 9 (7 June 1993); affirmed 
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Belgium have extended such benefits to military and armed forces personnel.1141 
Nonetheless, in the South African context and prior to the decision in South African 
Security Forces Union and Others v Surgeon General and Others1142 members of the 
South African National Defence (“SANDF”) could have recourse based on an 
infringement of their constitutional rights to equality, privacy and dignity  and the 
provisions of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination 
Act1143 (“PEPUDA”) (which is aimed at  giving effect to the right to equality in 
section 9 of the Constitution and promoting equality and preventing the unfair 
treatment of persons). 
6.6.1.2 Case Law 
The South African Labour Court has handed down two important decisions on 
HIV/AIDS testing in the employment sphere and in so doing shed light on the 
provisions of the EEA in this respect.1144 In Joy v Mining Machinery (A Division of 
Harnischfeger SA (Pty) Ltd) v NUMSA and Others1145 the Court reaffirmed its role of 
“policeman” with regard to HIV/AIDS testing in employment. The applicant, after 
                                                                                                                                      
exclusion.The Canadian Armed Forces had failed to explore alternatives to Thwaites discharge such 
as a change in the nature and scope of his duties or a re-muster to some other occupation. Canadian 
HIV/AIDS Legal Network “HIV Testing of UN Peacekeeping Forces: Legal and Human Rights 
Issues” 9 September 2001 17. 
http://www.aidslaw.ca/Maincontent/issues/testing/peacekeepingforces.pdf (2005-02-05). 
1141
 Heywood and Hassan “The Employment Equity Act and HIV/AIDS: A Step in the Right 
Direction” (1999) Industrial Law Journal 845 852. 
1142
 High Court of South Africa (Transvaal Provincial Division) Pretoria, Case No 18683/07. 
1143
 Act 4 of 2000. 
1144
 It is important to note that the leading cases with regard to the common law right to privacy and its 
application to an individual’s HIV status are: C v Minister of Correctional Services 1996 4 282 (T) 
and Jansen van Vuuren v Kruger 1993 4 SA 842 (A). C v Minister of Correctional Services 
concerned the testing of prisoners for HIV. The decision is credited with determining the doctrine of 
informed consent to be a prerequisite in testing for HIV. The findings of the court in C v Minister of 
Correctional Services in the employment context require the employer to not only obtain the consent 
of the person to be tested but further require the employer, prior to administering the test, to explain 
the purpose of the test, procedure to be followed and the implications of a positive test to the 
applicant or employee. In Jansen van Vuuren v Kruger the then Appellate Division of South Africa 
looked to the common law right to privacy in finding that a doctor had unjustifiably disclosed his 
patient’s HIV status to a third party. The Appellate Division held that the disclosure of a patient’s 
HIV positive status to a third party amounted to a breach of privacy and that a doctor’s respect for his 
patient’s confidentiality was not only an ethical duty but a legal duty. See McLean “HIV Infection 
and a Limit to Confidentiality” (1996) 12 South African Journal of Human Rights 452. According to 
Radipati the case placed South Africa alongside other jurisdictions in recognising that HIV, although 
contactable and infectious, is neither contagious nor hereditary (See Radipati “HIV and Employment 
Law: A Comparative Synopsis” (1993) CILSA XXVI 396). The case further confirmed the fact that a 
person's HIV positive status is an extremely private and personal condition, which an individual may 
wish to keep to himself and selected individuals. See Ngwena “HIV in The Workplace: Protecting the 
Rights to Equality and Privacy (1999 ) 15 South African Journal of Human Rights 513  533 – 534. 
1145
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consultation with recognised unions representing its employees, sought an order 
permitting it to conduct voluntary testing on its employees in order to determine the 
incidence of HIV amongst its staff to enable it to deal with the epidemic better. The 
court emphasized that before it would authorise an employer to conduct HIV/AIDS 
tests on employees, it must be satisfied that the tests furthered the objectives of the 
EEA. The court granted the order in light of the fact the employer had already 
instituted an education and awareness campaign amongst its workforce, established 
onsite clinics to treat sexually transmitted diseases, the applicant desired to formulate 
and implement a strategy to deal with the virus amongst its employees. The employer 
had assured its employees that they would not be forced to take the test. In other 
words, the applicant wished to conduct voluntary (and not mandatory) HIV tests on its 
employees and the employer guaranteed its employees confidentiality in respect of the 
test results. 
It was not necessary for the employer in Joy to obtain an order from the Labour Court 
for the testing, since such testing was to be voluntary and the decision to test its 
employees was taken in consultation with unions representing its employees.  
At issue in PFG Building Glass v CEPPAWU & Others1146 was whether anonymous 
and voluntary testing of employees for HIV/AIDS fell within the ambit of section 7(2) 
of the EEA. The Court reasoned that HIV testing infringes the right to bodily and 
psychological integrity (which includes the right to security in and control over one’s 
body in section 12 (2)(b) of the Constitution and the right not to be subjected to 
medical or scientific experiments without consent in section 12 (2) (c) of the 
Constitution) and the right to privacy. The Labour Court reasoned that these rights 
were not absolute and had to be balanced against the competing fundamental rights of 
employers, shareholders and regulators, such as the right to access to information and 
the right to trade. For the Court, even though the objective of the protection against 
HIV testing  is to prevent discrimination and promote equality, the test for 
justifiability of HIV testing goes beyond determining whether such testing is equitable 
or not. The test for the justifiability of HIV testing is also a constitutional enquiry and 
as such has to meet the requirements of the limitations analysis in section 36 of the 
Constitution. The Court found that because HIV is a medical condition, the testing for 
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it must be medical and this meant that: the data sought must be relevant to the purpose 
of the testing, the tests must be confidential, and the subjects of the tests should give 
their voluntary and informed consent to the testing. The Court pointed out that the 
Code of Good Practice on Key Aspects of HIV/AIDS erred in requiring employers to 
obtain permission from courts even where employees have given their voluntary and 
informed consent and exercised their constitutional right in terms of section 12 (2)(b). 
Pillay J further interpreted section 7(2) so as not to impose a limitation on employees 
in the exercise of their constitutional rights in section 12 (2)(b) and section 12 (2) (c) 
of the Constitution. For this reason, Pillay J concluded that anonymous and voluntary 
testing in the workplace did not fall within the ambit of section 7(2). 
The Labour Court recently confirmed that the dismissal of an employee on the basis 
of his or her HIV status amounted to an automatically unfair dismissal. In Botes v 
Eagle Ink Systems KZ Natal (Pty) Ltd1147, the employer alleged that it had dismissed 
the employee for misconduct. However, the Court found that the employer had tried 
to “camouflage discrimination under the cloak of misconduct”1148 and had failed to 
lead evidence showing that misconduct was the real reason for dismissing the 
employee The Court observed that three measures in South African employment 
context placed an onerous burden on employers discriminating against HIV positive 
employees: 
“[r]elative to people living in many other jurisdictions, people in South 
Africa have the advantage of a constitutionally entrenched right not to 
be discriminated on the grounds of their HIV positive status. 
Furthermore, legislation facilitates proof of discrimination, firstly by 
defining discrimination to include HIV as a prohibited ground of 
differentiation. Secondly, dismissal of an employee on account of his 
HIV status is, by definition, an automatically unfair labour 
practice…[Thus] justifying discrimination on the grounds of an 
employee’s HIV status is a hard row to hoe. Not surprisingly, 
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employers try to avoid basing a dismissal on an employee’s HIV 
status.”1149 
Although Hoffman v South African Airways1150 (“Hoffmann”) was decided in terms of 
the general right to equality in the Constitution and not in terms of the EEA, the 
judgment has been followed in cases decided in terms of the EEA.1151 The applicant in 
Hoffmann was HIV positive and was considered unsuitable for the position of flight 
attendant despite having successfully undergone a pre – screening interview, a 
psychometric test and a formal interview. SA Airways argued that its operational 
requirements and employment policies and practices excluded the applicant from the 
position of flight attendant. The applicant contended that he had been discriminated 
against solely on the grounds of his HIV positive status, resulting in the violation of 
his inherent right to dignity. The Constitutional Court in Hoffmann held that an 
employer may not exclude an applicant from employment on the basis of their HIV 
positive status, particularly if such applicants are fit for duty.  
The decision in IMATU & Another v City of Cape Town1152 did not pertain to the 
HIV/AIDS testing of an employee by an employer but it nonetheless concerned the 
medical testing of an employee to determine his suitability for employment. The 
decision also echoed the principle laid down in Hoffmann, namely that if an employer 
wants to exclude an applicant from employment on the basis of the condition of their 
health, the employer must show that the employee is incapable of meeting the 
requirements of the job.1153 The applicant in claimed that he was a victim of unfair 
discrimination after being denied employment as a firefighter by the metropolitan 
municipality of the City of Cape Town. The Labour Court, after hearing medical 
evidence that modern drugs had considerably reduced the risks associated with “Type 
1” diabetes, held that the applicant could not rely on the ground that he had been 
discriminated against because of disability, but could assert that he had been unfairly 
discriminated against in a manner which impaired his dignity.1154 The Court further 
found that the blanket ban to which the applicant had been subjected did not fulfil a 
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legitimate purpose and accordingly the City could not rely on the defence that the ban 
was related to “an inherent requirement of the job”.1155 
The matter of South African Security Forces Union and Others v Surgeon General 
and Others1156 (“SANDF decision”) is also worth mentioning notwithstanding that the 
matter was settled between the parties.1157 At issue in this matter was the 
constitutionality of a policy which excluded persons with HIV/AIDS from being 
recruited, promoted or deployed on international missions if they tested HIV positive. 
Privacy was of central concern. The applicant in the matter argued that the policy of 
the South African National Defence Force (“SANDF”), as reflected in its’ various 
policy documents dealing with recruitment, promotion and deployment discriminated 
against people who are HIV irrespective of their job, post, classification or mustering 
solely on the basis of their HIV status and the policy was for this reason 
unconstitutional in that it unreasonably unjustifiably infringed on a spectrum of 
constitutional the rights of affected persons including the right not to be unfairly 
discriminated against in terms of section 9(3) of the Constitution and the right to 
privacy in terms of section 14 of the Constitution and the right to dignity in terms of 
section 10 of the Constitution.1158 
In response the SANDF argued, amongst other things, the following: 
a) the policy was not directed at people living with HIV but was aimed at 
excluding persons who are not healthy and in so doing it ensured that the 
SANDF is at all times ready to do combat and is able to provide respond 
immediately to threats of national security; 
b) the policy of excluding persons with chronic diseases including HIV is not 
inconsistent with the Constitution on the contrary it is aimed at meeting the 
Constitutional imperative of the SANDF to preserve and protect national 
security; 
c) in post-apartheid South Africa, the SANDF is under a constitutional and 
statutory obligation to ensure that it maintains a core force that maintains a 
streamlined structure and design in order to be efficient and effective, 
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something which is militated against by the recruitment of persons who 
cannot meet the optimal fitness standards; 
d) the conditions of deployment are such that deployed members are exposed to 
significant stress and environmental challenges and these conditions require 
(amongst other things) that the SANDF conduct pre – deployment testing in 
order to conduct a medical risk analysis which will dictate the medical 
services to be provided in deployed areas and that SANDF members who are 
deployed are of an adequate standard of health in order to withstand hostile 
employment conditions; 
e) in excluding members who do not meet the health standards for deployment 
the SANDF does not act inconsistently with the Constitution but seeks to 
discharge its duty to protect employees with chronic illnesses by not exposing 
them to conditions which may result in a deterioration of their conditions and 
further seeks to not compromise the safety and integrity of collective units of  
troops by deploying people who may, once exposed to the harsh conditions 
characteristic of deployment, become unwell and unfit to discharge their 
functions as soldiers.1159 
f) In settling the matter, the parties agreed that the SANDF policy was 
unconstitutional in that it infringed a spectrum of constitutional rights. The 
Court gave the SANDF 6 months within which to review its regulations and 
policies. The settlement put to rest the issue of the constitutionality of the 
HIV testing policy of the SANDF, a policy which had been repeatedly 
questioned and challenged (without much success) since 1994 by various 
concerned and affected persons.  
6.6.2 United Kingdom 
At the end of 2005 an estimated 63,500 adults aged between 15 and 59 were living 
with HIV/AIDS in the United Kingdom. In 2005, the United Kingdom reported 730 
AIDS cases and 503 deaths.1160 The United Kingdom has reported the largest increases 
in HIV cases in Western Europe since 1998, as the number of new HIV diagnoses 
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have doubled since 2000. In 2004, the United Kingdom recorded more than 7200 new 
diagnoses of HIV and a year later (in 2005) this number had increased to 7700.1161 
6.6.2.1 Legislation 
In April 2005 the English parliament passed the Disability Discrimination1162 Act 
(“DDA of 2005”) thereby amending and extending certain provisions of the Disability 
Discrimination Act1163 (“DDA of 1995”). Of particular importance, the DDA of 2005 
extended the definition of “disability” in section 1 of the DDA of 1995. The DDA of 
1995 defined “disability” as “a physical or mental impairment which has a substantial 
and long - term adverse effect on [a person’s] ability to carry out normal day – to – 
day activities.” 1164 The DDA of 2005 supplemented this definition of “disability” to 
include persons with cancer, HIV infection and multiple sclerosis.1165 In terms of the 
extension, persons living with HIV were included within the disability definition 
already at the stage of diagnosis. Before 2005, persons living with HIV only fell 
within the ambit of the DDA from the stage when their HIV seropositivity began to 
have a long – term adverse effect on their ability to carry out normal day – to – day 
activities.1166 
The extension protects people living with HIV from discrimination by making it 
unlawful for employers to discriminate against an HIV positive employee or potential 
employee.1167 For employers, the extension means they have a duty to make 
reasonable adjustments for HIV positive employees. The DDA places a duty on an 
employer to make reasonable adjustments to any physical feature, provision or policy 
in the workplace that places a disabled person at a substantial disadvantage. This 
includes recruitment policies and conditions relating to the employment, promotion, 
transfer or training of employees.1168 In the case of HIV positive employees, 
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employers may be required to allow such employee time off for medical appointments 
and access to an area where they can take their medication.1169 
At the European level, the Council of Member States has issued guidelines about the 
treatment of HIV/AIDS in employment. The Council has also recognised the 
importance of protecting privacy in individual’s medical information in general and, 
in particular, an individual’s HIV status. In 1988, the Council and the Ministers for 
Health of the Member States adopted “Conclusions on AIDS and the Workplace”. 
The Conclusions are only recommendations and not legally binding legislation. The 
Conclusions recommend that “because people infected with the HIV virus or suffering 
from AIDS pose no danger to their colleagues at work, there are…no grounds for 
screening potential recruits for antibodies”. The Conclusions further state that there is 
no risk of HIV infection in medical procedures, if appropriate hygiene guidelines are 
followed. Employees who are asymptomatic should be regarded as fit for work and 
should not be under any obligation to disclose their status to their employer. They 
further recommend that if knowledge of HIV status is obtained, the employer should 
make every effort to protect the person from stigmatisation, discrimination and 
maintain medical confidentiality. The Conclusions also dictate that employees 
suffering from HIV should be treated as other employees with serious illnesses that 
affect their performance and, where the employee’s fitness is impaired, duties or 
working hours should be adjusted so that such employees may continue working as 
long as possible.1170 
Of particular significance are the main provisions of the Equality Act1171, which is 
expected to come into force in October 2010. The Equality Act consolidates the 
grounds of discrimination (sex, race and other grounds of discrimination) into one 
piece of legislation resulting in one single objective “justification” test to replace the 
various tests formulated under the varying grounds of discrimination.1172The 
justification test under the Equality Act will result in employers having to meet higher 
thresholds in justifying their actions if they for instance dismiss an employee for a 
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disability related reason. In terms of section 15 (discrimination arising from disability) 
and 19 (indirect discrimination) of the Equality Act, the employer will have to show 
that its conduct is a proportionate means to achieve a legitimate aim.1173 The Equality 
Act’s definition of a person with a disability is wide enough to include HIV positive 
persons, seeing as the condition may have a substantial and long term adverse impact 
on a person's ability to carry out normal day to day activities.1174 That being said, 
Schedule 1 of the Equality Act unequivocally states that HIV is a disability along with 
the medical conditions of cancer and multiple sclerosis.  
Also of importance is section 60 of the Equality Act, which restricts employers from 
asking about an applicant's health, including whether an applicant has a disability. 
Exceptions to this general principle are where the enquiry is aimed at establishing 
whether an employee has the ability to carry out a function that is intrinsic to the 
nature of the job concerned or where it is done for purpose of monitoring diversity in 
the workplace.1175 
6.6.2.2 Case Law 
In Commission v Germany1176  the European Court of Justice included the protection 
of medical information within the right to privacy. At issue was a German law 
prohibiting imports of medicinal products prescribed by a doctor in another member 
state, unless ordered through a German pharmacy. Germany admitted that the statute 
constituted a restriction on free movement of goods, but argued that this restriction 
was essential in order to guarantee the protection of the health and life of humans. The 
European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) agreed that the rights to privacy and the right to 
protection of medical secrets were fundamental rights in the Community, but held 
they were not absolute rights. The court held that a limitation of these rights may be 
justified by the objective of protection of public health, provided the restriction 
actually promotes the objectives of the general interest and is not disproportionate to 
the extent that it would interfere with the very substance of those rights.  The ECJ 
then found the German law illegal and concluded that Germany had failed to show 
that it would be impossible to implement controls which would protect public health 
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without also excessively interfering in the privacy of medical secrets.1177 Privacy 
protection in the European Community is found in Article 8 of the ECHR 
encompassing the right to oneself, to live as oneself and the balancing of 
considerations under Article 8(2). Included in this far–reaching protection of personal 
privacy is the protection of an individual’s medical information (even in the 
workplace).  
The fact that the “Conclusions on AIDS and the Workplace” (disseminated at 
European level and referred to above) are only recommendations (intended to 
influence Member State laws) and not legally binding legislation in terms of the 
Community hierarchy of legal norms, was emphasised by the Court of First Instance 
in A v Commission.1178 In A v Commission, A applied for an administrative post in the 
African, Caribbean and Pacific region with the Commission. A was required to 
undergo a pre-recruitment medical test which he willingly submitted to and 
voluntarily informed the testing medical officer that he was HIV positive. The testing 
medical officer concluded that A was fit for the post. In the Court of First Instance, A 
made two arguments against the pre-recruitment medical exam, namely that: 
1. The purported objective of the Commission’s pre-recruitment exam (that is to 
avoid major future costs) was economic in nature and therefore unjustified 
under any of the objectives listed in Article 8 of the ECHR. 
2. The test violated his right to privacy since his voluntary consent made the test 
unnecessary or useless in the circumstances. 
The Commission on the other hand argued that A was unfit for the post because he 
had gone beyond mere seropositivity to a condition of active illness. That is to say, 
because A had gone beyond being merely HIV positive to having full-blown AIDS 
and, in turn, his full-blown condition rendered his projected duties a risk to his health, 
since they required placement in “high-risk countries” which would expose A to the 
danger of infections in the absence of  appropriate health care infrastructure.1179 A 
objected to this medical determination by the Commission, by stating that he had 
previously worked in Mexico, “a developing country with only limited 
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infrastructures”. A further asserted that because he was not asymptomatic, the 
Commission had violated the Conclusions that an asymptomatic employee should be 
treated as fit to work.1180 
The Court of First Instance1181, in applying the proportionality test formulated in 
Commission v Germany, determined that the objective of pre-recruitment testing 
required by the Commission was either to avoid the Commission hiring an unsuitable 
candidate for duties linked to the post, or to assign duties compatible with an assigned 
candidate’s physical condition. The court found such objectives to be lawful within 
member state traditions and therefore concluded that the test could not be regarded as 
violating the principle of respect for a person’s private life. With regard to A’s 
contention that the nature of the HIV test was useless or unnecessary, the court found 
that it was beyond its review since it constituted an entirely medical assessment. The 
court, however, added that the medical officer might base his medical assessment of 
the candidate’s fitness “on a medically justified prognosis of future orders capable of 
jeopardizing in the foreseeable future the normal performance of the duties in 
question.” As to whether A’s seropositivity rendered him unfit for the post, the Court 
noted that the Conclusions A sought to rely on were not provisions of Staff 
Regulations or Community legislation and therefore not legally binding on the 
Commission. The Court did add that the Conclusions nonetheless functioned as rules 
of practice that could be deviated from without full explanation. The Court concluded 
that because the medical exam revealed certain symptoms that could be described as 
symptomatic of associated infections, there existed a link between the medical 
findings and the conclusion drawn on A’s fitness for the duties related to the post, 
especially considering the fact that those duties were to be carried out in developing 
countries in which the risks of infection were greater than in Europe. Hence, A was 
unfit for duties related to the post.1182 
In X v Commission1183, X a Portuguese freelance typist who had worked for the 
Commission applied for a temporary post as a typist in the Commission’s Portuguese 
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Translation Division. The application procedure required X to undergo a medical test, 
which X refused to undergo. The medical officer ordered supplementary blood tests 
(T4/T8 blood tests) and concluded that X was suffering from a significant immune 
deficiency which rendered him unable to perform duties as a temporary typist. X 
argued that the performance of an HIV test without his informed consent constituted 
interference with his physical integrity and hence violated his right to privacy. The 
Court of First Instance accepted X’s argument, but refused to accept that the T4/T8 
blood tests conducted on X were in fact  HIV tests  that could determine 
seropositivity. The Court of First Instance therefore concluded that X’s right to 
privacy had not been violated. On appeal to the European Court of Justice, the court 
asked the following questions based on the balancing test formulated in Commission v 
Germany1184: 
1. Whether the tests carried out in the pre-recruitment exam constituted an 
interference with X’s private life. The Court found the medical officer, by 
ordering supplementary tests in order to indirectly reach the same result as an 
HIV test, had violated X’s right to privacy. 
2. Whether such interference was justified by the public interest under Article 8 
(2) of the ECHR. The Court found that while the pre-recruitment exam served 
a legitimate purpose (the protection of health), X’s refusal mandated the 
Commission to respect his refusal to submit to an HIV test in whatever form. 
The Court stated the following in this respect: “since the candidate expressly 
refused to undergo an AIDS screening test that right precluded the 
administration from carrying out any test liable to point to…that illness, in 
respect of which he refused disclosure.”1185 
To summarise, European Community case law indicates that employers may subject 
candidates to medical tests with the consent of the concerned person, but should 
simultaneously consider the implications the results might have on the candidate’s 
recruitment. In the event that a candidate should refuse to submit to a medical test, the 
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medical officer may not perform related tests wherein an employer would be free to 
reject a candidate based on his refusal.1186 
6.6.3 United States 
The Centre for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”) describes HIV data 
collection in the United States as “patchy and incomplete” because not all 50 states of 
the United States record their HIV infections. According to the CDC only 35 of the 50 
states record their HIV infections.1187 This makes it difficult to give an exact 
indication of how many people are living with HIV/AIDS in the United States. The 
UNAIDS/WHO 2006 report estimates “only seven countries…have more people 
living with HIV than the United States.” The United States, according to the report, 
estimates that the concerned states had 1,2 million people living with HIV in 2005.1188 
Estimates further indicate that 40,000 new HIV infections occur every year.1189
6.6.3.1 Legislation 
The United State’s scheme of statutory legislation protects the disabled from 
discrimination by both private and public employers in the workplace. HIV 
seropositivity and AIDS are regarded as disabilities and both conditions find 
protection under the American with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”) and the 
Rehabilitation Act1190.1191 The ADA prohibits any private or public employer 
employing 15 or more employees from discriminating against a qualified individual 
on the basis of their disability.1192 The Act further prohibits all pre-employment testing 
medical exams that determine whether an applicant has a disability or the nature of 
the severity of the disability. The ADA only permits inquiries into a candidate’s 
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ability to perform job related functions.1193 Testing during employment akin to pre-
employment testing is also prohibited under the ADA unless the test is job related and 
consistent with business necessity.1194  Nevertheless, the ADA permits an employer to 
reject a disabled applicant who poses a direct threat to the safety and health of others 
in the workplace.1195 The employer can also impose a provision that no employee pose 
a direct threat to the safety and health of others in the workplace after being 
employed.1196 
The Rehabilitation Act covers federal employers as well as those benefiting 
financially from federal government. Equally, the Rehabilitation Act prohibits the 
discrimination of individuals solely on the basis of their disability and prohibits pre-
employment medical exams and inquiries into an applicant’s disability. The two Acts 
differ in that the ADA includes medical exams and inquiries under “discrimination” 
and the Rehabilitation permits inquiries into an applicant’s ability to perform job 
related functions.1197 The Rehabilitation Act does not explicitly state that persons with 
infectious diseases fall within its scope, but the Supreme Court has held that the Act 
does benefit such persons.1198 As a result, people infected with HIV/AIDS benefit 
from the protection offered by the Rehabilitation Act as long as they do not pose a 
direct threat that cannot be remedied by reasonable accommodation.1199 
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Only thirteen American states (including Texas and Florida) have specific legislative 
restrictions on pre-employment HIV/AIDS testing. The restrictions prohibit pre-
employment testing unless the test can establish that HIV negative status is a bona 
fide job qualification or that there is a material risk of HIV transmission in the 
workplace, impossible to eliminate through less intrusive means.1200 Moreover, the 
implicit right to privacy in the United States constitution provides a measure of 
protection for unwarranted employee HIV testing, since the United States Supreme 
Court has held mandatory blood testing is a search and seizure that must comply with 
the standards of reasonableness imposed by the Fourth amendment.1201 The search’s 
reasonableness is measured by balancing the nature and quality of the intrusion on the 
individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental 
interests alleged to justify the intrusion.1202 
6.6.3.2 Case Law 
In Anonymous Fireman v City of Willoughby1203 city fire fighters and paramedics 
challenged the city’s policy of requiring mandatory testing of fire fighters and 
paramedics for HIV/AIDS as part of its annual physical examination for fitness to 
serve. The court held: 
“Fire fighters and paramedics are in a high-risk group for the 
contracting and transmission of the HIV virus since their duties include 
a significant risk of being exposed to blood, bodily secretions and 
bodily fluids. This line of work exposes the employees to [the] high 
risk of bodily injury, lacerations, exposure to bleeding victims, 
puncture wounds and the like.” 
The court added: 
“Fire fighters and paramedics are at a higher risk than persons in 
hospitals for contracting or transmitting the HIV virus, because they 
work in a non-controlled setting.  The universal precautions for fire 
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fighters such as gloves, masks, and protective clothing, may not be 
practical in this setting.”1204 
The court’s reasoning about the effectiveness of fire fighting protective wear against 
HIV/AIDS transmission was influenced by the evidence given by a medical doctors 
who testified that “[t]he universal precautions for fire fighters, such as a space suit, 
boots, masks, gloves, etc., are not very practical because it is difficult to function 
wearing all of these garments; it is too much paraphernalia to work efficiently” and 
“…fire fighters who are HIV positive are dangerous because they can transmit 
diseases”.1205 The court further found on the evidence that the inclusion of a 
mandatory HIV test in the annual physical examination of city fire fighters and 
paramedics was rational (therefore not an unreasonable search and seizure in violation 
of the Fourth amendment) and closely related to fitness for duty. It was furthermore 
justified by a compelling governmental interest (that is, protecting the public from the 
contraction and transmission of HIV/AIDS by fire fighters and paramedics and 
stopping the spread of the deadly AIDS epidemic), in light of the high-risk nature of 
the job involving the possibility of exposure to blood and bodily fluids in a non-
controlled setting. The court concluded that the testing at issue did not violate the 
plaintiff’s right to privacy as protected by the Fourth, Ninth and Fourteenth 
Amendments and fitness for duty was a compelling governmental interest for safety 
forces, including fire fighters and paramedics.1206 
The plaintiff in Doe v District of Columbia1207contended that the District of Columbia 
had denied him a position as a fire fighter because of HIV- positive status. The court 
found the following: 
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a) An HIV-positive fire fighter was an “individual with handicaps” within the 
meaning of the Rehabilitation Act because of physical impairment that 
substantially limited his major life activities, such as procreation, sexual 
contact, and normal social relationships. 
b) Employment of an individual with HIV-positive status as fire fighter did not 
pose a “direct threat” to the health or safety of others, within the meaning of 
the Rehabilitation Act, since the risk of transmission was so small that it 
vitiated any concern that HIV status would present a “direct threat” to other 
fire fighters or members of the public. 
c) A fire fighter applicant was “otherwise qualified” for his position, within the 
meaning of the Rehabilitation Act, despite his HIV-positive status, where that 
fire fighter continued to pass the fire department’s own physical examinations 
throughout the period of litigation and was asymptomatic. 
d) The District of Columbia’s withdrawal of its offer of employment to applicant 
for the fire fighter position on the basis of the applicant’s HIV-positive status 
was an act of discrimination in violation of the Rehabilitation Act in light of 
the fact that the District failed to show that the applicant was not an otherwise 
qualified individual with handicaps or that he was denied the fire fighter 
position for reasons other than his HIV status. 
The medical experts in Doe testified that an HIV-positive asymptomatic status does 
not impair a person’s strength, agility, or ability to breathe and an asymptomatic HIV-
infected person should be able to perform all of the functions of a fire fighter as 
stipulated by the District. In addition, the experts testified that the fire fighting 
equipment and protective gear required for fire fighters and emergency medical 
personnel by the Occupational Health and Safety Administration and the National Fire 
Protection Association and the use of this equipment and protective gear eliminate the 
risk of blood-to-blood contact in the performance of fire fighting functions. One of the 
health experts further pointed out that her research revealed that several fire 
departments throughout the United States employ HIV-positive fire fighters in active-
duty status and none of those departments require any special precautions to be 
undertaken by these HIV-positive personnel.  The court emphasised the risky nature 
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of fire fighting and the uncontrollable rate at which the disease was spreading and 
infecting new groups of people.1208 The court said the following in this regard: 
“Much has been written and said about the subject of Acquired 
Immune Deficiency Syndrome, or AIDS. It has now reached epidemic 
proportions, both in the United States and throughout the world. At the 
present time, there is no known cure for AIDS. The only way to stop 
its spread is by education and prevention until some cure is found. 
Billions of dollars are now being spent to find a cure for AIDS but, so 
far, these efforts have not been successful.”  
The reverse was held four years earlier in the matter of Glover v Eastern Nebraska 
Community Office of Retardation.1209 Glover concerned the validity of a Nebraska 
administrative agency’s personnel policy requiring certain employees (serving the 
needs of mentally retarded persons) to submit to blood testing for the HIV virus and 
hepatitis B. In addition to testing, the policy required employees to inform a personnel 
officer when they knew or suspected they had HIV or Hepatitis B and to disclose 
medical records relating to the treatment they received for those diseases. The 
employer argued that it had a strong and compelling interest in protecting its mentally 
retarded clients and the rationale for testing these employees was that clients who 
engage in violent or aggressive behaviour associated with their conditions, such as 
biting and scratching, risked contracting one of the diseases from an infected 
employee.1210 The employer further argued its employees had only a diminished 
expectation of privacy. The court found both arguments missed the mark. The court 
concluded that the risk of clients contracting HIV or Hepatitis B from employees was 
miniscule or negligible and therefore held that the policy constituted an unreasonable 
search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment.1211 
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United States Courts have also held that the disclosure of an employee’s HIV status 
by an employer violated the employee’s right to privacy.1212 
6.6.4 Analysis 
It has been suggested that the United States safeguards the right to privacy in the 
context of HIV/ AIDS better than the European community because of its legislative 
scheme and that protection of the right to privacy in the European Community would 
be better guaranteed if it were to adopt legislation similar to that of the United 
States.1213 This suggestion seems to overlook that there is legislation with similar 
objectives to the United States’s ADA and Rehabilitation Act in the European 
Community - the ECHR and the Conclusions on HIV/AIDS in the workplace. While 
it may be true that the Conclusions on HIV/AIDS in the workplace are not binding on 
member states, they have positively influenced decisions of l the ECJ.  Protection of 
the employee can be achieved indirectly through other means. While, for example, the 
United States Constitution does not explicitly provide for the protection of the right to 
privacy, this right has been implied by the courts.1214 Note that the ADA and the 
Rehabilitation Act also do not explicitly refer to HIV/AIDS in any of their provisions. 
Nonetheless, based on judicial interpretation and EEOC guidelines implementing the 
ADA, HIV is considered a handicap under both pieces of legislation. Lastly, the 
balancing or proportionality tests used by the European Community and the United 
States are similar. Perhaps the clearest conclusion to be drawn from the three 
jurisdictions is that discrimination law remains, in practice (and controlling for the 
limited possibility of direct reliance on the right to privacy in Constitutions and 
supranational instruments) the primary vehicle for protection of the privacy in this 
context (as is also the case with the policies and practices discussed earlier in the 
chapter).   
                                               
1212
 William S v Lassen County 18 AD Cas.(BNA) 303 (2006) and Doe v Southeastern Pennyslvannia 
Transport Authority 101 IER Cas. (BNA) (1995). 
1213
 Stanley “Note: May I Ask You a Personal Question?” The Right to Privacy and HIV Testing in the 
European Community and the United States” (1997)  65 Fordham Law Review 2775 2776. 
1214
 In Griswold v Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) the US Supreme Court first introduced the right to 
privacy even though it was not expressly provided for in the US constitution. 
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6.7 CONCLUSION 
This chapter sought to provide an overview, on a comparative basis, of a number of 
policies and practices which typically threaten or put pressure on privacy in the 
employment sphere and to evaluate to what extent privacy was protected.  
With respect to background checks, the chapter revealed that the selected countries 
have no legislation directly regulating the practice in general. However, various pieces 
of legislation could be used to protect the employee's rights in relation to such checks. 
It further emerged from the discussion that, because employers could be held liable 
for negligent and wrongful acts committed by their employees, the risk exists that 
employers will conduct background checks on all employees regardless of their 
position. In some instances, background checks were conducted by employers 
because legislation (justifiably) compels them to do so. At the same time, legislation 
such as the United Kingdom’s Rehabilitation of Offenders Act is commendable for 
attempting to protect the privacy of individuals in relation to “spent convictions” and 
in its attempt to balance privacy interests and the interest in unprejudiced access to 
employment with concerns employers may have. 
The discussion on psychological and psychometric testing showed that South Africa 
had (discrimination) legislation explicitly prohibiting the use of psychometric testing 
unless the tests were shown to be scientifically valid and reliable, apply fairly to all 
employees and are not biased against any employee of group. A popular theme in the 
discussion on the use of these tests in the United Kingdom and South Africa is that 
certain duties are placed on employers to ensure that the tests are valid and do not 
discriminate against any group. The United Kingdom and South Africa have yet to 
aggressively wrestle with the issue of the use of the tests and their discriminatory 
impact. Notably, the United States courts have confronted this issue in a number of 
cases and in so doing established the notion of indirect discrimination. It further 
appeared from the United States case law discussed that the use of the tests may be 
justified particularly in safety sensitive positions such as that of fire fighter and 
probationary police officer.  
It also emerged from the chapter that the use of polygraph tests remains controversial 
because of continued doubt about their scientific validity and reliability. 
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Notwithstanding this controversy, these tests continue to be used in South African and 
United States workplaces. Case law points to the fact that in the South African 
workplace, the tests are used after the commission of an offence to determine if an 
employee is responsible for the alleged offence. In the United States employment 
context, employers seem to employ the tests primarily in the pre – employment stage 
in relation to safety sensitive positions. 
The discussion on drug and alcohol testing revealed that employers in the selected 
countries carry out drug and alcohol testing on employees, especially those employees 
in safety sensitive positions. The discussion further revealed that legislation (again, 
primarily discrimination legislation) not only regulated the use of such testing in the 
different jurisdictions but also in certain instances compelled employers to carry out 
such testing on employees especially (again, primarily in safety sensitive positions. 
South African has made great strides in ensuring that individuals who are HIV 
positive are protected from discrimination in the workplace. The recent SANDF 
decision bears testimony to the strides taken by South Africa in ensuring that persons 
are not negatively treated because of their HIV status. The developments in the 
protection of HIV positive persons from discrimination has also made it more difficult 
for South African employers to justify subjecting individuals to the HIV tests in the 
workplace. These developments are much needed in South Africa (in comparison to 
other jurisdictions), simply because of the prevalence of HIV/AIDS in South Africa. 
The policies and practices identified in this chapter are by no means the only policies 
and practices employers use in the workplace that impact on privacy. Modern 
technology has enabled and continues to enable sophisticated forms of testing or 
monitoring of employees and in the two chapters to follow detailed attention will be 
given to the most recent and challenging (in the sense of the advanced technology 
underlying it) of these practices – internet and e-mail monitoring and genetic testing. 
The technology underlying the policies and practices discussed in this and subsequent 
chapters implicate employee privacy interests which have to be balanced against 
competing employer interests. Perhaps the lasting impression of the overview 
provided in this chapter is that the law is perhaps lagging behind, at least to the extent 
that it endeavours to use existing legal principles to combat these developments. What 
this chapter shows, is that privacy protection, for the most part, remains primarily to 
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be dealt with through a combination of broad constitutional principle (where 
available) and a perhaps inordinate and curious reliance on discrimination law. 
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CHAPTER 7: 
SELECTED FOCUS AREAS: E-MAIL AND INTERNET 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter 5 the first steps were taken in consideration of the focus of this research, 
namely to consider how developments in technology has impacted on privacy 
protection in the workplace and whether these challenges call for a fundamental 
reconsideration of such protection. That chapter gave brief consideration to the 
“privacy in the workplace”, examined the arguments for and against the need for 
privacy protection in the workplace, identified a number of policies and practices in 
the workplace that threaten privacy in the workplace and discussed how these policies 
and practices impacted on privacy. It was found that these policies and practices did 
indeed impact on privacy, and that the extent of this impact depended on the manner 
and circumstances in which they are used. That chapter also put forward the argument 
that, in light of technological advancements, there is a continued need for privacy 
protection in the workplace, but that such protection should consist, in the first 
instance, not so much on a fundamental re-evaluation of privacy as a protectable 
interest, but on a contextual balancing of the interests of employers and employees.  
Chapter 6  expanded on the discussion in chapter 5 by evaluating how selected 
countries have approached or dealt with the use of these policies and practices 
identified by employers in the workplace, with specific emphasis on the availability of 
statutory protection and the approach of the courts in the different jurisdictions. One 
interesting insight gained from the discussion in chapter 6 is that apart from common 
law principles (identified and discussed in earlier chapters) and the odd application of 
relatively focused legislation (such as the Data Protection Act1215 in the United 
Kingdom), discrimination legislation remains one of the main available lines of 
defence of privacy in the workplace. This situation arguably is already at odds with 
the importance of privacy as a value and the need for its protection. At the same time, 
and viewed from a different angle, this is perhaps already a clear indication of the fact 
that the protection of privacy as such in the workplace may not be of paramount 
                                               
1215Act of 1998. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
251 
 
importance, and that such protection is only deemed worthy where other, related, 
values (such as equality) are the primary values infringed through conduct by the 
employer.   
This chapter, along with Chapter 8, is one of two chapters that focus in depth on two 
workplace policies and practices also mentioned in chapter 5 (although not discussed 
in chapters 5 and 6) as constituting a threat to the protection of privacy in the 
workplace. What perhaps makes these practices and policies - e – mail/internet 
monitoring and genetic testing – different to those considered in chapters 5 and 6 – is 
that  e – mail/internet monitoring and genetic testing arguably represent policies and 
practices based on the most recent and advanced technology available. As such, they 
represent both the essence of, and the latest in, the ongoing technological challenge to 
privacy in the workplace. In this chapter, e – mail/internet monitoring will be 
considered in some detail, while chapter 8 will focus on genetic testing. 
7.2 A BRIEF SURVEY OF INTERNET AND E-MAIL 
7.2.1 Internet 
There is no official definition of the Internet. The Internet is commonly referred to as 
the “network of all networks”1216. United States courts have described the Internet as 
“an international network of interconnected computers”1217 and a “vast collection of 
interconnected computer networks”1218. The United States Federal Networking 
Council passed a resolution in 1995 defining the term Internet as follows: “…the 
global information system that (i) is globally linked together by a globally unique 
address space based on the Internet Protocol (IP) or its subsequent extensions/follow-
ons; (ii) is able to support communications using the Transmission Control 
Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) suite or its subsequent extensions/follow-ons, 
and other IP compatible protocols; and (iii) provides, uses or makes accessible either 
publicly or privately, high level services layered on the communications and related 
infrastructure herein.” The definition is very technical and uses information 
technology terms such as “TCP/IP” and “protocol”. However, the definition was 
                                               
1216
 Edwards and Waelde The Law and Internet: Regulating Cyberspace (1997) 13.  
1217
 Reno v American Civil Liberties Union 521 US 844 (1997). 
1218
 In re DoubleClick Inc Privacy Litigation 154 F Supp 2d 497 (2001). 
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developed in consultation with individuals in the internet and intellectual property 
fields, hence its use of information technology terms.1219 
There is much debate surrounding the precise origins and history of the Internet.1220 
What is clear is that the Advanced Research Projects Agency Network (“APARNET”) 
was a major contributor to the birth of Internet in 1969.1221 APARNET was a United 
States defence related academic research initiative connected to four computers and 
aimed at enabling defence researchers across the country to communicate and 
collaborate. The general view among writers on the Internet is that APARNET was a 
purely defence related initiative1222 and the network was designed to withstand a 
missile attack.1223 However, some writers believe that although the APARNET 
network was intended for defence related research1224 the academics and students who 
had access to it were using its features (including e-mail, discussion groups, databases 
and file transfer protocol) to communicate about non- defence issues.1225 
Whatever the intention behind APARNET may have been, the network developed 
various technologies that resulted in the Internet1226; these technologies include e-
                                               
1219
 http://www.nitrd.gov/fnc/Internet_res.html (2006-05-24). 
1220
 Peter lists five theories possible theories that have been advanced towards the origins of the 
Internet: packet switching represents the origins of Internet; TCP/IP protocol represents the origins of 
the Internet; origins of Internet are represented by the birth of applications and not protocols; 
inventions and activities of Xerox Palo Alto Laboratories and Ethernet represent the origins of 
Internet. Peter “The Beginnings of Internet” 
http://www.nethistory.info/History%20of%20the%20Internet/origins.html (2006-05-24). 
1221
 APARNET was funded by the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA). ARPA later changed 
its name to Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) in 1971 and 1996. Leiner, Cerf, 
Clark et al “A Brief History of the Internet”  http://www.isoc.org/internet/history/brief.shtml (2006-
05-24). 
1222
 See for example Hiller and Cohen Internet Law and Policy (2002) 6 and Edwards and Waelde The 
Law and Internet: Regulating Cyberspace (1997) 15. ARPA was a branch of the military that was 
responsible for the development of covet systems and weapons during the Cold War and APARNET 
was accordingly designed to protect between military installations. Bellis “Internet” 
http://inventors.about.com/library/weekly/aa09598.htm (2006-05-24). 
1223
 Edwards and Waelde The Law and Internet: Regulating Cyberspace (1997) 15. 
1224
 See Peter who writes that what amounted to Internet then (that is APARNET) was not intended to 
link people or enable people to communicate or be informed but rather to enable time sharing 
amongst research institutions. Time sharing enabled research institutions to share the research load by 
using the processing power of each other’s computers especially where large calculations were 
concerned. Peter  http://www.nethistory.info/History%20of%20the%20Internet/beginnings.html 
(2006-05-24) 
1225
 Ferrera, Lichstein, Reder, August and Schiano Cyberlaw: Text and Cases (2001) 3. 
1226
 Pioneers of the Internet existed before 1969, the date usually stated for the invention of the 
Internet. Leonard Kleinrock of Massachusetts Institute of Technology published the first paper and on 
packet switching, in 1961 and 1964 respectively. http://www.isoc.org/internet/history/brief.shtml 
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mail,1227 telnet1228 and TCP/IP.1229 In 1973, APARNET extended its connection beyond 
the academic community to other networks and to other countries.1230 Moreover, in the 
1980’s the power of the Internet was realised and the National Science Foundation 
joined APARNET to form NSFNET, in order to connect academic and scientific 
communities. The commercialisation of the Internet started in 1987 when the number 
of hosts increased from 23 on APARNET to 28,000 on NSFNET.1231 The growth and 
expansion of Internet continued after this. The commercialisation of the Internet 
flourished with its most significant development – the WWW (World Wide Web). 
The WWW1232 was developed by Tim Berners–Lee in 1991 and is often mistakenly 
referred to as the Internet. The court in In re DoubleClick Inc Privacy Litigation1233 
differentiated between the WWW and Internet:  
“The Internet is the physical infrastructure of the online world: the 
servers, computers, fiber – optic cables and routers through which data 
is shared online. The Web is data: a vast collection of documents 
                                                                                                                                      
(2006-05-24). Peter agrees that there were others who conceived the idea of the Internet before 1969 
and adds that the idea of Internet contrary to popular belief was not conceived solely in the United 
States. For instance Louis Pouzin, a French national introduced the idea of data grams and Donald 
Davies, an English National in 1969 also pioneered the packet switching technique. Peter “The 
Beginnings of Internet” http://www.nethistory.info/History%20of%20the%20Internet/origins.html 
(2006-05-23). 
1227
 See the discussion of what e-mail is and how it works. 
1228
 Telnet was developed by APARNET in 1972.Bellis 
http://inventors.about.com/library/weekly/aa09598.htm (2006-05-24). 
Telnet is a program for TCP/IP networks such as the Internet that connects a computer to a network 
server. http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/T/Telnet.html (2006-05-24). 
1229
 TCP/IP is a “set of standard operating and transmission protocols that structure the Web’s 
operation”. In re DoubleClick Inc Privacy Litigation  154 F Supp 2d 497, 501 (2001) 501.  
1230
 The first International connections to APARNET were with the England (University College of 
London) and Norway (The Royal Radar Establishment of Norway) in 1973. 
http://www.internetvalley.com/archives/mirrors/davemarsh-timeline-1.htm (2006-05-23). 
1231http://www.internetvalley.com/archives/mirrors/davemarsh-timeline-1.htm (2006-05-23).The 
timeline of Internet history is dotted with numerous and significant events however for purposes of 
this chapter only a few of these events will be discussed. 
1232
 The WWW “allows users to search for and retrieve information stored in remote computers, as 
well as, in some cases, to communicate back to designated sites…the Web consists of a vast number 
of documents stored in different computers all over the world”. Reno v American Civil Liberties 
Union 852. Prior to the WWW there was the Gopher system developed at the University of 
Minnesota; the Gopher system was not as colourful and interactive as the Internet but simply 
organised and displayed files on Internet servers. Edwards and Waelde The Law and Internet: 
Regulating Cyberspace (1997) 22.  
1233154 F Supp 2d 497, 501 (2001). 
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containing text, visual images, audio clips and other information media 
that is accessed through the Internet”. 1234 
Today, in addition to e-mail, the following facilities are available over the Internet: 
IRC (Internet Chat Relay)1235, Usenet1236 and FTP (File Transfer Protocol)1237. Internet 
users connect to the Internet through their Internet Service Providers. Their ISP’s in 
turn connect them to the Internet through network interfaces, telephone lines, satellite 
dishes and cable television lines.1238 More so, each Internet enabled computer has an 
IP (Internet Protocol) address and a DNS (domain name system). The IP address 
consists of sets of numbers separated by a dot. The DNS was implemented in 1984 to 
ease the burden of dealing with the digits in the IP address. The DNS identifies the IP 
address with text names and each domain name is associated with a unique IP 
number.1239 The DNS divides addresses into top-level domain names such as .org for 
organizations and .gov for governments. There are also geographical top-level domain 
names for countries, such as .za for South Africa and .uk for the United Kingdom.1240 
The Internet as a computer network operates with digital transmissions represented by 
the digits one and zero.1241 Information on the Internet is transmitted in packets (with 
headers displaying the address information) by routers and servers depending on the 
address system, that is, the TCP/IP.1242 The routers and servers would then examine 
the packets of data to determine the best route the packets should take in reaching the 
addressee. Hence, the various packets can take different routes in traveling to an 
                                               
1234
 TCP/IP is a “set of standard operating and transmission protocols that structure the Web’s 
operation”. In re DoubleClick Inc Privacy Litigation  154 F Supp 2d 497, 501 (2001) 501.  
1235
 IRC was developed in Finland in the late 1980’s and enables people to connect and join live 
discussions with multiple users on the Internet. http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/I/IRC.html. 
(2006-05-25).  
1236
 Usenet is a worldwide discussion system consisting of forums called newsgroups. Internet users 
can post messages and articles on the system which are then broadcast to other computer systems. 
Edwards and Waelde The Law and Internet: Regulating Cyberspace (1997)22. 
1237
 FTP enables computer users to exchange files over the Internet through TCP/IP protocols. FTP 
works in the same as HTTP, a language of the Internet that is used to transfer web pages from a 
server to a user’s browser. http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/F/FTP.html (2006-05-25). 
1238Ferrera, Lichstein, Reder, August and Schiano Cyberlaw: Text and Cases (2001) 44.  
1239
 Ferrera, Lichstein, Reder, August and Schiano Cyberlaw: Text and Cases (2001) 4. 
1240
 Edwards and Waelde The Law and Internet: Regulating Cyberspace (1997) 16. 
1241
 Ferrera, Lichstein, Reder, August and Schiano Cyberlaw: Text and Cases (2001) 6. 
1242Supra. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
255 
 
addressee. Once the packets of data have reached their destination, the addressee’s 
computer unpacks the packets for its user to read.1243 
7.2.2 E-mail 
E-mail has been defined as “a plain- language file that is sent by the sender, from 
computer to computer, via one or more mail servers, until it is delivered to the 
addressee’s inbox”1244 or a “small file which is sent to its destination through a series 
of linked computers, called e-mail servers.”1245 The court in Reno v American Civil 
Liberties Union1246 stated that e-mail “enables an individual to send an electronic 
message – generally akin to a note or letter to another individual or a group of 
addresses”.1247 
It is generally accepted that e-mail predates the origins of the Internet.1248 The creation 
of e-mail at APARNET was fortuitous. Hardy argues that because of APARNET’s 
functions,1249 the creation of e-mail as a tool for human communication was not 
planned and anticipated. After the creation of e-mail in 1971, however, the function of 
APARNET included human communication.1250 The first person to send an e-mail 
message was Ray Tomlinson through The Send Message Command (“SNDMSG”) 
network mail program, a program written by Tomlinson himself. Tomlinson sent this 
message across APARNET. The second message sent across APARNET announced 
the availability of e-mail and instructed users on addressing mail.1251 Initially, the use 
                                               
1243Supra. 
1244
 Blanpain and Van Gestel Use and Monitoring of E-mail, Intranet and Internet Facilities at Work: 
Law and Practice (2004) 227. 
1245
 Van Gestel Forwarding Confidential Information on the Internet: Technological Possibilities of 
Monitoring and Control in Blanpain On-line Rights for Employees in the Information Society: Use 
and Monitoring of E-mail and Internet at Work (2002) 17 – 28. 
1246
 521 US 844 (1997). 
1247
  Reno v American Civil Liberties Union 521 US 844 (1997) 851. 
1248
 Hardy “The Evolution of APARNET Email” (1996) History Thesis submitted at the University of 
California at Berkeley http://www.ifla,org/documents/internet/hari1.txt (2006-05-25). 
1249
 Hardy believed that APARNET arose out of military prerogatives and the need of a computer 
science research community. Hardy “The Evolution of APARNET Email” (1996) History Thesis 
submitted at the University of California at Berkeley http://www.ifla,org/documents/internet/hari1.txt 
(2006-05-25). 
1250
 Hardy “The Evolution of APARNET Email” (1996) History Thesis submitted at the University of 
California at Berkeley http://www.ifla,org/documents/internet/hari1.txt (2006-05-25). 
1251Dixon Email Security Policy Implementation in Multinational Organisations with Special Reference 
to Privacy Law (2003) 8. 
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of e-mail was restricted to the ARPANET community.1252 In fact, the ARPANET 
community was the first to use e-mail as a substitute for paper correspondence.1253 
E-mail is today one of the best forms of human communication because it combines 
two traditional forms of communication, namely speaking and letter writing. E-mail 
evolved to where it is today after undergoing various modifications to its original 
SNDMSG program. After SNDMSG there was READMAIL, which enabled users to 
read messages.1254 READMAIL, was later modified to offer users a comprehensive list 
of available messages indexed by a subject and date. E-mail was also developed to 
selectively delete messages, forward messages, automatically address fields in 
message replies and handle messages. 1255 
E-mail revolves around client/server technology. In essence, client/server technology 
allows a computer to access and use the services of another computer.1256 An e-mail 
client indicates the list of messages in a user’s inbox and allows the user to select a 
message header and read the text of the message. The client further creates new 
messages, sends messages, allows attachments to the message and connects to the 
server.1257 Two servers are responsible for transferring messages - the Simple Mail 
Transfer Protocol handles outgoing mail by transferring mails across the Internet and 
a Post Office Protocol which handles incoming mail.1258 
7.3 E-MAIL AND INTERNET IN THE WORKPLACE 
7.3.1 Introduction 
Modern employers and employees not only communicate through letters, office 
memos and the spoken word, but also through electronic tools like the Internet, 
                                               
1252
 Hardy “The Evolution of APARNET Email” (1996) History Thesis submitted at the University of 
California at Berkeley http://www.ifla,org/documents/internet/hari1.txt (2006-05-25). 
1253
 Hardy “The Evolution of APARNET Email” (1996) History Thesis submitted at the University of 
California at Berkeley http://www.ifla,org/documents/internet/hari1.txt (2006-05-25). 
1254
 Hardy “The Evolution of APARNET Email” (1996) History Thesis submitted at the University of 
California at Berkeley http://www.ifla,org/documents/internet/hari1.txt (2006-05-25). 
1255
 Hardy “The Evolution of APARNET Email” (1996) History Thesis submitted at the University of 
California at Berkeley http://www.ifla,org/documents/internet/hari1.txt (2006-05-25). 
1256
 Edwards and Waelde The Law and Internet: Regulating Cyberspace (1997) 14. 
1257
 Edwards and Waelde The Law and Internet: Regulating Cyberspace (1997) 14. 
1258Dixon Email Security Policy Implementation in Multinational Organisations with Special Reference 
to Privacy Law (2003) 10. 
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intranet and e-mail.1259 Internet and e-mail are replacing the traditional modes of 
communication and exchanges such as the letter, fax, telephone and telex. E-mail has 
enabled instantaneous and inexpensive communications between individuals and it 
therefore comes as no surprise that e-mail is the preferred medium of communications 
between individuals in the workplace and further saves on the use and cost of paper 
and postage stamps. E-mail also enables its users to edit and store documents. In 
effect, certain e-mail messages and attachments constitute records of business 
transactions that may be used stored and used later for company business.1260 
Internet and e-mail have not only altered the face of communication, but have also 
altered the business and workplace landscape. For instance, before the Internet 
individuals involved in team work had to be physically situated in the same place to 
be able to have team meetings or hold briefings. Today, Internet and e-mail usage 
have introduced the concept of global or virtual teams. Global or virtual teams are 
able to convene and hold meetings and briefings and in due course carry out their 
tasks without ever meeting one another and without being in the same office space, let 
alone the same city or country.1261 Internet and e-mail have also redefined what 
constitutes a workday or workspace. Employees are accessible at any time and any 
place and have access to the workplace and work related data outside the workplace. 
Employees do not need to come into the workplace to effectively carry out their 
duties, nor do they need not be physically present in the workplace to be able to 
communicate and interact with the employer and other employees.1262 
Insomuch as Internet and e-mail are the preferred medium of communications in 
today’s workplace, employers feel the need to closely regulate or monitor their use by 
employees to avoid the threats associated with their use. The monitoring of employee 
Internet and e-mail use involves two competing interests in the employment context: 
namely, the employer’s right to conduct his or her business as he or she deems fit and 
                                               
1259
 Blanpain On-line Rights for Employees in the Information Society: Use and Monitoring of E-mail 
and Internet at Work (2002) xi. 
1260
 Dixon Email Security Policy Implementation in Multinational Organisations with Special 
Reference to Privacy Law (2003) 12 – 13. 
1261
 Wallace The Internet in the Workplace: How New Technology is Transforming Work (2004) 2 – 3. 
1262
 See Cohen Employee Perceptions of Invasions of Privacy Whilst Surfing the World Wide Web at 
Work (2001) 2. Cohen points out that “…advances in technology have literally removed the face of 
the employer and replaced him/her with silent apparatuses”. Cohen Employee Perceptions of 
Invasions of Privacy Whilst Surfing the World Wide Web at Work (2001) 2. 
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the employee’s right to privacy. On the one hand, employers are concerned about the 
abuse and unrestricted use of these tools by employees and the harm that could result 
from this unrestricted use. On the other hand, employees are concerned about their 
right to privacy and the use of Internet and e-mail in the workplace. The monitoring of 
employee Internet and e-mail use can, for example, result in the employer having 
knowledge of an employee’s personal and private information.1263 
That said, it is important to bear in mind that the monitoring of employee 
communications by employers is not a new phenomenon. The monitoring of 
employees by employers certainly occurred before the introduction of electronic 
communications. In the past (as is still the case today), employers monitored use of 
company resources by using onsite managers and supervisors whose job was to 
physically observe and monitor employees at work, to ensure that employees were 
being productive and efficient. Nonetheless, in the information age employers prefer 
other, perhaps more efficient, methods to monitor their business operations in the 
interest of productivity.1264 In short, electronic communications have enabled 
employers to monitor employees on a larger scale, without time and space constraints, 
and with a certain element of immediacy.  
7.3.2 Arguments in favour of Monitoring Internet and E-mail Use in the 
Workplace 
A number of reasons have been advanced to justify the monitoring of workplace tools 
such as Internet and e-mail. Some of these arguments are discussed below. 
First, employers argue that as the owners of the Internet and e-mail system in the 
workplace, they have the right to specify how employees will use the Internet and e-
mail provided by them.1265 The employer as the owner of Internet and e-mail tools in 
                                               
1263
 Hebert Employment Privacy Law (2009) § 8A: 2. 
1264
 Kesan First Principle Examination of Electronic Privacy in the Workplace in Blanpain (ed.) On-
line Rights for Employees in the Information Society: Use and Monitoring of E-mail and Internet at 
Work (2002) 251 258. 
1265
 Blanpain On-line Rights for Employees in the Information Society: Use and Monitoring of E-mail 
and Internet at Work (2002) xii. Individuals using company resources do not own these resources. 
Employees do not own the computers they use to surf the Internet or to send and receive e-mail 
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the workplace also has a duty to ensure its employees use these tools appropriately 
and responsibly.1266 An employer’s failure to meet this duty may result in it being held 
liable for any misconduct by an employee through the use of Internet and e-mail.1267 
This argument may be referred to as the ownership argument and is premised on the 
idea that because the employer is the owner of the Internet and e-mail resources in the 
workplace, the employer has every right to determine when and how these resources 
shall be used by employees.  
Secondly, employees may conduct a number of illegal activities via the employer’s 
computer system. Employees may, for example, enter chat rooms while at work, use 
anonymous screen names and discuss confidential company information or post false 
information over the Internet about the company’s financial performance. 
Furthermore, employees may appropriate the employer’s trade secrets stored on the 
employer’s computer system for the benefit of a competitor.1268 Inappropriate use of 
Internet and e-mail in the workplace has also resulted in employers being held liable 
for copyright infringement,1269 defamation1270 and sexual and racial 
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 Employers may have claims of defamatory e-mail communications made against them by various 
individuals including their employees. For example in Meloff v New York Life Insurance Co51 F.3d 
372 an employee M, brought an employment defamation action against her former employer after she 
was dismissed and the reason given for her dismissal was “credit card fraud”. The reason for her 
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harassment1271.1272Employers may also attract negative publicity where an employee, 
for example, visits a website displaying sexually graphic images and the website 
captures and stores the employer’s IP address and domain name.1273 This argument 
may be referred to as the illegal activity argument and in sum holds that an employer 
is entitled to monitor an employee's e-mail and Internet activity in order to ensure that 
the employee is not engaging in any illegal activities in the name of the employer or 
through the use of the employer’s resources. 
Thirdly, employers sometimes take the view that Internet and e-mail can lure 
employees away from company business and that unrestricted e-mail and Internet 
usage by employees will encourage employees to spend time on personal business, 
which, in turn results in time wasting, poor customer service, lost business and profits 
and high overheads.1274 Furthermore, a company’s mail server and Internet may 
become congested or its  transmission bandwidth may be strained by employees 
sending and receiving voluminous e-mails (containing short films, photos or power 
point presentations) that are not work related, thereby slowing down the networks’ 
response.1275 
Employers also argue that the monitoring of employee and Internet usage enables 
them to measure employee work performance and to provide feedback on such 
performance.1276 
Fourthly, employers argue that absolute computer security is problematic in the 
workplace and that electronic communications are created with ease but can be 
difficult or sometimes impossible to retrieve. Consequently, the restricted use of 
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228 (Utah App. Ct. 2001) reinforced the fact that “e-mail transmission of sexually explicit and 
offensive material such as jokes, pictures, and videos, exposes the employer to sexual harassment and 
sex discrimination lawsuits…”. 
1272
 Kesan First Principle Examination of Electronic Privacy in the Workplace in Blanpain (ed.) On-
line Rights for Employees in the Information Society: Use and Monitoring of E-mail and Internet at 
Work (2002) 251 253. 
1273Supra. 
1274
 Kesan First Principle Examination of Electronic Privacy in the Workplace in Blanpain (ed.) On-
line Rights for Employees in the Information Society: Use and Monitoring of E-mail and Internet at 
Work (2002) 251 252 – 253. 
1275Supra. 
1276
 Hebert Employment Privacy Law (2009) § 8A:2. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
261 
 
Internet and e-mail by employees is necessary in light of the risks associated with the 
use of Internet and e-mail, such as the loss of confidential information.1277 For 
example, a Trojan Horse program, which is capable of sending information to 
undisclosed third parties without a user’s knowledge, can be sent with an e-mail that 
appears harmless to a user.1278 Sensitive information sent over e-mail, unless encoded, 
may be intercepted or its contents forged or altered. Furthermore, viruses can be 
transmitted via an e-mail sent to a recipient.1279 
7.3.3 Arguments against the Monitoring of Internet and E-mail Use in the 
Workplace 
A number of arguments against the monitoring of Internet and e-mail usage in the 
workplace have been advanced. Below, a selection of the more important of these 
arguments is considered. The essence of all of these arguments is primarily a theme 
that resonates throughout this dissertation, namely that employees have a right to 
privacy even in the workplace. Because employees take the view that their 
fundamental right to privacy does not cease to exist once they enter the employment 
relationship, it is not surprising that they further expect employers to respect their 
right to privacy in the workplace. This is so especially because “the once clearly 
demarcated boundaries between work and private life have become more and more 
blurred and in many cases eroded through new ways of working and technological 
developments”1280. In addition, new forms and patterns of work such as teleworking, 
homeworking and location independent working, as well as the growth of electronic 
communications via Internet, computers and mobile phones have all served to blur the 
line between an individual’s workplace and home.1281As a consequence, it is argued 
that employees should be permitted some personal use of an employer’s information 
technology resources for appropriate online activities.  
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Moreover, as is the case with ordinary mail, e-mail is a private means of 
communication in which the recipient is chosen by the author and its content usually 
intended solely for the recipient. For this reason, it is argued that e-mail often is 
intended to be private1282 and a reasonable expectation of privacy should be attached 
to personal e-mails employees send on or over the company system.1283 For instance, 
in the United States the Third Circuit Court held in Vernars v Young1284 that because 
individuals had a reasonable expectation of privacy that their mail will not be opened 
and read by unauthorised persons, the same reasoning could be extended to the 
treatment by employers of their employee’s personal mail. 
At the same time, security measures applied with respect to workplace computers and 
networks (such as confidential passwords and unique usernames) give the impression 
that computers are akin to personal desks or lockers in which employees have been 
held to have a reasonable expectation of privacy.1285 In this regard it was held by the 
Texas Court of Appeal in K-Mart v Trotti1286 that, as general rule, employees have a 
right to privacy in items locked in a desk, file cabinet, or locker if their employer does 
not require them to provide the supervisor with a key or a combination to open a lock.  
It is also argued that the use of e-mail and Internet enhances employees’ computer 
skills which may be applied in their workplaces.1287 In the same vein, the personal use 
of company resources may lead to an increase in productivity and may improve 
employee morale and cement loyalty. It may further allow employees to experience a 
sense of ownership in the company’s resources. It is also contended that it is 
unrealistic for employers to expect their employees to cease contact with family and 
friends upon entering the workplace and that employers should primarily be 
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concerned with whether or not an employee is doing his or her job and not with 
whether the employee is spending significant time on the Internet.1288 
Lastly, the restriction of on-line activities may increase stress levels of employees. 
Studies have indicated that electronic monitoring is a source of stress as it can take a 
physical and emotional toll on employees and ironically result in decreased 
productivity in the workplace.1289 
In summary, communications in the workplace take place not only through the spoken 
word but also through use of electronic tools like the Internet, intranet and e-mail. 
Internet and e-mail are replacing the traditional modes of communication and 
exchanges such as the letter, fax, telephone and telex. Internet and e-mail have not 
only altered the face of communication, but have also altered the business and 
workplace landscape. The use of Internet and e-mail at work has also redefined what 
constitutes a work day or workspace. Employees are accessible at any time and any 
place and have access to the workplace and work related data outside the workplace. 
Because Internet and e-mail are the preferred and most prevalent medium of 
communications in today’s workplace, employers feel the need to closely regulate or 
monitor the use of these communications by their employees in order to avoid the 
risks associated with their use. As such, the monitoring of employee use of workplace 
e-mail and Internet brings into play two competing interests, namely the employer’s 
right to conduct his or her business as he or she deems fit and the employee’s right to 
privacy.  
Employers advance a number of reasons to justify the monitoring of employer 
workplace tools such as Internet and e-mail. These reasons are formulated on the basis 
of economic and social reasons and are primarily aimed at ensuring a productive and 
efficient workplace. 
At the same time, a number of arguments against the monitoring of Internet and e-
mail usage in the workplace have also been advanced. The basis of these arguments 
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remains the existence of the right to privacy as a fundamental right, which also 
deserves recognition and protection in the workplace. Related arguments against 
monitoring of Internet and e-mail usage in the workplace are based on the realities 
and flexible nature work in the modern sense and the modern workplace, that these 
information systems encourage and should protect private use and that this may 
actually serve to increase economic performance. Viewed negatively, restrictions on 
privacy in the workplace through monitoring of Internet and e-mail usage may serve 
to increase anxiety and stress in the workplace, while such a restriction also runs the 
constant danger of suppressing creativity and innovation, generally recognised as 
positive side-effects of environments where privacy is allowed to flourish. 
The further discussion in this chapter will focus on how the selected jurisdictions have 
chosen legally to respond to the challenges raised by monitoring of Internet and e-
mail usage. 
7.4 SOUTH AFRICA 
7.4.1 Introduction 
Section 14(d) of the South African Constitution provides that everyone has a right not 
to have the privacy of their communications infringed. This aspect of the South 
African general right to privacy is known as informational privacy.1290 Privacy in this 
sense means control over information about oneself, a conception of privacy that was 
discussed in chapter 4. Furthermore, as also indicated in chapter 4, this form of 
control is “control over when and by whom parts of us can be seen or heard, touched, 
smelled or tasted by others”1291 and further “control over acquaintance with one’s 
personal affairs”.1292 
Informational privacy, according to De Waal and Currie should be construed as 
safeguarding the interest of an individual to restrict the collection, storage and use of 
personal information concerning him or her. The individual's expectation of 
informational privacy must be reasonable.1293 The Constitutional Court in Mistry 
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considered the following factors to determine whether an individual's expectation of 
informational privacy was reasonable in the circumstances:  whether the information 
was obtained in an intrusive manner; whether it was about intimate aspects of an 
individual's life; whether it involved data provided by the individual for one purpose 
which was then used for another purpose; and whether it was disseminated to persons 
from whom the individual could reasonably expect such information would be 
withheld.1294 In Mistry the Constitutional Court found that there had been no violation 
of the individual's informational right to privacy, because the information concerned a 
possible violation of a law by the individual and was communicated to the relevant 
official in the Medical Council by a member of the public. 1295 
7.4.2 Legislation 
Apart from Constitutional provisions,  and in contrast to most of the policies and 
practices discussed in chapter 6,  there are a number of pieces of legislation which 
protect (and protected) the individual right to privacy in their communications  by 
regulating the monitoring of Internet and E-mail communications in a direct or 
indirect fashion. 
7.4.2.1 Interception and Monitoring Prohibition Act (IMPA) 
The Interception and Monitoring Prohibition Act1296 (“IMPA”) came into effect on 1 
February 1993, before the interim Constitution of 1993 and arguably was the first 
piece of legislation applicable to monitoring of Internet and E-mail communications. 
Its purpose was to prohibit the interception and monitoring of certain communications 
and conversations and to provide for authorisation to do so in certain circumstances. 
IMPA repealed section 118A of the Post Office Act1297, which had earlier prohibited 
the wiretapping of a landline. For this reason, the purpose of IMPA placed emphasis 
on the fact that it aimed at the prohibition of the interception and monitoring of 
telephone conversations or the interception of postal articles communications. In 
actual fact, no mention was made of the regulation of the interception and monitoring 
                                               
1294
 De Waal and Currie Bills of Rights Handbook 5thed (2005) 325. 
1295
 De Waal and Currie Bills of Rights Handbook 5thed (2005) 324. 
1296
 Act 127 of 1992. 
1297Act of 1958. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
266 
 
of Internet and e-mail communications.1298 In contrast to section 118A, which was 
widely criticised for being “largely toothless” and limited, IMPA introduced harsh 
penalties for its contravention and signified a strong stance against illegal interception 
and monitoring.1299 
Despite the fact that the Act primarily focused on telecommunications, there appeared 
to be room for the argument that the provisions of the Act were broad enough to 
include Internet and e-mail communications. First, section 1 of the Act defined a 
“telecommunications line” to include “any apparatus, instrument, pole, mast, wire, 
pipe, pneumatic or other tube, thing or means which is or may be used for or in 
connection with sending, conveying, transmitting or receiving of signs, signals, 
sounds, communications or other information”. Secondly, a “monitoring device” was 
defined in the section 1 as “any instrument, device or equipment which is used or can 
be used, whether by itself or in combination with any other instrument, device or 
equipment, to listen to or record any conversation or communication”. Thirdly, 
section 2 of the Act which contained the prohibition on interception and monitoring 
provided as follows: 
“(1) No person shall –  
a) intentionally and without knowledge or permission of the dispatcher intercept 
a communication which has been or is being or is intended to be transmitted 
by telephone or in any other manner over a telecommunications line or;  
b) intentionally monitor any conversation or communication by means of a 
monitoring device so as to gather confidential information concerning any 
person, body or organisation”. 
Because the word “person” was not defined it arguably included an employer. Section 
2(1)(a) required the interception to be intentional and without consent or knowledge 
of the dispatcher (the party sending the communication). Section 2 further related to 
the interception of a communication that has been sent, is being sent and is intended 
to be sent. As such, in the employment context, an employer would have been able to 
intercept an employees’ Internet or e-mail communication at any point in time. With 
reference to the transmission of communications, the phrase “transmitted by telephone 
                                               
1298
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or in any other manner over a telecommunications line” also appeared to cover 
Internet and e-mail communications, seeing as Internet and e-mail communications 
are to a large extent transmitted over a telecommunications line.1300 Section 2(1)(b) 
stated that no one may intentionally monitor a conversation or communication 
through the use of a monitoring device for the purpose of gathering confidential 
information on a person, body or organisation. This meant, with regard to Internet and 
e-mail communications in the workplace that employers were not permitted to 
monitor such communications for the purpose of gathering confidential information 
on their employees. IMPA did not define the phrase “confidential information”. 
However, courts have defined “confidential information” to mean “information [the 
communicator] does not intend to disclose to any person other than the person to 
whom he is speaking and any other person to whom the disclosure of such 
information is necessarily or impliedly intended to be restricted”1301 and “information 
upon which the law confers the attribute of confidentiality”1302. In Protea Technology 
Ltd & Another v Wainer and Others it was further held  with regard to the provisions 
of section 2 (1)(b),  that the purpose of monitoring could be determined by examining 
the contents of the communication concerned.1303 
7.4.3  Case Law 
Mention has to be made of Moonsamy v The Mailhouse1304 where a different view of 
IMPA and its applicability in the private sphere was taken. It was held that IMPA was 
not concerned with interception and monitoring in the private sphere and therefore 
could not be applied to private sector employers and employees. Rather, it was held 
that IMPA was intended for use by public agencies such as the police, military and 
intelligence services in gathering evidence during the investigation of a crime.1305 
7.4.3.1 Case Law before RICPCIA 
Courts also addressed IMPA’s application with regard to interception and monitoring 
of telephone conversations and the admissibility of the evidence of such recordings.  
                                               
1300
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The admissibility of telephone conversation recordings obtained in contravention of 
IMPA was at issue in Tap Wine Trading CC v Cape Classic Wines (Western Cape)1306. 
The Court in Tap Wine Trading found that participant electronic monitoring does not 
breach the provisions of the Act and the constitutional right to privacy. In this regard, 
the Court drew a distinction between participant surveillance and third party 
surveillance. Participant surveillance, according to the Court, concerns the 
surveillance by one of the parties to the communication without the knowledge of the 
other party. Third party surveillance, on the other hand, concerns surveillance by a 
person or body other than the participants to the communication. The distinction 
between third party and participant surveillance was accepted by J Cameron in S v 
Kidson1307. Cameron J held that the intention of the legislature was for section 2 (1)(b) 
to apply to third party surveillance and not participant surveillance1308.1309 
In Protea Technology Ltd & Another v Wainer & Others1310 (decided under the Final 
Constitution), the employer had recorded phone calls made by the employee in the 
workplace without his consent. These phone calls were used in court to prove that the 
employee was acting in breach of a restraint of trade agreement. The employee argued 
that the recording invaded his right to privacy and contravened IMPA and that the 
court had no discretion to admit the evidence. The Court considered two issues: first, 
whether the employer’s conduct amounted to a breach of privacy and, secondly, 
whether the common law power of a court to admit evidence irrespective of the means 
by which it is obtained (that is the relevance test in Goosen v Caroline’s Frozen 
Yoghurt Parlour1311) remained valid under the new Constitutional dispensation. With 
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respect to the first issue, the Court held that the right to privacy requires a subjective 
expectation of privacy which society recognizes as objectively reasonable. More 
importantly, the Court also held the employee’s subjective expectation of privacy not 
to be objectively reasonable in light of the fact that the employee was in a position of 
trust and the telephone calls were made from the employer’s premises within business 
hours. The Court concluded that, because the parties were in an employment 
relationship, the conversations relating to the employer’s affairs were not private and 
therefore not protected by the Constitution. With respect to the second issue, the Court 
found that the discretion to admit illegally obtained evidence had to be exercised with 
reference to the substance of section 36(1) of the Constitution, meaning that the 
competing interests had to be balanced. The Court accordingly concluded the 
relevance test in Goosen was inconsistent with the Constitution, but still recognised 
discretion to be exercised on a case-by-case basis to admit illegally obtained evidence.  
At issue in Moonsamy v The Mailhouse1312 was whether the employer was entitled to 
use evidence at a disciplinary hearing which it had obtained by intercepting and 
recording the employee’s telephone calls in his office and which subsequently 
contributed to the employee’s dismissal. The employee argued that the evidence 
contravened IMPA and the Constitution. As mentioned above, the arbitrator 
established that IMPA applied only to interception or monitoring carried out by the 
police and the Defence Force. The tribunal based this on the fact that section 3(2) of  
IMPA provides that any application to a judge for a directive shall be made by a 
police officer, or an army officer, or a member of the intelligence services: “This 
would seem to be a clear indication that [IMPA] was intended to be used by only the 
police or military, including intelligence services, and is not concerned with 
interception or monitoring in the private sphere but is rather concerned with gathering 
of evidence by public agencies during the investigation of a crime”1313. The arbitrator 
also confirmed that the relevance test formulated in Goosen was contrary to the right 
to privacy contained in the Constitution. The arbitrator concluded that the recording 
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was in violation of section 14(d) of the Constitution and proceeded to consider 
whether the infringement was justified in terms of the limitations clause contained in 
the Constitution.  
In considering whether the infringement was justified,1314 the tribunal considered the 
following issues: the nature of right the court; the importance of the purpose of the 
limitation; the extent and nature of the limitation; the relation between the limitation 
and its purpose; and whether less restrictive means to achieve the purpose were 
available. In respect of the nature of the right, the tribunal held that the employee had 
a reasonable expectation of privacy in respect of calls made at his employer’s 
premises.1315 With reference to the importance of the purpose of the limitation, the 
tribunal reasoned that the employer considered its actions necessary for financial 
preservation and therefore the employee’s right to privacy had to be qualified. The 
arbitrator observed that the court in Protea Technology identified the competing 
interests to be the employee’s right to privacy versus the employer’s right to economic 
activity. The right to economic activity is no longer guaranteed in terms of the Final 
Constitution and has been replaced by section 22 of Constitution guaranteeing 
freedom of trade, occupation and profession. The introduction of section 22, 
according to the tribunal, seemed to indicate that the framers of the Constitution 
preferred “the employee’s personal right to the more amorphous (consequently 
controversial) right to economic activity”.1316 In considering the nature and extent of 
the limitation, the arbitrator opined that an employer might have a right to ask an 
employee to disclose the number of personal calls he or she made during working 
hours.1317 With regard to the relationship between the limitation and its purpose, the 
tribunal reasoned that if an employer showed that telephone tapping was the only 
method through which it could secure essential evidence against an employee, its use 
may be justified. As regards less restrictive measures to achieve the purpose, the 
tribunal reasoned that if the only method to obtain evidence was telephone tapping, 
the employer should have sought prior authorization.1318 
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In sum, and prior to IMPA coming into effect, “all relevant evidence which was not 
rendered inadmissible by an exclusionary rule was admissible in a civil court 
irrespective of how it was obtained”.1319 This unrestricted use of evidence resulted in 
abuse and violations of privacy. IMPA restricted the manner in which evidence was 
obtained and further introduced penalties for obtaining evidence in a manner contrary 
to the Act's requirements. The language of IMPA further points to the fact that the 
legislation was intended to apply to state agencies which were in the business of 
intelligence gathering for purposes of investigating and ultimately combating criminal 
activities. 
Up until the tribunal's reasoning in Moonsamy v The Mailhouse, it appears as if courts 
were quite willing to find that the application of IMPA was wide and that the Act 
applied to interception and monitoring in the private sphere. One reasons for this is 
that certain of terms in IMPA and its general prohibition were couched widely enough 
for the argument to be made that the Act could well regulate the interception and 
monitoring in places such as the workplace.  
The decision of Moonsamy v The Mailhouse altered this view when it cast doubt over 
the application of the Act in relation to interception or monitoring in the employment 
context. It is submitted that the arbitrator in Moonsamy v The Mailhouse was correct 
in finding that the Act aimed to regulate the interception and monitoring of 
communications by state institutions such the police, the military and other public 
agencies during the course of criminal investigations. Section 3(2) of  IMPA is 
indicative of this fact because it provides that only a judge may issue a directive on 
application by a police officer, or an army officer, or a member of the intelligence 
services enabling such persons to intercept and monitor communications: The fact that 
the Act was intended to apply  in the private sphere was later confirmed by the 
promulgation of Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of 
Communication – Related Information Act1320 (“RICPCIA”), IMPA’s successor. It is, 
however, important to bear in mind that it was only a matter of time before IMPA was 
replaced by legislation more attuned to advancements in technology. As pointed out in 
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Protea Technology1321 the language of IMPA concerned modes of communication, 
such as telegrams and telefaxes, that people in this day and age make little or no use 
of.  
7.4.3.2 The Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of 
Communication – Related Information Act (RICPCIA) 
The Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of Communication 
– Related Information Act1322 (“RICPCIA”), IMPA’s successor, is concerned with 
interception in both the private and public spheres and applies to private sector 
employees and employers. RICPCIA came into force and effect on the 30 September 
2005 and provides that no one may directly or indirectly intercept communications 
(including telephone calls, cell phone calls, e-mail and instant messaging, as well as 
SMS’s). Specifically, the Act prohibits the intentional interception or authorisation of 
an interception of any communication in the course of its occurrence or transmission. 
Section 2 of the Act contains the general prohibition and reads as follows:  
“Subject to this Act, no person may intentionally intercept or attempt 
to intercept, or authorise or procure any other person to intercept1323 
or attempt to intercept, at any place in the Republic, any 
communication1324 in the course of its occurrence of transmission.” 
Notwithstanding the general prohibition in section 2 of RICPCIA, the Act recognises 
3 instances in which the lawful interception of communications may take place: 
a) The Act in section 4(1) permits anyone other than a law enforcement officer to 
intercept certain communications if that person is a party to the 
communication. The Act does not define the term party, but within its 
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 603. 
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 Act 70 of 2002. 
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 ‘Intercept’ is defined as ‘the aural or other acquisition of the contents of any communication 
through the use of any means, including an interception device, so as to make some or all the contents 
of the communication available to a person other than the sender or recipient or intended recipient of 
that communication, and includes monitoring of any such communication by means of a monitoring 
device; viewing, examination or inspection of the contents of any indirect communication; and 
diversion of any indirect communication from its intended destination to any other destination.’ 
1324
 ‘Communication’ is defined as including both direct and indirect communications. 
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ordinary usage and meaning “party” includes the sender, recipient and 
probably the provider of the communications (i.e. the employer). 1325 
b) If one of the parties to the communication has given their prior consent in 
writing to such interception (section 5). The Act in section 5(1) again allows 
any person other than a law enforcement officer to intercept communications 
where one of the parties to the communication has given prior written consent 
to the interception. The consent to the communication must be given before 
the interception occurs and be in writing. The consent of an employee may be 
included in the terms and conditions of the employee’s contract of 
employment which may include an e-mail and Internet policy.1326 In the 
course of the carrying on of any business.1327   
c) Section 6 permits any person to intercept any direct communication by means 
of which a transaction is entered into in the course of that business (section 
6(1)(a)), or which relates to the business (section 6(1)(b)), or which otherwise 
takes place in the course of carrying on of that business. The ‘business 
exception’ provides the employer with lawful means of intercepting business 
communication without having to obtain consent from the employee. In terms 
of the exception, section 6(2) provides certain requirements an employer must 
meet in order for its interception to be lawful.  
These requirements relate to the nature and content of the intercepted communications 
(it must be communication related to the business or must take place during the course 
of the business);  the purpose for which the  interception is effected (it must be for 
legitimate purposes such as to establish the existence of facts, investigate or detect 
unauthorized use of the employer’s telecommunications system or to secure the 
effective operation of the employer’s telecommunications system); the nature of the 
telecommunication system involved (the telecommunication system must be provided 
for use wholly or partly in connection with the business of the employer); and the 
measure of control exercised over the interception process by the system 
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 Beech ‘The Right of an Employer to Monitor Employees’ Electronic Mail, Telephone Calls, 
Internet Usage and Other Recordings’ (2005) 26 Industrial Law Journal 650 656. 
1326
 Beech ‘The Right of an Employer to Monitor Employees’ Electronic Mail, Telephone Calls, 
Internet Usage and Other Recordings’ (2005) 26 Industrial Law Journal 650 658. 
1327The term ‘business’ is defined as ‘any business activity conducted by any person, including 
activities [the] activities of any private or public body. 
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controller(the system controller has to make all reasonable efforts to inform all 
individuals using the system in advance that interception of all  communications may 
take place). The business exception only applies to indirect communications. An 
“indirect communication” is defined in section 1 of the Act as the transfer of 
information including a message, or any part of a message, whether in the from of 
speech, music or other sounds, data, text, visual images (animated and non-animated), 
signals, or radio frequency spectrum, transmitted in whole or in part by means of a 
postal service or telecommunication system. Hence e-mail and Internet usage (as well 
as telephone conversations) by employees may be intercepted by the employer within 
the parameters of this exception.  In contrast, section 1 of the Act defines a “direct 
communication” as an oral communication other than an indirect communication 
between two or more people that occurs in the immediate presence of all the people 
participating in that communication, or the utterances of a person participating in an 
indirect communication, if the utterances are audible to another person who, at the 
time of the indirect communication, is in the immediate presence of the person 
participating in the indirect communication. (An employer may not monitor direct 
communications such as face to face discussions or post, since these are not 
transmitted over a telecommunications system.)  Noteworthy is the fact that the 
exception ceases to apply once the e-mail has reached it destination, since the Act 
indicates that the interception must occur during the course of transmission. 
7.4.3.3 Case Law after RICPCIA 
Bamford & Others/Energizer (SA) Limited1328 is one of the earliest decisions to put 
into perspective or effectively address the issue of employee privacy in the workplace, 
particularly in relation to the use of the employer's e-mail and Internet facilities. In 
this case Energizer, a leading manufacturer of batteries for electrical appliances, 
summarily dismissed a group of its female employees for violating the company’s e-
mail policy. At issue in Bamford was the fairness of this summary dismissal. The 
company justified the dismissal of the applicants on the following charges: 
1. The repeated violation of company policies and procedure regarding the use of 
company e-mail. 
2. The repeated receipt and forwarding to colleagues of obscene pornographic, 
racist and sexist material and jokes. 
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 [2001] 12 BALR 1251 (P). 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
275 
 
3. The violation of company procedures regarding the work environment.1329 
The applicants did not deny receiving and forwarding the said material and jokes. 
However, they contended that there was no clear rule against the private use of e-mail, 
that their right to privacy was invaded, and that there was a discriminatory application 
of discipline by the respondent.1330 In respect of last-mentioned claim, the applicants 
argued  that the standard of behaviour required by the respondent as regards company 
e-mail use was flawed because, were it applied across the board in business and 
industry, almost every employee would be at risk of losing their jobs.1331 In other 
words the applicants were asserting that even if there was a rule in place prohibiting 
the receipt and forwarding of pornographic, racist and sexist material and jokes, this 
rule was not consistently applied in the workplace, the more so because they were 
aware of other employees who received and forwarded such material and jokes 
without any disciplinary being taken against them. 
In considering these arguments the arbitrator found that although the standard policy 
document did not explicitly state the prohibitions about e-mail use in the workplace, 
there was enough in the document to suggest such prohibitions. The background of 
the applicants, which the arbitrator described as ‘middleclass…not bereft of 
education’, convinced the arbitrator that the applicants should have known that their 
conduct was not socially acceptable.1332 The arbitrator further stated that some of the 
materials received and forwarded by the applicants were ‘contrary to what would 
circulate amongst self-respecting people.’ Lastly, the arbitrator drew on common 
sense. He stated that even if the policy was silent on prohibitions against e-mail use in 
the workplace, common sense should have directed the applicants that the 
grotesqueness of the material they were receiving and forwarding had no place in the 
workplace.1333 
The arbitrator proceeded to find that the penalty of dismissal could be reasonably 
expected in the circumstances and also relied on the traditional arguments employers 
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advance to justify workplace surveillance of employee e-mail and Internet usage. In 
particular, the dismissals were found to be fair because of: 
1. The risks posed by the trafficking; 
2. The grotesqueness of the images. 
3. The danger of the outside world becoming aware of the exchanges of these 
messages and the further risk of the domain name of the respondent being 
associated with such material and jokes. 
4. The respondent’s exposure to trademark violations as the applicants resorted 
to entertaining themselves with trademark parodies. 
5. The offence that could be taken to the material and jokes by other staff 
members. 
6. The embarrassment to the employer by the exchange of such material and 
jokes.1334 
As far as violation of the applicants’ right to privacy was concerned, the arbitrator 
found this not to be the case. The arbitrator found that the material and jokes 
concerned could not be described as personal in nature, the personal dignity or 
personal affairs of the applicants had not been affected in any way, and the material 
and jokes concerned were stored in the respondent’s computers and could not be 
considered personal communications.1335 As such,  Bamford  broke new ground in that 
it made clear that, even where there is no (explicit) policy  regulating employee use of 
e-mail in a workplace,  employees cannot argue that they had a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in respect of  all received and forwarded communications in that 
workplace.  
The applicant in Cronje/Toyota Manufacturing1336 had been dismissed for circulating 
a cartoon he received via company e-mail. The cartoon superimposed President 
Mugabe of Zimbabwe head’s on a gorilla’s body. The bigger gorilla depicted in the 
cartoon was holding a smaller gorilla, also with Mugabe’s features, with a caption 
alongside worded “Mugabe and his right hand man. We want the farms to grow more 
bananas.” Although privacy considerations did not play a role in this case, the 
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respondent argued that it found it necessary to dismiss the applicant based on the 
following: 
1. race and race related issues are familiar and important issues on the shop floor; 
2. the employer’s factory employed a total of 4500 employees and 77 percent of 
these employees were black. This means one had to take extra care and display 
extra sensitivity towards the race issue, specially in light  of the country’s 
past;1337 
3.  concern that the incident would cause serious problems such as industrial 
action on the shop floor;1338 
4. the employer had dealt harshly with race related incidents in the past; 
5. employees knew that  racially offensive remarks and the distribution of 
racially offensive material or sexually explicit material would be dealt with in 
a very serious light; 
6. the employer’s internet and e-mail  code specifically prohibited the display 
and/or transmission of any offensive racial, sexual, religious or political 
images, documents and images on the company system;1339 
7. the depiction of a black person as an ape is racist and there is still a section of 
the white population that associated black people with apes; and 
8. the respondent’s shop stewards and black employees found the cartoon very 
offensive in that it portrayed black people as apes.1340 
The employee argued that he did not regard himself or the cartoon as racist, which is 
why he readily distributed the cartoon to others. The applicant also acknowledged that 
he was aware of the company’s e-mail policy, but was not aware of the fact that the 
cartoon fell within the policy’s prohibitions.1341 
On analysis of the evidence and argument, the presiding commissioner found that the 
cartoon was racist and inflammatory:  
“The subject of the crude superimposition is President Mugabe, but the 
picture and to no lesser extent, the caption, fall square into the crude, 
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offensive, racist stereotype developed over centuries by white people 
that associate black people with primates, beings of lesser intelligence 
and lower morality…The fact that the offensive, racist stereotype 
associating black people with apes exists is not disputed. This is a 
matter of deep moral, social and cultural sensitivity to black people, 
and this sort of offensive racial stereotyping is not by any means 
limited to black people. One recalls the grossly offensive and 
inflammatory caricatures of Jews which were specifically created by 
the Nazi party in the 1930’s, in order to alienate Jews from other 
Germans, as a prelude to the horrific social engineering that was to end 
in the holocaust. Jews were depicted as evil, as thieves, as base money 
lenders, as killers of German babies and the like. In a less crude form, 
these caricatures were deployed by anti-Semitic elements amongst 
Afrikaners prior to the Second World War. These caricatures were and 
are still are, deeply offensive to Jewish people, and not only to the 
particular person or leader depicted in the caricature. They offend 
people’s self-image as a cultural racial entity. The depiction of an 
Islamic leader as a pig would be found to be deeply reprehensible by 
Muslims in this and in many countries. In the same way the depiction 
of a black person as an ape is racist, inflammatory and inherently 
wrong.”1342 
Although the issue of employee privacy in the context of company e-mail systems 
was not raised in Dauth/Brown and Weir’s Cash and Carry1343, the matter deserves 
discussion since it adds to the general tenor of how South African courts and tribunals 
have addressed employee privacy with regard to e-mail use. In Dauth/Brown the 
applicant, a marketing manager, was dismissed for sending an e-mail on the internal 
company e-mail service to over 100 persons including managers and directors.1344 
The applicant argued that he could not be held responsible for the contents of the e-
mail as he was in a state of diminished responsibility because of his prescription drug 
intake for depression, insomnia and physical pain and emotional stress brought on by 
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his marital problems and the state of anxiety at losing his job.1345 On analysis of the 
evidence and arguments, the commissioner found that the applicant was not 
influenced by his medication when he sent the e-mail. The commissioner further 
found the dismissal justified since the remarks the applicant made about Jews were ‘a 
gross and sickening example of racism’. The commissioner harshly rebuked the 
applicant and felt the e-mail would ‘…offend not only Jewish people, but… [also] 
offend any enlightened or civilized person of whatever cultural or religious 
persuasion. The grotesque caricatures which flowed so glibly from the applicant’s key 
board, are strikingly similar to those which found favour with Nazi propagandists of 
the 1930’s, and it is well known that it was the use of that form of profoundly 
shameful racist stereotyping, that facilitated the complicity of German civilians in 
ghettos and the transportation of German Jews. Applicant should be deeply ashamed 
of himself…’.  
The employee in Singh and Island View Storage Ltd1346 had been dismissed for 
sending a sexually explicit e-mail to 3 of his colleagues on the company's intranet. 
The employee admitted that he was aware that the e-mail he had sent was 
inappropriate and contained sexually explicit material and also that he was aware of 
the company's electronic communications policy and that his conduct could result in 
his dismissal. The employee argued that he had intended no harm in sending out the e-
mail but had done so as a joke. The employee further argued that the company's 
electronic communications policy had not been consistently applied. Although the 
commissioner agreed that this was probably the case, the commissioner also reasoned 
that what was of paramount importance was the employee's motive in sending out the 
e-mail. In this respect, the commissioner found that the employee's motive was to 
embarrass and cause offence as he had admitted that he had a hostile and less than 
amicable relationship with his colleagues. The commissioner concluded that the 
employee was well aware of the consequences of his actions and his intention in 
sending the e-mail was to offend and insult his colleagues and, as such, found his 
dismissal to be justified. 
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The decision of Toker Bros (Pty) Ltd and Keyser1347 adopted the reasoning in 
Bamford. In Toker Bros (Pty) Ltd and Keyser an employee was charged with 
dishonesty in that she excessively misused the company computer for personal use 
during working hours and without permission. The employee was further charged 
with making defamatory remarks about her employer in an e-mail to a friend she sent 
from the company computer. The employee argued that her employer was aware that 
she was accessing the Internet to arrange a 20th school reunion, that her access to the 
Internet was mostly work related and that she was not told by her employer about a 
policy or rule against personal use of the Internet. The employee further admitted the 
defamatory remarks about her employer in her e-mail to a friend, but challenged the 
manner in which the e-mail was retrieved by her employer. The employer argued that 
it had advised the employee not to download from the Internet and denied giving her 
permission to use the Internet to arrange her school reunion. The arbitrator found that 
at issue was whether, in the absence of a written and clear policy against personal use 
of Internet, the employee could be reasonably expected to know or be aware of the 
rule. The arbitrator further found that “not all rules and policies have to be made 
known to employees as some common sense...[has] to be weighed against 
reasonableness”. As such, the employee “could reasonably have been expected to 
know the rules as she was cautioned at the start of her employment and due to her 
experience as an employee.” More importantly, the arbitrator pointed out that the 
charge was not for using Internet for personal use, but for using the Internet 
excessively for personal use. This implies that employers can reasonably expect their 
employees to make personal use of company Internet facilities, but the employee has 
to ensure that such use is within reasonable limits and not excessive.  
With regard to the employee’s challenge to the manner in which her defamatory e-
mail was accessed, the employer had argued that the manner in which the e-mail was 
obtained was not illegal in that the e-mail was obtained during an investigation into 
the employee’s excessive Internet usage. The arbitrator stated that the right to privacy 
in the Constitution particularly section 14 (d) prohibiting the monitoring and 
interception of employee communications, can be limited where consent has been 
given or a clear policy on monitoring and intercepting of communications in the 
workplace is implemented. The arbitrator found that the e-mail was not obtained with 
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malicious intent but its discovery was incidental to the investigation into the 
employee’s abuse of the company’s Internet facility. The arbitrator also considered 
the fact that the employee’s e-mail to her friend could have resulted in her employer 
being held vicariously liable in civil law, given that the e-mail could be regarded as 
offensive and insensitive by some of its recipients.  
In Van Wyk v Independent Newspapers Gauteng (Pty) Ltd & Others1348 the Labour 
Court reinforced the principle that personal e-mails sent from a company’s e-mail 
system are not private as they can be read by other recipients, especially where the 
intended recipients  also use the company e-mail system. The applicant had been 
employed as chief sub-editor by a newspaper when she had a heated argument with 
her editor and two other employees while on night duty. The next day the applicant 
addressed an e-mail to the managing director of the newspaper and six members of 
management to set out her frustrations at work, problems in the workplace and 
criticised the managing director and other senior management members. The 
employee sent an e-mail to her superior a day later in which she vented her feelings 
and frustrations about work  and further referred to her editor and his deputy as that 
‘arse hole’ and ‘his overbearing cohort’. This second e-mail landed on her editor’s 
desk in an unmarked envelope, even though the employee and her superior had not 
forwarded the e-mail to anyone else. The employee argued that the second e-mail to 
her superior should not be admitted by the arbitrator because of its private nature. The 
arbitrator found the employee should have been reasonably aware that the second e-
mail would be read by people other than its intended recipient given that: 
a) when her superior received her e-mail, two of her colleagues were standing 
behind her superior; 
b) the first and second e-mail were sent within a short time of each other and both 
dealt  wholly or partly with work related issues;  
c) the second e-mail was not marked private or confidential; 
d) the company’s e-mail policy stipulated that all information stored on the 
company system belongs to the company and cautions employees not to 
assume that their e-mails will not be read by others; and 
e) the e-mail had been sent to a communal computer which belonged to the 
company. 
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Recent case law relating to staff abuse of company e-mail and Internet suggests that 
courts and commissioners are unlikely to accept the  argument that the employee was 
unaware of a policy regulating such abuse, particularly where the concerned employee 
held a managerial or leadership role in a company and, of course, where the abuse is 
of an excessive nature. 
The employer in Kalam and Bevcap (Nampak)1349 established that over a period of 5 
months the employee had visited thousands of Internet sites, most of which contained 
pornographic material. The employer found that the employee had spent 
approximately 285 hours per week visiting 14802 non - work related sites. The 
employer further ascertained that the employee had visited and downloaded sexually 
explicit images using the company's Internet access. The employee was for this reason 
dismissed. The employee contended that his actions could not be considered 
unacceptable because he was aware of the company’s IT policy document, but had not 
read it because it was bulky document. The commissioner found the latter argument to 
be unacceptable and also found that the employee knew of the policy and its content 
because he ignored the popup messages that warned that the sites he was accessing 
were prohibited. The commissioner added that even if the employee was unaware of 
the policy and its contents, his common sense should have prevailed. The 
commissioner found the employee's dismissal to have been both substantively and 
procedurally fair. 
The employee in Latchmiah and Billiton Aliminium SA (Pty) Ltd t/a Bayside 
Aliminium1350 was also dismissed for repeatedly accessing pornographic websites via 
the employer’s Internet. However, unlike the employee in Kalam, the employee 
argued that he had a “dependency problem”, which employer had failed to explore. 
The employee, who had been employed as a process superintendent, further argued 
that his accessing of pornographic websites did not interfere with his work and that 
the rules in place restricting the accessing of pornographic sites, was not consistently 
applied. The employee further disputed the employer's argument that his repeated 
access interfered with the company's information systems as he did not access the 
sites with malicious intent. 
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The arbitrator found, in turn,  the existence of a well-established rule in the employer's 
workplace; the employee admitted to being aware of the rule; the rule was lawful and 
reasonable because it was aimed at dissuading unethical conduct, keeping the 
company information systems free from viruses and outside intrusion, preventing the 
slowing down of the system due to traffic, as well as preventing  sexual harassment 
claims; the rule had been breached by the employee's conduct and the “dependency 
problem” defence could not be considered because the employee failed to take steps 
to bring the problem to the attention of the employer; the rule was consistently 
applied; the company's Internet and access policies had evolved  because of the 
increase in Internet access in the workplace; and dismissal was an appropriate 
sanction because of the excessive nature of the employee's conduct.1351 
From the preceding discussion of case law decided since the enactment of RICPCIA, 
it appears as if South African courts take the following view towards employee 
privacy in the workplace: 
a) The employer is justified in protecting its business interests by regulating the 
use of e-mail and Internet in the workplace, because it owns the e-mail and 
Internet facilities in the workplace.  
b) The absence of an explicit policy or no policy is no excuse for forwarding 
racist or offensive e-mails using the employer's Internet facilities. This is 
probably the most consistent theme throughout the case law, which also 
shows reliance, in cases like Toker Bros (Pty) Ltd and Kalam and Bevcap 
(Nampak), on the common sense to be expected of employees. 
c) A tribunal will consider a number of facts in deciding whether or not the 
employer was justified in dismissing an employer because of abuse of a 
company’s e-mail facilities. Of particular importance in this regard is the 
reliance on our country’s new democratic and constitutional dispensation to 
address racial abuse (as evidenced by Cronje and Dauth/Brown). 
d) Tribunals in certain circumstances examine the intention of the employee in 
sending out an e-mail which later became the subject of his or her dismissal 
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and in some instances the intention of the employer in retrieving an 
employee's e-mail in deciding whether dismissal is appropriate (see Singh and 
Island Storage Ltd and Toker Bros (Pty) Ltd). 
e)  The Labour Court in Van Wyk v Independent Newspapers Gauteng (Pty) Ltd 
& Others held that personal e-mails sent from a company’s e-mail system are 
not private as they can be read by other recipients especially the intended 
recipients who are also using the company e-mail system. 
f) South African tribunals also tend to draw on comparing what would have been 
acceptable before the constitutional dispensation as opposed to what is 
considered acceptable in the new constitutional democracy. This is often the 
case when faced with the dismissal of an employee for use of the employer's 
e-mail system to receive or forward racially offensive material to third parties 
Take for instance, the decisions of Cronje and Dauth/Brown.  
Ironically, the right to privacy has only been considered in a handful of cases. From 
these cases it seems clear that in those instances where the right to privacy clashes 
with the interests of the employer in the context of e-mail and Internet use, the way in 
which the employer gathers information may well mean that the right to privacy has 
not been infringed upon (because of circumstances which eliminate a reasonable 
expectation of privacy), or, to the extent that there does exist an infringement of 
privacy, those (employer interests) may well constitute a justifiable and acceptable 
limitation on that right. South African tribunals have yet to apply the provisions of 
RICPCIA. 
7.4.4 Analysis 
In summary of the review of the South African approach to interception and 
monitoring of employee e-mail and Internet communications, it is immediately 
apparent (in contrast to the policies and practices discussed in Chapters 5 and 6) that 
South Africa now has legislation – RICPCIA - directly regulating this policy and 
practice. This was not always the case, as IMPA did not specifically provide for such 
interception and monitoring, although it arguable was broad enough to include 
Internet and e-mail communications in its scope of application. This, in itself, is a 
clear indication of the challenges technological developments create for the law in 
general, and privacy in particular  At the same time, case law decided under IMPA did 
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address the issue of privacy in the context of the interception of communications. In 
particular, it was decided that telephone calls in the workplace were not protected by 
the Act by virtue of the nature of the relationship between the employee and employer 
(Protea Technology). Furthermore, case law drew a distinction between participant 
surveillance and third party surveillance and concluded that the latter did not 
contravene the provisions of IMPA and infringe on the constitutional right to privacy 
(Tap Wine Trading).  Furthermore, it was also decided that IMPA was not concerned 
with interception and monitoring in the private sphere because it was intended for use 
by public agencies in gathering evidence during criminal investigations and therefore 
could not be applied to private sector employers and employees (Moonsamy). What 
can be said about these decisions is that they already started to send out a clear 
message that the clash of interests surrounding privacy has to be evaluated in the 
context of the workplace and that employers may have legitimate interests which 
trump any reliance on the right to privacy in the workplace. 
IMPA’s successor, RICPCIA, regulates the interception of communications in both 
the private and public spheres. RICPCIA, in general, prohibits the interception of 
communications, but also recognises 3 instances in which the interception of 
communications may be lawful – where a party to the communication is involved in 
the interception; if one of the parties to the communication has given their consent to 
the interception; and if the interception is carried out in the ordinary course of 
business. The latter exception provides the employer with a lawful means of 
intercepting business communications without the consent of the employee and 
applies to indirect communications such as e-mail and Internet connections 
intercepted within the parameters of RICPCIA. As such, legislation now also sends 
out a clear message that, in the circumstances defined by the Act, employees either do 
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the workplace, or, to the extent that 
they do, there are employer interests that outweigh privacy. 
Case law decided after the enactment of RICPCIA  has not really dealt with the 
application of that Act, nor in much detail with the balancing required where 
employer policies relating to e-mail and Internet clash with the privacy concerns of 
employees. Even so, and even though most cases have dealt with the fairness of 
dismissal of employees who abused e-mail and Internet systems, these cases already 
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make it clear that an employer has an important interest in the integrity of its 
information systems and that these interests typically will trump those of the 
employee. In general, these cases show a fourfold approach – that use of the systems 
provided by the employer already means that information stored and disseminated on 
those systems cannot be said to be private; by accepting that flagrant abuse (especially 
the dissemination of racial or sexually explicit material) of an employer’s information 
system (e-mail and Internet) does not raise privacy issues (even in the absence of a 
policy, there is no reasonable expectation of privacy, especially where the employee 
in question disseminates e-mail widely); that an employer may validly limit privacy 
through a clear policy in the workplace; and, to the extent that an employee may 
validly raise privacy issues, the interests of the employer are regarded as more 
important.   
7.5 UNITED KINGDOM 
7.5.1 Introduction 
In 2006, the United Kingdom’s Department of Trade and Industry (“DTI”) reported in 
its Information Security Breach Survey that 97 percent of United Kingdom businesses 
had Internet connection and 88 percent of this Internet connection is broadband.1352 
Furthermore, scanning of incoming e-mail and Web downloads was commonplace – 
70 percent of businesses scanned e-mail for viruses, 36 percent for inappropriate 
content, 15 percent for confidential information and 11 percent for unencrypted 
information that should ideally be encrypted. 62 percent of businesses reported having 
suffered a security incident in the previous year, 52 percent reported having suffered a 
malicious security breach and 68 percent of businesses attributed the cause of their 
worst security breach to an external threat. With regard to  the type of breach 
businesses had  suffered, 35 percent pointed to infection by viruses or other malicious 
software, 29 percent to systems failure or data corruption, 22 percent to staff misuse 
of information systems, 17 percent to attacks by an unauthorized outsider and 8 
percent to theft and fraud involving computers. With specific regard to staff abuse of 
company information systems, 21 percent of companies indicated they had been 
affected and, as far as the type of abuse is concerned, 17 percent of companies pointed 
to abuse of Web access, 11 percent to abuse of e-mail access, 4 percent to 
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unauthorized access to data systems, 2 percent to breaches of data protection laws or 
regulations and the abuse of confidential information.1353 
The 2008 Information Security Breaches Survey further showed that 24 percent of 
employers restricted Internet access to some staff only and 46 percent logged and 
monitored Web access in the workplace. Furthermore, 38 percent of employers 
blocked access to inappropriate websites and 94 percent of employers quarantined 
suspicious e-mail attachments. The 2008 survey also showed that most employers 
scanned outgoing e-mails for viruses, 26 percent of them for inappropriate content, 
such as the profane use of language and 16 percent of employers scanned outgoing e-
mail for confidential information. With respect to security breaches, 45 percent of 
companies reported having suffered a security breach in the previous, 35 percent of 
those being malicious. Most companies attributed the worst security breach they had 
suffered in the previous year to internal threats such as insider abuse of Internet 
access, viruses and laptop and mobile theft. A significant 62 percent of businesses 
claimed the cause of their worst incident was internal. Furthermore, 23 percent of 
businesses suffered a breach in the form of a systems failure or data corruption, 16 
percent suffered staff abuse of information systems and attacks by unauthorised 
outsiders (including hacking attempts) and, lastly, 14 percent of businesses suffered a 
breach in the form of an infection by viruses or malicious software.1354 Levels of staff 
abuse of company information systems dropped after 2006, but visiting inappropriate 
websites, excessive browsing and sending inappropriate e-mail remain commonplace. 
Lastly, the 2008 results show that security breaches that become known outside the 
company and receive adverse media coverage generally speaking remain somewhat of 
a rarity. Only 3 percent of United Kingdom employers attributed some damage to 
their reputation to the worst security incident they had suffered.  
7.5.2 Legislation 
7.5.2.1 Article 8 of the ECHR and the Human Rights Act 
The European Convention on Human Rights1355(“ECHR”) guarantees a number of 
political and civil rights, including the right to privacy. Article 8 of the ECHR 
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provides that “[e]veryone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his 
home and his correspondence.” This right can only be limited by a public authority in 
accordance with domestic legislation and as far as it is necessary in a democratic 
society for the protection of legitimate claims.  
The Human Rights Act1356 contains the absorption of Article 8 of the ECHR into 
United Kingdom law. Article 8 of the Human Rights Act generally protects a person’s 
private and family life, home and correspondence from arbitrary interference by the 
state, except where that interference is in accordance with the law (such as legislation 
or rules of a professional body);  in the interests of legitimate objectives set out in the 
Act ( the interests of national security,  the prevention of disorder or crime;  the 
protection of health or morals and  the protection of rights and freedoms of others); 
and necessary in a democratic society (the nature and extent of the interference must 
be weighed against the end it is set to achieve). By affirming the right to respect of 
one’s private life and correspondence, Article 8 of the Human Rights Act has 
implications for the online and e-mail privacy of employees.  
The ECHR provides no definition of what it means by privacy, but case law has shed 
light on the meaning of privacy in light of the ECHR.1357 Case law defines privacy as a 
wider than the inner sanctum of life and can encompass professional of business 
activities. Employees cannot rely on the ECHR for effective protection of their online 
rights, for a number of reasons, including uncertainty about the protection, if any, of 
an employee who  uses e-mail without the employers permission and  whether an 
employee who is informed monitoring will take place for legitimate purposes will 
have a reasonable expectation of privacy.1358 
The European Court of Human Rights imposes a duty on member states to ensure that 
measures are in place to afford individuals respect for their privacy and 
correspondence. In this regard, it was established in Niemetz v Germany1359 that an 
additional duty be placed on the state to put in place mechanisms which protect 
privacy between individuals, such as employee and employer. Hence, in Klass v 
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 Act of 1988. 
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 Niemetz v Germany [1992] EHRR 97. 
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 See decision of Halford v United Kingdom (1997) 24 EHRR 523. 
1359
 [1992] EHRR 97. 
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Federal Republic of Germany1360 and in Malone v United Kingdom1361 this duty was 
held to apply to the relationship between the employee and employer. 
7.5.2.2 Data Protection Act 
The Data Protection Act1362 (“DPA”) is incorporates aspects of the EC Directive 95/46 
– Data Protection Directive (“Data Protection Directive”) on personal data and 
governs the processing of personal data. The Data Protection Directive, , which aims 
to protect the data privacy of individuals  provides for a number of general principles 
related to  privacy in this context: everyone should have a right of access to personally 
identifiable data relating to themselves; a right to rectification of data where it is 
shown to be inaccurate; a right to object to the processing of his or personal data a 
right to information as to the purpose of processing and identity of the data controller 
(the person or body that determines the purposes and means of processing data, such 
as a company in relation to information about its clients and employees) and a right to 
consent to the processing of the data, especially where the data is sensitive.1363 The 
directive further ensures the free flow of data within the European Union by 
permitting companies and organizations within Europe to transfer data throughout the 
European Union.  However, such transfers may be limited in the employment context 
and decisions to block transfers are taken on specific individual cases in terms of 
Article 25.4 of the Directive. Article 26 of the Directive provides for the 
circumstances under which a transfer of data on employees may take place (for 
example where the transfer is essential for the protection of the interests of the 
individual concerned). Finally, the Directive’s application is limited in that it does not 
extend to the processing of data by individuals in the domestic sphere or the areas of 
public safety, defence or law enforcement.1364 
The DPA primarily places restrictions on the “processing” of “personal data”. Part I 
of the Act defines “data” to include information which is being processed by means of 
equipment operating automatically in response to instructions given for that purpose 
or is recorded with the intention that it should be processed by means of such 
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 [1978] 2 EHRR 213. 
1361
 [1984] 7 EHRR 14. 
1362
 Act of 1988. 
1363
 Articles 6 – 12 of the Data Protection Directive. 
1364
 Article 3 of the Data Protection Directive. 
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equipment. The definition therefore includes automatic systems that involve the 
interception of electronic communications such as Internet and e-mail1365 as well as 
employment related records. “Personal data” is defined in Part I of the DPA as data 
which relates to a living individual who can be identified from the data or from data 
and any other information in the possession of, is likely to come into possession of, 
the data controller and includes any expression of opinion about the individual and 
any indication of the intentions of the data controller or any other person in respect of 
the individual. The “processing” of data or information is defined as obtaining, 
recording or holding information or data or carrying out any operation or set of 
operations on the information or data including, inter alia, dissemination or otherwise 
making available, disclosure of information or of data by transmission, consultation or 
use of information or data and retrieval.1366 
Two preliminary points have to be made about the act. First, the DPA has to be 
promoted and enforced by a public officer known as the Information Commissioner. 
The Information Commissioner’s functions include promotion of the Data Protection 
Act, ensuring enforcement of the Act, to give advice on the Act and to decide cases 
relating to the Act. The Commissioner is also empowered under section 51 of the Act 
to prepare codes of practice to give guidance. In 2000, a draft Code of Practice on the 
Use of Personal Data in Employer/Employee Relationships, which discussed and 
clarified the application of the Act in the employment context, was issued.1367 Three 
years later (in 2003) The Employment Practices Data Protection Code (“Employment 
Practices Data Protection Code”), which includes a section on “Monitoring at Work”, 
was issued. The legal requirement on each employer is to comply with the Act and the 
Employment Practices Code sets out the Commissioner’s “good practice 
recommendations” as to how the legal requirements of the DPA can be met. The 
Employment Practices Code is not legally binding, but it can influence the decisions 
of tribunals and courts, particularly where there is uncertainty and the Employment 
Practices Code recommends a particular interpretation of a provision of the Act. As 
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 Morris English Law in Blanpain (ed.) On-line Rights for Employees in the Information Society: Use 
and Monitoring of E-mail and Internet at Work (2002) 132. 
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 Part I of the DPA. 
1367
 The Commissioner of Information is empowered to prepare code of practice in consultation with 
trade associations, data subjects or their representative bodies. Morris English Law in Blanpain (ed.) 
On-line Rights for Employees in the Information Society: Use and Monitoring of E-mail and Internet 
at Work (2002) 135.  
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such, relevant parts of the Employment Practices Code are likely to have persuasive 
weight in connection with any enforcement action that arises with regard to 
processing of information in the employment context.1368 The second preliminary 
point about the Act is that it requires data controllers to comply with eight data 
protection principles with respect to personal data. However, only the first, second, 
third, fifth and sixth data principles are relevant to monitoring of Internet and e-mail 
use in the workplace. The five relevant data principles, in their numbering assigned by 
the Act, will be discussed below.  
7.5.2.2.1 First Data Principle 
The “first principle”1369 is the duty to process data lawfully and fairly, which happens 
if at least one of the conditions set out in Schedule 2 of the Act is met. These 
conditions include the consent of the data subject to the processing. The use of the 
word “consent” in this context is misleading and should be understood to mean that  
an employee must be given a real choice whether to accept or decline the processing 
and be guaranteed that he or she will not be prejudiced as a result of whatever choice 
is made.1370 The consent of the sender or the third party or parties will be difficult, if 
not impossible, to obtain for the purpose of e-mails sent by employees, as they are 
likely to contain information about the sender or third parties.1371 The most important 
condition in Schedule 2 is that processing may be “necessary for the purposes of the 
legitimate interests pursued by the data controller or parties to whom the data are 
disclosed, except where processing is unwarranted in any particular case by reason of 
prejudice to the rights and freedoms or legitimate interests of the data subject.” This 
condition has been criticised for its uncertainty. The condition requires that a balance 
be struck between the data controller’s interests and interests of the data subject and 
depends wholly on the extent to which the courts accept that legitimate interests may 
include both economic and human rights interests (such as privacy).1372 
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 Morris English Law in Blanpain (ed.) On-line Rights for Employees in the Information Society: Use 
and Monitoring of E-mail and Internet at Work (2002) 132. 
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 Section 1 – 4 of the DPA. 
1370
 Morris English Law in Blanpain (ed.) On-line Rights for Employees in the Information Society: Use 
and Monitoring of E-mail and Internet at Work (2002) 132. 
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 Supra. 
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 Morris English Law in Blanpain (ed.) On-line Rights for Employees in the Information Society: Use 
and Monitoring of E-mail and Internet at Work (2002) 132. 
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The Act provides that “[i]n determining  for the purposes of the first principle whether 
the personal data are processed fairly, regard is to be had to the method by which they 
are obtained, including in particular whether any person from whom they are obtained 
is deceived or misled at to the purpose or purposes for which they are processed.”1373 
Schedule 1 goes on to specify that the processing will not be fair unless the data 
controller ensures as far as it is practical that the data subject has information about, 
inter alia, the identity of the data controller, the purposes for which the data has to be 
processed and any further information necessary, having regard to the specific 
circumstances in which the data are or to be processed, to enable the processing to be 
fair. An additional duty exists to provide such information where the information was 
obtained from a source other than the data subject, unless, amongst other things, the 
provision of the information involves a “disproportionate effort”. The Information 
Officer in determining whether the effort is “disproportionate” will take into account 
inter alia the cost to the data controller of providing the information, the difficulty of 
providing the information and the length of time it will take in each case, balanced 
against the extent to which withholding the information may be prejudicial to the data 
subject.1374 
The requirement of lawfulness is not defined or explained in the Act, but, in 
borrowing from the definition of “unlawful” in English case law, it is accepted to 
mean “…something which is contrary to some law or enactment or is done without 
lawful justification or excuse.”1375 This interpretation means that various forms of data 
processing would be in breach of the “first principle” requirement of lawfulness.1376 
7.5.2.2.2 Second Data Principle 
The “second principle” of the DPA requires that personal data be obtained only for 
one or more specified and lawful purpose(s) and shall not be processed in a manner 
incompatible with that purpose or those purposes. 1377 The purpose or purposes for 
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 Schedule I of the DPA. 
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 The Information Officer cited R v R [1993] 3 W.L.R. 767 in Morris English Law in Blanpain (ed.) 
On-line Rights for Employees in the Information Society: Use and Monitoring of E-mail and Internet 
at Work (2002) 134. 
1377
 Section 4 – 5 of the DPA. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
293 
 
which personal data may be obtained may be specified in a notice by the data 
controller to the data subject or the Information Commissioner (data controllers are 
required to give the Commissioner notification about specific details of their 
processing of data). Moreover, in determining whether any disclosure of personal data 
is compatible with the purpose or purposes for which the data was obtained, regard 
must be had to the purpose or purposes for which the personal data is intended to be 
processed by persons to whom such data is disclosed.1378 
7.5.2.2.3 Third Principle 
The “third principle” necessitates that personal data be adequate, relevant and not 
excessive in relation to the purpose or purposes for which they are processed.1379 
7.5.2.2.4 Fifth Data Principle 
The “fifth principle” of the DPA requires that personal data processed shall not be 
kept for longer than is necessary for that purpose or those purposes.1380 This principle 
may be breached if an e-mail is deleted from a system but is held as back- up or as 
archive data.1381 
7.5.2.2.5 Sixth Data Principle 
The “sixth principle” provides that data shall be processed in accordance with the 
rights of data subjects, which includes the right to notice where a data subject has not 
consented to the processing.1382 The “sixth principle” will be breached where the data 
controller fails to supply the data subject with a copy of information constituting 
personal data about them. A further breach of the principle will occur where the data 
controller “…fails to comply with a notice from a data subject requiring the controller 
to cease processing any personal data on the ground that, for specified reasons, the 
                                               
1378
 Section 4 – 5 of the DPA. See also Morris English Law in Blanpain (ed.) On-line Rights for 
Employees in the Information Society: Use and Monitoring of E-mail and Internet at Work (2002) 
134. 
1379
 Schedule 2 and section 8 of the DPA. 
1380Schedule 2 of the DPA. 
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processing is causing or is likely to cause substantial damage or substantial distress to 
the data subject or another and that damage or distress will be unwarranted”.1383 
7.5.2.3 Employment Practices Code and Supplementary Guidance 
The Employment Practices Code Supplementary Guidance, which is not binding 
legislation per se but a guide to employers to enable them to meet the requirements of 
the DPA, encourages employers monitoring electronic communications such as 
Internet and e-mail to put in place a policy on the use of such communications and to 
communicate the policy to employees. Moreover, employers have to ensure that the 
Employment Practices Code reflects data protection principles and integrates data 
protection features by, for example, specifying in detail the extent to which employees 
may use electronic communications for private use and the restrictions on material 
that can be sent or received.1384 More importantly, employers do not only have to 
communicate the nature and extent of the monitoring but also the purpose of the 
monitoring.1385 The Employment Practices Code Supplementary Guidance further 
advises employers to consider an impact assessment in determining whether the 
monitoring can be limited.1386 An employer may, for example, use a less intrusive 
method such as automated monitoring and a detection process to protect its system 
from hackers and viruses.1387 Employers are also encouraged to request employees to 
mark e-mails as personal and private so as to confine the monitoring to e-mails that 
are not marked as such.1388 The Employment Practices Code stresses the principles of 
transparency and proportionality. To address the transparency principle, the 
Supplementary Guidance of the Employment Practices Code recommends that 
employers notify employees and other parties to the communications of the 
monitoring. To address the proportionality principle, the Employment Practices Code 
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Supplementary Guidance recommends employers eliminate the collection of personal 
information that is “irrelevant and excessive” to the employment relationship.1389 
7.5.2.4 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act and the Telecommunications (Lawful 
Business Practice) Regulations 
7.5.2.4.1 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) 
Similar to the Data Protection Act, the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act1390 
(“RIPA”) regulates the use of e-mail and Internet usage at work in regulating for 
amongst other things, the interception of communications and the acquisition of data 
relating to communications.1391 RIPA was created to “ensure that the relevant 
investigatory powers are used in accordance with human rights” by extending the 
legal regulation of interceptions to cover private networks directly or indirectly 
attached to a telecommunications system.1392 RIPA aims to reform national law and to 
implement the pertinent requirements of European Directive 97/66 on Data Protection 
Telecommunications.1393 Prior to RIPA, there was a gap in English law with respect to 
legislation governing the interception of communications on private 
telecommunications networks.1394 “Communications” are defined in the Act to include 
speech, music, sounds, visual images, and data of any description, e-mail messages, 
telephone calls, faxes, voice mail and Internet access. The Act provides in section 1(3) 
that: 
“[a]ny interception of a communication which is carried out at any place in 
the United Kingdom by, or with the express or implied consent of, a person 
having the right to control the operation or use of a private 
telecommunication system shall be actionable at the suit or instance of the 
sender or recipient, or intended recipient, of the communication it is 
without lawful authority and is either – 
                                               
1389Lasprogata, King and Pillay “Regulation of Electronic Employee Monitoring: Identifying 
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a) an interception of that communication in the course of transmission by means 
of that private system; or 
b) an interception of that communication is the course of its transmission, by 
means of a public telecommunication system, to or from apparatus comprised 
in that private telecommunication system.”  
Section 2(3) further provides that for purposes of the Act, a person intercepts a 
communication in the course of is transmission by means of a telecommunications 
system if he modifies or interferes with the system, or its operations; monitors 
transmissions made by means of the system; or monitors transmissions made by 
wireless telegraphy to or from apparatus comprised in the system, so as to make some 
or all the contents of the communication available to a person other than the sender or 
intended recipient of the communication. An employer who intercepts a 
communication to or from its own telecommunication system could therefore face a 
suit from the sender or recipient of a communication on the basis that the interception 
lacks lawful authority.1395 
The Act accomplishes two purposes. First, it creates the general framework for the 
interception of all communications on private and public telecommunications 
systems. Secondly, it establishes the general principle that such interception shall be 
lawful if parties making and receiving the communications have consented to the 
interception.  
7.5.2.4.2 Telecommunications (Lawful Business Practice) Regulations 
The Secretary of State has authority in terms of RIPA to make regulations permitting 
businesses to lawfully intercept communications to which the parties making and 
receiving the communications have not consented.1396 The Secretary of State has 
exercised this authority through the Telecommunications (Lawful Business Practice) 
Regulations of 2000 (“the Regulations”). The Regulations give employers 
considerable powers of interception, especially in the performance of a variety of 
purposes such as ensuring the effective operation of their systems and in order to 
comply with external and internal regulations. The Regulations authorise interceptions 
                                               
1395
 Morris English Law in Blanpain (ed.) On-line Rights for Employees in the Information Society: Use 
and Monitoring of E-mail and Internet at Work (2002) 130. 
1396
 The Secretary of State is authorised in terms of section 4(1)(e) of RIPA to make such regulations. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
297 
 
of telecommunication communications which would otherwise be unlawful in terms 
of section 1 of RIPA. Interceptions permitted in terms of the Regulations have to meet 
three conditions to be considered lawful: first, the interception must be done using the 
business’ own telecommunications system;1397 second, the interception is authorised 
only if the system controller of the business telecommunications consented to the 
interception or carried out the interception and further made all reasonable efforts to 
inform users of the business telecommunications system that interceptions may be 
carried out;1398 third, the sole purpose of the interception must be the surveillance of 
communications relevant to the controller’s business.1399 
Section 3 of the Regulations goes on to list seven purposes which would make non-
consensual interception and recording of communications lawful: 
a) To establish the existence of facts. This purpose refers to the need for 
businesses to keep records of communications relating to, for example, orders 
and purchases; 
b) To ascertain compliance with regulatory or self-regulatory practices1400 or 
procedures applicable to the system controller in carrying on of his business 
or applicable to another person in the carrying on of his business, where that 
person is supervised by the controller in respect of those practices or 
procedures. This purpose refers to binding and voluntary legislation, codes or 
standards of any country within the European Economic Area; 
c) To ascertain or demonstrate the standards which are achieved or ought to be 
achieved by persons using the system in the course of their duties. This 
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purpose refers to standards and procedures set by the employer such as 
quality control and training procedures; 
d) To prevent or detect crime; 
e) To investigate or detect unauthorised use of any telecommunications system. 
This is designed to  enable employers to intercept their employee’s 
communications in order, for example, to check if employees are not 
contravening workplace rules on the use of Internet and e-mail; 
f) To ensure the effective operation of the system. This purpose is designed to 
cover interception as an inherent part of a system’s effective operation, such 
as virus checks, traffic routing1401 and system maintenance (which is still 
lawful under RIPA); 
g) To monitor (not record) communications to determine whether the 
communication is relevant to the business. This purpose was designed to 
enable employers to check the communications of a temporarily absent 
employee in order to determine the existence of business matters that need 
attention in the absence of that employee.1402 This purpose strikes a balance 
between giving businesses access to their own communications and protecting 
the privacy of non-business communications, but at the same it introduces the 
risk of intercepting non-business communications in order to establish 
whether communications are business related.1403 
The aforementioned purposes are, however, subject to limitation borne out of the 
uncertainty regarding the correct interpretation of the Regulations and other 
legislation in the same area, as well as the relationship between the Regulations and 
other legislation.1404 The first and most important limitation relates to personal data. 
Whenever surveillance entails the processing of personal data, the limitations that the 
DPA imposes on workplace surveillance will apply and so will the provisions of the 
                                               
1401
 Morris English Law in Blanpain (ed.) On-line Rights for Employees in the Information Society: Use 
and Monitoring of E-mail and Internet at Work (2002) 131. 
1402
 Morris English Law in Blanpain (ed.) On-line Rights for Employees in the Information Society: Use 
and Monitoring of E-mail and Internet at Work (2002) 131. 
1403Supra. 
1404
 Morris English Law in Blanpain (ed.) On-line Rights for Employees in the Information Society: Use 
and Monitoring of E-mail and Internet at Work (2002) 131. 
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Regulations in order to comply with the First Data Protection Principle that 
surveillance should constitute lawful processing.1405 
The second limitation is imposed by the Human Rights Act1406 requirement that all 
legislation be interpreted in accordance with Article 8 of the ECHR, which reinforces 
the protection of privacy.  This requirement will affect the interpretation of RIPA and 
the Regulations whether or not surveillance is covered by the DPA.1407 
The third limitation lies in the scope of the power to regulate in RIPA. The Act grants 
the Secretary of State the power to make Regulations and at the same time impresses 
binding conditions on the use of that power.1408 Limitations may also apply to the 
different purposes identified by the Regulations which would make interception 
lawful.1409 The first purpose (which provides that employers may intercept solely to 
establish the existence of facts) does not furnish employers with the additional 
permission to intercept in order to establish the identity of those facts. The first 
purpose thereby appears to preclude employers from keeping commercial records. 
The third purpose (which allows for compliance with an employer’s own standards) 
makes reference to the employee’s “duties”, thereby suggesting that the interception 
may extend only to standards that are included in the employee’s contract of 
employment.1410 
The fourth limitation is found in the fact that RIPA and the Regulations aim to 
improve national law and implement Directive 97/66. In effect, the Directive limits 
some of the lawful purposes identified in the Regulations. Purposes one to five 
(establishing facts, compliance with external regulations, compliance with internal 
standards, detecting crime and detecting unauthorised use) fall within the scope of 
Directive 97/66, though their scope appears to be wider than permitted by the 
                                               
1405
 Morris English Law in Blanpain (ed.) On-line Rights for Employees in the Information Society: Use 
and Monitoring of E-mail and Internet at Work (2002) 131. 
1406Act of 1998. 
1407
 Morris English Law in Blanpain (ed.) On-line Rights for Employees in the Information Society: Use 
and Monitoring of E-mail and Internet at Work (2002) 131 - 132. 
1408Supra. 
1409
 Morris English Law in Blanpain (ed.) On-line Rights for Employees in the Information Society: Use 
and Monitoring of E-mail and Internet at Work (2002) 131 - 132. 
1410
 Morris English Law in Blanpain (ed.) On-line Rights for Employees in the Information Society: Use 
and Monitoring of E-mail and Internet at Work (2002) 131 - 132. 
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Directive.1411 In terms of Article 5(2) of the Directive, permissible exceptions to the 
principles of privacy and confidentiality include those “in the course of lawful 
business practice for the purposes of providing evidence of a commercial transaction 
or for any other business communication”.1412 On the contrary, the Regulations and 
section 4 (2) of RIPA refer to the establishments of facts (not evidence) and seem to 
preclude employers from keeping commercial records, but not requiring that 
transactions be commercial. Further, the Regulations and RIPA refer to 
communications related to the business, whereas the Directive refers to business 
communication.1413 Moreover, purposes six and seven (ensuring the effective 
operation of the system and checking to determine whether communication is relevant 
to the business) appear to fall outside the scope of the Directive, which is primarily 
concerned with the confidentiality and privacy of communications.1414 
The Regulations have been criticised for giving employers “sweeping powers to 
monitor” their employee’s e-mail and Internet activities in the workplace. First, the 
Regulations do not interfere with the employer’s unilateral power to determine the 
manner in which the communications will be used.1415 Secondly, the Regulations 
permit the employer to intercept communications in order to determine whether its 
telecommunications system is being used appropriately.1416 Thirdly, the Regulations 
do not require employers to show that they suspect the unauthorised use of their 
system or that their action is proportionate before monitoring any communications. 
Lastly, the Regulations permit employers to monitor (not record) communications to 
determine whether the communication is relevant to the business. This creates the 
threat of all communications (regardless of whether they are relevant to the business) 
being intercepted.1417 The Regulations have further been criticised for contradicting 
                                               
1411Supra. 
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 Morris English Law in Blanpain (ed.) On-line Rights for Employees in the Information Society: Use 
and Monitoring of E-mail and Internet at Work (2002) 131 - 132. 
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primary legislation like the Data Protection Act.1418 Notwithstanding this, the 
Regulations only permit interception to the extent that it is in line with Directive 
95/46, Directive 97/66, the Data Protection Act and the Human Rights Act.1419 
7.5.3 Case law 
English law does not explicitly entitle employees to use their employer’s Internet and 
e-mail for personal purposes and the extent of use of an employer’s on-line facilities 
is usually determined by the employer. A number of cases have come before the 
European Court of Human Rights concerning the interception of workplace 
communications and these decisions in essence spell out the approach of English and 
European tribunals to the privacy of employees and their communications in the 
workplace. 
7.5.3.1 Halford v United Kingdom 
Halford v United Kingdom1420 is the first decision in which the European Court of 
Human Rights considered the application of Article 8 to the workplace. At issue in 
Halford was the interception of workplace communications (more specifically 
employee phone calls in the workplace). The court found that the employee, an 
assistant Chief Constable, had a reasonable expectation of privacy because of the 
presence of the following factors: the employee had not been warned that her calls 
could be subject to interception by her employer; she had the sole use of the two 
phones in her office, one of which was solely for private use; and she had been 
guaranteed a measure of privacy in relation to calls made from her office for purposes 
of her sex discrimination case. On the face of it, the decision seems to be a positive 
one for workplace privacy protection. On closer scrutiny, the decision is quite narrow 
as it rests particularly on Halford’s “reasonable expectation of privacy”. Ford 
observes that the “reasonable expectation test” in Halford “appears to take as its 
starting point that privacy at work is a deferential to management prerogative. 
Provided management tells workers or imposes a contractual “agreement” that for 
example, their calls are liable to interception, they will be watched by CCTV or they 
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will be tracked by infrared badges, it is hard to see how private life is engaged at 
all”.1421 
7.5.3.2 Niemetz v Germany 
The ECHR in Niemetz v Germany1422construed the private life categories in Article 8 
and declined to take a narrow approach to the interests protected by Article 8: 
“[t]he Court does not consider it possible or necessary to attempt an 
exhaustive definition of “private life”. However, it would be too 
restrictive to limit the notion to the “inner circle” in which the 
individual may live his own personal life as he chooses to exclude 
therefrom entirely the outside world not encompassed within that 
circle. Respect for private life must also comprise to a certain degree 
the right to establish and develop relationships with other human 
beings. There appears, furthermore, to be no reason of principle why 
this understanding of the notion of private life should be taken to 
exclude activities of a professional or a business nature since it is, after 
all, in the course of their working lives that the majority of people have 
a significant, if not the greatest opportunity of developing relationships 
with the outside world…especially in the case of a person exercising a 
liberal profession, his work in that context may form part and parcel of 
his life to such a degree that it becomes impossible to know in what 
capacity he is acting at a given time”.  
The Niemetz approach suggests that a key aspect of private life in Article 8(1) is 
“establishing and developing relationships with others, including with work 
colleagues during… [working hours] as well as outside [the workplace]…” and 
further exhibits “…a strong tendency to require stringent objective justification of a 
wide range of employer practices” in terms of Article 8(2)”.1423 
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7.5.3.3 Copland v United Kingdom 
As in Halford, the European Court of Human Rights found in Copland v United 
Kingdom1424 that because the employer had no internal policy in place pertaining to 
the monitoring of telephone, e-mail and Internet usage by its employees, its 
employees had a reasonable expectation to privacy with respect to their telephone, e-
mail and Internet usage.  
The facts were that C was employed by a state college as personal assistant to the 
college principal and was required to work closely with the deputy principal. C went 
on leave and whilst on leave, the deputy principal instructed that her telephone, e-mail 
and Internet usage be monitored. C argued that the monitoring violated her right to 
respect for her private life and correspondence (protected by Article 8 of the ECHR), 
because it not only covered her telephone, e-mail and Internet usage but her 
movements at work and whilst on leave.  
The college contended that the monitoring was essentially carried out to determine 
whether C was making personal use of the colleges’ facilities and merely entailed the 
analysis of automatically generated data. The college further contended that the 
monitoring was carried out in pursuit of the legitimate aim of ensuring that the 
facilities of the college, which was publicly funded, were not abused and that it had 
authority to do so in terms of its’ statutory powers. 
The Court reasoned that the employee’s telephone usage in the workplace was 
protected by Article 8 and for this reason C had a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
her telephone, e-mail and Internet usage at work, because she had not been warned 
that the use of her work telephone would be the subject of monitoring. This 
expectation extended to her usage of e-mail and Internet at work. The Court found 
that the collection and storage of personal information relating to C’s use of her work 
telephone, e-mail and Internet interfered with her right to respect for her private life 
and correspondence protected in Article 8, because such collection and storage was 
done without her knowledge. Lastly, the Court found that the interference was not in 
accordance with the law because there was no general domestic law or statutory 
powers regulating the monitoring in place at that time. 
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7.5.3.4 Re an Employer's Call – Monitoring System 
The employer in the Austrian decision of in Re an Employer's Call – Monitoring 
System1425 installed a new telephone system, but only gave its employees information 
about the possibility of installing the system three months after its actual installation. 
Moreover, the employer installed and used the new telephone system without prior 
consent from the Work Council. The system, like telephone service companies' 
systems, was capable of recording data (that is the caller's extension, the number 
called, the line used, the date, the time, the length of the conversation, the cost and the 
number of impulses) for  both business and personal outgoing calls.  
The Works Council argued that the installation of the system was likely to affect the 
human dignity of the affected employees, because it was tantamount to a monitoring 
system and its use would involve the collection, analysis and storage of employee 
data. It argued that the system could identify employees contacting the Works Council 
and further identify persons making calls to employees. The employer, on the other 
hand, argued that the system was a business tool which enabled it to determine 
whether a call from its premises was a business or a private call, which could assist 
for purposes of reducing prolonged private telephone conversations and avoiding 
excessive use of telephones. The employer further argued that the system did not 
involve listening in on calls; hence the privacy of the employees' call was preserved. 
The Austrian Supreme Court stated that it was settled law in terms of European Court 
of Human Rights jurisprudence that telephone conversations taking place at the 
workplace were envisaged in the concepts of “private life” and “correspondence” 
expressed in the wording of Article 8 of the ECHR. The Court also pointed out that 
there were two conflicting fundamental rights at stake– the employers’ right to 
inviolability of property (protected by Article 5 of the ECHR) versus the employees’ 
right to respect for his private and family life (protected by Article 8 of the ECHR). 
The Court further identified three interests invoked by the employment relationship in 
this regard: first, the employer’s obligation to provide for the welfare of its 
employees; the employee’s duty of trustworthiness; and the general interest in the 
economic consideration of reducing telephone bills. In weighing up these competing 
interests, the Court found that the employer, “as the owner of the telephone system 
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and as the person responsible for paying the telephone service provider, cannot be 
prevented from  charging his employees for private calls...Monitoring does not itself 
infringe any privacy enjoyed by the employees. It is a feature of the employment 
relationship that the employee is subject to the control of the employer”.1426 
7.5.4 Analysis 
The 2006 and 2008 DTI Information Security Breaches Survey indicate that a 
considerable number of United Kingdom employers do monitor and to some extent 
intercept employee e-mail and Internet communications in the workplace. It further 
appears that the United Kingdom employers monitor and intercept employee e-mail 
and Internet communications for a number of reasons, primarily to prevent viruses 
and other malicious software from corrupting their information systems and also as a 
means for ensuring that employees do not send out inappropriate content and 
confidential employer information using the employers systems.  
English law does not explicitly entitle employees to use their employer’s Internet and 
e-mail for personal purposes and the extent of use of an employer’s on-line facilities 
is usually determined by the employer. That being said, United Kingdom employees 
have recourse to three pieces of legislation to protect their rights, namely Article 8 of 
the ECHR, the DPA and RIPA (which has similar provisions to our RICPCIA). 
Article 8 of the Human Rights Act has implications for the online and e-mail privacy 
of employees by virtue of its affirmation of the right to respect one’s private life and 
correspondence. Article 8 of the ECHR was absorbed into domestic law after the 
implementation of the Human Rights Act and provides a measure of protection for the 
right to privacy in employment.  
There are different approaches to privacy in the ECHR associated with the judgments 
in Niemetz and Halford, Ford describes  these as follows: “[t]he conception of privacy 
endorsed in Niemetz is close to a right to individual and perhaps collective 
autonomy…Conversely, it is clear that a conception based on a “reasonable 
expectation” test will in practice fail to offer any significant protection against the 
growing intrusiveness of new techniques of surveillance, or indeed any worker 
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interests”.1427 McColgan, expounding on the effect of these differing approaches, 
states that if the more generous and purposive Niemetz approach is preferred, then 
Article 8 can provide significant protection from workplace surveillance. However, if 
the restrictive Halford approach is applied, Article 8 will be of little use for protection 
of employees against the interception of workplace communications and surveillance 
of employees through the use of CCTV, monitoring of key board use, audio 
recording, vehicle monitoring and internet access monitoring. The Halford approach 
will to some extent, however, prove useful as employees may have “a reasonable 
expectation of privacy”, particularly in the absence of clear and express warning, in 
relation to e-mails protected by a password and which have been deleted and in 
relation to telephone calls.1428 
The DPA primarily places restrictions on the “processing” of “personal data” and 
does so, among other things, through enforcement of data principles, five of which are 
relevant in the current context: the “first principle” is the duty to process data lawfully 
and fairly; the “second principle” requires that personal data be obtained only for one 
or more specified and lawful purposes; the “third principle” necessitates that personal 
data be adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purpose or purposes for 
which they are processed; the “fifth principle” requires that personal data processed 
shall not be kept for longer than is necessary for that purpose or those purposes; and 
the “sixth principle” provides that data shall be processed in accordance with the 
rights of data subjects under this the Act and includes inter alia the right to give the 
data subject notice where a data subject has not consented to the processing. The DPA 
almost always applies to surveillance in the workplace. It further will almost always 
involve the making of records which identifies an individual and therefore constitutes 
the processing of personal data as described by the Act.  
Similar to the DPA, the RIPA and the Telecommunications (Lawful Business 
Practice) Regulations of 2000 issued in terms of RIPA, regulate the use of e-mail and 
Internet usage at work. RIPA was created to “ensure that the relevant investigatory 
powers are used in accordance with human rights” by extending the legal regulation 
of interceptions to cover private networks directly or indirectly attached to a 
                                               
1427
 Ford “Two Conceptions of Worker Privacy” (2002) 31 Industrial Law Journal 135 153. 
1428
 McColgan “Do Privacy Rights Disappear in the Workplace” (2003) Special Issue European 
Human Rights Law Review 120 128 - 129. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
307 
 
telecommunications system. The Regulations give employers considerable powers of 
interception, especially in the performance of a variety of purposes such as ensuring 
the effective operation of their systems and in order to comply with external and 
internal regulations. The Regulations authorise interceptions of telecommunication 
communications which would otherwise be unlawful in terms RIPA. Interceptions 
permitted in terms of the Regulations have to meet three conditions to be considered 
lawful: first, the interception must be done using the business’ own 
telecommunications system; second, the interception is authorised only if the system 
controller of the business telecommunications consented to the interception or carried 
out the interception and further made all reasonable efforts to inform users of the 
business telecommunications system that interceptions may be carried out; third, the 
sole purpose of the interception must be the surveillance of communications relevant 
to the controller’s business. The Regulations furthermore set out seven purposes 
which would make non-consensual interception and recording of communications 
lawful, but, as discussed, these purposes may themselves be limited. Available case 
law has not so much dealt with the application and interpretation of legislation 
regulating e-mail and Internet use in the United Kingdom. Rather, it has dealt with the 
application of the right to privacy as found in the ECHR and the Human Rights Act. 
Even so, it is noteworthy that, just as the case is in South Africa (and, again dissimilar 
to the other policies and practices discussed in Chapter 5 and 6), the United Kingdom 
has enacted legislation more or less specifically aimed at electronic interception. As 
such, the legislation itself already recognizes the magnitude of the threat to privacy 
(given the ease of infringement through technological developments), but also seeks 
to balance the interests of both employer and employee.  
7.6 UNITED STATES 
7.6.1 Introduction 
United States employers generally argue for the monitoring and regulation of 
employee e-mail and Internet usage for the following reasons: to ensure that trade 
secrets and other confidential business information remain so; to ensure that sexual or 
racial harassment or the creation of a hostile work environment is not occurring 
through the “transmission and display of sexually or racially suggestive material or 
the circulation of injurious to or about a co-worker”; to ensure that employees remain 
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productive; to ensure that the company system is not overloaded with non-work 
related attachments such as jokes and chain e-mails; to ensure that the company is not 
held liable for copyright infringement, particularly where an employee copies and 
disseminates copyright protected material using the company’s system; and to 
monitor the transmission of legally incriminating electronic information sent or 
received by employees.1429 
A 2005 American Management Association (“AMA”) survey on Electronic 
Monitoring and Surveillance revealed that United States employers were primarily 
concerned with inappropriate Web surfing and, consequently, that 76 percent of 
employers monitor employee Website connections. The survey further revealed that 
computer monitoring is varied: 36 percent of employers track content, keystrokes and 
time spent on the keyboard; 50 percent of employers' store and review employee 
computer files; 55 percent of employers retain and review employee e-mail. Eighty 
percent of employers engaging in monitoring and surveillance activities inform 
employees that the company is monitoring content, key strokes and time spent on the 
keyboard; 86 percent alert employees about e-mail monitoring and 89 percent notify 
employees that their Web usage is monitored. Lastly, 13 percent of businesses have 
been engaged in workplace lawsuits arising from employee e-mail use.1430 In the 2004 
survey, 13, 2 percent of respondents confirmed that their organisation had faced a 
sexual, or racial or hostile work environment lawsuit emanating from e-mail.1431 
According to the 2007 Electronic Monitoring & Surveillance Survey from the AMA, 
over 50 percent of employers had dismissed employees for either e-mail or Internet 
abuse. More specifically, 28 percent of employers had dismissed employees for 
various forms of e-mail abuse (namely breach of confidentiality rules, violation of 
company policy, excessive personal use and inappropriate or offensive language) and 
30 percent for Internet abuse (namely violation of company policy, viewing, 
downloading or uploading inappropriate or offensive content and excessive personal 
use). Web surfing by employees, according to the 2007 survey, remained a primary 
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concern for employees even though a lesser percentage of employers reported that 
they monitored Internet connections (in 2007 only 66 percent of employers monitored 
employee Web activity). A considerable number of employers also monitor e-mail use 
mostly through technology which automatically monitors e-mail and to a lesser extent 
by assigning an individual to manually read and review e-mail. The 2007 survey 
further showed that employers were not only monitoring employee computers by 
tracking content or keystrokes and by storing and reviewing computer files, but by 
also monitoring the blogosphere and social networking sites to see what is written by 
employees.1432 
7.6.2 Legislation 
Even though these surveys indicate that a considerable number of employers in the 
United States prefer to limit employee use of company e-mail and Internet facilities 
and may enjoy an almost unfettered discretion in limiting employee use of e-mail and 
Internet, the privacy interests of employees are protected by legislation. 
7.6.2.1 Constitution 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits unreasonable 
searches and seizures by government employers.1433 Employees may argue that 
employer monitoring of their computer usage constitutes an unreasonable search and 
seizure and therefore violates their Fourth Amendment rights. In order to succeed in 
such a  challenge, an employee has to establish that he or she had a legitimate privacy 
expectation in the computer monitored and further has to establish that his or her 
subjective expectation of privacy is one that society is prepared to accept as 
objectively reasonable.1434 Individuals possess reasonable privacy expectation in their 
privately owned home computers.1435United States courts seem reluctant to extend a 
similar expectation of privacy with respect to the contents of office computers. It is 
generally accepted that government employees and private sector employees may 
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their offices, desks or file cabinet. 
However it is also accepted that this expectation may be reduced by office procedures, 
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practices and regulations.1436 Even where courts have held that employees possess a 
privacy expectation with respect to the contents of office computers,1437 it does not 
follow that courts will hold that the monitoring constitutes an unreasonable search. 
For example, in Simons the court found that although the employee had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his office, this expectation did not extend to the record of his 
internet usage in the workplace, particularly in light of the employer’s computer 
monitoring policy which stated that the employer would “audit”, “inspect” or 
“monitor” employee internet use including all file transfers, all web sites visited and 
e-mail messages sent and received.1438 
7.6.2.2 Electronic Communications Privacy Act 
The Federal Wire Tap Act1439 (“Wire Tap Act”) and the Stored Communications Act 
(Stored Communications Act) were enacted in the Electronic Communications 
Privacy Act1440(“ECPA”) to address the interception of electronic communications 
such as e-mail. It is important to note that the ECPA applies to both public and private 
conduct. The ECPA protects the privacy of the contents of electronic 
communications. The ECPA limits employer interceptions of employee e-mail 
messages and although the statute does not specifically mention “electronic mail” (but 
rather “electronic communications”), Congress1441 and the courts1442 take the view that 
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the term “electronic communications” includes e-mail. More so, because the ECPA’s 
enactment constituted an effort to update United States law in light of technological 
advancements.1443 The ECPA consists of two parts which are relevant to employee e-
mail privacy – the Wire Tap Act1444 (contained in “Title I” of the ECPA) and the 
Stored Communications Act1445 (contained in “Title II” of the ECPA). The Wire Tap 
Act prohibits the interception of electronic communications, whilst the Stored 
Communications Act prohibits the unauthorised access of stored electronic 
communications. Title I of the ECPA amended the Federal Wire Tap Act which 
previously addressed only the interception of wire and oral communications, to also 
address the interception of electronic communications. Title II of the ECPA, on the 
other hand, created the Stored Communications Act designed to address the access to 
stored wire and electronic communications.1446 
Title I of the ECPA prohibits the unauthorised and intentional interception of 
electronic communications while such communications are in transit. More precisely, 
Title I provides a right of action against anyone who “intentionally intercepts, 
endeavors to intercept, or procures any other person to intercept or endeavor to 
intercept, any wire, oral or electronic communication”.1447 Title I defines an 
“electronic communication” as “any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, 
sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, 
radio, electromagnetic, photo electronic, or photo-optical system, but does not include 
any wire or oral communication, any communication through a tone-only paging 
device, any communication from a tracking device, or electronic funds transfer 
information stored by a financial institution in a communications system.”  An 
“interception” is defined as the “aural or other acquisition of the contents of any wire, 
electronic, or oral communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical or 
                                                                                                                                      
ECPA. See also in this regard Wesley College v Pitts 974 F.Supp. 375, 385 (D.Del. 1997) in which 
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Journal 73 footnote 214. 
1447
 Miller “Don’t Be Evil”:  GMail’s Relevant Text Advertisements Violate Google’s Own Motto and 
Your E-Mail Privacy Rights” (2005) 33 Hofstra Law Review 1607 1616. 
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other device”. As such, the contents of a communication are deemed to have been 
intercepted where they are acquired “through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or 
other device”. In terms of the Federal Wire Tap Act1448, the term “intercept” (at least 
with regard to oral and wire communications) was construed as requiring that the 
acquisition of the communication be contemporaneous with the transmission of the 
communication from the sender to the recipient.1449 Some courts applied this 
“contemporaneous requirement” of the term “intercept” to electronic communications 
such as e- mail. That is to say, these courts have construed the term “intercept” to 
have the same meaning for the different types of communications.1450 This is 
problematic, because the different modes of communication rely on different 
technologies and are transmitted in different ways. The court in Fraser v Nationwide 
Mutual Insurance Co1451 described the nature of e-mail communications as “indirect” 
because an e-mail message “passes through intermediate storage or back – up storage 
in the course of transmission” from the sender to its recipient. The court added that 
the transmission of e-mail “is completed when the recipient logs on to the system and 
retrieves the message from intermediate storage”1452. Consequently, e-mail may be 
intercepted before its transmission is complete, or whilst it is stored in intermediate or 
back – up storage. The narrow interpretation of the term “intercept” (based on 
contemporaneity) excludes e-mail communications from the Act’s interception 
protection. As such, some courts like the court in Fraser v Nationwide Mutual 
Insurance Co have attempted to give the term “intercept” a broader meaning and 
found that an e-mail message can be intercepted whilst in storage, before it is received 
by its recipient.1453 
Title II of the ECPA protects against the unauthorised acquisition of stored electronic 
communications. Title II defines “electronic storage” as “(A) any temporary, 
immediate storage of wire or electronic communications incidental to the electronic 
transmission thereof; and (B) any storage of such communication by an electronic 
                                               
1448Act of 1968. 
1449United States v Turk 526 F2d 654 (5th Cir. 1976). 
1450Steve Jackson Games Inc v US Secret Service 36 F 3d 457 (5th Cir. 1994); Konop v Hawaiian 
Airlines Inc 302 F3d 868 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v Steiger 318 F3d 1039, 1048 – 49 (11th Cir. 
2003; Fraser v Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co 352 F3d 107 C.A. 3 (Pa.) (2003). 
1451135 F Supp 2d 623 (2001). 
1452
 633. 
1453
 See also Konop v Hawaiian Airlines Inc 236 F 3d 1035 C.A. 9 (Cal.) 2001. 
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communication service for the purposes of backup protection of such 
communication.” Further, the unauthorised access to a facility providing electronic 
communication services and thereby access to stored electronic communication, 
constitutes a federal crime in terms of Title II. Moreover, unless the interception or 
unauthorised access of electronic communication is permitted by a statutory 
exemption or defence, such interception or unauthorised access constitutes a violation 
of the ECPA and the commission of a federal crime. Title I houses exceptions for 
“business use in the ordinary course of business”, “providers of communications” and 
“authorisation by users of communications systems” and Title II houses the 
exceptions for “providers of communications” and “authorisation by users of 
communications systems.”  
It is important to note that theUnited States Patriot Act1454repealed the inclusion of 
“stored wire communications” in the definition of “wire communication”. The repeal 
of this particular aspect of the ECPA has significant implications, given that some 
courts have based their findings on the textual distinction between “wire 
communication” and “electronic communication” and have, on the basis of this 
distinction, held that the definition of “intercept” in Tile I with regard to electronic 
communications applies only to “acquisition contemporaneous with transmission” and 
not to communications in electronic storage.1455 
The ordinary course of business exception permits an employer to intercept an 
electronic communication ‘in the ordinary course of business through use of 
equipment provided by a communications carrier as part of the communications 
network.’  The term “ordinary course of business” is not defined in the ECPA. 
However, it requires that the use be for a legitimate business purpose, routine and 
with notice to persons being monitored.1456 
                                               
1454Act of 2001. The Act was enacted in response to the September 11 terrorist attacks on the US and 
the provisions of the Act afford government greater authority to monitor electronic communications. 
The Patriot Act further has significant implications for the privacy rights of employees as employers 
may be required in terms of the Act to assist government in its investigations into terrorism by 
providing information about their employees.  
1455
 Hebert Employment Privacy Law (2009) § 8A:18. 
1456
 Finkin “Information Technology and Worker’s Privacy: The United States Law” (2002) 23 
Comparative Labour Law and Policy Journal  471 481. 
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The provider exception allows “an operator of a switchboard, or an officer, employee 
or agent of a provider of wire or electronic communication service, whose facilities 
are used in the transmission of a wire or electronic communication, to intercept, 
disclose, or use that communication in the normal course of his employment while 
engaged in any activity which is necessary to the rendition of his service or to the 
protection of the rights or property of the provider of that service.” The provider 
exception simply allows e-mail providers to intercept and disclose electronic 
communications necessary to render services or to protect the rights or property of the 
provider. Therefore, an employer who provides an electronic communications service 
is free to intercept and disclose electronic communications in protecting its rights and 
property or in rendering services.1457 
The consent exception provides that an interception or disclosure of an electronic 
communication is lawful where the party intercepting or disclosing is a party to the 
communication and where one of the parties to the communication consents to the 
interception or disclosure. The courts have accepted that “full knowledge or adequate 
notice”, such as an employee’s signature on a company e-mail policy, suffice as 
implied consent.1458 However, the mere knowledge that an employer’s system may be 
monitored does not constitute implied consent.1459 
At first glance the ECPA seems to provide comprehensive protection of privacy in the 
context of e-mail and Internet, but the Act allows monitoring in the sense that “[o]nce 
an employer meets an exception, the ECPA place no restrictions on the manner and 
extent of monitoring….” Moreover, some courts have interpreted the scope of the 
ECPA and further limited its effectiveness. Specifically, courts have held that an 
electronic communication is only intercepted when it seized while in the process of 
transmission.1460 Other court decisions have narrowed Title II to hold that 
                                               
1457
 See for example United States v Mullins 992 F. 2d 1472 (9th Cir. 1993). 
1458Isajiw ”Workplace E-Mail Privacy Concerns: Balancing the Personal Dignity of Employees with 
the Proprietary Interests of Employers” (2001) 20 Temple Environmental Law and Technology 
Journal 73 89. 
1459
 See Deal v Spears 980 F.2d 1153 (8th Cir. 1994) and Ali v Douglas Cable Communications 929 F. 
Supp. 1362 (D. Kan. 1996). Finkin “Information Technology and Worker’s Privacy: The United 
States Law” (2002) 23 Comparative Labour Law and Policy Journal  471 481 – 482. 
1460
 Miller ‘‘Don’t Be Evil:  Gmail’s Relevant Text Advertisements Violate Google’s Own Motto and 
Your E-Mail Privacy Rights’ (2005) 33 Hofstra Law Review 1607 1610. For example in Steve 
Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret Service 26 F.3d 457, 461 (5th Cir. 1994) the Fifth Circuit 
held that the seizure of a computer on which is stored private e-mail that has been sent to an 
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unauthorised access to stored communications is unlawful only when the electronic 
communication has not been delivered to the recipient.1461 
That being said, two decisions have interpreted the ECPA broadly and purposively. In 
the first of these decisions, Theofel v Farey – Jones,1462 the defendants argued that the 
messages they accessed were not “electronic storage” as defined by Title II and 
therefore fell outside the ambit of Title II.  The court pointed out that several courts 
have held that the definition of “electronic storage” covers e-mail messages stored 
pending delivery to the recipient and does not cover post – transmission storage. The 
court, however, held the following in respect of the definition of “electronic storage”: 
“In contrast to subsection (A), subsection (B) does not does not distinguish between 
intermediate and post – transmission storage…[b]y its plain terms, subsection (B) 
applies to backup storage regardless of whether it is intermediate or post – 
transmission” .1463 
In the second and probably most important decision, United States v Councilman1464, 
the Fifth Circuit held that Congress intended that “electronic communication” as 
defined in the ECPA be interpreted broadly. The court also held that Congress did not 
intend, by including electronic storage in the definition of wire communications, to 
exclude electronic storage from the definition of electronic communication. The court 
                                                                                                                                      
electronic but not yet read by recipients was not unlawful under the Federal Wiretap Act. In other 
words the court found that the seizure of such a computer did not constitute an interception as defined 
by Title I of the ECPA. The court distinguished between the definitions of “wire communication” and 
“electronic communication” and observed that although the definition of “wire communication” 
included the electronic storage of wire communications, the definition of “electronic communication” 
by contrast did not include the storage of electronic communications. As such, the court concluded 
that congress did not intend for “intercept” in Title I to apply to “electronic communication” when 
those communications are in “electronic storage”. Similarly in Konop v Hawaiian Airlines, the Ninth 
Circuit adopted a narrow interpretation of the term “intercept” to mean contemporaneous acquisition 
and as such found that the pilot’s website amounted to a stored communication which was not 
included in the Title I definition of “intercept”. The airline pilot in Konop maintained a website on 
which he posted bulletins critical of his employer and others. The website could only be accessed 
through a password given to eligible individuals mostly employees of the airline and such individuals 
had to register and consent to a non-disclosure agreement prior to acquiring a password. The vice 
president of the airline was able to occasionally gain access and view the website by using an eligible 
employee’s password. The airline pilot became aware of the vice president’s access and brought an 
action against the airline, alleging that the airline’s unauthorised access to the website violated his 
Title I right.  
1461Fraser v Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. 135 F. Supp. 2d 623 (E.D. Pa. 2001). 
1462341 F. 3d 978 2004 Daily Journal D.A.R. 2089. 
14632346. 
1464418 F.3d 197 (1st Cir. 2005). 
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concluded in this regard that “electronic communication” included “transient 
electronic storage that is intrinsic to the communication process”1465. 
A combination of the exceptions created by the ECPA, the narrow interpretation of 
the ECPA by various courts and the fact that the majority of companies implement 
detailed e-mail and Internet policies, lessens the chances of success for an employee’s 
claim under the ECPA1466. However, in Fischer v Mount Olive Lutheran Church,1467 a 
youth minister brought an action against the church and some its staff alleging they 
had violated his Title I right by eavesdropping on personal telephone conversations. 
The defendants argued that their conduct was not in violation of Title I, because the 
employee’s telephone conversations were intercepted in the “ordinary course of 
business”. The upheld  the plaintiff’s claim by finding that under Title I the employer 
is obliged to cease listening as soon as it had ascertained that its employee’s calls was 
personal, regardless of the contents of the  conversation.1468 
7.6.2.3 State Legislation 
The weaknesses or shortcomings of the ECPA may be supplemented by state 
wiretapping legislation.1469Florida’s Security of Communications Act of 2003, for 
example, is more protective of electronic communications than the ECPA. The Act 
prohibits the interception and disclosure of electronic communications, including 
workplace communications, where the sender and the recipient have not given 
consent. However, this is not required in certain circumstances, such as where the 
employer reasonably suspects the employee of breaking the law or of creating a 
                                               
1465
 Miller argues that the narrow Konop and Steve Jackson Games interpretation of the ECPA is 
problematic because it permits service providers such as “Gmail to intercept, process, and utilise e-
mail intended for users for advertising and revenue purposes” and suggests as a possible remedy the 
amendment of the Wiretap Act by creating a definition of “intercept” for both wire and electronic 
communications. In other words the statute has to be amended to “specifically include unopened, post 
transmission e-mail messages in temporary storage within the list of communications that may be 
intercepted.” Miller ‘‘Don’t Be Evil:  Gmail’s Relevant Text Advertisements Violate Google’s Own 
Motto and Your E-Mail Privacy Rights” (2005) 33 Hofstra Law Review 1607 1638. 
1466
 Lasprogata, King and Pillay “Regulation of Electronic Employee Monitoring: Identifying 
Fundamental Principles of Employee Privacy Through a Comparative Study of Data Privacy 
Legislation in the European Union, United States and Canada” (2004) 4 Stanford Technology Law 
Review 1 74. 
1467207 F. Supp. 2d 914 (W.D. Wis. 2002). 
1468
 923. 
1469
 Notably 48 US states have adopted legislation fashioned on ECPA provisions and exceptions. Eltis 
“The Emerging American Approach to E-Mail Privacy in the Workplace: Its Influence on 
Developing Case Law in Canada and Israel: Should Others Follow Suit” (2003) 24 Comparative 
Labour Law and Policy Journal) 487 501. 
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hostile work environment.1470 Colorado requires that state employers have written e-
mail monitoring policies and Wisconsin restricts the ability of employers to discipline 
its employees on the basis of information obtained through surveillance.1471 
Connecticut has further legislated specifically on electronic communication 
harassment and so have the states of Delaware, Alabama, Indiana and New York.1472 
The state of Nebraska has unique legislation which allows employers to intercept their 
employee’s electronic communications without consent.1473 States protecting the right 
to privacy in their constitution, like the state of California in Soroka v Dayton Hudson 
Corporation1474, have extended this protection to a private employee.  Even though 
California’s constitutional privacy provision protects both private and public sector 
employees, the employees in Bourke v Nissan Motor Corporation1475could not rely on 
it to protect their e-mail communications. The employees were dismissed for sending 
sexually suggestive material through the employer’s e-mail system. The employees 
argued that they had a reasonable expectation of privacy in their e-mail 
communications in the workplace because they had been given individual passwords. 
The court found that the employees had no reasonable expectation of privacy because 
they knew that their e-mail may be monitored.1476 
7.6.3 Case Law 
The general tenor of United States case law is that employees’ have no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in e-mail boxes maintained by an employer or sent over an 
employer’s e-mail system, despite assurances from employers that such 
communications would not be intercepted and would not constitute the basis of a 
                                               
1470Lasprogata, King and Pillay “Regulation of Electronic Employee Monitoring: Identifying 
Fundamental Principles of Employee Privacy Through a Comparative Study of Data Privacy 
Legislation in the European Union, United States and Canada” (2004) 4 Stanford Technology Law 
Review 1 84. 
1471Supra. 
1472Lasprogata, King and Pillay “Regulation of Electronic Employee Monitoring: Identifying 
Fundamental Principles of Employee Privacy Through a Comparative Study of Data Privacy 
Legislation in the European Union, United States and Canada” (2004) 4 Stanford Technology Law 
Review 1 84. 
1473Supra. 
1474
 7 Cal. App. 4th 203, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 77, 84-85 (1991), review dismissed, 24 Ca. Rptr. 2d 587 
(1993). 
1475
 No. B068705 [1 ILR (P&F) 109] (Cal. Ct. App. 26 July 1996). 
1476
 Robinson “Big Brother or Modern Management: E-Mail Monitoring in the Private Workplace” 
(2001) 17 Labor Lawyer 311 324. 
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termination.1477Moreover, employees have no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
their e-mail communications sent over the company’s system even where an employer 
does not have in place an effective e-mail and Internet policy.1478 
7.6.3.1 Fourth Amendment Case Law 
The United States Court for Appeals for the Armed Forces confirmed in United States 
v Maxwell1479 that an individual had a reasonable expectation of privacy in e-mail 
messages transmitted through an on - line computer service such as AOL, because the 
e-mails were stored in a centralized computer until the recipient opened his or her 
network and retrieved them.1480 The court also found that the expectation of privacy in 
e-mail messages was largely dependent upon the type of e-mail and the intended 
recipient: “[E-mail] [m]essages sent to the public at large in the “chatroom” or e-mail 
that is forwarded from [one person to another] loses any semblance of 
privacy”1481.1482On the contrary, in United States v Slanina1483 it was reasoned that 
public sector employees would have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their 
offices and in files stored on a computer in the absence of a policy informing 
employees that their computer and internet usage will be monitored and where an 
employee’s computer is not routinely accessed by other employees.  Other courts have 
suggested that employees have no reasonable expectation of privacy in electronic 
                                               
1477Smyth v Pilsbury Co 914 F. Supp. 97 (E.D. Pa. 1996). 
1478
 For example in the unreported decision of Restuccia v Burk Technology of N.E.2d, 1996 WL 
1329386 
Mass.Super. 1996 the employer had no policy against chatting on its e-mail system and had not 
specifically indicated to its employees that management had access to their computer files. As such, 
the employees in Restuccia argued that they had an expectation of privacy in their e-mails messages 
which included nicknames for the company president and references to his alleged extra marital affair 
with another company employee. The employees claimed that they did not know that deleted e-mails 
on the company e-mail system were saved on the company’s back up file. 
147945 M.J. 406 (C.A.A.F 1996). 
1480
 417. 
1481
 419. 
1482
 Similarly in United States v Charbonneau 979 F. Supp. 1177 (S.D. Ohio 1997) the court found 
there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in e-mail messages sent by an individual in an 
electronic chat room because the “openness of the chat room” incrementally diminished an 
individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy. The court further stated that an e-mail message, like a 
letter, cannot be afforded a reasonable expectation of privacy once that communication is received. 
The court also noted expectations of privacy in e-mail transmissions depend in large on the type of e-
mail sent and the recipient of the e-mail. The court further noted that e-mail messages sent to an 
addressee who forwards the e-mail to third parties such as the public at large in a chat room did not 
enjoy some reasonable expectation of privacy. Courts have also held that a user of a computer 
bulletin board has no legitimate expectation of privacy in e-mail sent to such a board (Guest v Leis 
255 F.3d 325 (6th Cir. 2001).  
1483
 283 F3d 670, 677 (5th Cir. 2002) 
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communications sent through an employer’s network. The reasoning of the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces in United States v Munroe1484 supports 
this suggestion. The court in Munroe confirmed that an employee of the United States 
Air Force had no reasonable expectation of privacy from personnel maintaining the 
system in e-mail messages sent through an electronic host system, because the system 
resided on a computer owned by the air force. The court found that the expectation of 
privacy in such e-mails was further diminished by the fact that users had received 
notice that by logging into the system they are consenting to monitoring.1485 
7.6.3.3 Common Law Case Law 
Private and public sector employees may claim an invasion of their common law right 
to privacy with respect to e-mail monitoring. The common law of tort relating to the 
invasion of privacy has been divided into four distinct parts: (1) unreasonable 
intrusion into one’s seclusion, (2) misappropriation of one’s name or likeness, (3) 
public disclosure of private facts, and (4) false light.1486 In the context of the privacy 
of electronic communications in the workplace, the relevant tort is ‘unreasonable 
intrusion into one’s seclusion’. The Second Restatement of Torts defines the tort as 
follows: “One, who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude 
of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for 
invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable 
person”. 1487 
The decision of Smyth v Pillsbury1488touched on this tort in relation to e-mail 
monitoring. In Smyth an employee brought an action against his employer for 
wrongful discharge. The employee was discharged from his position as regional 
operations manager for transmitting in appropriate and unprofessional comments over 
his employer’s e-mail system. The Pennsylvanian court held that the termination did 
not violate public policy and the former employee could not maintain a wrongful 
                                               
148452 M.J. 326 (C.A.A.F. 2000). 
1485
 330. 
1486Prosser Privacy: A Legal Analysis in Schoeman ed. Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy: An 
Anthology (1984)  104 - 107. 
1487The decision of  Nipper v Variety Wholesalers Inc 638 So. 2d 778 (Ala. 1994) defined the tort as 
the wrongful intrusion into one’s private life activities in such a manner as to outrage or cause mental 
suffering, shame, or humiliation to a person of ordinary sensibilities. 
1488914 F Supp 97 (E.D. Pa. 1996). 
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discharge claim under Pennsylvania law. The court reasoned: “…we do not find a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in e-mail communications voluntarily made by an 
employee to his supervisor over the company e-mail system notwithstanding any 
assurances that such communication would not be intercepted by management. Once 
[the employee] communicated the alleged unprofessional comments to…his 
supervisor over an e-mail system which was apparently utilized by the entire 
company, any reasonable expectation of privacy was lost”. 1489 The reasoning in Smyth 
was considered instructive in Garrity v John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance 
Company1490. In Garrity, two employees of an insurance company were dismissed 
after they transmitted sexually explicit e-mail over the company’s intranet system in 
violation of the company’s e-mail policy. The employees admitted that they knew that 
the company could access and view their e-mails on its intranet system and that they 
had to exercise caution in sending e-mails, but argued they had a privacy expectation 
because the company had instructed them on how to create a passwords and personal 
mail folders. The court held that the employees had no reasonable expectation of 
privacy where the employees assumed that recipients might forward the messages to 
others, knew the company had the ability to look at e-mail on the intranet system and 
knew they had to be careful about sending e-mails. Similarly, in McLaren v Microsoft 
Corporation,1491 the court found that an employee had no reasonable expectation of 
privacy over the contents of e-mail messages sent over the company’s e-mail system, 
because, even though the employee stored his e-mail messages in “personal folders” 
and created a password to access his e-mail messages, all e-mail messages stored in 
his personal folders were first transmitted over the network and were at some point 
accessible to a third party.1492 Courts have also held that employees have no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in a computer provided by the employer for use in 
the employee’s home, particularly where the employer’s computer monitoring policy 
                                               
1489
 101. 
149018 IER Cases 981 (D. Mass. 2002). 
14911999 WL 339015 (Tex. App. Dallas 1999). 
1492
 See also Thygeson v US Bancorp, 34 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 2097, 2004 WL 2066746 (D. 
Or. 2004). In Thygeson the United States District Court for the District of Oregon in held an 
employee had no reasonable expectation of privacy in files accessed through his personal e-mail 
account and stored in his personal folder because the employer’s policy on monitoring computer use 
permitted the employer to access to the files.  
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made it clear that the employer would monitor files and messages on the computer 
and the employee consents to the policy.1493 
7.6.4 Analysis 
It appears that United States employers, unlike their United Kingdom counterparts, 
who primarily monitor employee usage of e-mail and Internet to minimize the 
security risks associated with such usage, mainly monitor employee e-mail and 
Internet use in the workplace in order to minimize litigation associated with the 
inappropriate use of these tools by employees and the role that electronic evidence 
plays in such lawsuits and in regulatory investigations. 
Generally, United States legislators have been slow in designing laws that address 
privacy in the workplace, probably because they know that such laws will not have 
the support of corporate America and congress. At the same time, legislation that does 
exist at both Federal (the Constitution and the ECPA) and State level, provides 
protection that may be more apparent than real. This is not only due to presence of 
exceptions contained in legislation, but also because courts have added fuel to the fire 
in failing to extend privacy protection, often through restrictive interpretation of 
applicable legislation, to newer technologies such as e-mail and Internet. What 
remains true is that case law, whether called on the interpret legislation or applying 
the common law, works with the underlying concept of privacy (often predetermined 
in case of legislation) premised on the reasonableness of the expectation of privacy in 
the surrounding circumstances. In the context of the workplace, and although case law 
addressing the issues raised by the increase and growth of e-mail and Internet use in 
the workplace has to draw a balance between employer property rights, employee 
privacy, and dignity rights, this simply means that United States courts have often 
held that employees have no expectation of privacy in the workplace. This is 
especially true where the employee uses the employer’s tools to carry out their 
employment or where employers restrict and monitor employee use of e-mail and 
Internet tools and provide employees with notice of monitoring activities. Such a 
                                               
1493TBG Insurance Services Corp v Superior Court of Los Angeles County 96 Cal. App. 4th 443 (2002). 
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notice invariably negates any expectation of privacy the employee may claim to be 
entitled to.1494 
7.7 CONCLUSION 
This chapter argued that employee monitoring is not necessarily a new trend, but that 
modern technology has enabled employers to monitor their employees more 
effectively and more extensively due to widespread use of technology enabled tools 
like e-mail and Internet. The arguments advanced by employers to justify the 
monitoring of employee e-mail and Internet usage are primarily aimed at protecting 
the employer's proprietal interest in the e-mail and Internet facilities,  in ensuring that 
the workplace is efficient and productive and eliminating risks associated with abuse 
of information systems. On the other hand, arguments against the monitoring and of e-
mail and Internet usage in the workplace are aimed at preserving the employee's 
informational privacy. What has become clear from the discussion in this chapter, is 
that, from a legal perspective, these balancing of interests invariably involve one (or 
both) of two issues. First, the underlying approach to the concept ‘privacy’ may serve 
to ultimately determine this balance. What is clear from the United Kingdom 
experience (within the supranational European context) is that a society premised on 
an acceptance that privacy means no more than a ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’, 
will find it easier to limit employee interests in the context of e-mail and internet use. 
The survey in this chapter shows that this is the case across the three different 
jurisdictions. Whether the ‘reasonableness’ of the expectation of privacy’ is pre-
determined in legislation (typically through a prohibition on interception and, 
crucially, provision for exceptions to the prohibition), or on a case by case basis 
through judicial evaluation, it will be easy for an employer to make the argument that 
there was no infringement of privacy (as there was no reasonable expectation of 
privacy to begin with). Of course, a notion of privacy which is aimed more at the 
individual may well alter this fundamentally.     
At the same time and even where it is accepted that employer policies and practices 
relating to e-mail and Internet use may infringe upon privacy, this calls for no more 
than a balancing act between the interests of the employer and employee. For a variety 
                                               
1494
 Babson Monitoring Electronic Mail in the Workplace: Property v Privacy (2001) 1. 
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of reasons identified across the different jurisdictions, this balancing act will almost 
invariably be determined in favour of the employer. The point is that although it is 
difficult to fault the balancing of competing interests to determine a dispute, the 
nature of privacy and the nature of the employment relationship, in which the balance 
of power will more often than not be in favour of the employer, will largely 
predetermine the issue. 
If one evaluates these broad statements on a more country-specific basis, it may be 
said that despite the fact that South Africa is a country with a comprehensive and 
generous bill of rights, which includes the right to privacy and in particular the right 
to informational privacy, it appears courts are loathe to allow this right to exist in the 
context of the workplace, especially, in the context of e-mail and Internet 
communications within the workplace. South African courts and tribunals are more 
likely to protect the employer’s interest in not having its e-mail and Internet facilities 
abused for non – business purposes, even in the absence of policies. Tribunals have 
even suggested that the question remains to finally be determined by an employee’s 
own common sense.  South African tribunals have yet to fully consider the 
implications of RICPCIA on the interception and monitoring of employee 
communications in the workplace. It is suggested that this will not make much 
difference – as mentioned above, as long as the underlying notion of privacy remains 
the reasonableness of the expectation of privacy (an approach arguably codified in 
RICPCIA), employers have much leeway to control e-mail and Internet use. Perhaps 
what South Africa needs is a code similar to the United Kingdom’s Employment 
Practices Code, which at least emphasizes the principles of transparency and 
proportionality, considerations clearly absent from  an examination of the decisions in 
the current context. 
In the United Kingdom, employees have recourse to a number of pieces of legislation. 
One of these pieces of legislation is Article 8 of the ECHR which was imported into 
United Kingdom through the Human Rights Act. The other important piece of 
legislation regulating the interception and monitoring of employee communications in 
the workplace is the Data Protection Act. The Act has a number of principles, which it 
is submitted reflect a sound balance between the competing rights at play in relation 
to the general issue of privacy in the workplace. What also makes the Act 
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commendable is that it has been supplemented by an Employment Practices Code 
which guides employers towards observing the requirements of the Act. For instance, 
the Employment Practices Code recommends that employers communicate the nature 
and extent of the monitoring and also the purpose for which the monitoring is carried 
out. Furthermore, as already indicated, the Employment Practices Code places an 
emphasis on two important principles, namely, transparency and proportionality. 
These principles ensure that the employee's interests to informational privacy are 
protected and also that the employee has some control over his or her communications 
in the workplace. It would seem that the different legislative approach at both the 
supranational (European) and national (United Kingdom) levels, have already served 
to inform a somewhat different judicial approach to that of South Africa. For example, 
decisions such as Halford ensure that employers were reminded of the fact that the 
employee's right to privacy is not left at the front door of the office, but exists even if 
and while the employee is in the workplace. Another example, contrary to the 
approach of South African Tribunals who have gone so far as justify employer 
intrusion even in the absence of internal policies about workplace communication 
systems, is to be found in a decision like Copland v United Kingdom, which show that 
United Kingdom tribunals are likely to find that the absence of a policy creates a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in respect of the use of information systems. 
The United States experience serves as support of the general statements made earlier 
in this conclusion – despite legislation regulating the interception and monitoring of 
employee communications in the workplace by the employer, this legislation has been 
of little or no benefit to employees as case law appears to favour the employer's 
proprietary interest in such communications. United States courts, similar to South 
African Courts, have often held that employees have no expectation of privacy in the 
workplace arena, seeing as the communication systems in place belong to the 
employer and not the employee and often simply because the employee has been 
notified of monitoring.  
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CHAPTER 8: 
SELECTED FOCUS AREAS: GENETIC TESTING 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter is the second of two chapters focussing on workplace policies and 
practices that not only have the potential to threaten or pressurise the protection of 
privacy in the workplace, but also illustrate how recent advancements in technology 
create new challenges for the protection of privacy. The previous chapter concluded 
that the monitoring of employees is not a new concept but rather one that has 
developed and become sophisticated due to advancements in technology. This chapter 
focuses on genetic testing, which perhaps is the most recent example of the way in 
which scientific advancement may challenge privacy. 
As point of departure, this chapter considers, first of all what genetic testing means, an 
enquiry which requires, in turn, a consideration of genes, genetic testing and genetic 
information. Thereafter, the legal challenges created by genetic testing will be 
considered. 
8.2 GENETIC TESTING 
8.2.1 Genes 
DNA (deoxyriboneuclic acid) is often said to be the most important molecule in 
human genetics because of the fact that it is the “basic bearer of genetic information in 
the human body”1495. 
The human body is made up of approximately 100 trillion cells. Moreover each cell in 
the human body (except for egg and sperm cells) carries an estimated 50,000 to 
100,000 genes and contains DNA molecules.1496 Thus DNA is found in all human 
cells except in mature red blood cells.1497 The DNA molecule is a ribbon consisting of 
                                               
1495Privacy Commissioner of Canada Genetic Testing and Privacy Discussion Paper (1995) 5. 
1496Privacy Commissioner of Canada Genetic Testing and Privacy Discussion Paper (1995) 6. 
1497Privacy Commissioner of Canada Genetic Testing and Privacy Discussion Paper (1995) 6. 
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2 coiled strands forming a double helix or spiral.1498  Each double helix DNA strand 
consists of varying sequences of four chemicals bases – adenine (A), guanine (G), 
thymine (T) and cytosine (C).1499 
Genes consist of various base pairs located on chromosomes.1500 Chromosomes are 
elongated strings of DNA and protein. Every human being has 46 chromosomes, 
arranged in two sets of 23 chromosomes. One set of 23 chromosomes is received from 
each parent.1501 
An individual’s entire genetic constitution or make up is also known as the genome 
and with the exception of identical twins no two individuals have the same genetic 
constitution.1502 Genomes vary widely in size and the smallest genome for a free living 
organism, bacteria, contains approximately 600,000 DNA base pairs, while mouse 
genomes, like human genomes, contain approximately 3 billion base pairs.1503 
DNA in the human body is commonly extracted from white blood cells, sperm cells, 
cells in saliva, nasal secretion, sweat and cells around the roots of the hair.1504 
Broadly speaking genes can influence an organism’s ability to combat infections, 
viruses and bacteria and the appearance of an organism and its behaviour.1505 In 
human beings, genes not only influence an individual’s characteristics and 
development but also an individual’s susceptibility or propensity to develop a disease 
and the existence of particular conditions.1506The individual’s susceptibility or 
propensity to develop a disease is in turn influenced by inherited genes or gene 
mutation or alteration resulting from environmental exposure. An individual may 
inherit genes from a parent which make them susceptible to developing a disease. For 
                                               
1498Schwartz “Privacy and the Economics of Personal Health Care Information” (1997) 76 Texas Law 
Review1 18. See also Edelson The Human Genome Project in Barker (ed.) Genetics and Society 
(1995) 44 - 55. 
1499Privacy Commissioner of Canada Genetic Testing and Privacy Discussion Paper (1995) 6. 
1500
 Solove and Rotenburg Information Privacy Law (2003) 248 – 249. 
1501Nuffield Council on Bioethics Report on Genetic Screening Ethical Issues (1993) 7. 
1502Schwartz “Privacy and the Economics of Personal Health Care Information” (1997) 76 Texas Law 
Review1 21. See also Solove and Rotenburg Information Privacy Law (2003) 249. 
1503http://www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/Human_Genome/projects/info.shtml (2006-03-10). 
1504http://www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/Human_Genome/project/info.shtml (2006-03-10). 
1505http://www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/Human_Genome/project/about.shtml (2006-03-10). 
1506Nuffield Council on Bioethics Report on Genetic Screening Ethical Issues (1993) 7. 
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example, scientists have established that conditions such as cystic fibrosis and 
prostate cancer are inheritable.1507 Exposure to environmental factors may also alter or 
mutate an individual’s genetic material in a manner that increases his or her 
propensity to develop a disease.1508 For example, scientists have identified 
approximately 50 genetic anomalies that increase an individual’s susceptibility to 
toxic and carcinogenic effects of elements such as copper, radiation, carbon monoxide 
and cyanide.1509 Exposure to carbon monoxide and cyanide, for instance, can increase 
an individual’s risk of developing symptoms of sickle cell anaemia.1510 
8.2.2 Genetic Testing 
Genetic testing has been defined as a “medical diagnostic tool used to detect 
deleterious genetic and chromosomal variations in order to identify potential future 
health problems or to confirm a prior diagnosis”1511 and also as “testing to detect the 
presence or absence of, or alteration in, a particular gene sequence, chromosome or a 
gene product, in relation to a genetic disorder”1512. The United States’ Genetic 
Information Nondiscrimination Act1513 (“GINA”) defines “a genetic test” to mean “an 
analysis of human DNA, RNA, chromosomes, proteins or metabolites that detects 
genotypes, mutations, or chromosomal changes”.1514 A genetic test does not, 
according to GINA, mean “an analysis of proteins or metabolites that does not detect 
genotypes, mutations, or chromosomal changes”.1515 Simply put, genetic testing is the 
                                               
1507
 See Pesonen “Genetic Screening: An Employer’s Tool to Differentiate or to Discriminate?” (2001) 
19 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy 187 189. 
1508
 Hebert Employee Privacy Law (2009) § 12: 1. 
1509
 Pesonen “Genetic Screening: An Employer’s Tool to Differentiate or to Discriminate?” (2001) 19 
Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy 187 195. 
1510
 Pesonen “Genetic Screening: An Employer’s Tool to Differentiate or to Discriminate?” (2001) 19 
Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy 187 195. 
1511Deyerle “Genetic Testing in the Workplace: Employer Dream, Employee Nightmare Legislative 
Regulation in the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany” (1997) 18 Comparative 
Labour Law Journal 547  554. 
1512
 United Kingdom Human Genetics Advisory Commission: Report on The Implications of Genetic 
Testing for Employment (1999). 
http://www.advisorybodies.doh.gov.uk/hgac/papers/papers_g/g_03.htm (2006-03-27). 
1513Act of 2008. 
1514Section 201 of GINA. 
1515Supra. 
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medical examination of an individual’s genes or genetic material in order to determine 
whether the individual has the susceptibility or propensity to develop a disease.1516 
Genetic testing can reveal an array of existing and probable medical information 
concerning an individual including “presymptomatic medical information about an 
individual, including information about an individual’s increased risk of future 
disease, disability, or early death…carrier status, that is, the likelihood of parents 
passing on to their children a genetic condition and about the health of the 
individual’s family members”1517. Before embarking on analysis of why genetic 
testing is potentially privacy invasive, it is also important to  describe  the type of 
information that can be determined or gleaned from one's genetic constitution as this 
will assist in illustrating how and why genetic testing may invade one's privacy. 
8.2.3 Genetic Information 
8.2.3.1 Introduction 
GINA defines genetic information broadly to mean “with respect to any individual, 
information about such an individual’s genetic tests, the genetic tests of family 
members of such individual, and the manifestation of a disease or disorder in family 
members of such individual.”1518 GINA excludes information about the sex or age of 
any individual from the meaning of genetic information.  
There appears to be general consensus amongst legal commentators that genetic 
information is medical information about an individual.1519 However, unlike other 
medical information, genetic information “includes information about…the 
individual’s biological family…the results of tests of genetic material, the results of 
non-genetic medical tests revealing genetic information, and family medical 
history”.1520 Genetic information may be obtained from the following sources: genetic 
test results, medical records such as medical history forms, health insurance claims 
                                               
1516
 Hebert Employee Privacy Law (2009) § 12: 1. 
1517
 Pagnattaro “Genetic Discrimination and the Workplace: Employee’s Right to Privacy v Employer’s 
Need to Know” (2001) 39 American Business Law Journal139  143. 
1518Section 1 of GINA. 
1519
 Lasprogata King and Pillay “Workplace Privacy and Discrimination Issues Related to Genetic 
Data: A Comparative Law Study of the European Union and United States” (2006) 43 American 
Business Law Journal 79 88. 
1520Supra. 
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and research on the prevalence of genetic diseases in a particular family.1521  Broadly 
speaking, genetic information is therefore medical information ascertained from 
analysing an individual’s genetic material and medical history. This link between 
medical and genetic information in mind the question then arises whether genetic 
information is different from other medical information and requires that it be treated 
differently from other medical information. 
8.2.3.2 The Genetic Exceptionalism Debate 
“Genetic exceptionalism” is the idea that genetic information is “…qualitatively 
different from other medical information and therefore raises unique social issues”1522. 
The genetic exceptionalism debate concerns the manner in which genetic information 
should be treated. On the one hand, proponents of genetic exceptionalism argue that 
genetic information is exceptional and should therefore be treated differently from 
other medical information. For instance, the confidentiality presumption in section 
206 of GINA suggests that genetic information is somewhat different from other 
medical information. This presumption requires employers to treat genetic 
information as a confidential medical report about employees and to keep the 
information on separate forms and in separate medical files. 
On the other hand, critics of genetic exceptionalism are of the view that genetic 
information should be treated like other medical information because there is nothing 
extraordinary or different about it.1523 
8.2.3.3 Proponents of Genetic Exceptionalism 
As already indicated above, proponents of “genetic exceptionalism” argue that genetic 
information is inherently exceptional and unique in comparison to other personal or 
                                               
1521
 Hendricks “Genetics, Data Protection and Non – Discrimination: Some Reflections from an 
International Human Rights Perspective” (2001) 20 Medicine and Law 31 39. 
1522
 Suter “The Allure and Peril of Genetics Exceptionalism: Do We Need Special Genetic Legislation” 
(2001) 79 Washington University Law Quarterly 669 674. Suter blames various institutions (namely 
the public, media, scientific community and legislators) for perpetuating and upholding the idea of 
“genetic exceptionalism”. 
1523See for example Annas “Genetic Privacy: There Ought to Be Law” (1999) 4 Texas Review of Law 
& Politics 9 and Green and Thomas “DNA: Five Distinguishing Features for Policy Analysis” (1988) 
11 Harvard Journal of Law and Technology. Poste however holds the view that genetic data does 
warrant special legal protection from other forms of medical information. Poste however submits that 
genetic testing poses different privacy risks from testing for an existing disease. Poste “Privacy and 
Confidentiality” (1999) 4 Texas Law Review of Law and Politics 25 26. 
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medical information. Underlying the idea of genetic exceptionalism is what has been 
described as “genetic determinism”. 
“Genetic determinism” is the notion that “genes determine and explain everything 
about us.1524 For many, genes define our essence, make us human, and explain “our 
place in the world: our history, our social relationships, our behaviour, our morality, 
and our fate”1525. 
Proponents of “genetic exceptionalism” such as Annas argue that genetic information 
is more “powerfully private” than other forms of personal or medical information 
because it concerns very private information about an individuals’ future health and 
an individuals’ family’s future health. Genetic information is also more private 
because it concerns information relating to private decision making (such as whether 
or not to have a child).1526Genetic information is further private because “it is in 
essence a reverse diary: it informs our younger selves about our aging selves”.1527  At 
the same time, unlike a written diary, which often contains present information, 
genetic information contains future information which is in code and probabilistic: 
“[Genetic information] is coded and probabilistic: we are not necessarily going to get 
every disease that we are genetically predisposed to develop. But you can think about 
your DNA molecule as a future diary. It is in code and probabilistic but just as 
private”1528. According to proponents, the fact that genetic information has historically 
been abused and misused, for example by the Nazis and scientists during the Eugenics 
movement, is also a pointer to its inherent power and value.1529 
Green and Thomas assert that genetic information is “qualitatively” and 
“quantitatively” different from other medical information. In support of this assertion, 
Green and Thomas provide five distinguishing features of genetic information.1530 The 
first feature relates to the risks associated with DNA’s informational nature. The 
                                               
1524
 Suter “The Allure and Peril of Genetics Exceptionalism: Do We Need Special Genetic Legislation” 
(2001) 79 Washington University Law Quarterly669  674. 
1525Supra. 
1526Annas “Genetic Privacy: There Ought To Be Law” (1999) 4 Texas Review of Law & Politics 9 10. 
1527Supra. 
1528Annas “Genetic Privacy: There Ought To Be Law” (1999)  4Texas Review of Law & Politics  9 11. 
1529Annas “Genetic Privacy: There Ought To Be Law” (1999)  4Texas Review of Law & Politics  9 12. 
1530Green and Thomas “DNA: Five Distinguishing Features for Policy Analysis” (1998) 11 Harvard 
Journal of Law and Technology 571 572-573. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
331 
 
principal risk emanating from the nature of DNA is related to the kind of information 
genetic information reveals about an individual’s genetic inheritance and the effect of 
the information on the concerned individuals.1531 The risks include anxiety, distress 
and other psychological maladies brought on by individuals learning that they carry 
defective genes that may predispose them to serious conditions. Incidental risks in this 
regard include unintended disclosures of painful facts about family relationships, such 
as paternity issues.1532 The nature of DNA further poses economic risks associated 
with discrimination in employment, medical insurance and life insurance.1533 The 
second feature concerns the longevity of DNA.1534 The longevity of DNA has the 
potential to harm individuals and their descendants. For example, the creation of DNA 
databases storing genetic samples may in some instances outlive the individuals who 
donated them, thereby not only compromising the concerned individuals’ right to 
withdraw their samples, but also threatening their descendants.1535 The third 
distinguishing feature relates to the familial risks implicated by genetic 
information.1536The study of genetics points to the fact that genes are shared among 
family members. The genetic testing of individuals therefore invariably implicates an 
individual’s family members and exposes those members to physical, psychological 
and social harms.1537 The fourth feature concerns DNA’s role as an identifier. DNA is 
information rich and dense.1538 For this reason, DNA has the ability to identify 
individuals who donate samples anonymously.1539 The last distinguishing feature of 
genetic information is that it can impact members of a broader community group.  
Genes are not only shared among family members, but among ethnic or racial 
                                               
1531Supra. 
1532
 Green and Thomas “DNA: Five Distinguishing Features for Policy Analysis” (1998) 11 Harvard 
Journal of Law and Technology 571 572-573. 
1533Supra. 
1534Green and Thomas “DNA: Five Distinguishing Features for Policy Analysis” (1998) 11 Harvard 
Journal of Law and Technology 571 577. 
1535Green and Thomas “DNA: Five Distinguishing Features for Policy Analysis” (1998) 11 Harvard 
Journal of Law and Technology 571 577. 
1536Green and Thomas “DNA: Five Distinguishing Features for Policy Analysis” (1998) 11 Harvard 
Journal of Law and Technology 571 580 -581. 
1537Green and Thomas “DNA: Five Distinguishing Features for Policy Analysis” (1998) 11 Harvard 
Journal of Law and Technology 571 580 -581. 
1538Green and Thomas “DNA: Five Distinguishing Features for Policy Analysis” (1998) 11 Harvard 
Journal of Law and Technology 571 579. 
1539Green and Thomas “DNA: Five Distinguishing Features for Policy Analysis” (1998) 11 Harvard 
Journal of Law and Technology 571 579. 
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communities, and other groups with distinctive genetic inheritances.1540 For instance, 
sickle cell anaemia is associated with persons of African American descent, the Tay-
Sachs disease is associated with persons of Ashkenazi Jewish inheritance and 
Mediterranean fever is associated with individuals of Armenian descent. The fact that 
larger ethnic and racial communities are associated with certain conditions may 
reinforce prejudice against these communities and create “genetic castes”.1541 Green 
and Thomas argue that because of the above mentioned features (and associated risks) 
genetic information merits distinctive legal consideration, particularly in the context 
of insurance and employment.1542 
8.2.3.4 Critics of Genetic Exceptionalism 
Critics of “genetic exceptionalism” primarily contend that there is nothing unique or 
exceptional about genetic information in comparison to other forms of personal and 
medical information. For Ginsburg, the difference between a DNA test and family 
medical history is one merely of degree.1543 Ginsburg agrees that a genetic test 
provides a high degree of specificity and may also provide a measure of predictability 
in comparison to a person’s medical history, but contends that both types of medical 
information point to the probability of an individual developing a particular 
disease.1544Suter also argues that genetic information is not unique or exceptional as 
compared to other medical information purely because the issues it raises “…are 
cloaked in new technological guises”.1545 For Suter, the issues raised by genetic 
                                               
1540Green and Thomas “DNA: Five Distinguishing Features for Policy Analysis” (1998) 11 Harvard 
Journal of Law and Technology 571 584 -585.  
1541Green and Thomas “DNA: Five Distinguishing Features for Policy Analysis” (1998) 11 Harvard 
Journal of Law and Technology 571 584 -585. See also Schwartz “Privacy and the Economics of 
Personal Health Care Information” (1997) 76 Texas Law Review1 28-30.  
1542Green and Thomas “DNA: Five Distinguishing Features for Policy Analysis” (1998) 11 Harvard 
Journal of Law and Technology 571 590. 
1543Ginsburg “Genetics and Privacy” (1999) 4 Texas Review of Law and Politics 17. 
1544Ginsburg “Genetics and Privacy” (1999) 4 Texas Review of Law and Politics17  19. Even though 
Laurie agrees with Ginsburg’s assertion that genetic information is not exceptional, Laurie prefers to 
view family medical history as different from genetic information. Family history for Laurie is 
abstract and detail flawed knowledge that may depend on poor or imperfect human memory. Further, 
it cannot determine the precise reason why an individual fell ill and the pattern of an individual’s 
illness whereas genetic information can offer a high degree of specificity in terms of predicting the 
likelihood of disease or even the mode and manner of an individual’s death. Furthermore, the threat 
posed by family medical history is abstract whereas the threat posed by genetic information is more 
concrete and is capable of altering an individual’s perception in ways that family history cannot. 
Laurie Genetic Privacy: A Challenge to Medico-Legal Norms (2002) 94. 
1545
 Suter “The Allure and Peril of Genetics Exceptionalism: Do We Need Special Genetic Legislation” 
(2001) 79 Washington University Law Quarterly 669 671. 
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information are on the contrary old and persisting problems about discrimination and 
privacy. Suter maintains that genetic information and other forms of medical 
information are akin and treating the two in a dissimilar manner will create inequities 
between individuals and classes.1546 Suter advances a number of reasons in support of 
the unexceptional nature of genetic information. First, even though genes are an 
immutable trait, the risk factors that influence the degree to which genes affect our 
future health can be controlled.1547 Second, most genetic information does not predict 
future disease.1548 Third, although certain genetic diseases are prevalent in a particular 
racial or ethnic group or sex, most genetic diseases are not.1549 Fourth, most genetic 
information is shared and therefore not unique.1550 Fifth, not all genetic information is 
highly sensitive and stigmatizing.1551 
Laurie also observes that genetic information is not exceptional because other forms 
of medical data can generate information that appears “genetic” in its functions. For 
example, high cholesterol levels are known predictors of cardiovascular disease. 
Furthermore, not all genetic information is predictive of future grave ill health. Many 
forms of genetic information are no more predictive than general health 
information.1552 
                                               
1546Supra. 
1547
  For example if an individual carries the gene for colon cancer, that individual can reduce the risk 
of developing colon cancer by undergoing regular endoscopies, a proper diet or surgery. Suter “The 
Allure and Peril of Genetics Exceptionalism: Do We Need Special Genetic Legislation” (2001) 79 
Washington University Law Quarterly 669 709. 
1548For example if an individual carries a single copy of a recessive gene, the presence of the gene does 
increase the risk of future disease in the concerned individual but it does increase the chances of the 
individual having affected offspring. Suter “The Allure and Peril of Genetics Exceptionalism: Do We 
Need Special Genetic Legislation” (2001) 79 Washington University Law Quarterly 669 710. 
1549
 Suter “The Allure and Peril of Genetics Exceptionalism: Do We Need Special Genetic Legislation” 
(2001) 79 Washington University Law Quarterly 669 710. 
1550Human beings share 99 percent of their genetic information with other human beings and 
chimpanzees, resulting in only a fraction of genetic information being unique to each individual. 
Suter “The Allure and Peril of Genetics Exceptionalism: Do We Need Special Genetic Legislation” 
(2001) 79 Washington University Law Quarterly 669 710. 
1551
 For example genetic information such as an individual’s blood type or eye colour is not sensitive or 
stigmatizing information. Suter “The Allure and Peril of Genetics Exceptionalism: Do We Need 
Special Genetic Legislation” (2001) 79 Washington University Law Quarterly 669 710. 
1552
 Laurie Genetic Privacy: A Challenge to Medico-Legal Norms (2002) 104. See also Poste “Privacy 
and Confidentiality in the Age of Genetic Engineering” (1998) 4 Texas Review of Law and Politics 
25. Poste like Ginsburg, Suter and Laurie contends that genetic information does not deserve separate 
legal consideration and the distinction between genetic information and other medical information is 
false. 
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8.2.3.5 Problems with Genetic Information 
Proponents of “genetic exceptionalism” often argue that genetic information is 
exceptional because of its predictive accuracy in determining who is likely to be 
affected by a genetic disease.1553 However, the predictive accuracy of genetic 
information is compromised by the fact that no two individuals, with the exception of 
identical twins, have exactly the same genes or gene constitution. Moreover, an 
individual’s sequence tends to be unique and as such no standard DNA sequence 
exists. The developing nature of genetics further means that the genetic component of 
one condition will be known while the genetic component of another condition will be 
unknown. For example, a certain group of women will be labelled as having a 
propensity or gene for breast cancer, but another group of women will suffer from 
breast cancer without being labelled as having this propensity or gene. 1554 
Consequently, a considerable element of chance is involved in labelling the two 
groups of women as genetically fit and genetically unfit.1555 
The predictive accuracy of genetic information is further not assured in dominant 
monogenic diseases and in polygenic disorders. 1556 Monogenic dominant disorders 
(such as cystic fibrosis, sickle cell diseases and Huntington’s disease) are caused by 
abnormalities in one gene.1557 What is more, monogenic dominant disorders such as 
Huntington’s disease may manifest themselves as adult onset conditions, that is, at a 
later stage in an individual’s life. 1558 Monogenic diseases often result in “incomplete 
penetrance”, meaning that the symptoms experienced by individuals may 
vary.1559Polygenic disorders (such as cardiovascular diseases, Alzheimer’s and most 
                                               
1553
 Laurie Genetic Privacy: A Challenge to Medico-Legal Norms (2002) 94. 
1554Schwartz “Privacy and the Economics of Personal Health Care Information” (1997) 76 Texas Law 
Review1 20-22. 
1555Schwartz “Privacy and the Economics of Personal Health Care Information” (1997) 76 Texas Law 
Review1 20-22. 
1556Nuffield Council on Bioethics Report on Genetic Screening Ethical Issues (1993) 8.  
1557Nuffield Council on Bioethics Report on Genetic Screening Ethical Issues (1993) 8.  
1558
 Kim “Genetic Discrimination, Genetic Privacy: Rethinking Employee Protections for A Brave 
New Workplace” (2002) 96 Northwestern University Law Review 1497 1504. 
1559
 In the majority of monogenetic diseases the link between genetic mutations and their functional 
effects is direct yet the manifestations of the disease are intricate to determine. For example 300 
mutations of the Cystic Fibrosis gene have been identified and some of the mutations according to 
researchers will produce no effect. Another example is mutations in the BRCA 1 gene strongly linked 
to susceptibility to breast cancer however research has shown that 10 – 15 percent of women with 
mutations of this gene will not develop breast cancer. Kim “Genetic Discrimination, Genetic Privacy: 
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forms of diabetes1560) are caused by abnormalities in more than one gene.1561The 
unpredictability of polygenic disorders is further reinforced by the fact that 
environmental factors play a major part in such disorders. 1562 Polygenic disorders 
belong to a broader group of multifactorial conditions, the manifestation or 
progression of which is influenced by genetic defects and non-genetic factors or 
environmental factors such as diet, stress, exercise, alcohol, exposure to toxic 
chemicals and radiation and drugs.1563 
8.3 GENETIC TESTING IN THE WORKPLACE 
8.3.1 Genetic Screening and Genetic Monitoring 
In the context of the workplace, employers administer genetic testing for pre-
symptomatic, susceptibility and carrier testing purposes.1564 Two types of genetic 
testing occur in the workplace, namely genetic screening and genetic monitoring. 
Genetic screening is often conducted on a once- off basis to determine an individual’s 
inherited traits. More specifically, genetic screening determines whether an individual 
has inherited genes that render him or her susceptible to both occupation – related or 
non – occupation- related diseases.1565 Given that the primary purpose of genetic 
screening is to determine whether the presence of a particular genetic trait exists in an 
individual, the screening is often conducted on an individual basis.1566 Genetic 
                                                                                                                                      
Rethinking Employee Protections for A Brave New Workplace” (2002) 96 Northwestern University 
Law Review 1497 1504. 
1560Report on “The Implications of Genetic Testing for Employment”: United Kingdom Human 
Genetics Advisory Commission July 1999 
www.advisorybodies.doh.gov.uk/hgac/papers/papers_g/g_03.htm (2006-03-27). 
1561Nuffield Council on Bioethics Report on Genetic Screening Ethical Issues (1993) 9. 
1562
 Laurie Genetic Privacy: A Challenge to Medico-Legal Norms (2002) 96. See also Schwartz 
“Privacy and the Economics of Personal Health Care Information” (1997) 76 Texas Law Review1 20-
21. 
1563
 Laurie Genetic Privacy: A Challenge to Medico-Legal Norms (2002) 96. See also Schwartz 
“Privacy and the Economics of Personal Health Care Information” (1997) 76 Texas Law Review1 20-
21. 
1564
 United Kingdom Human Genetics Advisory Commission: Report on The Implications of Genetic 
Testing for Employment 1999. 
http://www.advisorybodies.doh.gov.uk/hgac/papers/papers_g/g_03.htm (2006-03-27). 
1565
 Hebert Employee Privacy Law (2009) § 12: 1. 
1566Deyerle “Genetic Testing in the Workplace: Employer Dream, Employee Nightmare Legislative 
Regulation in the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany” (1997) 18 Comparative 
Labour Law Journal  547 554. 
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screening tests can detect, amongst others, sickle cell anaemia, Huntington’s disease, 
Thalassaemia, cystic fibrosis and Tay – Sachs disease.1567 
In contrast to genetic screening, genetic monitoring in the workplace occurs over a 
period of time and is conducted on a group of employees, particularly on employees 
who have been exposed to workplace hazards. Genetic monitoring determines 
whether “occupational exposure to hazardous agents has resulted in any chromosomal 
or genetic damage”1568. For example, the genetic monitoring of employees exposed to 
the agent benzene may reveal a peripheral cell count in the concerned employees, 
whilst employees exposed to lead may be found to have a concentration of lead in 
their blood.1569 The term “genetic monitoring” in GINA means “the periodic 
examination of employees to evaluate acquired modifications to their genetic material, 
such as chromosomal damage or evidence of increased occurrence of mutations, that 
may have developed in the course of employment due to exposure to toxic substances 
in the workplace in order to identify, evaluate and respond to the effects of or control 
adverse environmental exposures in the workplace”.1570 Genetic monitoring aids 
employers in not only identifying hazards  in the workplace and the effects of such 
hazards on employees, but also enables employers to take appropriate action in 
reducing or eliminating such hazards.1571 
To summarise: genetic monitoring serves the following functions: first, it monitors 
workplace exposure to hazardous substances; second, it identifies the risks for an 
exposed group in order to target workplace areas requiring increased health and safety 
precautions; and third, it reveals the necessity to reduce exposure levels.1572 
                                               
1567Privacy Commissioner of Canada Genetic Testing and Privacy Discussion Paper (1995) 11. 
1568Deyerle “Genetic Testing in the Workplace: Employer Dream, Employee Nightmare Legislative 
Regulation in the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany” (1997) 18 Comparative 
Labour Law Journal  547 555. 
1569European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies to the European Commission Genetic 
Testing in the Workplace  6 March (2000) 6. 
1570European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies to the European Commission Genetic 
Testing in the Workplace  6 March (2000) 6. 
1571European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies to the European Commission Genetic 
Testing in the Workplace  6 March (2000) 6.  
1572
 Pagnattaro “Genetic Discrimination and the Workplace: Employee’s Right to Privacy v Employer’s 
Need to Know” (2001) 39 American Business Law Journal 139 146. 
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Employers may also obtain genetic information from individuals by administering or 
requiring an individual to submit to genetic testing, particularly where an employer 
has made an offer of employment conditioned on the individual undergoing a medical 
examination which includes a genetic test. Employers can further obtain genetic 
information directly from an individual by enquiring about the individual’s family 
medical history or whether or not an individual has disabilities and the nature and 
extent of those disabilities. Lastly, employers may also use third parties - such as 
insurance companies - to obtain genetic information relating to an individual. For 
instance, an offer of employment may be conditioned upon an individual signing a 
waiver allowing a potential employer to access his or her medical records supplied by 
his or her medical insurance provider, which records could include genetic 
information.1573 
8.3.2 Employer Interests in Genetic Testing 
The employer’s primary interests in requiring individuals to undergo genetic testing 
are to reduce costs and improve workplace efficiency.1574 Employers argue that 
genetic testing determines the future employability of individuals prevents increased 
health care costs and ensures public safety. 
As far as future employability is concerned, employers argue that genetic testing 
identifies individuals at an increased risk of developing an illness which is likely to 
have an effect on their performance and individuals with susceptibility to workplace 
                                               
1573
 Rothstein (ed) Genetic Secrets: Protecting Privacy and Confidentiality in the Genetic Era (1997) 
112. 
1574
 The employer’s economic argument for accessing an individual’s genetic information is supported 
by some legal scholars.  See for example Posner “The Right to Privacy” (1978) 12 Georgia Law 
Review 393 and Epstein “The Legal Regulation of Genetic Discrimination: Old Responses to New 
Technology” (1994) 74 Boston University Law Review 1. Epstein contends that the genetic testing of 
employees provides employers with an opportunity to reduce labour costs and improve the efficiency 
of their operations. Epstein further provides that because the employer is driven by rational concerns 
of profit and loss in accessing genetic information on its employees, it will make only economically 
rational and efficient use of the information. Epstein “The Legal Regulation of Genetic 
Discrimination: Old Responses to New Technology” (1994) 74 Boston University Law Review 1 18. 
Epstein believes further believes that full disclosure by an employee of his or her genetic information 
is required particularly where an employee knows he or she is at risk of a condition from family 
history or from a reliable genetic test. It would be immoral for an employee to, for example, conceal 
that he or she carries the Huntington’s disease gene from his or her employer. Epstein “The Legal 
Regulation of Genetic Discrimination: Old Responses to New Technology” (1994) 74 Boston 
University Law Review 1 11. 
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exposures.1575 Genetic testing therefore enables employers to screen out “genetically 
unsuitable” individuals, that is, individuals at an increased risk of developing an 
illness or having a predisposition towards developing a work related illness. Such 
individuals are less attractive employees to an employer since they are likely to work 
less hours, impose greater health care costs on  employers,1576 increase the costs of 
hiring temporary replacements and  training permanent replacements and require that 
more precautions be taken in dealing with health and safety risks.1577 
Second, employers also see genetic testing as a useful measure to prevent increased 
health care costs. An employer may, for example, not wish to continue employing an 
individual with a predisposition to cancer or Alzheimer’s as these conditions are 
likely to impose excessive health care costs on the employer, particularly after the 
employer has spent time and money training the employee.1578 
Third, employers argue that genetic testing of individuals enables them to protect the 
employee, other employees and the public.1579 Employers have various obligations 
towards their employees and the public. Employers, for example, have a duty to 
provide acceptable standards of care for their employees and to bear the costs of work 
related accidents.  Employers have the additional obligation of bearing responsibility 
for the careless conduct of employees who cause harm or injury in the course of their 
employment. As such, employers are liable to third parties for any harm or damage 
occurring on the employer’s premises or as a result of the employer’s operations.1580  
It is for these reasons that genetic testing is perceived as a useful tool in assisting 
employers to meet these obligations by employing only “genetically suitable” 
individuals. 
                                               
1575Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, American Medical Association Use of Genetic Testing by 
Employers Journal of the American Medical Association in Barker (ed.) Genetics and Society (1995) 
79 – 89. 
1576Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, American Medical Association Use of Genetic Testing by 
Employers Journal of the American Medical Association in Barker (ed.) Genetics and Society 
(1995)79. 
1577Nuffield Council on Bioethics Report on Genetic Screening Ethical Issues (1993) 56. 
1578Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, American Medical Association Use of Genetic Testing by 
Employers Journal of the American Medical Association in Barker (ed.) Genetics and Society (1995) 
82. 
1579
 Laurie Genetic Privacy: A Challenge to Medico-Legal Norms (2002) 152. 
1580Supra. 
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On the other hand some employers use genetic testing to accommodate individuals 
who are not “genetically suitable”. For example, where an employee operating heavy 
machinery is found to be suffering from a condition that makes him or her prone to a 
sudden heart attack beyond a particular age, then his or her employer can take steps to 
ensure that the employee is given another, less hazardous, job to perform at that age. 
Another example is that an employee, who is found to have a propensity for a 
particular condition that is exacerbated by environmental factors, may be placed in a 
safer working environment.1581 
Employers further argue that the genetic testing of individuals in the workplace can 
reduce the incidences of occupational disease. In the United States, for example, black 
employees have been screened for the sickle cell trait because of concerns that 
exposure to nitro or amino compounds could precipitate the sickling of blood.1582 Male 
employees have also been screened for sex linked genetic abnormality of glucose-6-
phosphate dehydrogenise deficiency because of concerns that exposure to oxidizing 
chemicals could precipitate haemolytic anaemia.1583 Workplace genetic testing can 
also, for example, identify individuals with a high risk of developing a late onset 
disease - such as Huntington’s disease – which would enable the employer to take 
steps to prevent the concerned individuals from harming themselves and others in the 
course of their employment.1584 
It has been argued that individuals also have an interest in undergoing genetic tests in 
the workplace as it enables them to assess their own susceptibility to occupational 
disease. This, in turn, enables individuals to make free and informed decisions 
regarding the suitability of a particular employment and affords them due regard for 
their health and safety. Testing further enables individuals to avoid employment 
                                               
1581Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, American Medical Association Use of Genetic Testing by 
Employers Journal of the American Medical Association in Barker (ed.) Genetics and Society (1995) 
84. See also the US decisions of Echazabal v Chevron 226 F.3d 1063 (2000) and Johnson Controls 
499 U.S. 187 (1991).. In both decisions the employer wanted to exclude employees because they 
were likely to suffer some form of risk to their person (Echazabal v Chevron) or unborn child 
(Johnson Controls) from the toxins present in the workplace. 
1582Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, American Medical Association Use of Genetic Testing by 
Employers Journal of the American Medical Association in Barker (ed.) Genetics and Society (1995) 
84. 
1583Supra. See also the US decisions of Echazabal v Chevron 226 F.3d 1063 (2000) and Johnson 
Controls  499 U.S. 187 (1991).  
1584Nuffield Council on Bioethics Report on Genetic Screening Ethical Issues (1993) 57. 
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which is likely to aggravate their risk of ill health, allowing them to safeguard their 
economic well-being as well as that of their families.1585 
8.3.3 Arguments Against Workplace Genetic Testing 
The argument that genetic testing determines the future employability of individuals 
assumes that testing provides an adequate basis to determine an individual’s 
employability.  In fact, the tests are poor predictors of gene manifestation and even 
poorer predictors of disabling conditions. 1586 The argument further ignores the fact 
that genes are often characterised by “incomplete penetrance” i.e. individuals carrying 
a particular gene may never exhibit manifestations of the gene.1587  Even in those cases 
where the gene does manifest itself, the extent of the gene’s effects may differ 
considerably from person to person1588. For example, with sickle cell anaemia, certain 
individuals die within the first 5 years of their lives and others survive into their 
50’s.1589 Behavioural modifications have also been shown to limit gene manifestation. 
For example, patients at risk of diabetes and coronary artery disease can modify their 
diet and thereby reduce the manifestations of the particular gene.1590 To provide a 
further example, in the case of Huntington’s disease, the presence of the Huntington’s 
gene has a disabling and debilitating effect, but the manifestation of the gene or onset 
of the disease may be delayed. For these reasons, the exclusion of individuals from 
employment on the basis that their genetic profile impacts on their future 
employability merely discriminates against the concerned individuals regardless of 
                                               
1585Nuffield Council on Bioethics Report on Genetic Screening Ethical Issues (1993) 56. See also 
Laurie Genetic Privacy: A Challenge to Medico-Legal Norms (2002) 152. 
1586
 Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, American Medical Association Use of Genetic Testing by 
Employers Journal of the American Medical Association in Barker (ed.) Genetics and Society (1995) 
81. 
1587
 Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, American Medical Association Use of Genetic Testing by 
Employers Journal of the American Medical Association in Barker (ed.) Genetics and Society (1995) 
81. 
1588Supra. 
1589Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, American Medical Association Use of Genetic Testing by 
Employers Journal of the American Medical Association in Barker (ed.) Genetics and Society (1995) 
81. 
1590
 Supra. 
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whether their particular gene has manifested itself and affected the ability of the 
individual to perform his or her duties.1591 
The argument that genetic testing is an effective tool for reducing health care costs is 
flawed because the exclusion of individuals with undesirable genetic constitutions 
imposes heavy health care costs on society,1592 especially in societies where healthcare 
is financed through private and public insurance markets. In the United States, for 
example, the majority of individuals covered by health care insurance are found in the 
employment based portion of the private insurance market. Employers purchasing 
group health care insurance receive public support in that they can deduct the cost of 
their contributions as a business expense. Employment based insurance is further 
beneficial to employees because it is considerably cheaper when obtained through the 
employer. Hence individuals exiled from the private health care insurance market 
only have recourse to public health care programs and charity organisations and this 
increases society’s health care costs.1593 
Employers also justify the use of genetic tests with reference to public health and 
safety. Although employers have an important responsibility in this regard, genetic 
testing is not an effective tool for discharging this responsibility. As already indicated, 
genes may be characterised by incomplete penetrance, variable expression and 
delayed manifestation. A more effective tool in meeting this responsibility would be 
for employers to require individuals to undergo other types of routine tests or 
screening (such as routine medical supervision or screening1594) to determine their 
actual capacity to carry out their duties.1595 For example, an airline can require its 
pilots to undergo physical examinations every 6 months and a bus company can 
require its bus drivers to undergo neurobehavioral tests frequently.  Such non-genetic 
                                               
1591
 Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, American Medical Association Use of Genetic Testing by 
Employers Journal of the American Medical Association in Barker (ed) Genetics and Society (1995) 
81. 
1592
 Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, American Medical Association Use of Genetic Testing by 
Employers Journal of the American Medical Association in Barker (ed) Genetics and Society (1995) 
83. 
1593Schwartz “Privacy and the Economics of Personal Health Care Information” (1997) 76 Texas Law 
Review 1 33-34. 
1594
 Kim “Genetic Discrimination, Genetic Privacy: Rethinking Employee Protections for a Brave New 
Workplace” (2002) 96 Northwestern University Law Review 1497 1539. 
1595
 Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, American Medical Association Use of Genetic Testing by 
Employers Journal of the American Medical Association in Barker (ed) Genetics and Society (1995) 
83. 
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testing enables the employer to not only meet its public safety responsibilities, but to 
also identify those individuals whose incapacity cannot be detected by genetic 
tests.1596 
Employers further argue that genetic tests enable them to identify applicants with 
suitable personal traits or cognitive abilities. 1597 However, according to Kim, less 
intrusive methods of measuring behavior or aptitudes (such as ability testing, job 
supervision and references) exist. Kim further observes that employers making use of 
genetic testing in order to identify applicants with suitable personality traits are 
misguided because research has shown that genetic tests cannot measure behaviour 
and aptitudes. Genetic tests can merely ascertain the presence of DNA sequences 
associated with types of behaviour or aptitudes.1598 
The argument that genetic testing can identify individuals who are at risk of disease 
brought on by workplace exposures is also flawed.1599 If employers are to exclude 
individuals from employment because of their propensity to develop a particular 
condition they are likely to be lax in their efforts to eliminate potential toxins from the 
workplace. 1600 Employers can protect individuals from occupational disease or injury 
by offering individuals the opportunity to be monitored for exposure to toxins (such as 
lead and radioactive material) and any negative effects from those toxins. In addition, 
if employees develop excessive exposure to toxins present in the workplace, 
employers can arrange to transfer the affected employees to a toxin free 
environment.1601 
                                               
1596Supra. 
1597
 Kim “Genetic Discrimination, Genetic Privacy: Rethinking Employee Protections for a Brave New 
Workplace” (2002) 96 Northwestern University Law Review 1497 1540. 
1598
 Kim “Genetic Discrimination, Genetic Privacy: Rethinking Employee Protections for a Brave New 
Workplace” (2002) 96 Northwestern University Law Review 1497 1540. 
1599
 Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, American Medical Association Use of Genetic Testing by 
Employers Journal of the American Medical Association in Barker (ed.) Genetics and Society (1995) 
85. 
1600
 Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, American Medical Association Use of Genetic Testing by 
Employers Journal of the American Medical Association in Barker (ed.) Genetics and Society (1995) 
85. 
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 Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, American Medical Association Use of Genetic Testing by 
Employers Journal of the American Medical Association in Barker (ed.) Genetics and Society (1995) 
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To conclude, genetic testing compromises the privacy interests of individuals and 
their families. As previously indicated, genetic information is very confidential and 
powerful information because it pertains to information about an individuals’ future 
health and the future health of his family.  The information affects not only the 
concerned individual but the individual’s family and the individual’s personal 
decisions such as whether or not to have children.1602 One commentator aptly points 
out that the information revealed by genetic tests includes “pre-symptomatic medical 
information about an individual…information about an individual’s risk of future 
disease, disability, or early death… information about an individual’s carrier status, 
that is, the likelihood of parents passing on to their children a genetic condition, and 
about the health of an individual’s family members.”1603 Legal commentators further 
contend that genetic testing may afford employers the opportunity to discriminate 
against individuals on the basis of their genetic constitution. Genetic information 
comprises an irreversible trait of every individual, which an individual did not choose 
and cannot easily alter or modify.1604 For this reason, allowing employers to 
discriminate on the basis of genetic information as an immutable trait is grossly unfair 
because, more often than not, the individuals concerned have little or no control over 
their genetic make- up.1605 
Moreover, research has shown that there are psychological risks (such as anxiety, 
depression, loss of self esteem1606) attached to an individual undergoing genetic testing 
and learning that he or she is carrying a defective gene that may predispose him or her 
to a serious condition. As such, genetic information has the potential to not only 
compromise an individual's privacy and that of his family but also the dignity of the 
persons the information relates to. 1607 Individuals are further at risk of learning painful 
                                               
1602Annas “Genetic Privacy: There Ought To Be Law” (1999) 4 Texas Review of Law & Politics 9 10. 
1603
 Pagnattaro “Genetic Discrimination and the Workplace: Employee’s Right to Privacy v. 
Employer’s Need to Know” (2001) 39 American Business Law Journal 139 143. 
1604Suter “The Allure and Peril of Genetics Exceptionalism: Do We Need Special Genetic Legislation” 
(2001) 79 Washington University Law Quarterly 669 706 – 707. 
1605Suter “The Allure and Peril of Genetics Exceptionalism: Do We Need Special Genetic Legislation” 
(2001) 79 Washington University Law Quarterly 669 706 – 707. 
1606Kim “Genetic Discrimination, Genetic Privacy: Rethinking Employee Protections for A Brave New 
Workplace” (2002) 96 Northwestern University Law Review 1497 1539. 
1607Green and Thomas “DNA: Five Distinguishing Features for Policy Analysis” (1998) 11 Harvard 
Journal of Law and Technology 571 572 – 573. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
344 
 
facts concerning family relationships.1608 For example, genetic information can 
prematurely expose the fact that an individual is not his or her parents’ biological 
child before his or her parents have had a chance to explain this to the concerned 
individual. 1609  The fact that genetic information may not be as precise in predicting 
whether an individual is likely to be affected by a genetic disease, does not take away 
from the highly sensitive and personal nature of genetic information and the risks 
associated with the disclosure of such information. It also does not diminish the 
impact of genetic information on life changing decisions such as whether or not to 
have children. 1610 
Laurie sums up the genetic discrimination and privacy implications of genetic 
information as follows: 
“Information concerning an individual’s genetic make-up is of a highly 
personal and sensitive nature. To discover that one is likely to develop 
a debilitating condition in later life or that this might be passed to one’s 
children must be an intense and possibly devastating exposure. 
Exposure to such knowledge can alter the self-perception and 
challenge notions of identity, and could adversely affect an individual 
in [his or] her social and professional and familial milieux. The mere 
availability of genetic information serves to heighten concerns about 
uses which might in turn compromise the interests of the person who 
has been tested – the proband. For example the disclosure of 
information to employers, insurers or other interested parties might 
lead to judgments being made which adversely affect or discriminate 
against the individual. Uniquely, genetic tests can also reveal 
information about blood relatives of the proband, with a corresponding 
threat to their privacy interests and their privacy”.1611 
                                               
1608Green and Thomas “DNA: Five Distinguishing Features for Policy Analysis” (1998) 11 Harvard 
Journal of Law and Technology 571 572 – 573. 
1609Green and Thomas “DNA: Five Distinguishing Features for Policy Analysis” (1998) 11 Harvard 
Journal of Law and Technology 571 572 – 573. 
1610Green and Thomas “DNA: Five Distinguishing Features for Policy Analysis” (1998) 11 Harvard 
Journal of Law and Technology 571 572 – 573. 
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8.4 SOUTH AFRICA 
8.4.1 Introduction 
It is unclear to what extent South African employers engage in systematic genetic 
testing in employment. However, selected employers are required in terms of 
legislation to implement some biological monitoring or surveillance of their 
employees. For example, the Occupational Health and Safety Act1612 (“OSHA”) 
protects persons other than persons at work against hazards to health and safety 
arising out of or in connection with activities of persons at work.. OSHA places a 
number of duties on employers with respect to the safety and health of employees. 
OSHA further authorises the Minister of Manpower to declare any work as listed 
work.1613 Once work is declared as listed, employers whose employees undertake 
listed work or are liable to exposure to hazards emanating from listed work must 
identify the risks associated with the listed work and the steps to be taken to comply 
with the provisions of OSHA: to evaluate the risks associated with the listed work 
constituting a hazard to the health of employees; as far as reasonably practicable, to 
prevent the exposure of such employees to hazards concerned  (only where such 
prevention is not reasonably practicable can the employer minimise the exposure); 
and, having regard to the nature of the risks associated with such work and the level of 
exposure of such employees to the hazards, to carry out an occupational hygiene 
programme and biological monitoring and subject employees to medical 
surveillance.1614 As such, the type of programme introduced and type of biological 
monitoring and surveillance the employees are subjected to, will depend largely on 
the nature of the risks attached to the work and the level of exposure of affected 
employees.1615 Employers are required to keep designated workplace health and safety 
representatives informed of any action taken with respect to listed work and the 
results of such action. More importantly, OSHA recognises the private nature of the 
medical information and the privacy of individuals undergoing biological and medical 
surveillance in terms of the listed work requirements. OHSA restricts the availability 
of the test results to persons other than the Chief Inspector, the employee concerned or 
                                               
1612Act 85 of 1993. 
1613Section 11 of OSHA. 
1614Section 12(b) of OSHA. 
1615Section 12(1) (a) - (c) of OSHA. 
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the employer by providing that individual test results of biological monitoring and 
medical surveillance relating to the work of an employee shall not, without the written 
consent of the relevant employee, be made available to any other person (except the 
Chief Inspector, employee concerned or the employer).1616 
8.4.2 Legislation 
There is no legislation directly regulating the use of genetic testing in South Africa. 
That being said, there exists legislation that has implications for the use of genetic 
testing in employment, namely the Constitution and the Employment Equity Act1617 
(“EEA”).  
8.4.2.1 Constitution 
In Harksen v Lane1618 the Constitutional Court developed a two stage approach for 
determining whether conduct by an employer amounts to unfair discrimination. The 
first raises the question whether discrimination exists more particularly whether the 
differentiation is based on a listed or unlisted ground of discrimination. If the 
differentiation is based on a listed ground such as disability, discrimination is 
established. If the differentiation is not based on a listed ground, discrimination is 
established by considering whether the differentiation is based on attributes and 
characteristics which have the ability to impair the fundamental dignity of persons as 
human beings or to affect them adversely in a comparably serious manner. The 
second stage asks if the discrimination is unfair. If the differentiation is found to be on 
a listed ground, unfairness is presumed and if found to be on an unlisted ground, then 
the complainant will have to establish the unfairness. This in mind, the question arises 
whether negative decisions by an employer about a(n) (prospective) employee on the 
basis of a genetic disposition amount to unfair discrimination. In light of the test in 
Harksen v Lane and the fact that disability is a listed ground in both the 
Constitution1619 and EEA1620, the exclusion from employment of an individual on the 
basis of a genetic predisposition to certain diseases may amount to unfair 
discrimination. This, however, will only be the case if courts define disability in a 
                                               
1616Section 12(2) of OSHA. 
1617Act 55 of 1998. 
1618
 1998 (1) SA 300 (CC). 
1619Section 9(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996. 
1620Section 6(1) of the EEA. 
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generous and broad manner that includes immutable traits such as one’s genetic 
make-up or constitution. It is important to note in this regard that the EEA does 
provide a definition of ‘people with disabilities’. To the extent that this definition 
applies to the meaning of ‘disability’ in section 6(1) of the EEA, the apparent problem 
seems to be that it requires a pre-existing mental or physical impairment (not the 
potential thereof).1621 This limitation (i.e. an existing definition of “disability”) does 
not exist in the context of the Constitution.  
Perhaps more promising is the possibility that courts will, based on the reasoning in 
Hoffmann v South African Airways,1622 determine that discrimination on the basis of a 
genetic predisposition amounts to discrimination on an unlisted ground. The applicant 
in Hoffman argued that his HIV status constituted a disability and, as such, South 
African Airways - in denying him employment as a cabin attendant - had 
discriminated against him on a listed ground. The Court established that it was 
unnecessary to consider discrimination on a listed ground (disability) “because the 
denial of employment to the appellant because he was living with HIV impaired his 
dignity and constituted unfair discrimination [on an unlisted ground]”1623.1624 
8.4.2.2 The Employment Equity Act 
The chief purpose of the EEA is to achieve equity in the workplace. The EEA seeks to 
reach this goal by promoting equal opportunity and fair treatment through the 
elimination of unfair discrimination and the implementation of affirmative action 
measures to redress the disadvantages in employment experienced by designated 
groups.1625 Section 1 of the Employment Equity Act defines medical testing broadly as 
including: 
“Any test, question, inquiry or other means designed to ascertain, or 
which has the effect of enabling the employer to ascertain, whether an 
employee has any medical condition”.  
The above definition recognises that medical information is not obtained through  
medical tests only but can also be obtained through, for example, inquiries into an 
                                               
1621Pretorious, Klinck and Ngwena Employment Equity Law (2005) 748. 
16222000 11 BCLR 1211 (C). 
1623Paragraph 40. 
1624Pretorious, Klinck and Ngwena Employment Equity Law (2005) 748. 
1625Section 2 of the EEA. 
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individual’s family medical history. Furthermore, use of the term “condition” in the 
definition of medical testing denotes something broader than a disease, illness or 
injury and arguably includes early diagnosis of HIV/AIDS as well as predispositions 
to conditions such as various cancers and coronary heart disease.1626 This would mean 
that genetic testing is included in the definition of medical testing in the EEA. The 
significance hereof is that genetic testing would be permitted in terms of section 7 of 
the EEA, provided the testing is justifiable in light of medical facts, employment 
conditions, social policy, and fair distribution of employee benefits or the inherent 
requirements of the job.1627. 
Included in the EEA’s definition of the term “designated groups” (for purposes of 
affirmative action) are ‘people with disabilities’.1628 The EEA proceeds to define 
“people with disabilities” as “people who have a long term or recurring physical or 
mental impairment which substantially limits their prospects of entry into, or 
advancement in, employment”.1629It appears that individuals with genetic 
predispositions to certain diseases or conditions fall outside this definition, because 
the definition seems to require a pre-exisiting physical or mental impairment. The 
disability provisions of the Act are supplemented by the Code of Good Practice: Key 
Aspects on the Employment of People with Disabilities (“the Code”). The Code and 
the EEA share a similar definition of the term “peoples with disabilities”. This means 
both the Code and the EEA seem to exclude persons with a genetic predisposition to a 
future impairment. The definition of disabled persons, in this sense, further denotes 
that progressive genetic conditions such as Huntington's disease are only considered 
disabilities once the impairment becomes substantially limiting of an individual's 
prospects of entry into, or advancement in employment. This restrictive interpretation 
of the term disability not only fails to recognise persons with genetic disabilities or 
impairment as disabled, but also excludes persons with conditions such as HIV from 
being considered disabled (simply because they suffer from the condition). 
                                               
1626Christianson “The Testing of Employee: The Selective Prohibition of Medical, Psychological and 
Other Testing in terms of the Employment Equity Act” (1999) vol. 9 Contemporary Labour Law 
1112. 
1627Supra. 
1628Section 1 of the EEA. 
1629Section 1 of the EEA. 
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The definition of “people with disabilities” in the Code was further criticised by 
Ngwena and Pretorius1630 in the context of the Imatu v City of Cape Town1631 decision. 
The authors argued that the Code is only applicable in case of affirmative action and 
not in cases of discrimination. This would leave room for a more expansive definition 
of ‘disability’ to be applied in discrimination cases, which could, in turn, include a 
genetic predisposition to future impairment.  
At issue in the Labour Court decision City of Cape Town was whether the City of 
Cape Town's imposition of a blanket ban on the employment of diabetics amounted to 
unfair discrimination in terms of section 6(1) of the EEA. The Labour Court drew on 
the Harksen v Lane NO and Others1632 approach to unfair differentiation in finding 
that the City of Cape Town's blanket ban in this regard amounted to differentiation. 
The Court then proceeded to consider whether the differentiation was based on a 
listed ground, namely disability, or on an analogous (unlisted) ground.1633 In this 
regard, the Court noted, as point of departure, that the term “disability” is not defined 
in the EEA. Despite this, the Court looked to Item 5 of the Code, which was issued in 
terms of the EEA, for guidance.  
The Court noted  the  definition of the phrase “people with disabilities” in the Code1634 
and also  observed that Item 5 of the Code states that the "the scope of protection for 
people with disabilities in employment focuses on the effect of a disability on the 
person in relation to the working environment, and not on the diagnosis or the 
impairment", an approach  indicative of the fact that the Code's approach to disability 
is not  that associated with the medical model of disability, but instead  the social 
model.1635 
The Court took the view that for the applicant's condition to constitute a disability it 
had to meet all the elements of Item 5 of the Code, the first being “a .long term or 
recurring physical or mental impairment” (the “impairment element”) and the second 
being “a substantial limitation on the prospects of entry into, or advancement in, 
                                               
1630Pretorious, Klinck and Ngwena Employment Equity Law (2005) 748. 
1631(2005) 26 ILJ 1404 (LC). 
1632
 1998 (1) SA 300 (CC). 
1633
 1435. 
1634
 1435. 
1635
 1435. 
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employment” (the “limitation element”). The Court went on to determine that the 
applicant's condition met only some of the elements of Item 5 of the Code. In 
particular, the court felt that the limitation element was not met.1636 The Court held in 
this regard that: 
“…that fast acting, analogue insulin controls or corrects the long term 
physical impairment, diabetes mellitus, so that its adverse effects in 
relation to the working environment are largely prevented or 
removed…It must follow that although diabetes mellitus can be 
accurately described as a long terms impairment, in our law, a sufferer 
of it is not regarded as person with a disability under the EEA. [The 
sufferer of diabetes mellitus] lives a normal life apart from his 
medication regime, and there is no substantial limitation of his abilities 
to carry out his tasks. He does therefore not fall within the definition of 
“people with disabilities” in the [Code]. [The City of Cape Town] for 
that reason did not differentiate on the listed ground of disability within 
the meaning of that tern in section 6(1) of the EEA.”1637 
The Court then proceeded to consider whether the applicant was discriminated against 
based on an analogous (unlisted) ground (diabetes) and, based on application of the 
test for recognition of unlisted grounds in Harksen v Lane, came to the conclusion that 
this was indeed the case. The applicant’s medical condition was seen as analogous to 
the listed grounds of “disability, HIV status and, given its' genetic origins, perhaps 
even birth”.1638 
Ngwena and Pretorius argue that notwithstanding that diabetes can be said to 
constitute an analogous ground, the Court in City of Cape Town erred in finding that 
diabetes mellitus did not constitute a disability under section 6(1).1639 The concept of 
disability, according to the authors, is a broad concept that has been given multiple 
and contrasting meanings. Despite this elusiveness and fluidity there have been 
attempts to achieve a universal meaning of the concept,1640  which has resulted in two 
                                               
1636
 1436. 
1637
 1436. 
1638
 1437. 
1639Pretorious, Klinck and Ngwena Employment Equity Law (2005) 748. 
1640Pretorious, Klinck and Ngwena Employment Equity Law (2005) 755. 
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models of disability, namely the social model and the medical model. The social 
model, which was referred to by the Court in City of Cape Town, takes the view that 
people are disabled “by a social – cultural environment that is constructed around the 
norm of “able bodiedness”. The medical model conceives of disability as flowing 
from impairment.1641 Because disability is such a fluid concept and therefore is 
capable of taking on different and contested meanings, “the pointer towards 
deciphering the meaning of disability”, according to the authors, is context. In this 
regard the authors argue that the context for rendering disability a prohibited ground 
under section 6(1) of the EEA is to eliminate unfair discrimination.1642 
The authors go on to consider whether the impairment element and limitation element 
applied in City of Cape Town was appropriate. The impairment element for Ngwena 
and Pretorius was not only proper, but also essential, given that it distinguishes 
disability from other differential characteristics such as race or sex and further 
distinguishes disability from temporary impairments brought on by short lived 
illnesses.1643 Ngwena and Pretorious contend that the limitation element is 
“superfluous” and “juridically inappropriate” because it seeks to regulate “disability 
related discrimination with an under inclusive yardstick”,1644 namely the severity of 
the impairment or the severity of the effects associated with impairment.1645 The use 
of such a yardstick allows an employer who is found to have discriminated against a 
job applicant on the basis of a disability associated with impairment to argue that he 
was justified in discriminating against the job applicant because the impairment was 
not a substantially limiting one.1646 This approach is inconsistent in the South African 
constitutional dispensation which advances and holds as paramount human rights such 
as dignity and equality.1647 
                                               
1641Pretorious, Klinck and Ngwena Employment Equity Law (2005) 757. 
1642Pretorious, Klinck and Ngwena Employment Equity Law (2005) 757. 
1643Pretorious, Klinck and Ngwena Employment Equity Law (2005) 758. 
1644Supra. 
1645Pretorious, Klinck and Ngwena Employment Equity Law (2005) 759. 
1646Supra. 
1647Pretorious, Klinck and Ngwena Employment Equity Law (2005) 760. 
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8.4.3 Case Law 
The issue of genetic testing in the employment context has not come before South 
African courts, but it seems safe to say that it is only a matter of time bearing in mind 
both the rate at which technology is developing and the increasing affordability of 
medical testing. As indicated in previous chapters the Labour Court in Joy Mining 
Machinery had to determine the justifiability of HIV/AIDS tests that an employer in 
the mining sector sought to conduct on its employees. The Court stated that in 
determining the justifiability of HIV/AIDS testing it will take into account various 
factors: the prohibition on unfair discrimination; the need for HIV/AIDS testing; the 
purpose of the test; the medical facts; employment conditions; social policy; the fair 
distribution of employee benefits; inherent requirements of the job; and the category 
or categories of jobs or employees concerned. The court further stated that it would 
consider the following ancillary factors in arriving at its decision : the attitude of the 
employees; whether the test is intended to be voluntary or compulsory; the financing 
of the test; preparations of the test; pre-test counselling; the nature of the proposed test 
and procedure; and post-test counselling. Therefore, South African employers who 
consider genetic testing of their employees should not only ensure the tests are 
justifiable in light of section 7(1) (b) of the EEA, but also comply with the primary 
and ancillary factors listed in Joy Mining Machinery.1648 Alternatively, employers may 
bring the issue for consideration before the Labour Court, to ensure the justifiability 
of the genetic testing. 
8.4.4 Analysis 
South African courts have yet to address the issue of genetic testing in the 
employment context. There is currently no legislation directly regulating genetic 
testing. However, both the Constitution and EEA have implications for genetic 
testing. In terms of the Constitution and decisions like Hoffmann, an individual denied 
employment on the basis of a genetic predisposition may argue that he or she has been 
unfairly discriminated against on an unlisted ground. In terms of the EEA, it would 
seem as if genetic testing qualifies as medical testing, even though the Act’s definition 
of disability is not wide enough to include genetic predispositions. 
                                               
 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
353 
 
8.5 UNITED KINGDOM 
8.5.1 Introduction 
Genetic testing is rarely used in the employment context in the United Kingdom 
because it is still underdeveloped and its predictive value remains an issue of much 
debate.1649 In 1993 the Nuffield Council Working Party found evidence of only one 
compulsory genetic screening programme in use by a United Kingdom employer. 
This involved the screening of applicants for sickle cell in occupational categories of 
Her Majesty’s Forces (aviation candidates) who were to be exposed to atypical 
atmospheric conditions.  Candidates identified as carriers of this trait were considered 
unfit for duty because of the risk of sickling (a change in the shape of the red blood 
cells which can lead to a blockage of the blood vessels) on exposure to reduced 
atmospheric pressure or hypoxia.1650 However, by 2002, the Human Genetics 
Commission (“HGC”) had found no evidence of the systematic use of genetic testing 
in the employment context in the United Kingdom either as a condition of 
employment or in meeting workplace health and safety obligations.1651 
It further appears from the results of a 2000 survey by the Institute of Directors that 
the majority of United Kingdom employers are reluctant to require individuals to 
undergo genetic testing, particularly where the individuals have not given their 
consent. The Institute recorded that 0.6 percent of the directors reported they used 
genetic tests routinely and 1.1 percent indicated they used genetic tests only when 
they were concerned about particular employees. 34 percent of the directors approved 
of genetic screening with the employee’s consent in determining the likelihood of 
heart disease and 8 percent indicated they would consider compulsory testing if its use 
was in the employee’s interests. 50 percent approved of genetic testing as an indicator 
that employees were at risk of occupational related disease due to exposure in the 
                                               
1649Employment Practices Code 88. See also Tottel Publishing “Genetic Testing in the Employment 
Context – The State of Play” (2006) 13 (9) Health and Safety at Work 545 – 547. 
1650Nuffield Council on Bioethics Report on Genetic Screening Ethical Issues (1993) 59. See also 
Opinion of the European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies to the European 
Commission Ethical Aspects of Genetic Testing in the Workplace July (2003)  9. 
1651
 Human Genetics Commission Inside Information: Balancing interests in the Use of Personal 
Genetic Data (2002) 12. 
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workplace as long as the employee consented and 16 percent reasoned that this basis 
of testing should be compulsory.1652 
The HGC report also recommended that employers not demand that individuals take 
genetic tests as a condition of employment. The report instead advised employers to 
monitor the health of its employees or individuals by other means seeing as there 
exists uncertainty over the reliability of genetic information.1653 
8.5.2 Legislation 
Although the HGC report recommended that government give detailed consideration 
to legislation aimed at prohibiting genetic discrimination, there is currently no 
legislation in the United Kingdom directly regulating genetic testing. As such, it has 
been argued that United Kingdom employers may lawfully require an individual to 
undergo a genetic test as a condition for employment.1654 Employers may also refuse 
an individual employment on the basis of negative genetic test results and employers 
are not compelled to give reasons for refusing an individual employment1655.1656 
The United Kingdom does, however, have a range of other employment related 
legislation that can have implications for genetic testing in the workplace. This 
legislation protects the confidentiality of personal information, provides protection 
against discrimination in general and regulates workplace health and safety issues.1657 
8.5.2.1 Data Protection Act 
The Employment Practices Code provides employers with guidelines on how to meet 
the requirements of the Data Protection Act1658 (“DPA”) relating to the processing of 
                                               
1652Opinion of the European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies to the European 
Commission Ethical Aspects of Genetic Testing in the Workplace July (2003) 9. 
1653Opinion of the European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies to the European 
Commission Ethical Aspects of Genetic Testing in the Workplace July (2003) 9. 
1654
 Human Genetics Commission Inside Information: Balancing interests in the Use of Personal 
Genetic Data (2002) 12.  See also Tottel Publishing “Genetic Testing in the Employment Context – 
The State of Play” (2006) 13 (9) Health and Safety at Work 545 – 547 
http://www.advisorybodies.doh.gov.uk/hgac/papers/papers_g/g_04.htm (2006-03-23). 
1655Nuffield Council on Bioethics Report on Genetic Screening Ethical Issues (1993) 58. 
1656
 See also Sweet & Maxwell Limited and Contributors ‘Genetic Testing in the Employment Context 
– The State of Play” 13(9)  Health and Safety at Work 2006 545 – 547. 
1657Human Genetics Commission “Inside Information: Balancing interests in the Use of Personal 
Genetic Data” 2002.http://www.advisorybodies.doh.gov.uk/hgac/papers/papers_g/g_04.htm (2006-
03-26). 
1658Act of 1998. 
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employee data, which includes genetic information. First and foremost, the 
Employment Practices Code discourages employers from using genetic testing as a 
means of obtaining information about the future employability of an individual, 
because the procedure is too intrusive and the predictive value of such information is 
uncertain.1659 The Employment Practices Code Supplementary Guidance of the DPA 
(“Employment Practices Code Supplementary Guidance”) states that genetic tests 
cannot form the basis of an employment decision: “[a]t present, very few genetic tests 
are available that give information to either an employer or employee which could 
validly be used in the context of decisions concerning employment”1660. In fact, the 
Employment Practices Code recommends genetic testing in two scenarios only: first, 
where it is evident the employee with a genetic condition is likely to pose a risk to the 
safety of others and, secondly, where the workplace environment is likely to pose a 
risk to employees with particular genetic conditions.1661 The Employment Practices 
Code further requires that where genetic testing is used for a valid purpose (that is for 
health and safety concerns), it has to be subject to levels of accuracy and 
reliability.1662The Employment Practices Code Supplementary Guidance also provides 
that for genetic testing to be valid, it should not only be geared towards protecting the 
health and safety of others, but also should be reliable and reproducible and hold 
levels of predictive value.1663 This requirement is based on the sensitive nature of 
genetic information and the sometimes far reaching consequences of the 
information.1664 Perhaps the most important guideline provided for in the Employment 
Practices Code is that the results of the tests be communicated to the test subject and 
professional persons should be on hand to advise the subject.1665 
The Employment Practices Code Supplementary Guidance also explains the meaning 
of and difference between monogenic and polygenic diseases to illustrate why the 
predictive value of genetic testing remains uncertain.1666 Both the Employment 
                                               
1659Employment Practices Code 88. 
1660Employment Practices Code Guidance 71. 
1661Employment Practices Code 89. 
1662Supra. 
1663Employment Practices Code Guidance 71. 
1664Employment Practices Code Guidance 71. 
1665
 Employment Practices Code  89. 
1666
 Employment Practices Code Guidance  70. 
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Practices Code and Employment Practices Code Supplementary Guidance point 
employers to the fact that the Human Genetics Commission is the statutory body 
responsible for monitoring and advising on genetic issues.1667 The Employment 
Practices Code endorses the Commission’s recommendation to employers to not 
require individuals to undergo genetic testing as a condition of employment.1668 
8.5.2.2 Sex Discrimination Act and Race Relations Act 
Inadvertent protection against discrimination by employers on the basis of genetic test 
results exists under the Sex Discrimination Act of 1975 and the Race Relations Act of 
1976. Discrimination is defined in both acts to encompass direct and indirect 
discrimination.1669 Furthermore, protection against unlawful direct discrimination (on 
grounds of conduct which appears prima facie discriminatory) and unlawful indirect 
discrimination (conduct which appears prima facie non-discriminatory but which is 
discriminatory in effect)1670 exists especially for those conditions associated with sex 
(such as haemophilia associated with males) or particular races (such as thalassaemia 
associated with persons of Mediterranean descent).1671 The screening of aviation 
candidates by Her Majesty’s Forces referred to earlier has been criticised, not only for 
being based on unsound evidence, but also for being discriminatory against members 
of the African Caribbean population who comprise the greater number of sickle cell 
carriers.1672 
8.5.2.3 Disability Discrimination Act 
The Disability Discrimination Act1673 (the “DDA”) requires that employers reasonably 
accommodate disabled employees in the workplace. The DDA may protect employees 
with adverse genetic test results from discrimination by employers if they have an 
existing “physical or mental impairment which has a substantial and long-term 
adverse effect on [their] ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities”. The 
                                               
1667
 Employment Practices Code 88 and Employment Practices Code Guidance  70. 
1668
 Employment Practices Code  88. 
1669Nuffield Council on Bioethics Report on Genetic Screening Ethical Issues (1993) 58. 
1670Nuffield Council on Bioethics Report on Genetic Screening Ethical Issues (1993) 58. 
1671Human Genetics Commission Inside Information: Balancing interests in the Use of Personal 
Genetic Data 2002. http://www.advisorybodies.doh.gov.uk/hgac/papers/papers_g/g_04.htm (2006-
03-23). 
1672Opinion of the European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies to the European 
Commission Ethical Aspects of Genetic Testing in the Workplace July (2003) 9. 
1673Act of 1995. 
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definition of “disabled person” and “disability” in part 1 of the DDA does not include 
individuals who are genetically predisposed to a potential disability, but arguments 
have been made for their inclusion. Some legal commentators have argued that the 
DDA’s definition of “disabled” should not be extended because the DDA’s 
framework is not limited to the employment context, but includes other areas such as 
the provision of services, goods and facilities.1674 Others suggest the better approach is 
for parliament to legislate separately in protecting against the direct or indirect 
discrimination of individuals on the basis of genetic test results.1675 
8.5.2.4 Equality Act 
Although the United Kingdom’s Equality Act will be implemented in phases, the 
main provisions of the Equality Act are expected to come into force in October 
2010.1676As already mentioned, the Equality Act subsumes most of the United 
Kingdom's discrimination legislation (including the aforementioned Sex 
Discrimination Act, Race Relations Act and the Disability Discrimination Act) into a 
single piece of legislation.  The Equality Act seeks to harmonise and consolidate 
disability, sex, race discrimination and other discrimination laws under a single piece 
of legislation.1677 According to the impact assessment compiled in respect of the 
Equality Act, this consolidation and harmonisation process was necessary because 
previous discrimination laws tended to be complex and opaque  and tended to provide 
more protection for certain characteristics, namely disability, race and sex, to the 
detriment of other characteristics.1678 
Of particular importance, the Equality Act not only brings various types of 
discrimination legislation under one piece of legislation but also brings with it a 
number of changes to discrimination law. One of these changes is the introduction of 
one objective justification test to the discrimination landscape. The justification test 
would require, for example, that where an employer treats an employee unfavourably 
because of the employee's disability, the employer will have to show “that the 
                                               
1674
 See part 19 of the Act. 
1675Human Genetics Commission Inside Information: Balancing interests in the Use of Personal 
Genetic Data (2002). http://www.advisorybodies.doh.gov.uk/hgac/papers/papers_g/g_04.htm (2006-
03-23). 
1676http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/15/pdfs/ukpgaen_20100015_en.pdf (2010-08-21). 
1677http://www.stammeringlaw.org.uk/changes/sea.htm (2010-08-21). 
1678Equality Act Impact Assessment Final Version (Royal Assent) April 2010 7. 
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treatment is a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim”.1679 This results in 
employers having to meet a higher threshold of justification in case of disability 
discrimination. This test is not, strictly speaking, a new one as it is currently in use to 
justify indirect discrimination in the context of sexual or racial discrimination.1680 The 
Equality Act does not, however, broaden the definition disability and this effectively 
means that persons with asymptomatic disabilities are still excluded from the 
definition. 
The Equality Act may also limit the employer's ability to make enquiries into an 
individual's health and perhaps that of an individuals' family. This, in turn, may limit 
employers from having access to an individual’s genetic information, at the very least 
before the individual is made an offer of employment, whether that offer is 
conditional of unconditional.1681  In this regard, the Equality Act prevents employers, 
subject to exceptions, from making enquiries into an individual's health. The Equality 
Act, for instance, permits such enquiries for purposes of establishing whether the 
applicant will be able to carry out a function that is intrinsic to the type of work 
concerned and for purposes of monitoring diversity in the workplace.1682 
8.5.2.5 Health and Safety at Work Act 
The Health and Safety at Work Act1683 places a burden on the employer to ensure the 
health of employees in the workplace. The Act requires employers to either prevent 
exposure to risks or to reduce the risks to the health of employees. Where residual 
risks remain, the Act requires the employer to introduce preventative measures (such 
as the provision of preventative equipment and health surveillance).1684 Health 
surveillance encompasses a range of methods designed to detect adverse effects on 
those persons exposed to health hazards. It is possible, as the use of genetic tests 
                                               
1679Section 19 of the EA. 
1680http://www.stammeringlaw.org.uk/changes/sea.htm (2010-08-21). See also Equality Act Impact 
Assessment Final Version (Royal Assent) April (2010) 88 - 89.  
1681Section 60 of the EA. 
1682
 Section 60 (6)(a) and (b) of the EA. 
1683
 Act of 1974. 
1684http://www.advisorybodies.doh.gov.uk/hgac/papers/papers_g/g_04.htm (2010-08-22). 
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becomes more widespread, that these tests will be considered as one of the required 
methods to detect adverse health effects amongst those exposed to health hazards.1685 
8.5.2.6 Statutory Bodies 
Even though the United Kingdom does not have legislation regulating the use of 
genetic tests in the workplace, the privacy implications of employer requests for 
genetic information have been discussed by certain bodies - namely the Nuffield 
Council on Bioethics1686 and the Human Genetics Advisory Commission.1687 
It is interesting to note that the Nuffield Council expressed a reluctance to recommend 
any initiative to introduce legislation regulating the use of genetic testing and 
information because of the then lack of evidence regarding the systematic use of 
genetic testing by employers.1688 The Council concluded that the use of genetic testing 
by United Kingdom employers was not a cause for concern. The Council did 
recommend that the Department of Employment keep under review the potential use 
of genetic testing by employers.1689 
The Commission, on the other hand, suggested that legislation be introduced to 
prevent employers testing individuals for genetic conditions other than those that 
might substantially compromise the public’s safety. The Commission further 
suggested that genetic testing in the employment sphere be restricted to specific 
conditions relevant to the particular employment. Samples collected for such testing 
should not be examined for other conditions and the general principle that the 
individual’s right to privacy should prevail should underlie the genetic testing of 
individuals in the employment sphere. In sum, the Commission found that access to 
genetic information is only justified if the knowledge of that information has a direct 
bearing on the effective performance of the job. The Commission recommended 3 
scenarios in which genetic tests might be justified: 
                                               
1685http://www.advisorybodies.doh.gov.uk/hgac/papers/papers_g/g_04.htm (2010-08-22). 
1686Nuffield Council on Bioethics Report on Genetic Screening Ethical Issues (1993) 63. 
1687Report on The Implications of Genetic Testing for Employment United Kingdom Human Genetics 
Advisory Commission (1999). 
1688Nuffield Council on Bioethics Report on Genetic Screening Ethical Issues (1993) 63. 
1689Nuffield Council on Bioethics Report on Genetic Screening Ethical Issues (1993) 64. 
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a) where there is a strong evidence of a clear connection between the working 
environment and the development of the condition for which genetic testing 
can be conducted; 
b) where the condition in question is one which seriously endangers the health of 
the employee or is one in which an affected employee is likely to present a 
serious danger to third parties; 
c) where the condition is one for which the dangers cannot be eliminated or 
significantly reduced by reasonable measures taken by the employer to 
modify or respond to the environmental risks.1690 
The Commission emphasised that employees should have the freedom to decide 
whether to undergo the testing. 1691 The Council’s recommendations on this particular 
point are unclear. The Council simply states that genetic testing in employment should 
be accompanied by safeguards for the employee, while it remains unclear whether this 
particular recommendation applies to both current and prospective employees. 1692  
However, the Nuffield Council did articulate the need to protect the interest of both 
the current and prospective employee in not knowing their genetic constitution. This 
particular recommendation of the Nuffield Council, according to Laurie, fails to 
highlight an important distinction between individuals being tested for conditions 
which they are likely to contract based on their family medical history and the 
comprehensive testing of individuals. 1693 The distinction is an important one given 
that employers should not be allowed to  widely test individuals, in which case it may 
be assumed that the reasons for testing are purely financial and not for the individual’s 
or the public’s benefit.  
The Human Genetics Advisory Commission found that there were sound reasons for 
administering genetic tests where a condition may put the employer and others at risk 
in the workplace, provided that condition can be accurately predicted by a genetic test. 
As such, the Commission recommended that it would not be in anyone’s best interest 
                                               
1690Human Genetics Commission Inside Information: Balancing interests in the Use of Personal 
Genetic Data (2002).  http://www.advisorybodies.doh.gov.uk/hgac/papers/papers_g/g_05.htm (2006-
03-23). 
1691Human Genetics Commission Inside Information: Balancing interests in the Use of Personal 
Genetic Data (2002).  http://www.advisorybodies.doh.gov.uk/hgac/papers/papers_g/g_05.htm (2006-
03-23). 
1692Nuffield Council on Bioethics Report on Genetic Screening Ethical Issues (1993) 63. 
1693
 Laurie Genetic Privacy: A Challenge to Medico-Legal Norms (2002) 152. 
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to ban the use of genetic test results in employment completely. The Commission 
further concluded that if and when the systematic use of genetic testing increased, the 
following principles should be observed: 
a) an individual should not be required to take a genetic test for employment 
purposes – an individual’s “right to know” their genetic constitution should be 
upheld; 
b) an individual should not be required to disclose the results of a previous 
genetic test unless there is clear evidence that the information it provides is 
needed to assess either current ability to perform a job safely or susceptibility 
to harm from doing a certain job; 
c) employers should offer a genetic test (where available) if it is shown that a 
specific working environment or practice, while meeting health and safety 
requirements, might pose specific risks to individuals with particular genetic 
variations. For certain jobs where issues of public safety arise, an employer 
should be able to refuse to employ a person who refuses to take a relevant 
genetic test; 
d) any genetic tests used for employment purposes must be subject to assured 
levels of accuracy and reliability, reflecting best practice. Any use of genetic 
testing should be evidence-based and consensual. Results of any tests 
undertaken should always be communicated to the person tested and 
professional advice should be available. Information about and resulting from 
the taking of the test should be treated in accordance with Data Protection 
Principles. Furthermore tests results should be carefully interpreted, in light  
of how these may impact on and be affected by working conditions; 
e) if multiple genetic tests were to be performed simultaneously, then each test 
should meet the standards set out in b, c and d1694. 
8.5.3 Case Law 
It remains to be seen how United Kingdom tribunals will approach the issue of 
genetic testing in the workplace, particularly the effect of such testing on the privacy 
interests of the individuals concerned. In this regard United Kingdom tribunals are 
                                               
1694Human Genetics Commission Inside Information: Balancing interests in the Use of Personal 
Genetic Data (2002).  http://www.advisorybodies.doh.gov.uk/hgac/papers/papers_g/g_05.htm (2006-
03-23). 
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likely to look to Article 8 of the ECHR to determine whether there has been an 
infringement of an individual's right to privacy as protected by the ECHR. An 
important decision in this regard is that of the Grand Chamber of the European Court 
of Human Rights in S and Marper v United Kingdom,1695 which provided a 
comprehensive assessment of genetic information.  
The applicants in S and Marper argued that the retention by authorities of their 
fingerprints, cellular samples and DNA profiles (“personal data”) in terms of section 
64 of the United Kingdom's Police and Criminal Evidence Act1696 (“PACE”) 
interfered with their right to respect for private life, as this information was linked to 
their identity and concerned a type of information that they were entitled to keep 
within their control. The applicants further argued that the retention of such personal 
data interfered with their physical and psychological integrity and breached their right 
to personal development and self-determination and to establish relationships with 
other persons. 
The Government accepted that the information constituted “personal data” within the 
meaning of the DPA, but argued that the mere retention of the information in terms of 
PACE did not fall within the ambit of Article 8 of the ECHR because it did not 
constitute interference with the integrity or relationships of the applicants.1697 
The court was of the view that the retention of the personal data amounted to an 
infringement of Article 8(1). The point of departure was that the concept of “private 
life” under Article 8 was a broad concept and not capable of an exhaustive definition. 
The concept of “private life” covers the physical and psychological integrity of a 
person as well as aspects of a person's physical and social identity. The court then 
went on to consider whether the personal data concerned involved aspects of “private 
life” as envisioned by Article 8. In this regard, the court considered fingerprints to be 
different to cellular samples and DNA profiles, because cellular samples and DNA 
profiles contained substantial amounts of personal and sensitive data and had a 
stronger potential for future use. The court expressed particular concern with the fact 
that DNA profiles could be used for familial searches in order to identify genetic 
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 30562/04 [2008] ECHR 1581 (4 December 2008). 
1696Act of 1984. 
1697http://www.libertysecurity.org/article2332.html - forum (2010-08-22). 
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relationships between individuals and could be used to assess the ethnic origin of the 
donor of such data. The court concluded that the retention of cellular samples and 
DNA profiles interfered with the applicants’ right to private life and further concluded 
that the retention of fingerprints may give rise to fundamental life concerns.1698 
After establishing that there was an interference with the applicants’ right to private 
life, the court went on to consider whether the interference was justified under Article 
8(2). The applicants had argued that the retention of the personal data was not 
justified under Article 8(2) for a number of reasons, namely: first, the authorities were 
given the power to use the cellular samples and DNA profiles for purposes which 
were widely worded and vague and open to abuse; secondly, the indefinite retention 
of the personal data of suspected offenders could not be regarded as necessary in a 
democratic society; and, thirdly, the retention was disproportionate as its application 
was blanket in nature and disregarded, amongst other things, the type of offence 
involved. The Government submitted that the interference was justified as the 
measures were in accordance with the law (i.e. section 64 of PACE) and was 
necessary and proportionate for the legitimate purpose of preventing crime.1699 
The court agreed with the applicants that the purposes of retention provided for in 
section 64 of PACE were so widely and generally worded that they were likely to give 
rise to an extensive interpretation. The context required that there are clear and 
detailed rules relating to the scope of the retention measures; detailed safeguards 
concerning the retention and usage of the personal data; and the procedures preserving 
the integrity and confidentiality of the personal data.1700The court did, however, agree 
with the Government that the retention of personal data pursued the legitimate aim of 
detecting and preventing crime. The court found that there was a margin of 
appreciation given to competent local authorities in making the assessment of whether 
the interference is necessary in a democratic society, final evaluation of whether 
remains subject to review by courts to determine conformity with the ECHR 
principles. The court further noted that the margin tended to be narrower when the 
right involved is crucial to an individual's enjoyment of fundamental ECHR rights and 
where the general consensus amongst Contracting States was contrary to the law 
                                               
1698http://www.libertysecurity.org/article2332.html - forum (2010-08-22). 
1699http://www.libertysecurity.org/article2332.html - forum (2010-08-22). 
1700http://www.libertysecurity.org/article2332.html - forum (2010-08-22). 
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concerned. In this regard, the court observed that the United Kingdom was the only 
Contracting State that had chosen not to set limits on the retention and use of such 
personal data in an effort to achieve a balance with the competing interest of 
preserving respect for private life. The court concluded that the blanket and 
indiscriminate retention of personal data of suspected offenders, (irrespective of the 
gravity of the offence or the age of the offender) but not convicted offenders, 
constituted a disproportionate interference with the applicant's right to respect for 
private life and cannot be regarded as necessary in a democratic society.1701 
8.5.4 Analysis 
There is no legislation directly regulating the use of genetic testing in United 
Kingdom.  There is no legislation preventing employers from using these tests in 
making employment decisions or restricting employers from making use of such 
tests1702however, legislation such as the Data Protection Act, Sex Discrimination Act, 
Race Relations Act, Disability Discrimination Act, the soon to be implemented 
Equality Act, as well as Health and Safety legislation provide some protection. 
Certain commentators have argued for the enactment of legislation directly regulating 
the use of genetic testing the in the United Kingdom workplace. This is perhaps a 
little premature as there is little evidence to suggest that genetic tests are being used 
by United Kingdom employers. Part 4 of the Employment Practices Code discourages 
employers from using genetic testing as a condition of employment, because such 
testing is still under development and because the predictive value of such testing in 
still largely uncertain. The Employment Practices Code does, however, approve of 
such testing to obtain genetic information to ensure the safety of employees in the 
work environment. That said, the Employment Practices Code advises that genetic 
testing be used as a measure of last resort and requires employers to inform the 
Human Genetics Commission of the proposed use of genetic testing.1703 More 
importantly though, the soon to be implemented Equality Act should deal with any 
case of genetic discrimination that may arise, particularly those concerning 
individuals with symptomatic genetic conditions. 
                                               
1701http://www.libertysecurity.org/article2332.html - forum (2010-08-22). 
1702http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/library/data_protection/practical_application/coi_html/en
glish/employment_practices_code/part_4-information_about_workers_health_2.html (2010-08-22). 
1703http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/library/data_protection/practical_application/coi_html/en
glish/employment_practices_code/part_4-information_about_workers_health_2.html (2010-08-22). 
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8.6 UNITED STATES 
8.6.1 Introduction 
American employers have been conducting genetic testing since the 1960’s when 
Dow Chemical first conducted genetic monitoring of their employees to detect 
possible mutagenic effects from their workplace environment.1704 By the 1970’s, the 
United States Air Force Academy refused sickle cell gene carriers to train as pilots. 
Courts have, however, found that testing for the sickle cell trait has a disproportional 
impact on African Americans and for this reason several states prohibit employers to 
conduct such tests.1705 
The use of genetic testing has increased with the creation of DNA and genetic 
databases. Moreover, the success of the Human Genome Project has increased the 
prevalence of this kind of testing in the employment sphere.1706 
In 1982, the National Opinion Research Centre (“NORC”) conducted a survey for the 
United States Congressional Office of Technology Assessment (“OTA”) on the Use 
of Genetic Testing in the Workplace. NORC sent confidential questionnaires to 500 of 
the largest industrial companies, chief executive officers of 50 of the largest private 
utility companies, and presidents of the 11 major unions representing the largest 
numbers of employees in those companies.1707 At that time, of the 366 responding 
companies, 1.6 percent reported that they were currently conducting genetic testing, 
4.6 percent indicated that they had used some of these tests in the past 12 years, a 
further 1.1 percent anticipated using the tests in the next 5 years and 15 percent stated 
that they would possibly be using the tests in the next 5 years.1708 
                                               
1704http://www.privacyinternational.org/survey/phr2003/threats.htm (2004-07-09). 
1705Opinion of the European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies to the European 
Commission “Ethical Aspects of Genetic Testing in the Workplace” July 2003 10. 
1706http://www.privacyinternational.org/survey/phr2003/threats.htm (2004-07-09). 
1707United States Office of Technology Assessment 1982 Survey of the Use of Genetic Testing in the 
Workplace. In 1989 conducted a follow-up survey which demonstrated that the 1982 results 
indicating that the use of genetic testing by employers was bound to increase. The 1989 survey found 
that 2 % of the responding companies reported use of genetic screening. Nuffield Council on 
Bioethics Report on Genetic Screening Ethical Issues (1993) 60. 
1708United States Office of Technology Assessment 1982 Survey of the Use of Genetic Testing in the 
Workplace. In 1989 conducted a follow-up survey which demonstrated that the 1982 results 
indicating that the use of genetic testing by employers was bound to increase. The 1989 survey found 
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In 1991, the OTA undertook another survey on Genetic Screening and Monitoring in 
the Workplace of 1,500 United States companies, 50 of the largest utilities and 33 of 
the largest unions. The survey considered the scientific, legal, ethical and social 
aspects of such testing in the workplace by these entities.1709 The survey revealed that 
1 percent of companies reported to have used genetic screening to identify persons 
with increased health risks and a further 12 percent of the companies reported genetic 
screening or monitoring of their employees. The survey further revealed that 1 percent 
of company health officers reported that they had a formal policy in place on either 
pre-employment genetic testing or genetic monitoring.1710 The American Management 
Association (AMA) conducted a survey in 1998, which suggested that 10 percent of 
United States employers routinely test employees for genetic predispositions to 
diseases. A more recent (2004) AMA survey revealed that this figure may have 
increased. The survey found that 62.6 percent of employers conduct medical testing 
on their employees for various categories:  sickle cell anaemia (1 percent); 
Huntington’s disease (0.2 percent); family medical history (8 percent) and 
susceptibility to workplace hazards (10.5 percent).1711 
8.6.2 Legislation 
8.6.2.1 Americans with Disabilities Act 
The American with Disabilities Act (“the ADA”) specifically prohibits discrimination 
against “an individual with a disability who, with, or without reasonable 
accommodation can perform the essential functions of the employment position that 
such an individual holds or desires.”1712  The ADA defines a disability as: “(A) a 
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life 
activities of such an individual; (B) a record of such impairment; (C) being regarded 
as having such an impairment.”1713 The ADA does not recognise “genetic disability or 
impairment”; therefore persons with predispositions to genetic conditions fall outside 
                                                                                                                                      
that 2 % of the responding companies reported use of genetic screening. Nuffield Council on 
Bioethics Report on Genetic Screening Ethical Issues (1993) 60. 
1709
 United States Office of Technology Assessment Medical Monitoring and Screening in the 
Workplace: Results of Survey (1991).  
1710Opinion of the European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies to the European 
Commission Ethical Aspects of Genetic Testing in the Workplace  July (2003) 10. 
1711American Management Association (2004) Workplace Testing Survey: Medical Testing. 
1712Section 12112(a) of the ADA. 
1713Section 12111(1). (2) and (3) of the ADA. 
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the ambit of the Act’s definition of “disability”. Some experts and state legislatures 
have expressed concern with this state of affairs, a concern based on the view that the 
ADA is designed to protect individuals who have a genetically related illness or a 
disability once it manifests and substantially limits a major life activity”1714. Other 
writers have argued that symptomatic individuals with disease linked genetic 
conditions can also be protected by the ADA under the third prong of its “disability 
definition” - “being regarded as having such impairment”1715. According to 
Pagnattaro, asymptomatic individuals may be protected by the ADA if an employer 
covered by the ADA (1) mistakenly believes that a person has a physical impairment 
that substantially limits one or more major life activities, or (2) mistakenly believes 
that actual, non-limiting impairment substantially limits one or more major life 
activities.1716 The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) also prefers 
to extend protection to persons with predispositions to genetic conditions under the 
third prong of the definition. The EEOC Compliance Manual on the Definition of the 
Term “Disability” (Order No. 915.002 902 issued in 1995)1717, provides that “regarded 
as” in the third prong of the definition is applicable to discrimination based on 
“genetic information relating to illness, disease, or other disorders”1718.  
                                               
1714
 Pagnattaro “Genetic Discrimination and the Workplace: Employee’s Right to Privacy v Employer’s 
Need to Know” (2001) 39 American Business Law Journal 139 159. Pagnattaro proposes that a 
determination into whether an individual with a genetic condition is disabled should be an 
individualised enquiry based on the individual’s actual condition. Pagnattaro adds that therefore a 
person with Parkinson’s whose illness does not impair a major life activity is not necessarily disabled. 
Pagnattaro “Genetic Discrimination and the Workplace: Employee’s Right to Privacy v Employer’s 
Need to Know” (2001) 39 American Business Law Journal 139 160. 
1715This argument is usually made under the Supreme Court’s finding in Bragdon v Abbott 524 U.S. 
614 (1998). In Bragdon v Abbott the US Supreme Court held that an HIV infection or an 
asymptomatic HIV infection is protected under the first prong of the definition, that is to say, it 
constitutes a “physical impairment” that “substantially limits the major life activity” of reproduction. 
Kim asserts that the Court’s holding in Bragdon v Abbott cannot be extended to individuals with 
genetic anomalies because genetic anomalies in contrast to HIV vary in their physical manifestations. 
The Court in Bragdon v Abbott based its decisions on the immediacy with which HIV produces 
anomalies in the blood and on the predictable course and effect of the disease. Kim “Genetic 
Discrimination, Genetic Privacy: Rethinking Employee Protections for A Brave New Workplace” 
(2002) 96 Northwestern University Law Review 1497 1529. 
1716
 Pagnattaro “Genetic Discrimination and the Workplace: Employee’s Right to Privacy v Employer’s 
Need to Know” (2001) 39 American Business Law Journal 139 161. 
1717
 EEOC Compliance Manual Section on the Definition of the Term “Disability” 
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/902cm.html (2006-05-03). 
1718Kim “Genetic Discrimination, Genetic Privacy: Rethinking Employee Protections for A Brave New 
Workplace” (2002) 96 Northwestern University Law Review 1497 1529 1514.  
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However, the ADA has shortcomings despite its apparent protection against genetic 
discrimination in the workplace. Even though the EEOC Compliance Manual presents 
an important move towards protecting asymptomatic individuals with genetic 
conditions from discrimination, the manual and its guidelines do not bind courts. In 
addition, the EEOC interpretation does not consider “unaffected recessive carriers of 
recessive genes” and fails to prevent employers from requiring a waiver from an 
individual once they have been made an offer of employment by an employer. Finally, 
the ADA only prevents use of genetic information. 1719 The ADA does not prevent an 
employer from acquiring genetic information.1720 
On the other hand, other legal commentators1721 have suggested that the ADA should 
not be expanded to provide protection for asymptomatic individuals with genetic 
disorders and maladies. One such commentator asserts that the ADA cannot be 
expanded without violating its legislative intent: 
“…expanding the  definition of disability beyond its practical limits 
would eviscerate the original purpose of the ADA, which was to 
protect the disabled minority from discrimination by the majority…the 
current language of the ADA cannot be reasonably be interpreted to 
include such persons when they only have a probability, rather than a 
certainty, of contracting a genetic disease in the future…Expanding the 
definition of disability…to include genetic disorders would 
substantially dilute the purpose behind the ADA and impair the 
strength of its protections…the definition of disability is crafted 
narrowly, and to sustain a claim for discrimination the plaintiff must 
show that (1) he has a physical or mental impairment that (2) 
substantially limits (3) one or more major life activities. The most 
difficult element to overcome “substantial limitation” in a major life 
                                               
1719
 Pagnattaro “Genetic Discrimination and the Workplace: Employee’s Right to Privacy v Employer’s 
Need to Know” (2001) 39 American Business Law Journal 161. 
1720
 Pagnattaro “Genetic Discrimination and the Workplace: Employee’s Right to Privacy v Employer’s 
Need to Know” (2001) 39 American Business Law Journal 161. 
1721Steinforth “Bringing Your DNA to Work: Employer’s Use of Genetic Testing under the Americans 
with Disabilities Act” (2001) 43 Arizona Law Review 965 989 – 991 and Kim “Genetic 
Discrimination, Genetic Privacy: Rethinking Employee Protections for A Brave New Workplace” 
(2002) 96 Northwestern University Law Review 1497 1529. 
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activity has been interpreted to mean that a person must show he is 
“presently-not potentially or hypothetically-substantially limited.”1722  
The ADA further permits employers to conduct medical examinations of current 
employees if these examinations are “job related and consistent with business 
necessity”.1723 Thus where the use of genetic testing is motivated by non-
discriminatory purposes, the testing can be protected by the ADA as job related and 
consistent with business necessity.1724 
The ADA Amendment Act of 2008 came into effect on 1 January 2009 and was 
enacted to address the result of certain Supreme Court decisions,1725 which excluded 
individuals with a range of substantially limiting impairments from falling within the 
narrowly construed meaning of disability in the 1990 Act.1726 The 2008 Act provides 
that the meaning of “disability” in the Act “shall be construed in favour of broad 
coverage of individuals under the [Act], to the maximum extent permitted by the 
terms of [the] Act.”1727 
8.6.2.2 Fourth Amendment Constitutional Prohibitions 
The constitutionally protected privacy interest in avoiding disclosure of personal 
matters encompasses medical information and its confidentiality.1728 In Whalen v 
Roe1729, the United States Supreme Court recognised a right to privacy in medical 
                                               
1722Steinforth “Bringing Your DNA to Work: Employer’s Use of Genetic Testing under the Americans 
with Disabilities Act” (2001) 43 Arizona Law Review 965 989 – 991. See also Kim who argues 
protection of individuals with genetic anomalies would result in definitional problems as individuals 
with genetic anomalies would bear a double burden of showing the employer based its decision on 
genetic characteristics and the employer regards him or her as disabled. Kim “Genetic 
Discrimination, Genetic Privacy: Rethinking Employee Protections for A Brave New Workplace” 
(2002) 96 Northwestern University Law Review 1497 1529. 
1723Section 12112(2) of the ADA. 
1724French “Genetic Testing in the Workplace: The Employer’s Coin Toss” (2002) 15 Duke Law and 
Technology Review 9. 
1725
 See for instance, the decision of Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v Williams 534 US 
184 (2002).  
1726
 See section 2 of the ADA Amendment Act. 
1727Supra. 
1728
 Norman –Bloodsaw v Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory 135 F.3d 126  1269. 
1729429 U.S. 589 (1977). 
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information. Later, in Doe v Attorney General of the United States1730, the Ninth 
Circuit confirmed that there were inherent privacy interests in medical information.1731 
8.6.2.3 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act1732 (“Title VII”), genetic tests constitute an 
adverse effect or an injury when employees or applicants are singled out on the basis 
of their sex or race. An example of this is to be found in Norman-Bloodsaw v 
Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory1733 where genetic tests were performed on female 
employees for purposes of detecting pregnancy, a condition that only women can 
experience and on black employees for purposes of testing for the sickle cell trait, a 
condition present mostly in African Americans.1734 The EEOC, as the enforcement 
agency of Title VII has established guidelines for the use of employment selection 
criteria - “EEOC’s Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures”.1735 These 
guidelines have been held to constitute “the administrative interpretation of [Title VII] 
by the enforcing agency and consequently they are entitled to great deference.”1736 The 
guidelines apply to pre-employment tests and other selection procedures. In terms of 
the guidelines employers are encouraged to use the least discriminatory selection 
procedure in serving their interest and in selecting an efficient and trustworthy 
workforce. Further, the selection process must have a valid purpose, be closely related 
to the job and be subject to periodic review.1737 
8.6.2.4 State Constitutions and Legislation 
Several states in the United States have enacted statutes directly regulating the use of 
genetic tests in the employment context. States such as Alaska, New Mexico and Utah 
have statutes regulating genetic testing and genetic privacy. Alaska’s 2004 statute1738 
                                               
173015 F. 3d 1260, 1270 (N.D. Cal. 1998). 
1731
 See also Doe v City of New York 15 F.3d 264, 267 
1732Act of 1964. 
1733135 F.3d 126. 
1734French “Genetic Testing in the Workplace: The Employer’s Coin Toss” (2002) 15 Duke Law and 
Technology Review 9 12. 
1735Pesonen “Genetic Screening: An Employer’s Tool to Differentiate or to Discriminate?” (2001) 19 
Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy 187 198. 
1736Griggs v Duke Power Co.  433-434. 
1737Pesonen “Genetic Screening: An Employer’s Tool to Differentiate or to Discriminate?” (2001) 19 
Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy 187 198. 
1738
 2004 Alaska Sess. Laws 176(approved October 24, 2004). 
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prohibits employers from conducting genetic tests and dealing with the results of 
genetic tests without “informed and written consent” from the test subject.1739 The 
state of New Mexico (Genetic Information Privacy Act of 2005)1740 prohibits the use 
of genetic information in relation to employment. The statute further requires the 
“written and informed consent” of the test subject before genetic information can be 
obtained or analysed. Utah’s Genetic Privacy Act1741 regulates the use of genetic 
testing and genetic information by employers. The statute prohibits genetic testing and 
the use of genetic information for purposes of making an employment decision. On 
the other hand, some states such as Florida1742 and New Jersey1743 initially regulated 
the use of genetic testing for a particular trait or traits only.1744 For example, Florida 
regulated the use of genetic screening for the sickle cell trait. However, in 1992 
Florida enacted a broader statute to regulate the use of genetic testing.1745 The 1992 
statute protects applicants and employees from genetic testing without consent and 
requires that they receive notice in the event that an employment decision is based on 
the results of genetic testing.1746 Similarly, New Jersey now also has a broader statute 
prohibiting the use of genetic testing and discrimination in the employment 
context.1747 The Act basically prohibits employers from discriminating against 
applicants or employees on the basis of acquired or inherited genetic traits or on the 
basis of a refusal to submit to genetic testing.1748 Also in this regard, New Jersey’s 
Privacy Act of 20001749 offers employees an expansive degree of protection by 
explicitly acknowledging that the improper collection, retention or disclosure of 
genetic information can lead to significant harm to the individual, including 
stigmatization in areas such as employment.1750 The Act further restricts the disclosure 
                                               
1739
 Hebert Employee Privacy Law (2009) §12:16.50. 
1740
 2005 N.M. Laws 204(approved April 6, 2005). 
1741
 2002 Ut. Laws ch. 120, 2002 Ut. HB 56 (approved March 18, 2002; effective January 1, 2003). 
1742Fla Stat § 448.076 and Fla Stat 448.075. 
1743NJ Stat Ann § 10:5 – 12(a). 
1744
 Hebert Employee Privacy Law  (2009) §12:16.50. 
1745Fla Stat Ann § 760.40. 
1746Hebert Employee Privacy Law (2009) §12:22. 
17471996 NJ Laws ch 126 (effective Nov. 19, 1996). 
1748Hebert Employee Privacy Law (2009) §12:34. 
1749NJ Stat Ann § 10:5 – 44 (c). 
1750
 Pagnattaro “Genetic Discrimination and the Workplace: Employee’s Right to Privacy v Employer’s 
Need to Know” (2001) 39 American Business Law Journal139 174. 
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of genetic information by requiring the informed consent of the test subject to obtain, 
retain or disclose the genetic information concerned. In addition, the Act requires that 
notice be given to the test subject that the test was performed and the results were 
received.1751 
8.6.2.5 Occupational Safety and Health Act 
Similar to the United Kingdom Health and Safety at Work Act, the United States 
Occupational Safety and Health1752 (“the United States OSHA”) charges employers 
with the safety of its employees. The United States OSHA imposes a dual duty on 
employers: first, the “general duty clause” of the Act requires employers to provide 
employees with a workplace “free from recognised hazards that are likely to cause 
death or serious physical harm”; secondly, the “compliance clause” of the Act 
requires the employer to comply with the United States OSHA safety regulations and 
standards.1753 The Act further requires employers to biologically monitor employees 
through “periodic analysis of body fluids, tissues and excreta in order to measure the 
impact of the body’s exposure to chemical agents and to evaluate the health risks 
these chemicals pose”.1754 Moreover, United States OSHA regulations with regard to 
cancer causing agents require an employee to undergo a physical exam (which 
includes the personal history of the employee and family and occupational 
background) before entering a regulated area.1755 Given that the Act is primarily aimed 
at protecting the safety of employees, it requires the use of the most precise testing to 
ensure the safety of employees.1756 
8.6.2.6 Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 
The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act 1757 (“GINA”) was signed into law in 
May 2008. The Act provides protection against the misuse of genetic information and 
                                               
1751Supra. 
1752Act of 1970. 
1753
 Pagnattaro “Genetic Discrimination and the Workplace: Employee’s Right to Privacy v Employer’s 
Need to Know” (2001) 39 American Business Law Journal 139 170. 
1754This requirement applies especially to those employers dealing with the presence of toxins in their 
respective workplaces. Pagnattaro “Genetic Discrimination and the Workplace: Employee’s Right to 
Privacy v Employer’s Need to Know” (2001) 39 American Business Law Journal 139 170. 
1755
 Pagnattaro MA ‘Genetic Discrimination and the Workplace: Employee’s Right to Privacy v 
Employer’s Need to Know’ 2001 39 American Business Law Journal 139,170. 
1756French “Genetic Testing in the Workplace: The Employer’s Coin Toss” (2002) 15 Duke Law and 
Technology Review 9 22. 
1757Act of 2008. 
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against discrimination on the basis of genetic information by restricting the collection 
and use of such information.1758 
GINA provides protection to individuals with respect to their genetic information in 
two ways: first, it restricts the collection, storage and use of genetic information and, 
secondly, it prohibits the discrimination against individuals on the basis of genetic 
information.1759 GINA encompasses two broad contexts, namely employment and 
medical insurance coverage.  
GINA defines genetic information broadly to mean “with respect to any individual, 
information about such an individual’s genetic tests, the genetic tests of family 
members of such individual, and the manifestation of a disease or disorder in family 
members of such individual.”1760 Information about the sex or age of any individual is 
excluded from the meaning of genetic information. GINA further defines a “genetic 
test” to mean “an analysis of human DNA, RNA, chromosomes, proteins or 
metabolites that detects genotypes, mutations, or chromosomal changes.”1761 A genetic 
test does not include “an analysis of proteins or metabolites that does not detect 
genotypes, mutations, or chromosomal changes.”1762 
The employment provisions of GINA, specifically section 202(a)(1) and (2), prohibit 
private and public sector employers, labour organisations or employment agencies 
from failing to hire or discharging an employee or discriminating against employees 
on the basis of genetic information with respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment.1763 The section further prohibits employers from limiting, 
segregating or classifying employees on the basis of genetic information, in a manner 
that would deprive or tend to deprive an employee of opportunities in employment or 
                                               
1758
 Jones “The GINA is Out of The Bottle: The Genetic Information Non – Discrimination Act of  
2008” (2009) 52 Boston Bar Journal 9. 
1759
 Jones “The GINA is Out of The Bottle: The Genetic Information Non – Discrimination Act of  
2008” (2009) 52 Boston Bar Journal 9. 
1760Section 201(7) of GINA. 
1761Section 201(4). 
1762Section 201(4). 
1763
 Section 202(a)(1) of GINA. 
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adversely affect the status of an employee as such. GINA affords this protection to 
state and federal employees as well as private sector employees and applicants.1764 
Of particular significance, GINA incorporates two fundamental presumptions in the 
employment context – a presumption of confidentiality and a presumption of 
unlawfulness.  
Section 202(b) establishes a general presumption of unlawfulness in respect of an 
employer who requests, requires or purchases genetic information of an employee or 
an employee’s family member. However, the section incorporates several statutory 
exceptions to this general presumption. For example, the presumption falls away 
where an employer inadvertently requests or requires the family medical history of an 
employee or a family member of an employee through the health and genetic services 
it offers its employees as part of a wellness programme, or where an employer comes 
across genetic information after purchasing commercially and publicly available 
newspapers, magazines, periodicals and books that include family medical history.1765 
Section 206(a) establishes a further presumption of confidentiality in relation to the 
treatment and maintenance of genetic information. The section requires that 
employers, employment agencies and labour organisations treat genetic information in 
their possession in the same manner as it maintains and treats confidential medical 
records under Section 102(d)(3)(B) of the ADA.1766 There are several statutory 
exceptions to this presumption. For instance, an employer may disclose genetic 
information to an employee at his or her written request and to a government official 
investigating compliance with Title II of GINA if such information is relevant to the 
investigation.1767 
A number of commentators have identified weaknesses in GINA’s employment 
provisions, particularly its practicality and effectiveness as a discrimination 
                                               
1764
 Section 202(a)(2) of GINA. Schlein “New Frontiers for Genetic Privacy Law: The Genetic 
Information Non-discrimination Act of 2008” (2009) 19 George Mason University Civil Rights Law 
Journal 311. 
1765Section 202(b). 
1766Section 102(d)(3)(B) of the ADA requires that medical information obtained regarding an 
individual’s medical condition or history be collected and maintained on separate forms and in 
separate medical files and is treated as a confidential medical record. 
1767Section  206(b). 
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deterrent.1768 It remains to be seen if these criticisms are warranted. GINA’s 
employment provisions are expected to affect the way in which United States 
employers require or request sensitive genetic information pertaining to their 
employees and further deter the use of genetic screening and monitoring by employers 
as a means of curbing employee health care and compensation costs.1769 
8.6.3 Case Law 
8.6.3.1 The Americans with Disabilities Act and Case Law 
At issue in Echazabal v Chevron United States Inc.1770 was the decision by Chevron 
not to hire Echazabal on the ground that it would pose a direct threat to Echazabal’s 
health if he worked at their oil refinery. The question before the court was whether the 
direct threat defence provided by Title I of the ADA included a threat to one’s own 
health or safety. (The “direct threat” defence permits employers to impose a 
“requirement that an individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of 
other individuals in the workplace”,1771 but this was expanded by an EEOC regulation 
to include a threat to the employee’s own health and safety1772) Justice Reinhardt 
concluded that the ADA’s direct threat defence permits employers to impose a 
requirement that their employees not pose a significant risk to the health or safety of 
other individuals in the workplace, but does not permit employers to exclude the 
disabled from jobs on the ground that they may put their own health or safety at 
                                               
1768
 Schlein “New Frontiers for Genetic Privacy Law: The Genetic Information Non-discrimination Act 
of 2008” (2009) 19 George Mason University Civil Rights Law Journal  311 364 – 367. See also 
Rothstein (ed) Genetic Secrets: Protecting Privacy and Confidentiality in the Genetic Era (1997)  
 837. 
1769
 Schlein “New Frontiers for Genetic Privacy Law: The Genetic Information Non-discrimination Act 
of 2008” (2009) 19 George Mason University Civil Rights Law Journal  311 362. 
1770226 F.3d 1063 (2000). Echazabal had been employed by various maintenance contractors at 
Chevron’s oil refinery. Echazabal subsequently applied to work directly for Chevron and was 
extended an offer of employment by Chevron at the refinery, primarily in the coker unit. This offer 
was however contingent on Echazabal passing a physical examination. A pre-employment physical 
examination conducted by Chevron’s regional physician revealed that Echazabal’s liver was releasing 
certain enzymes at an abnormal rate and based on these results, Chevron concluded that Echazabal’s 
liver might be damaged by exposure to the solvents and chemicals in the coker unit and rescinded its 
job offer to Echazabal. Echazabal after consulting several physicians was diagnosed with 
asymptomatic, chronic active hepatitis C but none of the physicians advised him to stop working at 
the refinery because of his medical condition. Echazabal reapplied for the job at Chevron and was 
again told that his offer of employment was contingent on his passing a medical examination. 
Chevron again proceeded to rescind its offer of employment. Echazabal filed a compliant with the 
EEOC that Chevron had discriminated against him on the basis of the disability. 
1771Section 12111(3) of the ADA. 
1772EEOC Regulations for the ADA Amendments Act. 
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risk.1773 Justice Reinhardt further held that Congress purposely omitted threats to one’s 
own health or safety in the ADA’s direct threat defence as it was conscious of the 
history of paternalistic employment practices often resulting in the exclusion of 
disabled individuals from employment. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the EEOC 
regulation exceeded the scope of permissible rule making under the ADA.1774 
The Supreme Court (in Chevron v Echazabal1775) reversed the decision of the Ninth 
Circuit and accepted the EEOC regulation authorising the refusal to hire an individual 
because his performance on the job would endanger his own health owing to a 
disability. Justice Souter, in delivering the opinion of the Court, found that the EEOC 
regulation extended the “direct threat” defence by allowing the employer to screen out 
a potential worker with a disability for risks on the job to his own health.1776 It is 
interesting to note that the Supreme Court equated Echazabal’s condition to a 
“disability” In a nutshell, the Supreme Court reinforced an employer’s discretion to 
decline to hire applicants whose health and safety may be directly threatened by 
exposure to chemicals present in the workplace.1777 
In 2001, the EEOC settled the first lawsuit alleging genetic discrimination in 
employment, namely EEOC v Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway1778. The EEOC 
filed a suit against the Burlington Northern Santa Fe (“BNSF”) Railroad for secretly 
testing its employees for a rare genetic condition that causes carpal tunnel syndrome 
as one of its many symptoms. The EEOC sought a preliminary injunction against 
BNSF to end genetic testing of employees who claimed for work related injuries 
based on carpal tunnel syndrome. BNSF argued that the testing would enable it to 
determine whether the high incidence of work related injuries among its employees 
based on carpal tunnel syndrome were work-related. BNSF doctors were not only 
instructed to test for the rare genetic condition, but were also instructed to screen for 
several other medical conditions such as diabetes and alcoholism. BNSF doctors 
conducted the genetic testing without the knowledge or consent of BNSF employees 
                                               
17731072. 
1774Chevron v Echazabal  supra 73. 
1775536 U.S. 73 (2002). 
177681. 
1777Pesonen “Genetic Screening: An Employer’s Tool to Differentiate or to Discriminate?” (2001) 19 
Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy 187 189. 
1778Civ. No. CO1-4013 MWB (N.D. Iowa 2001). 
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and at least one employee was threatened with termination of employment for failing 
to submit a blood sample for a genetic test. The EEOC argued that the tests were 
unlawful under the ADA because they were not job-related, and any condition of 
employment based on such tests amounted to discrimination on the basis of disability. 
The lawsuit was settled by BNSF, which agreed with everything sought by EEOC.1779 
 In Norman-Bloodsaw v Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory1780 employees of a research 
facility operated by state and federal agencies had their blood and urine samples tested 
for syphilis, sickle cell trait, and pregnancy without their knowledge or consent and 
without any notification that the tests were being conducted. Moreover, only black 
employees were tested for sickle cell trait and only female employees were tested for 
pregnancy. The employees brought an action against the research facility and 
contended: first, the defendants violated the ADA by requiring, encouraging or 
assisting in medical testing that was not job related or consistent with business 
necessity; secondly, the defendants violated the federal constitutional right to privacy 
by conducting the testing, collecting and maintaining the results of the testing, and 
failing to provide adequate safeguards against disclosure of the results; thirdly, the 
testing violated their right to privacy under the California constitution; and fourthly, 
the defendants violated Title VII by singling out black employees for sickle cell trait 
testing and performing pregnancy tests on female employees generally.  
As point of departure, the court noted that, although most cases articulating the 
privacy interest in medical information involved its disclosure to third parties, the 
most basic violation of this interest involved the performance of unauthorised tests. 
Such tests were also regarded as searches in violation of Fourth Amendment 
constitutional rights. The court further noted that there were few subjects more 
personal and more likely to implicate privacy interests than that of one’s health or 
genetic make-up and the facts revealed by the tests are highly sensitive, even relative 
to other medical information. The court found that by testing the plaintiffs for syphilis 
                                               
1779http://www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/Human_Genome/elsi/legislat.shtml (2006-05-03). The 
EEOC sought an order which included the following terms: “BNSF shall not directly or indirectly 
require its employees to submit blood for genetic tests; BNSF shall not analyse any blood previously 
obtained; BNSF shall not evaluate, analyse or consider any gene test analysis previously performed 
on nay of its employees; and BNSF shall not retaliate or threaten to take any adverse action against 
any who opposed the genetic testing or who participated in EEOC’s proceedings.” 
http://www.eeoc.gov/press/4-18-01.html (2006-05-04). 
1780135 F.3d 126. 
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and pregnancy the defendants had violated the Constitution, because the Constitution 
prohibited unregulated and unrestrained enquiries into personal sexual matters that 
have no bearing on job performance. As regards testing the plaintiffs for pregnancy, 
the court found the defendants had violated the Constitution because pregnancy is also 
private matter which pertains to one’s sexual history and can invoke social stigma. 
With regard to testing the plaintiffs for the sickle cell trait, the court found that the 
defendants had again violated the Constitutional privacy provisions as the testing 
concerned sensitive information about family history and reproductive decisions.1781 
The court reasoned that even where an individual has consented to a general medical 
examination, this particular consent does not abolish one’s privacy right no to be 
tested for intimate, personal matters involving one’s health, nor does consenting to 
giving blood or urine samples or filling out a questionnaire.1782 The court concluded 
that the conditions tested for were aspects of one’s health, in which an individual 
enjoyed the highest expectation of privacy.1783 The court further found that the same 
privacy interests implicated under the Federal Constitution were recognised in the 
Californian Constitution. 1784 
8.6.3.2 Title VII Case Law 
The issue of employment testing pursuant to Title VII was examined by the Supreme 
Court in two decisions, Griggs v Duke Power Co.1785and Albemarle Paper Co. v 
Moody1786. In Griggs v Duke Power the Supreme Court erected the parameters for 
employment testing. The court held that Title VII proscribes not only overt 
discrimination but also covert discrimination, that is, acts that are facially fair but are 
discriminatory in their operation. 1787 The court stated that following in this regard:  
“…good intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem 
employment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as “built-
                                               
1781
 1269 – 1270. 
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 1270. 
17831270. 
17841270. 
1785401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
1786422 U.S. 405 (1975). 
1787
 432. 
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in-headwinds” for minority groups and unrelated to measuring 
capability”1788. 
Consequently, the court observed that if an employment practice which operates to 
exclude blacks cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the practice is 
prohibited. The court  concluded that an employer was prohibited by Title VII from 
requiring a high school education or the passing of a standardised general intelligence 
test as a condition of employment, particularly where neither standard was shown to 
be significantly related to successful job performance, both requirements operated to 
disqualify blacks at a substantially higher rate than white applicants and the jobs 
concerned had formerly been occupied only by white employees as part of a long 
standing practice of giving preference to whites.1789 
In Albemarle Paper Co. v Moody a group of black employees brought an action 
against their employer, a paper mill. At issue was the plant’s seniority program of 
employment testing which required applicants to pass two standardised tests (to test 
non-verbal intelligence, the Beta examination and the Wonderlic test, to measure 
general verbal facility). The Court found that the job relatedness standard for use of 
pre-employment testing in Griggs v Duke Power Co. and EEOC Guidelines required 
that discriminatory tests are impermissible unless shown by professionally acceptable 
methods to be, “predictive of or significantly correlated with important elements of 
work behaviour which comprise or are relevant to the job or jobs for which candidates 
are being evaluated”.1790 The Court further found the validation study for pre-
employment tests used at the paper mill defective because of  the odd patchwork of 
results from the study, the fact that the study compared test scores with subjective 
supervisorial rankings, the study dealt only with job-experienced, white workers even 
though the tests were given to new job applicants, who are younger, largely 
inexperienced and in many instances non-white and the study was conducted by plant 
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officials who could not be considered neutral. The Court concluded that Albemarle’s 
test failed to meet the job relatedness test.1791 
In International Union v Johnson Controls1792 the Court considered whether an 
employer may discriminate against its female employees on the basis of their ability 
to conceive or fall pregnant, in order to protect the unborn foetuses of the concerned 
women. The Supreme Court found Johnson Control’s (a battery manufacturer) policy 
biased in that it did not apply to the reproductive capacity of the company’s male 
employees in the same way as it applies to its female employees. More specifically, 
the court established the company’s sex-specific-foetal protection policy was not 
facially neutral since the policy classified on the basis of gender and childbearing 
capacity rather than fertility alone, despite evidence about the debilitating effect of 
lead exposure on the male reproductive system.1793 The court added “…the absence of 
malevolent motive does not convert a facially discriminatory policy into a neutral 
policy with a discriminatory effect.”1794 In sum, the Court found that a danger to a 
woman herself does not justify discrimination1795 and further found Johnson Control 
“does not pass the simple test of whether the evidence shows “treatment of a person in 
a manner which but for that person’s sex would be different.”1796 The policy barred all 
women, except those whose infertility was medically documented, from jobs 
involving actual or potential lead exposure exceeding OSHA standards in light of the 
fact that documented evidence indicated that occupational exposure to lead entailed 
health risks which included harm to an unborn foetus.1797 Johnson Controls argued its 
foetal protection policy fell within the safety exception of the bona fide occupational 
qualification defence (“BFOQ”) and professed moral and ethical concerns about the 
welfare of the unborn foetuses of pregnant women working in the battery 
                                               
1791Pesonen “Genetic Screening: An Employer’s Tool to Differentiate or to Discriminate?” (2001) 19 
Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy 187 204. 
1792499 U.S. 187 (1991). 
1793198. 
1794199. 
1795See also Dothard v Rawlinson 433 U.S. 321 (1977) where the Supreme Court permitted an 
employer to hire only males prisoners in contact areas of maximum security male prisons but the 
Court only permitted this because more than the individual’s woman’s decision to weigh and accept 
the risk of employment was at stake. The Court in Dothard v Rawlinson 433 U.S. 321 (1977) 366 
concluded sex was a bona fide occupational qualification because the employment of a female guard 
would due to the guard’s sex create a real threat to the safety to others if violence broke out. 
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manufacturing business. The Court noted that on the basis of the language and 
legislative history, the BFOQ defence has to be read narrowly.1798 More specifically, 
discrimination on the basis of sex because of safety concerns is limited to 
circumstances in which sex or pregnancy actually interferes with an employee’s 
ability to perform the job.1799 The Court found that the language of the BFOQ 
legislative history and case law prohibit an employer from discriminating against a 
woman because of her capacity to become pregnant unless her reproductive potential 
prevents her from performing the duties of her job. The Court reiterated that “…an 
employer must direct its concerns about a woman’s ability to perform a job safely and 
efficiently to those aspects of the woman’s job-related activities that fall within the 
“essence” of the particular business.” The Court concluded that Johnson Controls had 
failed to establish a BFOQ, given that fertile women were able to perform their duties 
as efficiently as anyone else. The Court further concluded that Johnson Controls’ 
professed moral and ethical concerns about the welfare of unborn foetuses of their 
fertile female employees do not establish a BFOQ of female sterility. In this regard, 
the court observed that “decisions of the welfare of future children should be left to 
the parents who conceive, bear, support and raise them rather than to the employers 
who hire those parents”.1800 
8.6.4 Analysis 
The United States currently has no comprehensive law protecting the privacy of 
medical information or genetic information. An employee whose rights have been 
violated by genetic testing in the workplace has recourse to various pieces of 
legislation: the Americans with Disabilities; the Fourth Amendment’s constitutional 
prohibition on illegal searches and seizures; Title VII and state legislation.1801 It 
remains to be seen what the effect of GINA will be, especially with respect to 
protecting employees against genetic discrimination. The United States should be 
commended in enacting legislation that explicitly bans genetic discrimination. The 
United States should also be commended for having addressed the issue of genetic 
discrimination and laying down guiding principles even prior to GINA, notably in the 
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decisions of EEOC v Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway and Norman-Bloodsaw v 
Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory,1802. It appears from these decisions that unless an 
employee has consented to the testing it will be considered a search in term of the 
United States Constitution. It further appears that such testing must be job related and 
aimed at ensuring the safety of employees in the workplace. As to whether such 
testing violates the right to privacy, United States courts are likely to determine that it 
does, but it may be justified provided the testing is administered in furtherance of a 
compelling governmental interest, particularly where the testing involves public 
sector employees employed in safety sensitive positions.  
8.7 CONCLUSION 
This chapter focussed on genetic testing, which perhaps is the most recent example of 
the way in which scientific advancement may challenge privacy. The analysis on 
genetic testing revealed that genetic information was medical information. The debate 
further revealed the existence of a debate concerning whether or not genetic 
information is different from other forms of medical and personal information, which 
debate is known as the genetical exceptionalism debate. Proponents of “genetic 
exceptionalism” argue that genetic information is inherently exceptional and unique in 
comparison to other personal or medical information because it concerns very private 
information about an individuals’ future health, an individuals’ family’s future health 
and relating to certain personal decisions (such as whether or not to have a child). 
Proponents of “genetic exceptionalism” further contend that this type of medical 
information is more private than other forms of medical information because “it is in 
essence “a reverse diary” which is not only privacy but also in code and probabilistic. 
On the contrary, critics of “genetic exceptionalism” argue there is nothing unique or 
exceptional about genetic information in comparison to other forms of personal and 
medical information for a number of reasons. One of the reasons put forward by 
critics of “genetic exceptionalism” is that the majority of genetic information, 
contrary to popular belief, does not predict future diseases. 
The arguments advanced by employers to justify the genetic testing are primarily 
aimed at safeguarding the health and safety of employees in the workplace. 
Employers argue that genetic testing allows them to not only identify existing hazards 
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in the workplace and the effects of such hazards on employees, but also enables them 
to take appropriate action in reducing or eliminating such hazards. The arguments 
advanced by employers to justify genetic testing are also based on economics and in 
this regard employers argue that genetic testing determines the future employability of 
individuals prevents increased health care costs and ensures public safety. On the 
other hand, arguments against the genetic testing in the workplace are aimed at 
preserving the employee's informational privacy and integrity. More importantly, the 
arguments are aimed at preventing the exclusion of individuals from employment and 
the discrimination of individuals irrespective of whether a particular gene has 
manifested itself and affected the ability of the concerned individuals to perform his 
or her duties. The discussion on the South African experience showed OSHA 
obligated selected employers to carry out biological monitoring or surveillance in the 
workplace. That having been said, the South African survey observed there is no 
legislation directly regulating the use of genetic testing in South Africa however the 
Constitution and the EEA may have implications for the use of genetic testing in 
employment as well as the recently enacted the Protection of Personal Information 
Bill of 2009 (“POPI”). POPI will also have direct implications for genetic testing in 
employment because the Bill specifically includes and makes mention of biometric 
information in it’s’ definition of “personal information”. The South African 
experience in addition showed South African courts had yet to deal with genetic 
testing in the employment context but noted that it was only a matter of time before 
they did so bearing in mind both the rate at which technology is developing and the 
increasing affordability of medical testing. Perhaps the enactment of POPI is 
indicative of the fact that the time for South courts to consider the issue of genetic 
testing in the employment context is near. The United Kingdom experience showed 
genetic testing is rarely used in the employment context (except in the context that it 
is required by Health and Safety at Work Act) because it is still largely 
underdeveloped and its predictive value remains a bone of serious contention. That 
having been said, the DPA’s Employment Practices Code discourages employers from 
using genetic testing as a means of obtaining information concerning the future 
employability of an individual and recommends the use of genetic testing for health 
and safety concerns only it because of its’ intrusive nature and uncertainty 
surrounding its’ predictive value. The South African and United Kingdom experiences 
impress that even in those jurisdictions where genetic testing is rarely used in the 
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workplace law makers are not blind to the rate at which technology is developing and 
the increasing affordability of medical testing and realise that it is only a matter of 
time that a larger number of employers (other than those compelled by legislation to 
carry out genetic testing) carry out genetic testing and this perhaps why they provide 
for that eventuality in their existing informational privacy legislation. The United 
States discussion showed that genetic testing is regulated by various pieces of 
legislation including GINA, the genetic non - discrimination legislation which 
provides protection against the misuse of genetic information and against 
discrimination on the basis of genetic information by restricting the collection and use 
of such information even in the workplace. However these pieces of legislation only 
effectively address the discriminatory implications of genetic testing as opposed to the 
informational privacy implications of such testing and perhaps what the United States 
needs is legislation similar to that of the DPA and POPI.  
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CHAPTER 9: 
CONCLUSION 
This dissertation set out to examine the extent to which privacy is protected in the 
South African workplace in light of advancements in technology and what the 
implications (if any) are for the right to privacy as such. In the first substantive 
chapter (Chapter 2), the issue of the protection of privacy is placed in its historical 
context. To this end, chapter 2 of the dissertation broadly traced the development of 
the legal protection of privacy. Four specific stages were identified and subjected to 
critical analysis. The stages are (i) the early conceptions stage; (ii) the gradual and 
specific protection stage; (iii) the international recognition stage; and(iv) the domestic 
and constitutional protection stage.  
The discussion of the “early conceptions of privacy stage” revealed that early 
conceptions of privacy existed, but that these conceptions were often obscured by the 
communal and paternalistic traditions prevailing in these societies. For instance, 
aspects of human life which contemporary society considers private (such as marriage 
and sexual relations) were not treated as private concerns but rather as public 
concerns.1803  What is more, factors such as the character and structure of the societies 
(particularly with respect to Greek, Roman and Hebrew societies) and the absence of 
words or concepts equivalent to the contemporary meaning of “private” and “public” 
excluded the development of the legal protection of privacy.1804 This stage further 
brought to light the fact that conceptions of privacy formulated during the 
Renaissance period have found their way into contemporary notions of privacy – for 
example the notion that  “a man’s home is his castle”.1805 In the “gradual and specific 
protection stage”, privacy was protected on an ad hoc basis using existing laws.1806 
This period saw the emergence of a growing awareness that privacy had to be more 
than just a principle or value, but instead should be a protected right. The 
“international recognition stage” ushered in a series of international and regional legal 
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instruments which recognised and advocated for the respect and protection of a 
fundamental right to privacy.1807 The final stage – the “explicit domestic and 
constitutional protection stage” - is characterised by the protection of privacy in 
various national laws and constitutions. 
Chapter 3 of the dissertation concentrated on the development of the legal protection 
of privacy in selected countries, namely South Africa, the United Kingdom and the 
United States. These countries were selected for the simple reason that they protect 
the privacy of their citizens in distinct and varying ways. This diversity in the manner 
of protection is illustrative of the elusive nature of privacy and further illustrative of 
the fact that there is neither agreement on exactly what privacy entails nor agreement 
on the extent to which and the manner in which privacy should be protected. The right 
to privacy in South Africa, although still in its infancy, enjoys rich and generous 
protection under both the common law and the constitution. In addition, South Africa 
has also taken great strides towards enacting specific privacy legislation in the form of 
the Protection of Personal Information Bill of 2009 (“POPI”). One of the primary 
purposes of POPI is to give effect to the constitutional right to privacy by 
safeguarding personal information.1808 POPI came into existence as a result of 
recommendations made by the South African Law Reform Commission 
(“SALRC”).1809 POPI will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter.  
Chapter 3 also illustrated with reference to the United Kingdom (more specifically 
England) that despite the fact that it has no constitution and does not recognise that 
there is a right to privacy – nevertheless protects privacy through other common law 
principles and an international human rights instrument. Various commissions set up 
for the purpose of determining whether a common law right to privacy should be 
recognised in English law concluded that there was no need for an express recognition 
of the right to privacy in English law because existing legal doctrines or principles are 
quite capable of achieving the very same aim that a right to privacy set out to do, 
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namely the doctrine of breach of confidence.1810 One of the reasons advanced for the 
non- existence of a common law right to privacy is the fear that changes in existing 
law would result in legal uncertainty.1811The debate as to whether or not English law 
should recognise a common law right to privacy continues to this day. In this regard, 
several commentators have suggested that breach of confidence cannot effectively 
protect privacy interests. They argue that although the two actions appear similar, they 
are in actual fact two different actions which must be allowed to grow distinctly 
without jeopardising one another. As such, English courts or parliament should look 
into the creation of an independent right of privacy tort.1812 It is submitted that the 
creation of an independent right to privacy is the only manner in which to ensure that 
individual privacy interests are protected. The right to privacy cannot be effectively 
protected through another right or action and can only be protected in its’ true nature 
and form. Note however that certain commentators take the view that where privacy is 
protected through another right or action it is likely to disappear within that right or 
action or become a hybrid of that right or action and eventually cease to exist in its’ 
truest or purest form. However, this view is not entirely correct because the United 
States experience has shown that even in the absence of a specific constitutional right 
to privacy zones of privacy may be through other constitutional rights. 
As already mentioned above despite the absence of a right to privacy in the United 
States constitution, the United States has found a way to protect zones of privacy 
through other rights in its’ Constitution. In addition, common law protection exists for 
privacy infringements. It is submitted that the United States should be commended for 
not only recognising but also protecting the right to privacy despite the absence of the 
right in its Constitution and for not allowing the absence of the right in its constitution 
to be an impediment towards the protection the right. The United Kingdom can 
certainly draw certain lessons from the development of privacy protection in the 
United States. It is ironic that certain English jurists continue to deny despite the 
existence of a right to privacy in English despite the line of English decisions (such as 
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Entick v Carrington1813), dating back hundred of years, that recognise a right to 
privacy. In fact, these decisions were relied upon by the American jurists Warren and 
Brandeis to advocate for the recognition of a common law right to privacy in the 
United States.1814 Perhaps the most important insight to be gathered from the 
discussion in chapter 3, especially from the experience in South Africa (under the new 
constitutional dispensation) and the United States, is that, for purposes of legal 
protection, privacy cannot be accurately defined, and that privacy is a context –
dependent right, which, upon closer inspection, renders the phrase ‘right to privacy’ a 
misnomer. Rather, the existence of the right is made subject to the subjectively held 
but objectively reasonable expectation of privacy. This seems to imply that the 
existence of the right (and its infringement) ultimately becomes dependant on a 
balancing of interests.  
In Chapter 4, three noteworthy realities about the concept of the privacy were 
revealed. The first of these realities is the existence of two schools of thought with 
respect to the value or usefulness of privacy.1815 On the one hand, proponents of 
privacy proclaim privacy as a useful value that is distinct and coherent.1816 On the 
other hand, the ‘reductionists’ assert that privacy is incoherent and contend that there 
is nothing morally distinctive about privacy claims, because privacy can be protected 
through other interests, or reduced to some underlying right or interest such as 
freedom from mental stress, or property.1817 Despite the divergent view on the 
usefulness of privacy, the majority of commentators agree that privacy is a value at 
the core of human existence and well-being but they also lament the fact that privacy 
is difficult to define. The difficulty to define privacy, some assert, has played a role in 
undermining its value and usefulness and has further impeded its effective legal 
protection.1818 This leads to the second of the three realities, namely that privacy is 
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virtually impossible to define1819.1820 The concept has a number of meanings and as 
such cannot be reduced to a single definition or meaning. What is considered private 
and what not differs from society to society. For this reason it is a concept that is 
neither eternal nor universal but rather relative and contextual. The third and final 
reality revealed in Chapter 4 is that there is general disagreement as to what makes 
privacy distinct and coherent. The value and distinction of privacy lie in the functions 
of privacy, the values that privacy promote and those aspects of human life that would 
be impossible or unlikely in the absence of privacy. Privacy serves a number of 
functions. For example, it creates and maintains social and personal relations and also 
limits access to an individual.1821 Moreover, privacy promotes and is grounded on 
values such as happiness, justice and liberty. In the absence of privacy, ideals like 
personal relations and morally autonomous persons would cease to exist.1822 It is 
submitted that the reality that privacy is virtually impossible to define should guide 
its’ effective legal protection rather than prevent its’ effective protection. In protecting 
the right, the focus should be on how best to protect the right in each context in which 
it manifests itself because privacy has multiple meanings.  
Despite this reality, a number of legal and philosophical commentators have 
attempted to define privacy. This has resulted in the postulation ofsix dominant 
approaches or conceptions of privacy, namely the right to be let alone, limited access 
to the self, secrecy, control over information, personhood and intimacy. In Chapter 4, 
these approaches or conceptions of privacy are discussed as well as the value of 
privacy in relation to each conception and the shortcomings of each conception. It is 
submitted that the “pragmatic approach” is the more realistic and workable approach 
to privacy because the approach embraces the dynamic and evolving nature of 
privacy.1823 Chapter 4 further concluded that privacy is a concept that cannot be placed 
in a mould to be used in the same manner over and over again, which is why the 
pragmatic approach is preferable. The approach accepts privacy as an aspect of 
customs, norms and traditions that may change from time to time and activities that 
                                               
1819
 Posner “Privacy, Secrecy and Reputation” (1979) 28 Buffalo Law Review 1 3 and Michael Privacy 
and Human Rights (1994) 1 
1820Supra. 
1821
 Gavison “Privacy and the Limits of Law” (1980) 89 Yale Law Journal  421 442- 443. 
1822
 Benn Privacy, Freedom and Respect for Persons in Pennock and Chapman (eds) Privacy: Nomos 
XIII (1984) 24. 
1823Solove “Conceptualizing Privacy” (2002) 90 California Law Review 1087 1095. 
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we want to protect from disruptions and interferences.1824 Of all the dominant 
approaches or conceptions of privacy postulated, the right to be let alone is perhaps 
the most commonly articulated one and constitutes one of the earliest conceptions of 
privacy.1825 The conception locates the value of privacy in its ability to provide the 
individual with physical space away from others. One of the criticisms levelled at this 
conception is that it is merely descriptive of an attribute of privacy.1826 The conception 
has also been criticised for being antiquated, “archaic”1827 and a conception that was 
appropriate during a time in human history when individuals generally lacked 
physical space, which is no longer the case because the “opportunities for physical 
privacy are so much greater” and “abundant”.1828 As fundamental as the conception 
may be, it has a number of other shortcomings: first, it does not indicate how privacy 
should be valued; secondly, it obscures the fact that not every violation is a violation 
of privacy; thirdly, it overlooks the fact that not being let alone does not always result 
in a loss of privacy; and finally, it is out-dated in its sense of privacy as seclusion or 
solitude.1829 
The other approaches to or conceptions of privacy postulated in legal and 
philosophical literature, namely secrecy, control over information, personhood and 
intimacy also have shortcomings simply because they locate the value of privacy in a 
single context and fail to embrace the evolving and dynamic nature of privacy. It is 
worth repeating at this juncture that ultimately, the pragmatic approach is perhaps the 
more realistic and workable approach to privacy because the approach embraces the 
dynamic and evolving nature of privacy. In terms of this approach, privacy is seen as 
a dynamic and evolving concept, it occurs in varied contexts, can be compromised in 
diverse circumstances and its underlying interests may evolve.1830 Put differently, 
privacy is an aspect of customs, norms and traditions that may change from time to 
time and activities that we want to protect from disruptions and interferences. The 
different conceptions have all featured at different times, to different degrees and in 
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 Solove “Conceptualizing Privacy” (2002)  90California Law Review1087 1093. 
1825
 Godkin “The Rights of the Citizen: IV. To His Own Reputation” (1890)  Scribner’s Magazine  66. 
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 Solove “Conceptualizing Privacy” (2002)  90 California Law Review1087 1102. 
1827Posner “Privacy, Secrecy and Reputation” (1979) 28 Buffalo Law Review 1 4. 
1828Supra. 
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different contexts in case law across the jurisdictions under review. Chapter 4 finally 
discussed the conceptions of privacy in each of the selected countries. It was found 
that each of the jurisdictions protected different conceptions of privacy. For example, 
the South African common law protects privacy as an independent personality right. 
Further, a person’s privacy is breached when there has been an unlawful intrusion on 
their personal privacy or an unlawful disclosure of private facts concerning such a 
person. The right protects the privacy of an individual’s person or home, their 
property, possessions and communications.1831In addition the South African 
Constitutional Court has chosen to view privacy as expressed in the South African 
Constitution as protecting, amongst other elements, personhood1832 and intimacy1833.  
The goal of chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8 was to consider the issue that constitutes the heart 
of this research, namely, the extent to which privacy is protected in the workplace 
given advancements in technology and the implications (if any) for the right to 
privacy as such. To this end, the aim of chapter 5 was to briefly consider what is 
meant by the phrase “privacy in the workplace”, and to examine the arguments for 
and against the need for privacy protection in the workplace. A further aim of the 
chapter was to consider a number of policies and practices in the workplace that 
typically threaten or pressurise the protection of privacy in the workplace, as well as 
the implication of these policies and practices for privacy. Chapter 5 begun with the 
basic premise that the need for privacy is not created by people, but instead inheres in 
all.  
The chapter went on to examine the arguments for and against the protection of 
privacy in the workplace. Arguments in favour of the protection of privacy were 
found to emphasise the value of privacy as well as its constituent elements and 
suggested that privacy protection is essential because it preserves and maintains the 
autonomy, dignity and well-being of employees in an environment where the 
employer in general yields more influence and authority than the employee. The 
arguments in favour of privacy protection further stated that privacy is inherent in the 
notions of good faith, loyalty, respect and trust which underpin the employment 
relationship. These notions breed diversity and nurture the development of fresh and 
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1832National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice 1999 (1) SA 6. 
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different ideas, beliefs and attitudes, which are crucial for innovation and creativity in 
individuals.1834The chapter also identified the policies and practices in the workplace 
that typically threaten privacy in the workplace and further examined the extent to 
which they in fact impact on privacy. Perhaps the most important observation made in 
chapter 5 is that all the policies and practices identified are enabled by and emanate 
from advancements in science and technology. It is for this reason that the biggest 
continuous threat to privacy in the workplace remains developments in science and 
technology. Chapter 5 concluded that these technological and scientific developments 
demand no more than a continuous balancing of the interests of the employer and the 
employee in the different contexts created by new policies and practices made 
possible by technology.  
Chapter 6 paid specific attention to how different jurisdictions have responded to what 
may be termed this ‘contextual challenge’ to the accommodation of privacy in the 
workplace. It did this by briefly discussing the use of the policies and practices 
identified in the previous chapter in the selected countries. The discussion examined 
legislation and case law indicative of the use and treatment of a relevant practice or 
policy in the workplace. It is important to bear in mind that the policies and practices 
identified in this chapter are by no means the only policies and practices utilised by 
employers that impact on privacy because modern technology has enabled and 
continues to enable sophisticated forms of testing or monitoring of employees. The 
discussion on background checks in the chapter made the general observation that the 
selected countries have no legislation directly regulating the carrying out of 
background checks by employers and further illustrated how, notwithstanding the 
absence of legislation directly regulating background checks in employment, there 
were various pieces of legislation such as the constitution (where applicable) that 
could be used to protect the employee's rights in relation to the carrying out of such 
checks. The evaluation on psychological and psychometric testing showed that South 
Africa had legislation explicitly prohibiting the use of psychometric testing unless the 
tests were shown to be: scientifically valid and reliable; to apply fairly to all 
employees and not biased against any employee of group and employers in using the 
tests have to ensure that the tests are valid and do not discriminate against any 
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group.1835 It moreover emerged that South Africa has yet to aggressively wrestle with 
the issue of the use of the tests and their discriminatory impact.  
The discussion on polygraph tests showed the use of polygraph tests is not without 
controversy because the scientific validity and reliability of the tests are questionable. 
The discussion further showed that despite the controversy surrounding the scientific 
validity and reliability of the tests, the tests continue to be used in the South African 
workplaces.1836 The drug and alcohol testing evaluation revealed that employers in the 
selected countries carry out drug and alcohol testing on employees, especially those 
employees in safety sensitive positions, and that legislation not only regulated the use 
of such testing in the selected countries but also in certain instances compelled 
employers to carry out such testing on employees - especially on those employees in 
safety sensitive positions.1837 The discussion on HIV/AIDS testing revealed that in 
general,  individuals in the selected countries who are HIV positive are protected from 
discrimination in the workplace. The overview provided in this chapter was further 
illustrative of the fact that technology underlying the policies and practices implicate 
employee privacy interests which have to be balanced against competing employer 
interests and the law is perhaps lagging behind, at least to the extent that it endeavours 
to use existing legal principles to combat these developments. Moreover, what all the 
identified policies and practices have in common is that all of them are based on 
recent and continued technological advances. As such, it seems clear that the biggest 
continuous threat to privacy in the workplace remains developments in science and 
technology. It may also be said that it does not appear as if the challenge lies in a 
changed conception of privacy and the values it seeks to protect. Rather, it would 
seem that technological developments demand no more than a continuous balancing 
of the interests of employer and employee in the different contexts created by new 
policies and practices made possible by technology. In sum, chapter 6 sought to 
provide an overview, on a comparative basis, of a number of policies and practices 
which typically threaten or put pressure on privacy in the employment sphere and to 
evaluate to what extent privacy was protected. The main conclusion drawn is that 
                                               
1835Section 8 of Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998. 
1836Christianson “Polygraph Testing in South Africa Workplaces: Shield and Sword in the Dishonesty 
Detection versus Compromising Privacy Debate” (2000) 21 Industrial Law Journal 17 36. See also 
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privacy protection, for the most part, remains primarily to be dealt with through a 
combination of broad constitutional principle (where available) and a perhaps 
inordinate and curious reliance on discrimination law. 
Chapter 7 of the dissertation provided an in depth view of one the policies and 
practices identified in chapter 5, namely e-mail and internet monitoring. The chapter 
departed from the notion the employee monitoring has always been carried out by 
employers and is not necessarily a new trend. However, what modern technology has 
simply done is to enable employers to monitor their employees more effectively and 
more extensively due to widespread use of technologically-enabled tools like e-mail 
and Internet.1838 Chapter 7 considered the arguments for and against the monitoring of 
employees in the workplace, which arguments the chapter reasoned were 
representative of the two competing interests that would ultimately have to be 
balanced to determine whether the monitoring is justifiable. In this regard, the chapter 
revealed that  the main arguments advanced by employers to justify the monitoring of 
employee e-mail and Internet usage are primarily aimed at protecting and preserving 
the employer's proprietal interest in its’ e-mail and Internet facilities1839 and in 
ensuring that the workplace is efficient and productive1840, whereas the chief 
arguments advanced by employees against the monitoring and of e-mail and Internet 
usage in the workplace are aimed at preserving the employee’s informational privacy. 
The chapter concluded that a balancing act was necessary to weigh these competing 
rights or interests to determine whether the monitoring of employee e-mail and 
Internet usage by the employer is justified. The chapter also pointed out that although 
the balancing of the competing interests is well-suited to determining whether an 
employee has an expectation to privacy in the workplace with respect to his or her use 
of the employer’s e-mail and facilities, this approach was perhaps not ideal in a 
relationship such as the employment relationship, in which the balance of power will 
more often than not be weighted in the employer's favour. This means that while in 
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 Kesan First Principle Examination of Electronic Privacy in the Workplace in Blanpain (ed.) On-
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Point of View in Blanpain On-line Rights for Employees in the Information Society: Use and 
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theory a careful balancing of interests should take place, this balancing act will almost 
invariably be determined in favour of the employer because the nature of privacy and 
the nature of the employment relationship, in which the balance of power will more 
often than not be in favour of the employer.  
The discussion of the position in the United Kingdom indicated United Kingdom 
employees have recourse to a number of pieces of legislation including the Data 
Protection Act1841 (“DPA”) which contain a number of data protection principles and 
which reflects a sound balance between the competing rights at play. In addition, the 
DPA is representative of an appropriate means of elucidating the concepts of 
information privacy rights into practicable and effective terms.The country-specific 
evaluation also showed that, despite the fact that South Africa is a country with a 
comprehensive and generous bill of rights, which includes the right to privacy and in 
particular the right to informational privacy, it appears that courts are generally loathe 
to allow this right to exist in the context of the workplace, especially in respect of e-
mail and Internet communications within the workplace. In fact, it seems that South 
African courts and tribunals are more likely to protect the employer’s interest in not 
having its e-mail and Internet facilities abused for non–business purposes, even in the 
absence of express workplace policies. It appears that South African tribunals have 
yet to fully consider the implications of The Regulation of Interception of 
Communications and Provision of Communication – Related Information Act1842 
(“RICPCIA”) on the interception and monitoring of employee communications in the 
workplace. Perhaps what South Africa needs and which at least emphasizes the 
principles of transparency and proportionality has recently presented itself in the form  
the  Protection of Personal Information Bill of 2009 (“POPI”). POPI aims to give 
practical effect to the constitutional right to privacy and further aims to create a 
balance between the right to privacy and other important rights such as the right of 
access of information.1843More importantly, the Bill introduces a number of 
mechanisms aimed at ensuring that personal information concerning an individual is 
safeguarded when processed by public and private bodies. POPI introduces eight 
conditions or principles (termed “Information Protection Principles”) to ensure the 
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lawful processing of personal information. The South African “Information Protection 
Principles”, very much like the data protection principles contained in the United 
Kingdoms’ Data Protection Act, place an emphasis on the pertinent principles of 
transparency and proportionality. Then again, the United States experience has shown 
that legislation regulating the interception and monitoring of employee 
communications in the workplace by the employer is by no means a guarantee that 
courts would recognize the rights of employees to a reasonable expectation of privacy. 
The United States experience illustrates that legislation may be of little or no benefit 
to employees in the workplace. United States courts have often held that employees 
have no expectation of privacy in the workplace arena because of the nature and 
character of the employment relationship, which tilts the balance of power will more 
often than not in favour of the employer.  
The second last chapter of this dissertation, namely Chapter 8, focussed on genetic 
testing, which is perhaps the most recent example of the way in which scientific 
advancement may challenge privacy. A number of insights were gathered from the 
discussion on genetic testing. The analysis on how and why genetic testing is 
potentially invasive of privacy revealed that the type of information that can be 
determined or gleaned from one's genetic constitution genetic testing, namely 
medical- and personal information, has profound implications for privacy. The 
analysis further revealed the existence of two schools of thought as to whether genetic 
information is different from other forms of medical and personal information. This 
debate has come to be  known as the genetical exceptionalism debate. On the one 
hand, proponents of “genetic exceptionalism” argue that genetic information is 
inherently exceptional and unique in comparison to other personal or medical 
information because it concerns  private information about an individuals’ future 
health, an individuals’ family’s future health and because it contains information that 
may influence certain personal decisions (such as whether or not to have a child).1844 
Proponents of “genetic exceptionalism” further contend that this type of medical 
information is more private than other forms of medical information because it is in 
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essence “a reverse diary” which is not only privacy but also in code and 
probabilistic.1845 
On the other hand, critics of “genetic exceptionalism” argue that, for a number of 
reasons, there is nothing unique or exceptional about genetic information in 
comparison to other forms of personal and medical information.1846 One of the reasons 
put forward by critics of “genetic exceptionalism” is that the majority of genetic 
information, contrary to popular perception, does not predict future diseases.1847The 
arguments advanced by employers to justify genetic testing are primarily aimed 
founded on health and safety concerns. Employers argue that genetic testing allows 
them to not only identify the hazards in the workplace and the effects of such hazards 
on employees, but also enables them to take appropriate action in reducing or 
eliminating such hazards.1848 The arguments advanced by employers to justify genetic 
testing are also partially economic. They argue that genetic testing determines the 
future employability of individuals prevents increased health care costs1849 and ensures 
public safety.1850On the other hand, arguments against the genetic testing in the 
workplace are aimed at preserving the employee's informational privacy and integrity. 
More importantly, the arguments are aimed at preventing the exclusion of individuals 
from employment and the discrimination of individuals irrespective of whether a 
particular gene has manifested itself and affected the ability of the concerned 
individuals to perform his or her duties.1851 The survey in the chapter on the South 
African experience showed how the Occupational Health and Safety Act1852 
(“OSHA”) obligated selected employers to carry out biological monitoring or 
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1846See for example Annas “Genetic Privacy: There Ought To Be Law” (1999) 4 Texas Review of Law 
& Politics 9 and Green and Thomas “DNA: Five Distinguishing Features for Policy Analysis” (1998) 
11 Harvard Journal of Law and Technology.  
1847
 Suter “The Allure and Peril of Genetics Exceptionalism: Do We Need Special Genetic Legislation” 
(2001) 79 Washington University Law Quarterly 669 710. 
1848European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies to the European Commission Genetic 
Testing in the Workplace 6 March 2000 6. 
1849
 Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, American Medical Association Use of Genetic Testing by 
Employers Journal of the American Medical Association in Barker (ed.) Genetics and 
Society(1995)82. 
1850
 Laurie Genetic Privacy: A Challenge to Medico-Legal Norms (2002) 152. 
1851Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, American Medical Association Use of Genetic Testing by 
Employers Journal of the American Medical Association in Barker (ed.) Genetics and Society (1995) 
81. 
1852Act 85 of 1993. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
398 
 
surveillance in the workplace. That having been said, the South African survey 
illustrated that there is no legislation directly regulating the use of genetic testing in 
South Africa. Nonetheless, the Constitution and the EEA may have implications for 
the use of genetic testing in employment. This also holds for the recently enacted 
POPI. POPI will have direct implications for genetic testing in employment because 
the Bill specifically includes and makes mention of biometric information in the 
definition of “personal information”.1853 The discussion of the South African 
experience further revealed that South African courts have yet to deal with genetic 
testing in the employment context. However, it is arguable that this it was only a 
matter of time bearing in mind both the rate at which technology is developing and the 
increasing affordability of medical testing. Perhaps the enactment of POPI is 
indicative of the fact that the time for South courts to consider the issue of genetic 
testing in the employment context is near. The United Kingdom experience pointed to 
the fact that genetic testing is possibly rarely used in the employment context (except 
in the context that it is required by Health and Safety at Work Act) because it is still 
largely underdeveloped and its predictive value remains a bone of contention. The 
Data Protection Act’s1854 Employment Practices Code (“Code”) discourages 
employers from using genetic testing as a means of obtaining information about the 
future employability of an individual and recommends the use of genetic testing 
solely for health and safety concerns because of its’ intrusive nature and uncertainty 
surrounding its’ predictive value.1855 The South African and United Kingdom 
experiences indicate that even in those jurisdictions where genetic testing is rarely 
used in the workplace, lawmakers cannot afford to turn a blind eye to the rate at which 
technology is developing and the increasing affordability of medical testing. It 
submitted that it is only a matter of time before a larger number of employers (other 
than those compelled by legislation to carry out genetic testing) begin to carry out 
genetic testing. The United States experience showed that genetic testing may be 
regulated by various pieces of legislation including Genetic Information 
Nondiscrimination Act1856 (“GINA”), the genetic non - discrimination legislation. 
GINA provides protection against the misuse of genetic information and against 
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discrimination on the basis of genetic information by restricting the collection and use 
of such information.The United States’ experience further revealed that these pieces 
of legislation only addressed the discriminatory implications of genetic testing as 
opposed to the informational privacy implications of such testing. Thus, as it stands, 
the United States currently has no comprehensive law protecting the privacy of 
medical information or genetic information. Perhaps what the United States needs is 
an information privacy act such as the United Kingdom’s DPA and South Africa’s 
POPI which can effectively address the information privacy implications of the use of 
genetic testing. 
To some extent, many of the issues discussed in this dissertation and many of the 
specific recommendations made have been either directly or indirectly incorporated 
into the recently enacted Protection of Personal Information Bill of 2009 (“POPI”). 
Given the fact that POPI was enacted after most of the substantive chapters of the 
dissertation had already been written, it receives scant attention in the dissertation. It 
is therefore of vital importance to discuss POPI in more detail in order to determine 
the extent to which it represents an step forward on the road towards the 
comprehensive protection of privacy in South Africa. 
POPI aims to give practical effect to the constitutional right to privacy by introducing 
mechanisms which ensure that personal information concerning an individual is 
safeguarded when processed by public and private bodies. The Bill moreover aims to 
create a balance between the right to privacy and other important rights such as the 
right of access of information.1857 Because one of the purposes of POPI is to give 
effect to the constitutional right to privacy by safeguarding personal information1858, 
POPI is in essence the first piece of legislation to expressly deal with the right to 
privacy in South Africa. More importantly, POPI applies to all public and private 
entities.1859 The definitions section of POPI defines a “responsible party” as a public 
or private body or person which determines the purpose for which and the manner in 
which personal information is processed.1860 A “public body” is described as any state, 
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administration, functionary or institution of government or exercising or performing a 
public power, function or duty. A “private body” is defined as a natural person or 
partnership carrying on or which has carried on a trade, business, trade or profession 
or a juristic person. The term “processing” is given wide meaning to include the more 
technologically advanced forms of processing of information such as e-mail 
monitoring. “Processing” means any automated or non-automated operation or 
activity concerning personal information including amongst others dissemination by 
means of transmission, distribution, or making available in any other form or merging, 
linking, as a well as blocking, degradation, erasure, and destruction of information.1861 
Section 3 of POPI provides that the Bill applies to the processing of personal 
information entered into by or for a public and/or private entity. The use of the words 
“by or for” a public or private entity suggests that the Bill applies to the direct 
processing of personal information and the indirect processing of personal 
information on behalf of by such public or private entities by a third party. The Bill 
refers to persons in respect of whom the personal information pertains to as “data 
subjects”. The broad application of POPI to both public and private entities means 
that the Bill covers both private and public sector employers in so far as they process 
personal information of their employees. The term “personal information”, is defined 
as information relating to an identifiable individual or juristic person, including but 
not limited to inter alia information relating to an individuals’ sexual orientation, 
well-being, culture, birth of a person and more importantly information related to the 
education, medical, financial, criminal or employment history of a person. Also 
included in the definition of “personal information” is information relating to the 
blood type or any other biometric information of a person. This in effect means that 
employers carrying out certain of the policies and practices discussed and identified in 
this dissertation as being potentially privacy invasive (particularly background checks, 
psychometric testing and genetic testing) will have to observe the obligations placed 
on them as processors of personal information and further ensure that data subjects are 
in a position to exercise the rights granted to them in the Bill. 
POPI introduces 8 conditions or principles termed “Information Protection Principles” 
for the lawful processing of personal information. These principles, very much like 
the principles in the United Kingdoms’ DPA, not only place a number of duties and 
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obligations on responsible parties but also provide data subjects some measure of 
control over their personal information by according them rights in relation to the 
processing of personal information relating to them by responsible parties.  
Chapter 3 of POPI (which deals with the conditions of lawful processing of personal 
information) houses these 8 core information protection principles, namely, 
accountability, processing limitation, purpose specification, further processing 
limitation, information quality, openness, security safeguards and data subject 
participation. These principles prescribe the minimum requirements for the processing 
of lawful information.1862 The SALRC indicated in this regard that it was 
commonplace for most information privacy legislation to house a set of principles 
which were considered or regarded as an appropriate means of elucidating the 
concepts of information privacy rights into practicable and effective terms.1863 
The “accountability principle” holds a responsible party accountable for complying 
with complying with the measures and principles enunciated in the Bill.1864 
In terms of the “processing limitation” principle, a responsible party may only process 
personal information lawfully and in a manner that does not unreasonably infringe or 
intrude the privacy of a data subject.1865 What is more, a responsible party may only 
process personal information for a warranted, adequate and relevant purpose.1866 The 
processing principle further provides that a data subject has to giver or her consent to 
the processing. A data subject also has the right to object to the processing, at which 
point the responsible party may no longer process a data subject’s personal 
information.1867 
The “purpose specification” principle permits the processing of personal information 
by a responsible party only where the information is collected for a specific, explicitly 
defined and lawful purpose, which purpose has to be related to a function or activity 
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of the responsible party.1868 In terms of this principle, a responsible party is required to 
ensure that the data subject is fully aware of the purpose for which his or her 
information is processed1869 and a responsible party is prohibited from keeping records 
pertaining to personal information which has been processed for any longer than is 
necessary for meeting the purpose for which it was processed.1870 
The “further processing limitation” principle prevents a responsible party from 
processing further personal information unless the purpose for which such further 
personal information is processed is compatible with the purpose for which it was 
initially processed.1871 The principle builds in a number of factors that a responsible 
party must take into account in determining whether the further processing is 
compatible with the purpose for the processing such as the nature of the information 
concerned, the manner in which the information is processed and the consequences of 
the intended further processing contemplated by the responsible party. The further 
processing principle stipulates that the further processing of personal information is 
compatible with the purpose for the processing where, for instance, the data subject 
has given its’ consented to such further processing and the further processing is 
necessary to prevent or mitigate a serious imminent threat to the public health or 
safety or the life or health of the data subject.1872 
The “information quality” principle requires a responsible party to take reasonable 
steps to ensure that the personal information it processes is not inaccurate, obsolete, 
incomplete and misleading.1873 
The “openness” principle provides that personal information may only be processed 
by a responsible party which has notified the Information Protection Regulator 
(“IPR”)1874 in terms of chapter 6 of the Bill of its’ intended processing of personal 
information. Perhaps the most important aspect of this principle is the obligation it 
places on a responsible party to take practicable steps to ensure that the data subject is 
                                               
1868Section 12 of  POPI. 
1869Section 13 of  POPI. 
1870Section 14 of  POPI. 
1871Section 15 of  POPI. 
1872Section 15(3) of  POPI. 
1873Section 16 of  POPI. 
1874The IPR a body to be established in terms of the Bill (see below for a more detailed discussion of 
the role and functions of the IPR). 
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aware of, amongst things, that the personal information is being collected; the purpose 
for which the information is collected; whether or not the supply of the personal 
information by the data subject is voluntary or mandatory; and the consequences of a 
failure to provide such personal information.1875 
The “security safeguards” principle requires the responsible party and anyone 
processing the personal information on behalf of the responsible party to safeguard 
the integrity of the personal information by taking the necessary and appropriate 
technical and organisational measures to safeguard the personal information against 
loss or damage or destruction or unlawful access.1876 
The “data participation” principle accords a data subject the right to request a 
responsible party to provide confirmation, at no cost to the data subject, relating to 
whether not it holds personal information concerning the data subject and to further 
request from a responsible party a description of the personal information that the 
responsible party holds concerning the data subject.1877 Once a data subject has been 
provided with this confirmation and is privy to the personal information held by the 
responsible party, a data subject has the additional right to demand that the 
responsible correct the information in the event that it is inaccurate, incomplete or 
out-dated, irrelevant, excessive or unlawfully obtained.1878 
Provision for the exemptions is made in Chapter 4 of the Bill. Section 33 of the Bill 
stipulates that the processing of information will not be in breach of the information 
protection if authorised by the IPR and the IPR may authorise such processing if, for 
example, the public interest in the processing of the information outweighs any 
interference with the privacy interests of the data subject.1879 
The Bill contains a general prohibition on the processing of special or sensitive 
personal information. Special personal information in terms of the Bill is described as 
personal information which reveals amongst others certain characteristics of data 
subject such as their race, ethnicity, health, sexual life, political or religious beliefs 
                                               
1875Section 17 of  POPI. 
1876Section 18 of  POPI. 
1877Section 22 of  POPI. 
1878Section 23 of  POPI. 
1879Section 34 of  POPI. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
404 
 
and criminal behaviour.1880 Exceptions to the processing of special personal 
information are provided for and these exemptions are possible where for instance the 
information is required for an essential and legitimate public purpose.1881 
The Bill establishes an independent and impartial statutory authority known as the 
Information Protection Regular (“IPR”).1882 POPI charges the IPR with the task of 
monitoring and enforcing compliance with POPI by public and private bodies.1883 
In addition, POPI requires public and private bodies to appoint an Information 
Protection Officer with a number of duties and responsibilities which are mainly 
aimed at ensuring compliance within such bodies with the information protection 
principles and also cooperation with the IPR in so far as it is required to conduct 
investigations into the processing of personal information by the bodies in terms of 
chapter 6 of the Bill.1884 
Chapter 6 is concerned with two information protection principles, namely, the 
principle of purpose specification and openness. The first part of Chapter 6 obliges 
responsible parties to provide the IPR with notification prior to commencing the 
processing of personal information1885 containing particulars such as the purpose of 
the contemplated processing and a description of the categories of the data subjects. 
The IPR is required to keep a register of information processing in which it records all 
notifications received in this regard.1886 
The second part of Chapter 6 requires the IPR to conduct investigations prior to the 
commencement of any processing by a responsible party in order to establish whether 
the contemplated processing complies with the law, for instance, where the processing 
of the personal information concerned carries a particular risk for the legitimate 
                                               
1880Section 25 of  POPI. 
1881
 For instance section 27 of POPI allows the processing of special personal information concerning a 
data subject’s race, where that information is used only and is essential for purpose of identifying a 
data subject or is required by legislation which is aimed at advancing categories of persons 
disadvantaged by unfair discrimination. This would in fact allow employers to process information 
regarding the race of their employees for purposes of for example complying with employment equity 
requirements imposed by the EEA.  
1882Section 35 of  POPI. 
1883Section 35 of  POPI. 
1884Section48  of  POPI. 
1885Section 51 of  POPI. 
1886Section 53 of  POPI. 
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interests of the data subject.1887 Section 56 of the Bill prohibits a responsible party 
from processing any information whilst the IPR is conducting its’ investigation. 
POPI also makes provision for the IPR to issue codes of conduct incorporating the 
information protection principles and prescribing compliance with the principles.1888 
The IRP is empowered to issue codes of conduct however it has to do this in 
conjunction with affected stakeholders or their representative bodies.1889 The codes of 
conduct are developed so as to contribute towards the effective implementation of the 
information protection principles in the divergent sectors and industries.1890 
POPI has to be much-admired for recognising South Africa’s diversity and 
multiplicity. A respect for this recognition is illustrated in making provision for the 
various sectors and industries to develop their own codes of conduct which will be 
sector, activity, industry and profession specific and may even be information 
specific.1891Instead of simply providing for an umbrella code of conduct or practice 
which attempts to address how best data processors can ensure compliance with the 
information protection principles in a single code, POPI allows for the existence of 
tailored or customised codes of conduct which cater for the information protection 
needs of the various and diverse segments of society.1892 In taking this flexible and 
non-rigid approach to the protection of privacy, POPI is taking into account the 
context specific nature of privacy and the fact that it means different things, to 
different people in different circumstances. Codes of conduct must developed by the 
various sectors and industries.1893 These codes of conduct are required to provide for 
an expiry period and provide the IRP with the power to review the operation of the 
Code under certain circumstances.1894 In this regard, the various sectors and industries 
that wish to develop codes of conduct can do so under the guidance of the IRP. 
Provision is made for the IRP to issue written guidelines aimed at assisting the various 
sectors and industries to develop acceptable and appropriate codes of conduct and on 
                                               
1887Section 55 (1) and (2) of  POPI. 
1888Section 57(1) and (2) of  POPI. 
1889Section 58 of POPI. 
1890
 See The Memorandum on the Objects of the Protection of Personal Information Bill of 2009 
contained in page 47 of POPI. 
1891
 See section 57(3) of POPI. 
1892Section 57(1) and (2) of  POPI. 
1893
 Section 57 of  POPI. 
1894See section 57 (4) of POPI. 
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how to best address grievances within the codes.1895 A breach of a code of conduct 
issued in terms of the Bill is tantamount to a breach of an information protection 
principle.1896 
In terms of Chapter 10 of the Bill, a breach of an information principle or for breach 
of a provision of a code of conduct issued in terms of the Bill by a responsible party is 
regarded as an “interference with the protection of personal information” of a data 
subject.1897 The Bill allows anyone to lodge a complaint alleging an interference with 
the protection of personal information1898 and further prescribes the manner in which 
the complaints may be made.1899 The IPR has the power to investigate complaints 
lodged with it and is required to inform a responsible party of an imminent 
investigation and to allow the responsible party an opportunity to respond to the 
complaint and possibly assist the parties relating to the complaint to resolve the 
dispute prior to commencing the investigation.1900 The IRP also has the authority to 
refer such complaints to other suitable regulatory bodies.1901 The IRP is empowered to 
make an assessment of its’ own initiative or by request as to whether a processing 
practice complies with the provisions of the Bill.1902 
To summarise, the enactment of POPI is a necessary component in ensuring that 
informational privacy rights are effectively protected by those processing personal 
information. The legislation is a much needed addition in South African law because 
the protection and development of privacy is still in its formative years and the right 
has yet to find its true expression in our society. Moreover, the legislation accords the 
individual a measure of active control over whether or not his or her personal 
information should processed and how it will be handled should he or she consent to 
the processing of the information.1903 The South African Law Reform Commission 
warned that in so much as it is important to learn from the experiences of other 
                                               
1895Section 62 of POPI. 
1896Section 65 of POPI. 
1897Section 70 of  POPI. 
1898Section 71 of  POPI. 
1899Section 72 of  POPI. 
1900Section 78 of  POPI. 
1901Section 76(2) of POPI. 
1902Section 87 of POPI. 
1903South African Law Reform Commission Privacy and Data Protection Discussion Project 124 Paper 
109 October 2006 38. 
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countries, it is also important to not directly import foreign legislation into our law 
because each country has divergent factors (such as the historical background, public 
attitudes and population size) which have to be considered in drafting information 
privacy laws. These factors would ultimately shape the information privacy laws of 
any country.1904 
The Bill should also be commended for not being an attempt to directly translate the 
experiences of other countries into South African law. This comes through in its 
provision for multiple codes of practices (as opposed to a single code of practice) 
representing a privacy model that aims to directly empower and involve individuals in 
the protection of their informational privacy rights and in most cases individuals who 
were previously deprived the right to exercise some measure of control over the 
processing of their personal information in the past by public bodies. On the other 
hand, as much needed as POPI is for the protection of information privacy in South 
Africa, information privacy laws only protect an aspect of a person’s right to privacy. 
The constitutional right to privacy as expressed in the South African constitution 
protects other aspects of a person’s right to privacy and not only the right not to have 
the privacy of one’s communications or personal information infringed. As such, as 
important and much need as POPI is in realm of  South African privacy protection, 
there is also a need for other legislation placing an emphasis on the protection of other 
aspects of the constitutional right to privacy, particularly the substantive privacy right 
protecting the “personal autonomy” of the individual  in areas such as the workplace. 
As already alluded to in Chapter 3 of this dissertation, substantive privacy rights 
protect “personal autonomy” whereas informational privacy rights “prevent 
[disclosure] and access to information”.1905 As such it can be stated that POPI in actual 
fact aims to give effect to only one (albeit important) aspect of the constitutional right 
to privacy and not the constitutional right to privacy in its entirety. POPI focuses on 
the protection of informational privacy rights to the exclusion of substantive privacy 
rights. There will come a time when South African society requires that privacy be 
given specific protection as opposed to general protection by the introduction of 
privacy specific legislation.  
                                               
1904
 South African Law Reform Commission Privacy and Data Protection Discussion Project 124 
Paper 109 October 2006 372. 
1905
 Devenish Commentary on the South African Bill of Rights (1999) 147. See also Woolman et al 
Constitutional Law of South Africa 2nded  (2005) 38-19. 
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To conclude, the journey towards the legal protection of privacy has been a long and 
laboured one. That being said, the journey was one that could possibly not be avoided 
because privacy is an essential and necessary value, right or claim without which man 
would cease to flourish, create and function. It was only a matter of time before the 
legal protection of privacy reached the level of protection that it now enjoys the world 
over. The value and importance of privacy is emphasised by the fact that the even 
though it cannot be satisfactorily defined and corralled, it has been found to be worthy 
of constitutional protection in a number of countries, including South Africa. This 
dissertation sought to determine the extent of the legal protection of privacy in a 
specific context in society, namely the workplace. Hence, the issue at the heart of this 
dissertation was to determine to what extent privacy is protected in the South African 
workplace given advancements in technology and the implications (if any) for the 
right to privacy as such. The effective protection of privacy in is still in its infancy in 
South Africa. In fact, it may be said that the concept of privacy as described in the 
Constitution is still being developed and nurtured by legal commentators and courts. 
Advancements in technology have also played a significant contribution towards the 
legal protection of privacy after Warren and Brandeis first made the observation in 
1890 that the biggest continuous threat to privacy is developments in science and 
technology. That is to say, advancements in technology will invariably determine the 
extent to which privacy is protected because they remain the biggest threat to privacy 
in this day and age of significant scientific research and progress.  
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